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This dissertation concerns adding resource accountability to a simplex internetwork such as the Internet,
with only necessary but sufﬁcient constraint on freedom. That is, both freedom for applications to evolve
new innovative behaviours while still responding responsibly to congestion; and freedom for network
providers to structure their pricing in any way, including ﬂat pricing.
The big idea on which the research is built is a novel feedback arrangement termed ‘re-feedback’.
A general form is deﬁned, as well as a speciﬁc proposal (re-ECN) to alter the Internet protocol so that
self-contained datagrams carry a metric of expected downstream congestion.
Congestion is chosen because of its central economic role as the marginal cost of network usage.
The aim is to ensure Internet resource allocation can be controlled either by local policies or by market
selection (or indeed local lack of any control).
The current Internet architecture is designed to only reveal path congestion to end-points, not net-
works. The collective actions of self-interested consumers and providers should drive Internet resource
allocations towards maximisation of total social welfare. But without visibility of a cost-metric, net-
work operators are violating the architecture to improve their customer’s experience. The resulting ﬁght
against the architecture is destroying the Internet’s simplicity and ability to evolve.
Although accountability with freedom is the goal, the focus is the congestion metric, and whether
an incentive system is possible that assures its integrity as it is passed between parties around the system,
despite proposed attacks motivated by self-interest and malice.
This dissertation deﬁnes the protocol and canonical examples of accountability mechanisms. De-
signs are all derived from carefully motivated principles. The resulting system is evaluated by analysis
and simulation against the constraints and principles originally set. The mechanisms are proven to be
agnostic to speciﬁc transport behaviours, but they could not be made ﬂow-ID-oblivious.Acknowledgements
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Introduction
1.1 The Problem
This research concerns the introduction of a resource consumption metric for the datagram internetwork-
ing layer, intended to improve the current Internet architecture. The end-to-end design principle [SRC84]
advises that removing unnecessarily speciﬁc functions is as important as deciding which generic func-
tions to include—necessary but sufﬁcient. Chosen correctly, the internetwork layer should allow com-
munications systems to be built around it that can evolve to meet unforeseen requirements without undue
complexity.
This thinking has resulted in the characteristic rudimentary network layer of the Internet that solely
delivers datagrams to their destination address. It allows every end-point the freedom to communicate in
any way it wants with any other end-point, using any amount of the resource pool in between. But giving
all end-points such freedom allows them to conﬂict with the freedom of others, wherever the capacity of
particular resources is insufﬁcient for the total load focused on it.
The problem we address is to include sufﬁcient mechanism in the network layer to transmit a trust-
worthy resource consumption metric, but no more than the minimum necessary to allow higher layer
mechanisms to resolve resource conﬂicts with a wide range of resource sharing approaches.
A large part of the contribution of this research has been to identify the precise sub-problems that
need solving towards this end. Therefore the following problem description becomes a sequence of
continually reﬁned sub-problem statements. Perhaps more importantly, in the process it also identiﬁes
(non-)problems that were only on the generally accepted research agenda due to unsound reasoning—
they were actually huge distractions.
The current Internet architecture allows every data source the freedom to choose whatever sending
rate it requires, irrespective of the congestion it may cause. Most application authors choose to use the
Internet through the TCP library, which behaves very sociably by reducing its sending rate in response to
congestion [Jac88]. However, applications can choose not to reduce their rate in response to congestion,
some because they cannot function below a minimum rate (e.g. interactive streaming media) and others
through deliberate malice (e.g. ﬂooding attacks). If these applications compete with TCP sources their
careless, selﬁsh or malicious behaviour is rewarded further by the TCP sources, which try even harder to
alleviate congestion as long as competing sources continue their aggression.1.1. The Problem 15
However, even if every application used TCP, or was at least TCP-friendly [FHPW00] (i.e. us-
ing roughly the same average bit-rate as a TCP source under similar conditions), although congestion
collapse would be avoided, there would be no control over whether resource sharing conﬂicts were rec-
onciled. TCP certainly provides a safe dynamic (second order) response to congestion, but it is a fallacy
that the shares of resources (ﬁrst order) that TCP allocates are in some way special. That cannot be true
because it depends on how much data different users ask TCP to transfer, and how many instances of
TCP they use to do it [Bri07b]. A transport protocol alone cannot and should not be expected to share
resources fairly, in any sense of the word [Bri08d].
Further, it would be a mistake to solve the problem of resource conﬂicts by forcing every individual
application to respond to congestion in a certain way. Curtailing the freedom that an application has to
choose whatever sending rate it needs would limit the space for future innovation, stunting the growth of
new (and existing) applications such as networked games, ﬂurries of transactional messages or just faster
than normal ﬁle downloads. Ideally we need to allow freedom within some wider bounds that encourage
a generally sociable long-term and short-term sharing of resources, but with allowance for considerable
give and take [GK99b].
A more fruitful approach is to view the problem as a need for accountability. We want every
application to have the freedom to choose whatever rate is necessary with whatever dynamics. But,
where this can restrict the freedom of others, networks need to at least be able to hold users accountable
for the consequences of their actions. But, even if some networks don’t hold users accountable precisely
for the congestion they cause, but may-be for some poor approximation like volume, and even if some
networks don’t use accountability at all, then the whole system must still work for those who do care
about accountability.
Accountability for resource usage was on the original 1988 agenda of requirements for the Internet
protocols [Cla88], albeit last of seven in priority order. It was still an unmet requirement in the list
for a new Internet architecture (NewArch) in 2000 [BCSW00], though framed as a need for a capacity
allocation capability.
Only having solved the problem, do we now truly understand that the ability for networks to asso-
ciate trafﬁc with the sending user’s account is neither a necessary nor sufﬁcient form of accountability
for internetworking. Firstly, the problem is one of accountability for causing congestion, as trafﬁc itself
is not a problem to anyone unless it contributes to congestion.
This is because the minimal accountability necessary for datagram forwarding should concern cost
of usage. Certainly the Internet architecture should not help reveal other economic information such as
consumer value. Consumers try to keep their valuation private and providers try to capture it, so it would
be wrong to pre-judge the outcome of this tussle at such a low layer in the architecture. However, if the
architecture doesn’t reveal true usage costs, no mechanism can ensure that the cost to the consumer tends
downwards over time towards the cost of provision. Cost minimisation is a generally accepted goal of
all modern societies whatever mechanism is chosen, whether by encouraging competitive markets or by
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The marginal cost of usage of a network resource depends entirely on the extra congestion due to
the presence of the trafﬁc. So the architecture should reveal congestion.
From the early days of the Internet, end-points were responsible for detecting and controlling con-
gestion. Therefore, end-points place all the information they need for detecting congestion (sequence
numbers) in the end-to-end transport layer. But there is no way for all the end-points to co-ordinate
themselves sufﬁciently to hold each end-point accountable for the costs it causes to others, let alone for
them to enforce any desired preventative action. Only the operator of a forwarding device can be in the
natural position to do either.1 But networks cannot see this congestion information unless end-points
allow them to. It is hard for networks to measure this information reliably, because a gap in a sequence
might simply imply a few packets went over a different path. And anyway, if networks did use this
information against the interests of end-points, end-points could just encrypt it, or just not send it at all.
As well as which costs to consider, we have to consider who needs to associate the costs with whom.
The minimum sufﬁcient accountability requires a forwarding device to be able to associate the expected
marginal costs of trafﬁc with the entity directly causing the costs. Although the costs are originally
caused by the data sender, each forwarding device directly assists in causing the costs. We now realise
that it removes considerable complexity if the congestion is associated with each packet, rather than with
the original sender. Then, minimally, accountability can be localised to any trust boundary across which
packet trafﬁc ﬂows.
The advantage of making the packet, not just the sender, accountable is that we can then make
each party along the forwarding path accountable for forwarding the packet across each trust boundary,
localising accountability and enabling aggregation. As the packet crosses each trust boundary, the party
on the receiving side can associate the costs in the packet with the party on the sending side of the
boundary. Thus, a network forwarding packets on behalf of the sender can be held accountable for
allowing the sender to cause congestion.
Localisation of accountability avoids any need for globally meaningful identities. Speciﬁcally,
the validity of the sender’s address in the network layer packet header becomes irrelevant for resource
accountability. For wireline links this means accountability need only depend ultimately on the security
of local physical connectivity.2 For wireless links and for many virtualised wireline links, accountability
will usually also have to depend on identiﬁers or authentication in link headers, but these need only be
trusted local to the link.
The main omission prior to our research was that datagrams could only be held to account for
the congestion they caused after the fact—once actual congestion had happened—because datagram
transfer is inherently one-way or simplex. Instead, we ensure the sending or forwarding party can be
held accountable for its expectation of how much congestion it will cause on the rest of the path. Then
causes of excessive expected congestion can be curtailed. The problem then becomes one of ensuring
that expected congestion is declared honestly, which is the subject of this dissertation.
1The operator might also be a consumer, as in an ad hoc or peer-to-peer network.
2The term wireline scales to ’wires’ at a microscopic level, including data ﬂows crossing process ownership boundaries within
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We now understand that the problem is how to hold each self-contained datagram accountable for
the congestion it expects to cause. Which leads us to have to solve the problem of how to update a
packet as it traverses a network, so it always declares the congestion it is likely to cause, but only the
likely congestion over the remainder of its journey. Laskowski & Chuang have also identiﬁed exactly
this need to be able to monitor ‘rest-of-path’ congestion, delay etc. as the major cause of the Internet’s
economic problems [LC06]3.
By requiring the upstream entity to form an expectation of downstream congestion, it becomes
in their interest to monitor recent downstream congestion by soliciting timely feedback. However, it
would have been wrong to make feedback a necessary condition for using the Internet—a datagram
must be sufﬁciently self-contained to be delivered alone. So we must not require end-points to depend
on feedback about congestion from previous datagrams (although they can use it if they have it). Instead,
an upstream entity can simply be conservative in its expectation of congestion if it chooses not to gather
feedback (also essential for starting or re-starting a data ﬂow before feedback is available).
Finally, congestion is of course caused by either excess trafﬁc or insufﬁcient capacity. We have
so far focused on accountability for sending trafﬁc, not for insufﬁciently supply capacity—dropping
trafﬁc. We believe it would be misguided to try to build a mechanism for networks to be accountable
to data senders for speciﬁc instances of congestion [AMI+07, LC06]. It is sufﬁcient for network NB
to be accountable to its upstream neighbour NA both for any congestion within its own network and
congestion in downstream networks it chooses to route through. This accountability takes a simple form.
If NB provides NA with more expensive, more congested paths than other networks, NA can choose
not to use NB’s service. NA can just not route via NB, on a path-by-path basis if necessary.4 So again,
the problem is to ensure packets carry downstream congestion information. Then not only can NB hold
NA accountable for forwarding trafﬁc that causes congestion, but NA can hold NB accountable for not
having provisioned sufﬁciently. Again, the problem is that packet networks lack visibility of downstream
congestion information.
1.2 Motivation
The problem of improving the sufﬁciency of datagrams without sacriﬁcing simplicity is an important
scientiﬁc and engineering endeavour in its own right. But considerable social and economic problems
are also at stake.
Firstly, if used as intended, the current Internet architecture allows resource allocations to become
extremely sub-optimal relative to the social welfare maximisation that a perfect market would produce.
Proving this is not part of the current research. But the intuition has been given above, and the author’s
complementary work (with co-authors) gives worked examples of how bad resource allocations can be
for typical uses of the current Internet [Bri08d]. We also try to quantify the problem a little below. We
3In a paper published in SIGCOMM’06, articulating the problem we had provided a solution to in the same conference the year
before [BJCG+05].
4There is an important exception where the terminating network has a monopoly on routes to the destination, which is also part
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can certainly say that current resource allocations are not just slightly out, but hopelessly unlike they
would be if a market were allocating resources.
Unconstrained resource sharing can be beneﬁcial in small doses, but if allowed to predominate
it can stagnate market growth. If applications that want higher bit rate can help themselves without
being held to account during congestion, they can effectively free-ride at the expense of other people’s
service impairment. Communications infrastructure, particularly the access edges of a network, requires
huge levels of investment many years in advance. If free-riding predominates, the risk of investment in
new infrastructure becomes too high, because there is no expectation that those most beneﬁting from
the investment can be made to pay the returns on that investment (and usually no-one else will unless
Government backing is provided). A downward spiral of declining quality and declining investment
results [Gro05].
But there is considerable evidence that investment in networks is not declining. Rather than allow
their network to descend into this is spiral, unsurprisingly, ISPs have found other ways to prevent the
worst effects of free-riding. With no formal architectural support against free-riding, they have resorted
to a hotch-potch of locally invented attempts at improvement.
This is what is happening on the Internet. It is now very common for ISPs to deploy deep packet
inspection (DPI) boxes to effectively ﬁght TCP’s resource allocations. ISPs identify the application
within the payload of each packet ﬂow and throttle those that they infer have low value. This violates
the Internet architecture. But they are trying to improve their competitive position by pleasing more of
their customers more of the time, without spending excessively on capacity. They have to violate the
architecture for their businesses to remain viable.
Their ‘need’ to violate the architecture causes unintended consequences. Those application devel-
opers most likely to be hit by throttling are obfuscating their application trafﬁc. Many ISPs are already
starting to suspect any encrypted and unidentiﬁable payload. Anecdotally, there is already some evidence
that some applications under threat are starting to imitate the characteristics of other ‘business-critical’
encrypted trafﬁc. This could lead the ISPs to throttle all unidentiﬁable trafﬁc or to consider making
customers seek permission to send it (possibly for a fee).
Many people don’t like companies taking control of their choices, and even those who don’t care
get angry when ISPs infer their values wrongly. Some ISPs have a vested interest in disadvantaging
certain applications or competitor services. So even if an ISP’s intentions are honourable (throttling
heavy users in the interests of the majority), discriminating against certain packets can be confusable
with anti-competitive practice. In the US over the last three years, this has led to politicians getting in-
volved in the details of Internet resource allocation, at which point the possibilities for further unintended
consequences expand, and the chance of rational scientiﬁc debate worsens.
But what justiﬁcation is there for saying Internet resource allocation has become extremely sub-
optimal? If one considers that a weight could be associated with every data ﬂow (as in weighted pro-
portional fairness [Kel97b]), then the predominance of TCP can loosely be considered as a special case
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accountability for the congestion they caused, Kelly shows everyone would maximise aggregate social
welfare by setting the weights based on their willingness to pay for the bit-rate of each application.
Market studies5 have shown that value per bit covers a spectrum of about ten orders of magnitude,
from messaging (SMS, IM) at the extreme high end to software & video downloads at the bottom, with
interactive voice, Web, email, interactive video and music downloads between. Assuming the value of
transferring a bit is related to the value of the bit itself, this shows that optimal weights would probably
range over many orders of magnitude, so setting all the weights to one is likely to be extremely sub-
optimal. Even worse, bulk transfers (a large proportion of trafﬁc on the Internet) would probably be given
a very low weight, if users were accountable. But they are currently often given a weight considerably
greater than one (by the programmer opening multiple instances of TCP).
Unfortunately, bulk transfers least need a high weight. Even without considering economics,
weighting small jobs is the classic way to optimise completion times in scheduling problems with a
mix of job sizes [Kle76]. But if the utility of completion times is also considered, when small jobs tend
to carry higher utility per unit size, weighted solutions are even more powerful.
If there were accountability for congestion, higher weight would generally be assigned to brief
intermittent ﬂows (i.e. ﬂows of fewer bytes interspersed by periods of inactivity) because the extra cost
would be easier to sustain over lower activity factors than in larger ﬂows with higher activity factor. And
if small data ﬂows go faster they ﬁnish sooner, leaving as much capacity on average for the bigger ﬂows
over time (modulo inefﬁciencies due to the greater dynamic range).
1.2.1 Other Motivations
Simpler Quality of Service. Quality of Service (QoS) mechanisms, whether per-session (e.g.
Intserv [BCS94]) or bulk (e.g. Diffserv [BBC+98]), have foundered once inter-domain deployment
has been attempted (for years they just foundered, full-stop). There seem to be two main problems. One
is at the API, the other is the need for considerable operational baggage between networks; to scalably
authorise and authenticate, to provision, to monitor contracts and so forth.
The API to QoS seems to be problematic because applications can only ask for something the
network knows how to offer, which often isn’t really what they want (which in turn would be too com-
plicated to express or even know clearly at design time). The industry has trained its customers to say
they want bit-rate, burst size and so forth. But applications (and humans) aren’t like that. Once appli-
cation demands are aggregated, it starts to become easier to express what is wanted, especially in terms
of expectations rather than quantitative assurances [Cla95]. But this still leaves an API gap between the
application and the aggregated part of the network.
It should be fruitful to look at these QoS problems in a different light. As long as an application
is given early warning of impending congestion somewhere on its path, e.g. with explicit congestion
notiﬁcation (ECN [Flo94]), it can take QoS for itself by just not responding as much to approaching
congestion as it would otherwise.
Seen like this, the QoS problem becomes one of accountability for causing congestion anywhere
5Unfortunately not citable.1.3. Road map 20
on the path. The problem is then not what the application can do—it can always do almost anything.
The problem is what the network provider will allow the application to do and how to stop it exceeding
these bounds. This becomes a lot easier if each network on the path can see the same information
about congestion as the customer’s machines. The network directly attached to the consumer can then
set limits to the behaviour of the customer as a whole site or household and it can enforce them (or
charge for exceeding them). And networks further downstream can do the same recursively against their
upstream neighbour networks.
Thus, instead of arranging packets to carry QoS requests to distant networks, the problem can be
seen as getting packets to carry congestion information from distant networks to the local one. Impor-
tantly, this removes any need to place signiﬁcance on identiﬁers in packets.
This approach alone would not be expected to give QoS with strong assurances6, but it might allow
a wide range of expectations to be met without applications having to translate what they think they want
into a language that doesn’t have the right vocabulary.
The interface between end-point and network or between two networks would be so simple, one
could hardly call it a QoS API any more. Only incipient congestion (ECN) information would need
to pass across it. But the congestion information would have the additional semantic of cost—for the
application to trade off against the beneﬁt it will get from continuing to send bits.
Mitigating Bandwidth Flooding. Mitigating distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks is another
motivation for this research. The security community generally hasn’t considered bandwidth ﬂooding as
a congestion accountability problem.
But, instead of the victim trying to ﬁnd where attack packets are coming from, the problem can be
seen as ensuring packets reveal expected congestion as they leave the sender. Then the packets headed
for a ﬂooding attack should be very obvious to the networks on the way. A high rate stream of packets
heading for close to 100% congestion should stand out from everything else, as it would be very unlikely
to be a genuine application. And source and networks alike could be held accountable for the congestion
cost of the attack, creating strong incentives to remove it [Bri06].
1.3 Road map
The dissertation is in four parts. This ﬁrst part has explained why freedom with accountability for
causing congestion is important for the Internet. It now continues in more depth by surveying the seminal
literature in this ﬁeld followed by the main criticisms of the state of the art that motivated the present
research to ﬁll the gaps. With the background to the ﬁeld explained, we then end this ﬁrst part by stating
the two hypotheses that focus the rest of the dissertation.
It will be more meaningful to give an outline of the approach used in the rest of the dissertation at
the end of Part I, in §3.3 after the hypotheses have been introduced.
6It can in an edge-to-edge rather than end-to-end architecture [Ear09b], but the API gap opens up again in this case.Chapter 2
Related Work
In retrospect, reading and thinking deeply about just the following ten or so papers would have been
sufﬁcient background for this research. Of course, other sources (extensively referenced throughout this
dissertation and in supporting publications) provided necessary background understanding and ideas, as
well as many false trails.
2.1 Internet Congestion Control
TCP:In 1988, Jacobson published “Congestion Avoidance and Control” [Jac88] to document the col-
lection of algorithms he had implemented to provide congestion control for the transmission control
protocol (TCP). Bravely, this was a wholly distributed protocol in which all aspects of resource control—
efﬁciency, stabilityandfairness—weregovernedbythecollectiveactionofthecomputerscomprisingthe
Internet. Without it, or something like it, it is unlikely the Internet would have ever become widely used.
TCP congestion control was produced in response to repeated congestive collapses of the whole Internet
in 1986 and 1987. Router-based alternatives were being actively pursued, but Jacobson’s distributed
solution was such an astonishing improvement on the previous TCP that it was immediately deployed on
all 30,000 or so Internet hosts, and has remained the Internet’s predominant resource control mechanism
to this day.
A colleague1 recently collected results from 16 trafﬁc characterisation studies conducted at different
parts of the Internet (campus, residential and WLAN) between Jan 2003 and May 2006 in an unpublished
survey. The proportion of TCP bytes measured in each study clusters around two percentages, 80% and
92%, with a clear mode of 94% Internet bytes controlled by TCP. Two outlier studies found 72% and
98% respectively. There is no signiﬁcant trend up or down over the years.
Most academic focus has been on the additive increase multiplicative decrease algorithm that TCP’s
congestion avoidance phase borrowed from Jain et al [JRC87]. But probably Jacobson’s most important
contribution was the balance between the parameters of the initial ‘slow-start’ phase and the following
congestion avoidance phase, which he justiﬁed with self-confessed ‘hand-waving’ in the paper. Internet
trafﬁc has a heavy-tailed ﬂow-size distribution, so large numbers of ﬂows either never reach congestion
avoidance, or at least send the majority of their bytes in slow start phase. Slow start phase is a tricky
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period for a ﬂow as it quickly tries to ﬁnd a fair operating point alongside other trafﬁc. But the majority
of bytes (not ﬂows) in all the other trafﬁc are in congestion avoidance phase. So the long ﬂows must
react fast enough to losses to allow in brief ﬂows, then they must quickly converge on the new operating
point together, then, as the brief ﬂow ﬁnishes, the long ﬂow must be able to quickly use up the freed
capacity.
ECN:In 1994, Floyd published “TCP and Explicit Congestion Notiﬁcation” (ECN) [Flo94]. It pro-
posed a new ﬁeld in the Internet protocol (IP) header, which ﬁnally reached the ﬁrst ‘Proposed Stan-
dard’ stage of the Internet Engineering Task Force’s (IETF’s) standards track nearly seven years later, in
2001 [RFB01].
Prior to ECN, a queue experiencing congestion would discard some packets, then Internet con-
gestion controls like TCP would detect the lost packets as gaps in the sequence numbers of the packet
stream. The idea of ECN was to use an explicit marking on packets to indicate the onset of congestion,
to try to keep the network at an operating point just below where losses started to be experienced. There
is always a possibility that a gap in a packet sequence is merely a symptom of re-ordering, so a transport
protocol waits for stronger evidence of a loss (further packet arrivals without ﬁlling the gap, or ultimately
a timeout) before deciding congestion has really been experienced and slowing its rate. This delay due to
uncertainty (which ECN solves) has a disproportionately detrimental effect on the performance of short
transfers.
The reason ECN is important to the present research is an unintended but necessary side-effect of its
introduction. It makes congestion visible to network devices downstream of the congested link, whereas
any discards of packets by upstream devices are difﬁcult if not impossible to monitor within the network.
This is because there is no need for a sequence number space at the IP layer. So if the transport or higher
layers choose not to reveal their sequence numbers (e.g. by encrypting them), the network cannot detect
a gap in them. And even if they are not encrypted, a network element doesn’t know whether gaps are
due to re-routes or congestion. Readability of the ECN ﬁeld at the IP layer is a fortunate side-effect of
the need for writability of the ﬁeld at the network layer.
In outline, ECN works as follows. As an ECN-enabled queue in the network starts to grow, it sets
the new ECN ﬁeld to a codepoint termed congestion experienced (CE), with increasing probability the
longer the queue. Whenever a CE mark arrives at the receiver it notiﬁes the sender, which can quickly
and unambiguously know that congestion has been experienced. The sender is then meant to reduce its
rate as if it had detected a drop (e.g. in its congestion avoidance phase TCP would halve its window).
Despite the mention of TCP in the title both of the research paper and the proposed standard,
ECN was a change to the network layer’s notiﬁcation of congestion, which then requires any higher
layer transport protocol, not just TCP, to be updated in order to understand it. TCP was merely the
ﬁrst transport protocol to be adapted to the new IP. This required some careful attention to backward
compatibility to avoid using ECN to signal congestion to legacy transports that only understood loss as
a sign of congestion.
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(now termed Not-ECT, a non-ECN-capable transport). So, for packets with the ECN ﬁeld cleared to zero,
even if a queue is ECN-enabled it must use drop rather than ECN to notify congestion. Also a sender-
receiver pair must not use ECN unless they have established that they are both capable of understanding
it, typically in the capability negotiation during the initial handshaking to start a ﬂow. Then the sender
must set the ECN ﬁeld in every data packet to a non-zero value2 to indicate to the network that the
transport understands ECN (termed ECN-capable transport or ECT).
2.2 Economics of Network Congestion
Two-part congestion pricing:MacKie-Mason & Varian’s “Pricing Congestible Network Re-
sources” [MMV95] summarises their research in this ﬁeld. It examines the tension between recovering
the cost of capacity through a ﬂat charge or through a variable usage dependent charge. It considers a
range of providers available to a user, all buying capacity K [b/s] at cost c(K) [¤/s].3 It hypothesises a
two-part tariff offered to customers i with a ﬁxed subscription price q [¤/s] and a variable usage price p
[¤/b] for usage xi [b/s], such that the rate of charge [¤/s] is q + pxi. It considers what choice of p & q
would maximise social welfare under a centrally planned economy or under competitive or monopolistic
markets. The monopoly case will be set aside in this summary.
Providers vary their prices to maximise proﬁts. Users switch between providers until the price-
quality balance suits them. Quality degrades when usage starts to exceed capacity. As a result, both the
non-monopoly cases arrive at the same analytical result
usage revenue
capacity cost
=
pxi
c(K)
=
1
e
,
where e is the elasticity of scale of the capacity. Elasticity of scale is solely a property of the shape of
the function giving the cost of capacity at the current capacity operating point,
e =
average cost
marginal cost
=
c(K)
K
1
c0(K)
.
For the present research, the actual result isn’t so important as the order of magnitude it implies.
Typical elasticities of scale for transmission equipment are of the order of 2 and they approach linear (i.e.
1)ascapacityapproachestechnologylimits(unfortunatelyﬁguresareallfromprivatelypublishedstudies
of equipment costs, e.g. Lechner [Lec99] and those of Reid). So the usage element of revenue should
be about 50% of total revenue—and probably increasing, given no signiﬁcant cost-saving disruptions
in mass transmission technology are on the horizon. This implies that, for the foreseeable future, there
will be a signiﬁcant element of usage pricing in competitive Internet markets, because it holds strong
competitive advantage against ﬂat pricing. Note that usage pricing schemes that roughly approximate
congestion pricing could be sufﬁcient, such as volume caps at tiered but otherwise ﬂat prices, or with
volume limiting at peak periods.4
2It should use 01 or 10, but it can also use 11 even though it shouldn’t.
3The paper concerned usage of general congestible resources. Applying it to speciﬁc scenarios like networking was not always
natural. So, for our application of the theory to networking, units have been included in brackets to add dimensional precision. ¤
is the symbol for non-speciﬁc currency.
4To give a current data point, BT’s ‘up to 8Mb’ DSL broadband pricing at Feb 2008 consists of a ﬁxed charge of £4/month and2.2. Economics of Network Congestion 24
This formulation also clearly shows that, in a competitive market, congestion pricing will not add
to an average customer’s charge, rather it will substitute some part of the ﬁxed element with a variable
element.
MacKie-Mason & Varian’s work also contributed the idea of shadow prices for congestion—
borrowed from the classic economics literature and applied to computing and networking problems.
The congestion that others experience is a negative side-effect of an individual’s usage of a network (a
negative externality). Shadow pricing makes an individual internalise this congestion externality. So
shadow pricing is a powerful technique for dividing up the Internet’s resource allocation problem across
all users.
Utility functions:In the same year, Shenker published “Fundamental Design Issues for the Future In-
ternet” [She95], which posited that people’s utility U for bit-rate x always satiates at high bit-rates,
(∂
2U
∂x2 ≤ 0;x → ∞) and that utility curves fall into two main classes: elastic and inelastic, being concave
(∂
2U
∂x2 ≤ 0) and convex-concave (sigmoid) respectively. As load increases through a capacity bottleneck,
this implies there is no limit to how small a share each user of an elastic application will ﬁnd useful. But
for inelastic applications, there will come a point where higher value for all will result if some users have
zero capacity as their share drops below the knee of the sigmoid.
If Shenker’s hypothesis is correct, it implies that variable-rate congestion control suits elastic ap-
plications, but admission control is preferable for inelastic applications. Shenker also pointed out that
typical bit-rate reservation systems of the time were designed as if people’s utility was a step function
of bit rate, which could be considered as an approximation of a sigmoid. Whereas rate-adaptive codecs
would give a better approximation to a more gradually inclined utility curve.
These classes of utility curve had no experimental basis. But, since, we have validated that video
utility curves are indeed sigmoid with a wide shallow sloped ‘step’. We used carefully designed exper-
iments with users paying real money, but unfortunately the results are only accessible to partners in the
M3I project, given they reveal price sensitivity information [HE02]. It is possible that all utility is strictly
sigmoid because, to our knowledge, the existence of elastic utility right down to zero bit rate remains
unproven. Nonetheless, as long as a network rarely gets so congested that bit rates fall below the knee
of typical users’ utility curves, it is not cost-effective to introduce the admission control mechanisms
for all trafﬁc that some still argue for [MR99, MPCC00]—it is easier to treat the trafﬁc as effectively
elastic, which certainly leads to sub-optimal total utility during rare overload episodes, but the total loss
of utility over time is probably smaller than the extra it would cost to deploy and operate an admission
control mechanism.5
a variable charge of either £5, £10 or £15/month. Reverse engineering this, the lower two tariffs equate to about £1/GB of volume
irrespective of congestion, while the upper, so-called ‘unlimited’ tariff limits heavy volume users during peak period congestion.
Given the ﬁxed element has to cover non-capacity costs as well, these ﬁgures imply BT is trying to cover about 80% of its capacity
costs from usage revenues. If BT’s pricing is rational and if Mackie-Mason & Varian’s analysis is broadly correct, this imputes an
elasticity of scale ﬁgure of perhaps 1.2 for BT’s network. Or equivalently BT’s network cost, c(K) ∝ K0.8.
5As long as congestion controls handle extreme congestion safely (e.g. TCP’s exponential back-off).2.2. Economics of Network Congestion 25
Kelly:In 1998, Kelly and others published “Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices,
proportional fairness and stability” [KMT98], which made advances on many fronts and brought all the
previously mentioned research together6:
• It applied MacKie-Mason & Varian’s shadow pricing to a network, rather than just a single re-
source. It proved that, where elastic applications compete for bandwidth, the total welfare of
everyone using the network can be maximised if the network charges each pair of end-points a
shadow price p dependent on the sum of congestion they cause on the path between them.
• It added models of each queue’s pricing algorithm and each end-point’s rate control algorithm,
albeit abstracted and ﬂuid.
• It proved that, given shadow pricing, if application users were modelled with a private willing-
ness to pay per unit time wi, and private elastic utility modelled by Ui = wi lnxi, purely out of
self-interest they would have the incentive to weight the rate of their private congestion control
algorithm in proportion to their willingness to pay. Speciﬁcally, user i would have an incentive to
control her rate xi to converge on wi
p . Kelly proposed users could do this with an equation-based
additive increase multiplicative decrease algorithm of the form
∆xi = κ(wi − pxi)∆t,
where κ is a gain constant. Later Siris designed and implemented a window-based vari-
ant [SCM02].
• It emphasised how the proposed way to distribute the solution preserved the Internet’s ability to
allow new applications with new congestion control requirements to evolve. Gibbens & Kelly also
restated this body of research in a more accessible paper that focused more on the evolvability
aspect, “Resource Pricing and the Evolution of Congestion Control” [GK99b].
• It proved that such self-interested behaviour would preserve local and global network stability,
as long as the gain parameter of everyone’s rate control algorithms met certain constraints. Sta-
bility was proved assuming instantaneous feedback, but a number of papers later proved stability
with propagation delays, each assuming various algorithms and constraints. They are reviewed
in [Kel03]. In broad terms they showed the gain constant must be below a certain constraint,
which must itself be inversely proportional to round trip time.
• It gave a simple mechanism to implement the proposed scheme, based on explicit congestion
notiﬁcation (ECN) that was in the process of standardisation into IP at the time (now proposed
standard status [RFB01]). All an ISP had to do was count the number of bytes in packets arriving
marked as having experienced congestion at the receiver and apply a ﬁxed price per marked byte.
6Kelly and Voice extended the work to cover end-point congestion-based routing in 2005 [KV05], but the original work made
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Kelly’s assumptions seem reasonable, although one continues to cause debate—not over its cor-
rectness, but over how soon it will come into play. Kelly uses the scaling arguments outlined in [Kel00,
§2] to show that, whichever way that Internet scale increases in the future—whether more ﬂows, longer
ﬂows or higher bit-rate ﬂows—as long as scale does indeed continue to increase, congestion delays will
become insigniﬁcant relative to propagation delays.
Kelly et al’s work raised a number of important questions about TCP’s congestion control algo-
rithms [Jac88], which dominate congestion control and resource sharing throughout the Internet.
• Firstly it introduced the possibility that the rate towards which a congestion control algorithm
converges need not be limited by round trip time (RTT), as long as the algorithm’s ﬁrst order
dynamics are limited within a constraint that is inversely proportional to RTT. For instance, with
stationary congestion ¯ p, the above rate control algorithm converges on ¯ x = wi
¯ p , which can be
independent of the gain, κ and therefore independent of RTT7. More recently, FAST TCP [JWL04]
has adopted a similar strategy.
• But, much more signiﬁcantly, the likely values that self-interested users would set Kelly’s weights
to, given congestion pricing, would lead to extremely different capacity shares to those produced
by TCP (see §1.2).
However, in the wider Internet community, the message that TCP probably leads to an extremely
sub-optimaloutcomegotlostamongtheobjectionstoKelly’sproposedmeansforevolvingtotheoptimal
outcome: dynamic congestion pricing.
Simple pricing:Odlyzko’s paper “A modest proposal for preventing Internet congestion” is more well-
known for its main subject, the Internet pricing proposal called Paris Metro Pricing8 But it also contains
a wealth of evidence from numerous other consumer sectors that consumers are highly averse to un-
predictable pricing [Odl97, §5].9 The section is entitled ‘The irresistible force runs into the immovable
object,’ because it seems to be an unescapable fact that the irresistible economic logic of usage-sensitive
pricing runs counter to the greater desire of consumers for pricing that is predictable and mentally un-
demanding. Consumers will pay a premium to not have to continuously work out how to pay less. As
a result, as Odlyzko puts it, “...free enterprise companies prefer the socialist method of rationing by
queue to that of rationing by price.”
Congestion pricing preserves the complete freedom of application logic (under the control of the
user) to change its mind at any instant—to increase or decrease spending without seeking the permission
of the network. But, consumers must also be able to opt not to have complete freedom. Because along
with total freedom comes risk—the risk that events outside the consumer’s control (the discovery of
some desirable information coinciding with high congestion) will tempt them into spending more than
they would have wished, in hindsight.
7Otherwise an application’s attempts to maximise utility can become confused if it doesn’t compensate for RTT.
8Incidentally, PMP fails in a competitive market [GMS00].
9Earlier Barns [Bar89] had provided evidence for a desire for predictable network pricing from the defence sector.2.3. Internetwork Market Structure 27
The aim of the M3I project10 was to produce an architecture that would enable Internet resource
sharing to self-manage through a variety of pricing plans that would be able to evolve to take account of
the tensions between these immovable consumer pricing preferences, their quality preferences and the ir-
resistible logic of congestion pricing. My own summary of the projects results and their architectural im-
plications, “Market Managed Multi-service Internet (M3I): Architecture PtI; Principles” [Bri02a] agreed
with Odlyzko’s two consumer preferences for pricing (predictable and undemanding) and added a third,
transparency, in which the consumer wants to know that they are getting a known quantity of a well-
understood good for a known price.
This M3I report includes a summary of how the different pricing scenarios enabled by the M3I
architecture resolved all the conﬂicts between demand control, quality control and pricing preferences
to varying extents. By the end of the M3I project, the tensions had been resolved for inelastic trafﬁc at
the expense of a little extra complexity at the network edge—a risk broker function between the user’s
access network and the core11. But the tensions remained not fully resolved for elastic trafﬁc.
One could argue (as I did [BDT+00]) that a consumer can buy into congestion pricing but then
synthesise her own ﬂat rate pricing by mediating the risk of overspending with her own software agent
that keeps congestion charges within a moving window. But, psychologically, this is still not the same
as someone else sorting it all out for you. Getting Internet service at minimal cost just isn’t important
enough to most people who just want to pay a ﬂat-fee and it works. Consequently, ISPs don’t want to
offer a pricing plan with a footnote saying “As you probably won’t like this pricing plan, we also provide
free software to make it acceptable.”
Further reading:Costas Courcoubetis and Richard Weber, “Pricing Communication Networks” Wiley
(2003) [CW03]
2.3 Internetwork Market Structure
Edge-pricing:In 1996, Shenker, Clark, Estrin and Herzog published “Pricing in Computer Networks:
Reshaping the research agenda” [SCEH96]. It puts forward three main arguments, two of which are
outlined here.12
Firstly it argues that there is a need to cover more than just marginal costs, so “It is important to
allow prices to be based on some approximation of congestion costs, but it is important to not force them
to be equal to these congestion costs.” This was essentially a precursor to the principle that was better
10www.m3i-project.org
11The solution is currently being standardised in the IETF congestion and pre-congestion notiﬁcation (PCN) working
group [Ear09b].
12The second of the three arguments seems misguided in hindsight. It says that Internet service tries to be generic to all
applications, so it is inherently impossible for the network to capture user utility for not having individual packets delayed or
dropped, as required for congestion pricing schemes like MacKie-Mason & Varian’s ‘Smart Market’ [MMV93] under discussion
at the time. However, the point of the ’Smart Market’ proposal is that utility can remain private but then the market mechanism
effectively allows users (not the network) to sort all the demand into two sets, with utility either above or below the shadow price,
in order to limit demand to supply. The argument was perhaps saying that users wouldn’t be able to divide their utility down on a
packet by packet basis anyway. But, this rather threw out the baby with the bath-water by eliminating the possibility that even a
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articulated later in ‘Tussle in Cyberspace’: that researchers shouldn’t try to dictate outcomes.
Lastly it argued that the form of pricing wrt. usage was only one aspect of pricing that needed
research. Instead it argued that more attention should be given to how contractual relationships should
be structured across an internetwork.
The main contribution was a description of a structure called edge-pricing. With edge-pricing,
networks levy bulk fees on their neighbours (end-customers and other networks) that all taken together
cover a network’s costs and proﬁts, but charges don’t have to be levied on a ﬂow-by-ﬂow basis. The
motivation of edge-pricing is to allow the forms of tariffs to be different on a pairwise basis between
neighbours, encouraging evolution of tariffs structures, rather than having to embed a pricing scheme in
the architecture.
Information asymmetry: In 2001 Constantiou and Courcoubetis published “Information Asymmetry
Models in the Internet Connectivity Market” [CC01]. Although it is not a conclusive paper, in that it
presents no solutions, it clariﬁes more precisely than other similar papers which information networks
cannot see about the quality of other networks and why this is so corrosive to a successful communica-
tions value chain. More recently, Laskowski & Cheung [LC06] also highlighted the same information
as the critical missing piece of the Internet, but they did not relate the problem to the economic literature
on market failures due to information asymmetry.
When it comes to theoretical understanding of quality issues, basic economic theory is only just
in front of the ‘science’ of computer communications. The detrimental effects of asymmetry of quality
information were only ﬁrst articulated in Akerlof’s 1970 paper “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality,
Uncertainty and Market Mechanisms” [Ake70], which led to him (with others) winning the 2001 Nobel
Prize in Economics. Using the example of used car sales, it showed that the salesman’s privately held
knowledge of which cars were duds (’lemons’) drove down the price for used cars across the whole
market, because the willingness to pay of consumers would reduce once they took the average risk of
buying a dud into account, even if the car in question turned out to be ﬁne. The suppressed market price
led in turn to a reduction in the incentive to supply.
One can think of a data sender, or a forwarding network, as contracting with a downstream13 net-
work todeliver packets. Butwith one-waydatagram technology, the upstreamnetwork knowslittle about
the downstream neighbours it contracts with, whereas they know their own trafﬁc loading and distribu-
tion, available capacity, resource allocation policies, customer types and interconnection agreements.
Similarly, the next network is in a similarly weak position relative to the one after.
Constantiou and Courcoubetis apply the Principal-Agent formulation to model the resulting situ-
ation. The Principal-Agent formulation has been developed in economics to model the position of the
principal (upstream) and agent (downstream) parties to this contract. By attaching parameterised rewards
to any measurable effort of the agent and any measurable outcome for the principal, it is possible to op-
timise the parameters to design a contract that minimises the negative effects of information asymmetry.
13Different ﬁelds use the term ‘downstream’ ambiguously. Communications engineering uses it to mean ‘in the direction of
data transmission’. In the ﬁeld of industrial organisation, downstream can also have the sense of ‘towards the retail end of a value
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Alternatively, it is possible to predict the value of improved measurability of effort or results. As already
stated, the paper is inconclusive, but it at least identiﬁes the problem well.
Design for Tussle:Clark and others published “Tussle in Cyberspace: Deﬁning Tomorrow’s Internet”
in 2002, followed by a clearer journal article in 2005 [CWSB05]. It argues that the architecture of the
Internet should allow the major tensions in society and in economics to be resolved at run-time, not
design time. It turns this principle into the slogan ‘Design for Tussle’.
The M3I architecture mentioned earlier also espoused this principle (it was published in parallel),
but Clark et al give a far better and more general articulation. The M3I discussion was more speciﬁc (but
consequentlysomewhatmoreconcrete), beingbasedonspeciﬁcexampleswheretheInternetarchitecture
should be changed.
The paper offers further speciﬁc design principles, one being particularly relevant here: ‘Modu-
larise along tussle boundaries’. In the context of the above two papers on edge-pricing and information
asymmetry, one could interpret this as advice to ensure the intended advantage of edge-pricing (indepen-
dent evolvability of each pair-wise contract) is indeed possible. And to ensure that quality information
is visible to both networks at every border.
Towards the end, the paper revisits some of the old design principles of the Internet in the light of
the new tussle-related principles. It tries to grapple with the tensions in the end-to-end principle [SRC84]
(see §1.1). Although the discussion seems inconclusive, it concludes that “...end-to-end arguments are
still valid and powerful, but need a more complex articulation in today’s world.” We will return to this
below as we highlight the main outstanding deﬁciencies in all the works we have just introduced.
2.4 Critique of Existing Work
TCP:The most pernicious deﬁciency in existing work has been the false goal of approximately equal
ﬂow rates through a bottleneck. The idea that rate equality is a good approximation to ‘fair’ set in long
before Jacobson adopted it for TCP (traceable at least back as far as ATM research in 1980 [Jaf80]), to
the extent that he didn’t even question it as a reasonable goal. The problem statement of §1.1 has already
rehearsed the core arguments that instantaneous ﬂow rate is the wrong metric to be concerned with for
fairness, because a) fairness should be between users not ﬂows and b) instantaneous ﬂow rate doesn’t
take account of the proportion of time that a user (or ﬂow for that matter) is inactive.
Myrecentpaper“FlowRateFairness: DismantlingaReligion”[Bri07b]publishedinACMCCR,is
anattempttoexplainwhyKelly’sworkshowsthatﬂowrateequalitythroughabottleneckisanonsensical
fairness goal. It is aimed at an audience that requires implications to be spelled out bluntly and one that
has an aversion to maths. It carefully builds a case to show that the idea of ﬂow rate fairness is completely
unsubstantiated dogma. In contrast Kelly’s welfare maximisation is given as an example of a properly
deﬁned form of fairness built on the philosophical notion of commutative justice14.
14In350B.C.E.Aristotledistinguishedtwotypesofjustice, distributiveandrectifactory(commutative)[Ari25, BookVChapters
2, 4 & 5]. Distributive justice concerns whether a particular distribution of goods is just but has proved impossible to deﬁne
convincingly (Rawls [Raw01] comes closest, but still requires all one’s preconceptions to be set aside in order to judge a just
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However, the paper’s main message is that different forms of fairness should be possible to enforce
locally15, but this will only ever be possible if the Internet architecture as a whole supports the ability
to make self-interested individuals or entities (including whole networks) accountable for the costs they
cause (or allow to be caused) to others. It therefore advocates the metric of congestion-volume as a
prerequisite for different forms of fairness to co-exist. Congestion-volume is deﬁned as a count of all the
bytes of dropped or congestion marked data sent by all an individual’s ﬂows i over a period of time, T:
Z
T
X
∀i
p(t)x(t)idt,
where x(t)i is the bit-rate of ﬂow i and p(t) is the congestion it experiences.
“...Dismantling a Religion” was motivated by the extreme unfairness (deﬁned per user and over
time) that has resulted on the present Internet in the name of ﬂow-rate equality. But it was particularly
motivated by the continued use of friendliness to TCP as a goal for new congestion controls (such as
TFRC [FHPW00], XCP [KHR02] and other new high speed congestion controls), which constrains the
future solution space completely unnecessarily. Even though it was claimed that an XCP switch could
implement different forms of fairness, “...Dismantling a Religion” explained that fairness is a property
of the congestion a user causes in a whole network over time, which is not something each switch can
ever hope to control by setting the relative rates of just the ﬂows that happen to be passing through it at
any particular instant.16
More recently, I have published an Internet draft (with others) for the IETF, “Problem Statement:
Transport Protocols Don’t Have To Do Fairness” [Bri08d] that justiﬁes the assertion that there is extreme
unfairness on the Internet, using numerical examples drawn from Internet measurements. It uses the
evidence to argue that the IETF’s protocol designs don’t, can’t and shouldn’t have any control over
fairness. But instead the IETF should concentrate on a protocol framework to allow fairness to be
controlled at run-time (the message of ‘Design for Tussle’).
transfers are entered into voluntarily. It is alternatively termed rectifactory justice because a transfer of value (e.g. goods) in one
direction that alters the balance of justice can be rectiﬁed by a transfer of value (e.g. money) in the other direction. Welfare
maximisation is a result of a continuous sequence of transfers of value that are each commutatively just. If the original distribution
of goods was not just (by whatever deﬁnition), a series of commutatively just transfers always improves everyone’s lot in absolute
terms, but it won’t necessarily improve distributive justice (e.g. if deﬁned relatively), even though progressive taxation is designed
to attempt this. The only way to otherwise improve distributive justice is to somehow deﬁne a just distribution then forcibly take
from the rich and give to the poor. However, further commutatively just transfers would again diverge from distributive justice,
requiring continuous intervention.
15Both physically local and locally across a virtual grouping of users.
16XCP bears a superﬁcial resemblance to re-feedback in that routers along the path decrement the change in ﬂow rate requested
in-band by the source, which is then fed back from receiver to source. However, XCP’s structure is more analogous to a dynamic
form of RSVP [ZDE+93]. The subtle but important difference from re-feedback is that XCP’s metric quantiﬁes the service rate
(the primal variable), not the impairment introduced along the path (the dual). Even if the set of all the service rates is combined
(e.g. at the customer’s attachment point) nothing can be determined about whether that customer’s use of the whole network is
fair, because there is insufﬁcient information about how much each ﬂow impacts other users. In addition, in a non-co-operative
setting, the service rate claimed in each XCP packet has to be policed at each border against the service actually provided, which
requires per ﬂow processing. This was the issue that killed the scalability of the Integrated Services architecture [BBB+97].
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The draft accepts that some individuals aren’t concerned if the Internet protocols aren’t fair, so it
aims to show that extreme unfairness leads to other highly detrimental concrete consequences. It uses
further numerical examples to show how the inability to prevent free-riding in an architecture (extremely
high allocations of congested resource for a minority of users who pay no more than others) leads to
signiﬁcantly higher investment risk. Because the majority will abandon a provider that continues to
expect them to share the cost of its investments while receiving only a tiny share of the beneﬁts. Using
evidence that investment is still actually continuing, it explains this is because operators are throttling
heavy users.
However, operators know that heavy users actually represent a mix of light and heavy usage. So
rather than lose the heavy users’ by limiting all their usage indiscriminately, operators are inspecting
packet payloads and limiting only applications that they infer are causes of heavy congestion. Operators
could limit overall trafﬁc for heavy users and give them control over limiting their least valuable usage,
but most users have neither the software nor the inclination to do this, so ISPs keep control themselves.
Users understandably get upset whenever their ISP’s inferences are wrong. Also, however
honourable the provider’s intentions, their discriminatory throttling is easily confusable with anti-
competitive discrimination against competitors’ services, leading to the recent net neutrality debate.
The goal of ﬂow-rate equality led to a large body of work on policing equal ﬂow rates: Floyd
and Fall’s penalty box idea [FF99], Stabilized RED (SRED [OLW99]), CHOKe [PPP00], RED
with Preference Dropping (RED-PD [MFW01]), Least Recently Used RED (LRU-RED [Red01]),
XCHOKe [CCG+02], and Approx. Fair Dropping (AFD [PBPS03])). Because the goal of ﬂow-rate
equality is deﬁcient, it has led these works to be triply deﬁcient. Primarily because they are trying to
police a ﬂawed goal (per ﬂow not per user, and instantaneous not over time). Secondly because it is easy
for ﬂows to circumvent any such policing using multiple ﬂows on multiple paths. And thirdly because
ﬂows can simply whitewash their identiﬁers as soon as they are discovered, because there is no cost to
creating new ﬂow IDs.
ECN-based Congestion Pricing:Despite integrating together huge advances on many fronts, ultimately
Kelly’s work hit practicality problems for two entangled reasons: i) consumer aversion to dynamic con-
gestion pricing and ii) dependence on the asymmetric structure of congestion information in the Internet.
The entanglement was explained in “The case against classic feedback” in our main publication so far
on re-feedback “Policing Congestion Response in an Internetwork using Re-feedback” [BJCG+05] (re-
produced and updated slightly in §5.1.1 and outlined below.
Odlyzko’s tension between the irresistible economic logic of usage-sensitive pricing and the im-
movable consumer desire for simpler pricing cannot be side-stepped. It must be possible for a network
to ration demand by queue rather than by pricing—to slow down trafﬁc causing congestion rather than
delegate this responsibility to consumers under threat of higher charges. Of course any one user’s ration
will still be able to be sold at the correct congestion price. However, this will be simple, ﬂat congestion
pricing, not dynamic.
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But an ingress network cannot see the congestion being caused by the trafﬁc entering the network,
unless the congestion happens to be local. The classic feedback structure used by ECN, on which Kelly
naturally built, cuts the upstream networks out of the loop. As explained above, ECN reveals information
about congestion that was previously hidden, but not to networks upstream of the congestion. Certainly a
feedback stream usually returns to the sender, but it is beyond the view of all the intervening networks—
in higher layer end-to-end messages that may be encrypted, asymmetrically routed or simply omitted
completely.
This is a highly unusual form of information asymmetry, where the buyer holds more information
than the seller about the quality of the service. We believe it is this asymmetry that leads to all the
Internet’s problems of resource control economics. As we discussed in our summary of [Bri08d], this
asymmetry can lead to heavily suppressed investment. This is the same outcome as for Akerlof’s case
where the seller holds better information about quality than the buyer. But the chain of logic is the
converse to Akerlof’s. Nonetheless it has the same underlying structure, in which the market price has
to include a premium that averages the risk of uncertainty over each contract.
This unusual information asymmetry is solely because the Internet is simplex at the internetwork
layer (one-way information ﬂow).17 Duplex networks don’t seem to exhibit the same economic problems
as the Internet because any network can see the quality of the paths into which it is sending trafﬁc by
monitoring the feedback returning along each connection and managing trafﬁc accordingly (e.g. ATM
trafﬁc management [ITU04]).
Because only the current Internet’s classic feedback arrangement was available to Kelly and co-
workers, congestion pricing could not be turned into rationing by queue. It might be feasible to throttle
trafﬁc at the last egress of the internetwork, based on information emerging from upstream congestion,
but only by rationing the congestion received by a host. However, this would be a rather odd deal for a
consumer to accept as a receiver cannot stop sent trafﬁc from entering the network, ﬁlling it with trafﬁc
and consuming the receiver’s congestion ration.
Given the Internet’s feedback structure, the only option available to Kelly was to charge the receiver
for congestion received. Then, in order to transfer the correct incentives to the sender, the receiver had to
ask the sender to reimburse its congestion costs. This would unfortunately open all receivers to ‘denial
of funds’ attacks, as well as incurring extra transaction costs.
There is a further subtle issue with Kelly’s form of congestion pricing. Kelly holds each pair of end-
points accountable for actual congestion. Whereas MacKie-Mason & Varian’s smart market proposal
holds the sender accountable for her bid if and only if it is greater than the actual congestion price. In
both schemes, the charge ends up the same. But the subtle distinction only becomes apparent by thinking
at the scale of individual packets. In both schemes the sender only discovers the price after the packet
is sent. But in the smart market the sender limits her exposure to the risk of a high price, and if the
actual price is higher the packet is discarded—again, rationing by queue rather than by price, but at the
17The term connectionless is deliberately avoided because it has a slightly different meaning. For instance multi-protocol label
switching (MPLS) is simplex (reverse connections are not associated with forward connections) but not connectionless (connection
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microscopic scale.
A different potential problem also lurks within Kelly’s approach (it actually stems from the place-
ment of utility with respect to instantaneous bit-rate in Shenker [She95]). As Clark had pointed out in
1995 [Cla95] and Shenker et al had repeated [SCEH96], the utility of transfers of ﬁxed volume objects
will often depend on completion time not instantaneous bit-rate. In 1999, Key & Massouli´ e pointed out
that the two are inversely related because completing earlier stops the congestion costs earlier [KM99].
Therefore, once congestion is above a threshold there seems to be an incentive to drive up bit-rate to the
maximum possible. In these cases, Key & Massouli´ e seem to convincingly argue that there will be no
incentive to continuously optimise instantaneous bit-rate against instantaneous congestion. If they are
correct, Kelly’s results would lose much of their signiﬁcance, as ﬁle transfers with utility from comple-
tion time probably comprise a large proportion of elastic Internet trafﬁc. However, Gibbens & Kelly’s
experiments [GK99b, §3] propose a strategy for optimising instantaneous bit-rate by adapting willing-
ness to pay that does pay off for users transferring ﬁxed volume ﬁles.
Despite the importance of ﬁle completion time as a metric of value being ‘reinvented’ re-
cently [DM06], the implications have still not been fully worked out. However Key and others have
proved that, in the presence of delays, self-interested rate control will still lead to stability as long as ﬁle
transfer trafﬁc is mixed sufﬁciently with other types [KMBK04].
An interesting question is whether it is myopic to solely consider each object transfer in isolation, or
whether transferring each object faster necessarily leads to opportunities to transfer more objects. This
would imply that ﬁxed volume objects are part of a larger stream with an overall volume that expands
with bit-rate, at least when viewed at sufﬁciently coarse granularity.
Edge-pricing:I developed Shenker et al’s edge-pricing further in “The Direction of Value Flow in Open
Multi-Service Connectionless Networks” [Bri00], a technical report that collects together two previously
published papers applied to unicast and multicast [Bri99b, Bri99a]. It questions the proposed close tie
between edge-pricing and apportionment of costs between sender and receiver.
The whole reason apportionment of costs between sender and receiver is needed is because different
pairs of each have different apportionments of value. If the apportionments of usage cost between sender
and receiver are ﬁxed by the network, there will often be cases where the sum of the value they both
derive is greater than the sum of their costs, but the value that one alone derives is less than its ﬁxed
share of the cost. If the losing party cannot shift some of its charge to the other, the communication won’t
happen. In the language of industrial organisation, communications is a two-sided market, because at
least two buyers are involved in each sale [FW06] (see also §12.1.2).
The Shenker edge-pricing paper argues discursively that edge-prices should embed the chosen ap-
portionment of costs between senders and receivers, whereas “The Direction of Value Flow...” argues
that different ﬂows will want different apportionments between sender and receiver to match the ap-
portionment of value each derives from the communication. “The Direction of Value Flow...” uses a
model of internetwork pricing to show that embedding the apportionment of costs between senders and
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an Internet-wide pricing scheme—exactly what Shenker et al were trying to avoid.
“The Direction of Value Flow...” outlined an end-to-end clearing function to re-apportion charges
between the end-points, where the difference in value apportionment from the default made the transac-
tion cost worth it. The Shenker paper had rejected such a clearing function in a footnote.
“The Direction of Value Flow...” further allowed each edge price to be split down into a ﬁxed and
a variable charge, and allowed the usage charge to ﬂow in a direction independent of the direction that
ﬁxed charges took. This model was termed split-edge pricing.
My later work, co-authored with Rudkin, “Commercial Models for IP Quality of Service Intercon-
nect” [BR05] revisited this whole ﬁeld in the light of developments like re-feedback. It also added some
speciﬁc structure to Shenker et al’s ﬁrst point (that charging should merely be based on marginal cost,
not equal to it). It reasoned why we can predict that commoditisation to marginal cost will proceed faster
in transit (non-access) networks, while access networks will retain a greater ability to extract proﬁts.
The reasoning was that, although end-users and software developers might be expected to drive all net-
working to marginal cost, many end-users do not choose to spend their time minimising their charges
(Odlyzko’s point again). However, access networks have the motivation and means to aggregate their
knowledge of their user’s demands but to hide this knowledge from transits. From the viewpoint of tran-
sit networks, access networks resemble end-users—recursively. But unlike end-users, access networks
have the power of aggregation and the means to use it.
Information asymmetry:Constantiou and Courcoubetis, like other papers on accountability [AMI+07,
LC06], put the problem in terms of network accountability. But, of course, congestion is the result of too
much trafﬁc meeting too little capacity, so it is a question of both network and sender accountability.18
However, any one source of the trafﬁc is not wholly to blame, because they didn’t necessarily know
all the others would send at the same time. And the network is not wholly to blame either because trafﬁc
can adapt much more quickly to insufﬁcient capacity than capacity can adapt to trafﬁc.
So accountability in both directions needs to be solved. Kelly’s work shows how to divide the blame
among the trafﬁc—by sharing out instantaneous congestion in proportion to instantaneous bit rate. This
can then be integrated over time and each user’s contribution can be summed over all queues in the
network as in the formula for congestion volume earlier:
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And, the same information should be used by a network NA to hold its downstream neighbour NB
accountable for congestion within NB or in networks beyond, that NB has chosen to route through
towards the destination (its subcontractors). In the short term, this congestion is caused by the decisions
of networks like NA to route their trafﬁc through NB. But if the congestion persists longer term it
implies NB is not sufﬁciently provisioning capacity, or it is making poor onward routing decisions into
other networks that are insufﬁciently provisioned.
Tussle:‘Tussle˙ ..’ [CWSB05] identiﬁes some of the symptoms of the economic tension within the end-
to-end design principle [SRC84] that is central to the Internet’s design. But it largely side-steps any
18And, as pointed out in §1.1, the problem is simpliﬁed further if it is viewed as a trafﬁc accountability problem.2.5. Conclusions from Reviews 35
challenge to the fundamental economic tension between the principles of ‘Design for Tussle’ and of
‘End-to-end Design’. We believe this tension cannot be fudged to one side with the words “...end-to-
end design is still valid but needs a more complex articulation.”
The end-to-end principle essentially mandates that the lion’s share of the proﬁts from the com-
munications value chain should go to the computing sector. Whereas the message of ‘Tussle’ is that the
Internetarchitectureshouldnotprejudgetheoutcomeofthecontinuingcompetitionbetweenthecomput-
ing and communications sectors. And if the architecture does pre-judge this tussle, the communications
sector will choose to serve its own interests rather than comply with the architecture, thus leading to a
mess of badly interconnected patches without an architecture—the present reality of the Internet.
If the communications sector were driven to near-zero commodity proﬁts too early, investment cap-
ital would move to other less liquid sectors. A sector that is still growing rapidly is, by deﬁnition, not
a commodity sector. Notwithstanding Odlyzko’s points about consumer preferences, shadow pricing of
congestion is the end-game that commoditisation will drive towards. But, as well as allowing congestion
control to evolve under congestion pricing [GK99b], we have to allow pricing to evolve too. Even if pric-
ing will eventually collapse towards congestion pricing (including congestion limiting), along the way
we must allow the market to experiment with other more proﬁtable schemes and services. Consumers,
not system designers, are meant to commoditise a market—when they are ready. System designers
should merely ensure the architecture would allow a shift to commoditisation.
Eveniftheeconomicspredictsthatanoutcome(commoditisation)seemsinevitable, thearchitecture
shouldn’t prejudge how quickly the whole value chain will reach this outcome and it should be able to
encompass the structures that might develop on the possibly long road to that outcome.
For instance, many telcos (particularly in the cellular sector) are still wanting to build service-
oriented networks, to sell services bundled with basic networking. It might well be that the open Internet
model will just steam over them as they hanker after the golden past when they could bundle everything
together and lock-in their customers. But it’s just as likely their mass customer base might buy into
servicesbuiltonservice-orientednetworks, thenthecellularoperatorswillhaveresistedtheopenInternet
model. Considerable value would be released [BR05, BOT06] if ﬁxed and cellular networks could
converge more closely. Therefore, the lesson from “Tussle” should be that the Internet architecture must
encompass service-oriented networks as well as open networks. It’s not clear the authors of “Tussle”
meant to go that far. But that certainly must be a goal of the present research.
2.5 Conclusions from Reviews
The literature reviewed above builds a picture of the multifaceted problem the present research aims to
tackle. It can be pictured as an ancestry diagram in two cascades.
1. The ideas and deﬁciencies in TCP, ECN, two-part congestion pricing and bit-rate utility were all
brought together into one solution by Kelly, along with Kelly’s own considerable advances in
network trafﬁc modelling.
2. Then the present research brings together the ideas in Kelly with those in simple pricing, edge-2.5. Conclusions from Reviews 36
pricing, information asymmetry and tussle to identify and ﬁx a deﬁciency in the feedback archi-
tecture of simplex networks.
Others either discard the power of Kelly’s model because it doesn’t give simple pricing, or those who
identify the information asymmetry problem try to retroﬁt internal feedback loops within the Internet.
Whereas the task we set ourselves is to keep simplex networks fully simplex end-to-end, but convolve
necessary and sufﬁcient feedback information into the forward path.Chapter 3
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 (Congestion Signal Integrity). The incentives of self-interested or malicious economic
entities can be aligned to assure the integrity of indications of downstream congestion in the packets of a
connectionless simplex internetwork. This can be achieved by only constraining aggregate downstream
congestion-volume sent by each economic entity over time, without any dynamic congestion pricing to
end-consumers, without any further constraints on transport behaviour and without any further con-
straints on the agents’ freedom to distribute load across the internetwork, or across time.
Hypothesis 2 (Welfare Maximising Allocation). With a competitive market and under Assumptions
3.1 & 3.2, incentives of all parties can be aligned so that the system produces the welfare maximising
allocation of resources, under all the conditions of Hypothesis 1.
Assumption 3.1. Each consumer’s demand is small relative to aggregate load on each link.
Assumption 3.2. Consumer utility is for bit-rate and the internetwork operates within the concave
region of everyone’s utility curves or ﬂow admission control prevents anyone operating outside their
concave utility range.
3.1 Clariﬁcations
Can be aligned: An example scalable enforcement mechanism can be deﬁned with acceptably low
probability of false hits or false misses.
Scalable: Sub-linear complexity wrt. trafﬁc and network topology characteristics (no. of ﬂows, no. of
networks, etc.)
Acceptably low false hits: Losses of the same order as existing losses;
Acceptably low false misses: Where attacks might be successful due to statistical variations, over time
the cost of launching failed attacks must be greater than the gains from successful attacks;
Downstream congestion-volume: As deﬁned in §6.2
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Constraining aggregate congestion-volume over time: A congestion-volume allowance fed at a con-
stant ﬁll-rate into a bulk token bucket per data-sender by their access network operator, which
prevents further congestion being caused below a certain level and also constrains the maximum
consumption of allowance;
Sent by each economic entity: The sending end of possibly multiple applications on possibly multiple
computers under the control of a single economic entity. It is assumed that economic entities
behind the data-receivers may choose to share part of the data-senders’ costs, and some data-
senders may make sending data conditional on the receiver’s contractual commitment to share
costs.
Assumption 3.3. Transaction costs between sender and receiver can be ignored.
This assumption is invalid, but analysis of how much this higher layer issue affects the welfare
maximisation and the mechanisms for sharing costs are left for further research;
Economic entity: A stakeholder with its own motivations, resources and capabilities including end-
consumers and network providers (alternatively, economic agent or party);
Welfare maximising: Maximisation of the sum of the utilities of all economic entities.
The system: The combination of economic entities, the internetwork, rate control functions on host
computers, congestion notiﬁcation protocols, and the incentive mechanisms at the network’s trust
boundaries deﬁned in this dissertation;
Connectionless simplex internetwork: A collection of network domains operated by autonomous eco-
nomic entities, using only one-way self-contained end-to-end datagrams with no return channels
for congestion feedback at the network layer (e.g. not in routing or congestion back-pressure mes-
sages).
Self-interested economic entity: Individuals or organisations operating with rational self-interest;
Malicious: Unbounded malice if the entity is an end-consumer or bounded malice if the entity is a
network;
Bounded malice: Only willing to exploit amplifying trafﬁc-related vulnerabilities, where the cost to the
victim is strictly greater than the cost of the attack;
Unbounded malice: Willing to exploit any trafﬁc-related vulnerabilities to cause harm to others.
Trafﬁc-related vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities in the re-ECN system, or in related Internet trafﬁc con-
trol functions. Information security issues within the payload or pre-existing network security
issues (e.g. routing vulnerabilities) are ruled out of scope;
Dynamic congestion pricing: Pricing proportional to congestion caused per bit;
End-consumers: The economic agents behind data-senders and data-receivers;3.2. Signiﬁcance and Rationale 39
Further constraints: Constraints other than the aggregate constraint;
Transport behaviour: Increases and decreases in data-rate;
Distribute load across the internetwork: Send to any destination at any data rate;
Distribute load across time: Send less data now and more later or vice versa.
3.2 Signiﬁcance and Rationale
The congestion signal integrity hypothesis is ambitious. Paraphrasing Popper [Pop63], safe conjectures
are not interesting. For me, it is not as important to be correct as it is to be practical, as long as I’m
practically correct so there is a possibility of making an impact.
Proving robustness against gaming is an ambitious and ultimately impossible goal, because one
cannot know the set of all attacks that might be invented against it. However, one can create an abstract
model of the solution, its incentive environment and its information ﬂows, towards proving it has high
likelihood of being robust against the attacks we know. This is believed to be a sufﬁcient approach in
computer science when proposing systems solutions to large, distributed problems.1
The welfare maximising hypothesis has been separated out from the integrity hypothesis. It fol-
lows fairly trivially if the ﬁrst hypothesis holds, by straightforward connection to the arguments in
Kelly [KMT98, KV05]. It was felt important to include a case close to the way resources are gen-
erally allocated in the world so as to link to the Internet resource allocation motivation for the work.
However, it would have been wrong to tie the integrity hypothesis only to this single (albeit important)
case. Congestion signal integrity is an architectural building block that would be useful for other ways
of allocating resources than a market (reﬂecting the arguments of ‘Design for Tussle’).
The practicality conditions are the more challenging and interesting aspects of the integrity hypoth-
esis. These conditions have been carefully chosen because they encapsulate a wider set of practicality
constraints.
Dynamic congestion charging not required: We wanted to ﬁnd a solution that did not present retail
network providers with the dilemma of either having to offer an unpopular tariff or not being able
to rely on their customers’ natural incentives in order to share network resources fairly. We also
wanted to avoid the idealistic assumption that players only act rationally, which many proofs of
incentive compatibility require. So we replaced congestion pricing with engineering mechanisms
that would allow networks to police their customers’ responses to congestion whether they were
rational or not. Enabling engineered policers, rather than relying on rationality, also protects a
player against accidental misconﬁguration of its own part of the system.
We know from the start that it is fruitless to align the incentives of some zealot with unbounded
1I have also (perhaps deliberately) engineered incentives for others to try to break my solution (by strongly criticising whole
ﬁelds of other people’s work, persistently claiming near-perfection in my own and challenging others to break it!). This has already
led to a number of proposed attacks on re-feedback, which have helped my generalisation of possible attacks, and in some cases
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malice. However, we believe we may be able to prove our hypothesis if we require only the malice
of networks to be bounded (§8.1.2), while we will allow everyone else’s malice to have no bounds.
This is an ambitious (and therefore interesting) attack model.
No further constraints on transport behaviour: This point aims to ensure accountability is not intro-
duced at the expense of freedom—so that new applications with novel responses to congestion
can emerge. Choosing to enforce accountability through network engineering rather than pric-
ing would seem to imply that the congestion behaviours used by today’s set of applications will
become embedded within every network. But, by constraining our solution to avoid service stan-
dardisation between applications and network operators and between operators, we intend to show
that new applications would be able to emerge without asking permission. Even if networks do put
in certain behaviour constraints, these can be relaxed by bilateral agreement between a customer
and the ingress network, without further standardisation effort across other networks downstream,
which would effectively block any evolution.
Whether a system allows players the freedom to evolve is notoriously subjective and therefore
both easy to prove loosely and difﬁcult to prove conclusively. Whether service standardisation is
necessary is perhaps only one aspect of evolvability, but it is at least a provable fact.
Scalability: This constraint aims to ensure that accountability is not introduced at the expense of poor
network layer scaling with number of ﬂows, users etc. in the sense used in complexity theory.
3.3 Approach
The vast majority of the rest of the dissertation is aimed at proving Hypothesis 1 (congestion signal
integrity). The welfare maximising hypothesis only requires brief treatment at the end.
The following chapters are not only structured around the goal of proving the hypothesis, but at the
same time having to introduce the elements of the system in an order that will be readable and interesting,
and bring out all the insights learned on the way.
The dissertation proceeds in three passes: i) high level ii) abstraction; iii) concrete, because the
parts of the system are interdependent, so it would otherwise have been hard to go into detail on any one
part without knowing where it ﬁtted into the whole. Experiments appear next to the aspect of the system
that they test, not collected separately nearer the end. Otherwise, they would have become so distanced
from the assertion they were trying to prove that the connections would have become tenuous.
Part II (next) does the ﬁrst two passes. It introduces the re-feedback protocol and its incentive
mechanisms in a setting that sets aside the practicalities of deployment on the Internet. In particular, it
assumes the protocol can write real numbers of arbitrary precision into packet headers. It then introduces
some of the possible uses of re-feedback, taking a broad brush approach, but subjecting some aspects to
experiment.
Part III contains the bulk of the recent work. Not only is it grounded in the practicalities of the
Internet, but it takes a more principled approach to the design of the components introduced previously.3.3. Approach 41
This allows implementations to be tested against the constraints and principles they were intended to
realise.
Finally, part IV ties up the proofs of the hypotheses using the material in the intervening parts. It
concludes by enumerating limitations and future research directions, before listing material contributions
(papers etc.) and giving concluding remarks.
Appendices are added that describe alternative approaches either deprecated or rejected, to record
why they fell short, so others need not tread the same erroneous paths.Part II
Re-feedback
42Re-feedback: Summary
These chapters introduce a novel feedback arrangement, termed re-feedback. It ensures metrics in packet
headers such as time to live and congestion notiﬁcation will arrive at each relay carrying a truthful
prediction of the remainder of their path. We propose mechanisms at network trust boundaries that
ensure the dominant selﬁsh strategy of both network domains and end-points will be to set these headers
honestly and to respond in an agreed way to path congestion and delay, despite conﬂicting interests.
Although these mechanisms inﬂuence incentives, they don’t involve tampering with end-user pricing.
In these chapters mechanisms are described that use the truthful path information to police a re-
sponse to congestion. We also brieﬂy present a range of other potential uses for truthful path information
showing re-feedback is a more generally useful architectural building block than just for rate policing.
For instance, we believe it can help to counter ﬂooding attacks, simplify inter-domain trafﬁc engineering
and enable inherently scalable QoS.
The re-feedback wire protocol in these chapters uses an abstraction of protocol headers, without
regard to how much space is required to store path characterisation values. This is sufﬁcient to explain
the architectural intent. A concrete way to ﬁt the protocol into the IP header is deferred until Part III.
The text of this part is largely based on text of Bob Briscoe, Arnaud Jacquet, Carla Di Cairano-
Gilfedder, Alessandro Salvatori, Andrea Soppera& Martin Koyabe, , “Policing Congestion Response
in an Internetwork using Re-feedback,” In Proc. ACM SIGCOMM’05 (Aug 2005) [BJCG+05]. The
present author’s contribution was the architecture, high level design, experiment design, write-up and
editing, but not the implementation and evaluation, nor the write-up of the TCP-policer and the perfor-
mance evaluation. Three aspects of the original paper have been overtaken by new thinking:
• The bulk dropper design is ﬂawed against attackers adopting the ﬂow ID whitewashing strategy
(§7.5.1). Although it has since been replaced by the more principled dropper design of §7, it is still
described here unchanged (with a warning note). This dropper design and the performance exper-
iments on it were a large part of the research and experimental endeavour behind this dissertation.
Removing them would have damaged the overall dissertation too much.
• One detail of the border mechanisms (that tried to remove the effect of dishonest metrics from
metering) was ineffective, and has been removed. §8.2.4 now addresses the issue it tried to solve.
• The re-ECN wire protocol originally described contained a ﬂaw. It has been removed from the
text, but its description is still recorded in Appendix B.1, where the ﬂaw is explained.44
Finally, it will be noticed that these chapters focus primarily on policing the congestion response
of TCP—a rather ill-ﬁtting centrepiece given my subsequent tirade against ﬂow-rate fairness [Bri07b].
This example has been preserved to show how re-feedback can be put to purposes the designer didn’t
intend [CWSB05].2
2In 2005, my co-authors and I reluctantly decided to make TCP policing the focus despite knowing it was useless. We relegated
bulk policing to a paragraph at the end. We reasoned that the paper, which was already a bit too architectural for SIGCOMM, would
otherwise have been too radical to be likely to be accepted. Frustration over having to play along with the ﬂow-rate equality game
and having to hide the wider insights in our work, led to the writing of ‘Flow Rate Fairness; Dismantling a Religion’ [Bri07b] the
following year.Chapter 4
Receiver Aligned Re-inserted Feedback
4.1 Introduction
In 2000, capacity allocation and accountability problems helped to motivate an overhaul of the Internet
architecture [BCSW00], but they remain unresolved. We believe their solution lies in a realignment of
the feedback architecture.
Changing the Internet’s feedback architecture seems to imply considerable upheaval. But, perhaps
surprisingly, we believe a limited form of the new arrangement could be deployed incrementally at the
transport layer, around unmodiﬁed routers using the existing ﬁelds in IP (v4 or v6) (see Part III). But
protocol engineering isn’t the focus at this stage—an idealised numeric scheme is all that is necessary to
explain the concepts.
Conceptually, the solution could hardly be simpler. We propose collecting path information in
packet header ﬁelds as data traverses a path, just as can already be done with time to live (TTL) or
congestion notiﬁcation (ECN [RFB01]). But previously, as each node added characterisation of its local
hop, the header values accumulated upstream path knowledge. By a simple realignment, we arrange
each ﬁeld to characterise the remaining downstream path. We aim to reach a target for the metric at the
destination, rather than aligning the datum at the source. For example, TTL currently always starts at
the datum 255. Instead we propose it should arrive at the destination set to an agreed datum (say 16).
To achieve this, each receiver needs to occasionally feed back the TTL values arriving in packets, so the
sender can adjust the next attempt in order to continue to hit 16. §4.2 expands on this basic explanation
with more precision.
We term this pattern ‘re-feedback’, short for either receiver-aligned or re-inserted feedback, al-
though it is actually similar to the ordinary feedback found in other disciplines (electronics, hydraulics,
etc.). Once re-feedback is in place, each packet arrives at each network element carrying a view of its
own downstream path, albeit a round trip ago. So full path congestion becomes visible at the ﬁrst ingress,
where a rate policer is most useful.
But we still don’t seem to have solved the problem. It seems na¨ ıve to police trafﬁc by trusting
ﬁelds that depend on the honesty of both the sender and receiver—those with most to gain from lying.
However, in §5.1 we explain why re-aligning feedback allows us to arrange for honesty to be everyone’s
dominant strategy—not only end-users, but also networks. Building on the resulting trustworthiness of4.2. Re-feedback 46
path metrics, we describe how to build a rate equation policer, using TCP as a concrete example. We
generalise to any rate equation, in particular Kelly’s [KMT98], showing that we can synthesise the same
effect as quality of service mechanisms, but only using an ingress policer. And we brieﬂy propose a
bulk congestion policer similar to that described in detail in §11. We also describe a passive policer for
inter-domain boundaries.
In §5.2 we give the results of simulations conducted to test whether the incentive mechanism really
is responsive enough to ensure truthful congestion reporting. Finally we end this collection of chapters
with a review of what has been achieved to that point.
The closest idea we can ﬁnd to this work is Clark’s proposed decrementing ﬁeld representing pay-
ment as a packet traversed a path [Cla96], with receiver-initiated messages able to meet it in the middle
to make up any shortfall. It may be a subtle distinction, but we would rather network layer ﬁelds repre-
sented veriﬁable properties of the path. Then rather than engineers deﬁning a ﬁeld as a ‘price’, operators
could choose (or not) to apply pricing to whatever ﬁelds they wished, in order to determine cost (or even
value). Of course, once a price is applied to a ﬁeld, the operator may have an incentive to distort its
meaning to vary the price. But the distinction between a metric and a pure price applied to a metric is
still important, as it allows operators not to use the metric for pricing.
It is worth noting that connection-oriented technology such as ATM network elements send con-
gestion back-pressure messages [ITU04] along each connection, duplicating any end to end feedback
because they cannot rely on it being present. In contrast, re-feedback ensures information in forwarded
packets can be used for congestion management without requiring a connection-oriented architecture and
re-using the overhead of ﬁelds that are already set aside for end to end congestion control and routing
loop detection.
4.2 Re-feedback
Characterising paths through networks requires more than one metric. We have chosen to explain how
re-feedback works using two: congestion and delay (that is, unloaded delay not congestion delay). Re-
feedback of just these two metrics helps solve a surprisingly large set of networking problems. But
additional metrics might be useful in practice, e.g. hop count, unloaded loss rate etc. Delay re-feedback
is a useful starting point because it is trivially simple to explain. Then we use congestion to highlight the
similarities and differences that are encountered between metrics.
A pre-requisite for re-feedback is the explicit declaration of path metrics and their maintenance
along the path. Setting aside protocol details for now, it will sufﬁce to consider a multi-bit ﬁeld for delay
and another for congestion carried in future network layer packet headers1. Also equivalent ﬁelds will
be necessary in the end-to-end back-channel from receiver to sender—sent frequently enough to control
the most volatile metric (congestion). For instance, in future TCP ACKs (or RTCP receiver reports, etc.)
When starting a ﬂow, the sender has no feedback so it will not know what to put in these ﬁelds.
However we make the sender responsible for the risk during this period of uncertainty, rather than other
1We believe it is possible to apply re-feedback in a separate control plane, or even where control information is analogue, but
for clarity we stick to one IP-based scenario.4.2. Re-feedback 47
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Figure 4.1: Path Characterisation Notation;
For metrics m and headers h.
users of the network. It must declare its conservative expectation of the path characteristics.
We propose an additional ‘certain’ ﬂag in network layer headers, which the sender should clear at
the start of a ﬂow, when no feedback is yet available. Metric(s) carried in uncertain packets should not
contribute to any bulk averaging at network equipment (e.g. see §5.1.3), but the ﬂag is not intended to
affect forwarding of the packet itself.
Fig 4.1 introduces our notation. Each path across the network consists of a sequence of resources,
ir; 0 ≤ ir < nr indexed in the context of each path r from the sender S with resource ir = 0 to
resource ir = (nr − 1) just before the receiver R. Whenever a single path context makes it obvious, we
will drop the sufﬁx r.
The unloaded delay header, h1, is carried in packets from resource to resource. Each relay N
characterises its local resource’s contribution to the delay—perhaps by echo tests with the downstream
neighbour. It contributes to the whole path delay by combining its local contribution m1,i with the in-
coming header value, h1,i, and forwarding the updated result, h1,i+1 (Fig 4.1). The choice of combining
function depends on the metric in question. As unloaded delay is additive, subtraction is an appropriate
combining function (like TTL processing), h1,i+1 = h1,i − m1,i.
Other packet header ﬁelds will require combining functions appropriate to the metrics they rep-
resent. The inset in Fig 4.1 shows packets carrying header ﬁelds for both delay and congestion being
combined with the local metrics for each, as parallel, independent operations. Where the context is
obvious, we drop the sufﬁx that distinguishes between delay and congestion.
If we introduce feedback of unloaded delay, the receiver will report the header values it receives
back to the sender. With classic feedback, the sender always initialises the unloaded delay header to a
well-known value, say h0 = 255, as shown in Fig 4.2a). The header will arrive at node j with a value
accumulated over all the upstream resources hj = h0 −
Pj−1
i=0 mi. We call the composition of all the
local metrics mi experienced by a packet the path metric
So, with classic feedback for delay, the path metric upstream of node j is
Pj−1
i=0 mi = h0 − hj.
Node j can work this out by examining hj in packets as they arrive, because h0 is well-known. So the
receiver (with j = n) can characterise the whole path delay h0 − hn. If it feeds back hn to the sender
using our notional end-to-end protocol (bent arrows in Fig 4.2a)), the sender can know the path delay4.2. Re-feedback 48
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Figure 4.2: Network Flows Carrying Unloaded Delay in Packet Headers.
a) With classic feedback, sources initialise headers to 255. b) With re-feedback over the same network,
sources set headers so as to reach 16 at the destination.
too. So far, we have said nothing new, merely introducing notation using a familiar example.
With re-feedback the trick is simply for the sender to choose an initial header value such that,
if the path metric were to remain unchanged, the header would reach a well-known value hz at the
destination—rather than starting from a ﬁxed value. In our numerical example in Fig 4.2b) we assume
the industry has standardised hz = 16.
Although that is really all there is to it, we will now trace through how re-feedback works step by
step to be precise about the differences:
1. For now, we will assume that the source bootstraps the very ﬁrst packet of a ﬂow with the ﬁxed
value we used with classic feedback, h0(t) = 255. (When we need to distinguish between packets,
we sufﬁx each header value with the time t at which it was originally sent.)
2. The source has to remember the initial value it chose, as depicted by the curved boxes containing
255 at each source in Fig 4.2b) and containing h0(t) in Fig 4.1.
3. The packet traverses the path r, combining each local delay in turn into its header, using the
combining function (subtraction) already described above.
4. The receiver feeds back the resulting delay header value hn(t) to the sender, which arrives a round
trip Tr after the ﬁrst packet was sent, depicted by the bent arrows.
5. The sender initialises the delay ﬁeld in the next packet (dotted) to h0(t+Tr) = h0(t)−hn(t)+hz as
well as storing this new value in place of the last one. Each initial delay header value only depends
on the previous round’s initial value and the value fed back—both known locally at the source.4.2. Re-feedback 49
unloaded delay congestion Eqn
combining function at resource i,
hi+1 = g(hi,mi) hi − mi 1 − (1 − hi)(1 − mi) (4.1)
header initialisation function at source,
h0(t+T) = f(h0(t),hn(t)) h0(t) − hn(t) + hz 1 −
(1−hz)(1−h0(t))
1−hn(t) (4.4)
downstream path metric at resource j,
ρj(hj(t+T)) hj(t+T) − hz s

1 − 1−hz
1−hj(t+T)

(4.5)
Table 4.1: Re-feedback Functions.
Summarising results from §4.2 & Appendix 4.A, where notation is formally deﬁned. The functions g(·)
& f(·) are required to implement re-feedback and ρ(·) to exploit it.
Now we can see that this simple shift of datum has achieved our original aim: as each packet arrives
at a resource j anywhere in the network, it carries within its header hj a prediction of its own downstream
path delay, hj − hz, requiring no path state on the relay because hz is well-known. Any packet in Fig
4.2b) illustrates this point, in that subtracting hz = 16 from any header value predicts the sum of the
remaining downstream resources on that path.
The second column of Table 4.1 summarises the functions to implement delay re-feedback that we
have just derived. The third column gives the equivalent functions for congestion, derived in Appendix
4.A.
As with delay, the combining function for each relay to accumulate local congestion into headers
(ﬁrst row) must be chosen to reﬂect the way congestion accumulates. In Appendix 4.A.1 we deﬁne
congestion as a probability, using axiomatic deﬁnitions2. So, as shown, we must use the function for
combinatorial probability to combine congestion headers.
For either delay or congestion, the combining function at relays can be the same as for classic feed-
back, as the purpose is still to accumulate a path metric from local metrics. By avoiding arbitrary changes
to the classic combining functions, re-feedback can be introduced incrementally, solely by arrangement
between corresponding endpoints.
Each initialisation function (second row) ensures the header reaches hz at the destination, given the
way it accumulates along the path. Each function in the third row was derived from the previous two in
order to predict the downstream path metric (DPM) from any node.
Note that neither prediction of DPM requires path state, only the state arriving in the packet itself.
Further note that, for congestion, the DPM ρj also depends on the effective packet size s. For bit-
congestible resources like links s = actual packet size. For packet-congestible resources like forwarding
look-ups s = 1.
Fig 4.2 also illustrates how a change on a path affects the predictions in packets traversing it. The
increase in delay at resource N3 between Figs 4.2a) & b) (highlighted as a star-burst) causes packets in
ﬂight upstream to underestimate their remaining downstream delay. Packets in ﬂight downstream still
correctly predict their downstream delay, but when feedback from them releases further packets, these
2In contrast to the proposed ECN standard [RFB01] where congestion is deﬁned as the output of the RED algorithm—leaving
no objective basis for improving RED.4.A. Re-feedback functions 50
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Table 4.2: Comparison of Sender and Receiver-Aligned Feedback.
By availability of path knowledge (x = not available; n/a = not applicable) and by range of timeliness
(using symmetric delay).
underestimate their path delay.
With no further changes in local delays, packets in the following round (dotted) correctly predict
the path again. Of course, changes in the unloaded delay at a node (e.g. due to a lower layer re-route) are
rare, at least in ﬁxed networks. However, for more volatile metrics like congestion, change is the norm.
For delay, the prediction error will be
Pn−1
i=0 (mi(t+T) − mi(t)). For congestion, it is given by Eqn (4.6)
in Appendix 4.A.1. In both cases, the error depends on the difference between the whole path metrics.
To put these errors in context, re-feedback causes a source to suffer the same path prediction error
as classic feedback—for equivalent path changes within the last round trip. So a re-feedback source
transport can extract the same information, with the same timeliness and apply the same rate control
algorithms with the same dynamics. For relays, it can take up to an extra half round trip before path
changesreachthem. But, forrelays, anydownstreampathpredictionatallisanimprovementoverclassic
feedback, which offers none. And at the ingress, where policers are most appropriate, responsiveness
will be similar to that of the source. Table 4.2 summarises the path knowledge that nodes gain or lose
from re-feedback. It also quantiﬁes the range of how long it can take for path changes to work through
into correct path predictions in each case.
Previously, to achieve such knowledge at every relay would have required messages to be reverse
routed hop by hop from all destinations (cf. routing messages or congestion back-pressure). Although
re-feedback takes a little longer to propagate (because it travels via the source), it updates at the same
rate as the ACK rate—as often as TCP congestion control and many orders of magnitude more often
than a typical routing message rate. Also, re-feedback piggy-backs on existing data, requiring no extra
packet processing.
4.A Re-feedback functions
Below, following the notation of §4.2, we derive the functions required to implement re-feedback for
congestion:
• the combining function on each relay, hi+1 = g(hi,mi),
• the function to initialise header values h0(t+T) = f(h0(t),hn(t))
• the downstream path metric from resource j, k
n−1
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We coin the notation kj
am for the path metric, which is the composition of all the local metrics mi
experienced by a packet along the sequence of resources {a,...i,...j} using the combining function
appropriate to the metric in question.
4.A.1 Congestion re-feedback
Deﬁnition 4.1. The congestion, mi, caused by a packet at single resource i is the probability that the
event Xi will occur if the packet in question is added to the load, given any pre-existing differential treat-
ment of packets. Where Xi is the event that another selected packet will not be served to its requirements
by resource i during its current busy period.
So, at resource i, the contribution to congestion is mi = P(Xi) ∈ [0,1], which is a function of
local load.
Deﬁnition 4.2. The path congestion, kj
am, caused by a packet traversing a sequence of resources, is the
probability that the event X will occur if the packet in question is added to the loads at each resource
along its path, given any pre-existing differential treatment of packets. Where X is the event that another
selected packet will not be served to its requirements by any of the sequence of resources {a,...i,...j}
during their current busy periods.
From deﬁnition 4.1, the function that combines the local contribution with the incoming congestion
notiﬁcation ﬁeld must emulate combinatorial probability resulting in an outgoing header value
hi+1 = 1 − (1 − hi)(1 − mi). (4.1)
∴ if the header is ha before resource a, after node j − 1 it will be
hj = 1 − (1 − ha)
Qj−1
i=a(1 − mi). (4.2)
From deﬁnition 4.2 the path metric from resource a to j − 1,
kj−1
a m = P(X) = 1 −
Qj−1
i=a(1 − P(Xi))
= 1 −
Qj−1
i=a(1 − mi)
= 1 −
1 − hj
1 − ha
(4.3)
A source with perfect foresight would initialise a packet header to h∗
0(t+T) in order to reach its
target value at the destination, where
hn(t+T) = 1 −
 
1 − h∗
0(t+T)
 
1 − k
n−1
0 mi(t+T)

= hz
∴ h∗
0(t+T) = 1 −
1 − hz
1 − k
n−1
0 mi(t+T)
A practical source will use the previous path metric as an estimator for the next and set
h0(t+T) = 1 −
1 − hz
1 − k
n−1
0 mi(t)
= 1 −
(1 − hz)(1 − h0(t))
1 − hn(t)
(4.4)4.A. Re-feedback functions 52
During sudden increases in congestion, hn → 1, but if protocol ﬁelds are bounded the source will remain
responsive, but understate congestion to the network, which is the safe way round.
With hindsight, the downstream path metric from resource j
k∗n−1
j m(t+T) = 1 −
Qn−1
i=0 (1 − mi(t+T))
Qj−1
i=0(1 − mi(t+T))
.
An efﬁcient estimator for this metric is
k
n−1
j m(t+T) = 1 −
Qn−1
i=0 (1 − mi(t))
Qj−1
i=0(1 − mi(t+T))
From (4.3) = 1 −
1 − hz
1 − h0(t+T)

1 − hj(t+T)
1 − h0(t+T)
From (4.4) = 1 −
1 − hz
1 − hj(t+T)
. (4.5)
The prediction error k
n−1
j m(t+T) − k∗n−1
j m(t+T) is
Qn−1
i=0 (1 − mi(t+T)) −
Qn−1
i=0 (1 − mi(t))
Qj−1
i=0(1 − mi(t+T))
. (4.6)Chapter 5
Re-feedback Incentive Mechanisms
5.1 Incentives
We aim to create an incentive environment to ensure anyone’s selﬁsh behaviour (including lying and
cheating) leads to truthful declaration of downstream path characteristics.1 Throughout this section
we will focus primarily on characterisation of path congestion. This will stress re-feedback incentive
mechanisms to the full in the face of conﬂict over scarce resources. Given most forms of fairness,
including TCP’s, also depend on round trip time, we will then outline how a path delay metric would be
amenable to similar treatment.
Fig 5.1 sketches the incentive framework that we will describe piece by piece throughout this sec-
tion. An internetwork with multiple trust boundaries is depicted. The downstream path congestion seen
in a typical packet is plotted as it traverses an example path from sender S1 to receiver R1. They are
shown using re-feedback, but we intend to show why everyone would choose to use it, correctly and
honestly.
Two main types of self-interest can be identiﬁed:
• Users want to transmit data across the network as fast as possible, paying as little as possible for
the privilege. In this respect, there is no distinction between senders and receivers, but we must be
wary of potential malice by one on the other;
• Network operators want to maximise revenues from the resources they invest in. They compete
amongst themselves for the custom of users.
Source congestion control: We want to ensure that the sender will be pressured to reduce its rate as
downstream congestion increases. Whatever the agreed congestion response (whether TCP-compatible,
ﬂow admission control or some hybrid general reduction across all the sender’s ﬂows), to some extent it
will always be against the sender’s interest to comply.
Edge ingress policing/shaping: But it is in all the network operators’ interests to encourage a
congestion response, so that their investments are employed to satisfy the most valuable demand. NA is
inthebestpositiontoensureS1’scomplianceanditnowhasachoiceofmechanismsacrossaspectrumof
customer autonomy. At one extreme, NA could give S1 complete autonomy, but encourage responsible
1These mechanisms can lie dormant wherever co-operation is the social norm.5.1. Incentives 54
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Figure 5.1: Re-feedback Incentive Framework.
behaviour by charging for the downstream congestion in packets. Or it can shape trafﬁc directly itself,
removing all S1’s autonomy. Between the two extremes, it can police a congestion response agreed
upfront with S1 (§5.1.4).
Edge egress dropper: If the source has less right to a high rate the higher it declares downstream
congestion, it has a clear incentive to understate downstream congestion. But, if packets are understated
when they enter the internetwork, they will be negative when they leave. So, we introduce a dropper
at the last network egress, which drops packets in ﬂows that persistently declare negative downstream
congestion (see §5.1.3).
Inter-domain trafﬁc policing: But next we must ask, if congestion arises downstream (say in ND),
what is the ingress network’s (NA) incentive to police its customers’ response? If NA turns a blind eye,
its own customers beneﬁt while other networks suffer. This is why all inter-domain QoS architectures
(e.g. Intserv, Diffserv) police trafﬁc each time it crosses a trust boundary. Re-feedback gives trustworthy
information at each trust boundary so the congestion response can be policed in bulk.
Emulating policing with inter-domain congestion charging: Between high-speed (e.g. optical)
networks we would rather avoid having to buffer packets while deciding whether to police them in series
to forwarding. Instead, we can emulate policing using a passive, parallel monitoring function. Once
re-feedback has arranged headers to carry downstream congestion honestly, NB can contract to pay ND
in proportion to a single bulk count of the congestion metrics ρ crossing their mutual trust boundary
(§5.1.5). Then NB has an incentive either to police the congestion response of its own ingress trafﬁc
from NA or to charge NA in turn on the basis of congestion counted at their mutual boundary. In this
recursive way, each ﬂow’s response can be precisely incentivised, despite the mechanism not recognising
ﬂows. If NA turns a blind eye to its own upstream customers’ congestion response, it will still have to
pay its downstream neighbours. And if NA lies on behalf of its customers by understating downstream
congestion, packets will suffer at the dropper as if the source itself had lied.
No congestion charging to users: Bulk congestion charging at trust boundaries is passive and
extremely simple, and loses none of its per-packet precision from one boundary to the next. But at any5.1. Incentives 55
trust boundary, there is no imperative to use congestion charging. Traditional trafﬁc policing can be used,
if the complexity and cost is preferred. In particular, at the boundary with end customers (e.g. between
S1 and NA), trafﬁc policing will most likely be more appropriate. Policer complexity is less of a concern
at the edge of the network. And end-customers are known to be highly averse to the unpredictability of
congestion charging [Odl97].
Competitive discipline of inter-domain trafﬁc engineering: With inter-domain congestion charg-
ing, a domain seems to have a perverse incentive to fake congestion; NB’s proﬁt depends on the differ-
ence between congestion at its ingress (its revenue) and at its egress (its cost). So overstating internal
congestion seems to increase proﬁt. However, smart border routing [GQX+04] by NA will bias its mul-
tipath routing towards the least cost routes, so NB risks losing all its revenue to competitive routes if it
overstates congestion. In other words, NB’s ability to raise excess proﬁts is limited by the price of its
second most competitive route (but see §12.1.2 on Termination Monopolies).
Closingtheloop: Alltheaboveelementsconspiretotrapeveryonebetweentwoopposingpressures
(upper half of Fig 5.1), ensuring the downstream congestion metric arrives at the destination neither
above nor below zero. So we have arrived back where we started in our argument. The ingress edge
network can rely on downstream congestion declared in the packet headers presented by the sender. So
it can police the sender’s congestion response accordingly.
5.1.1 The case against classic feedback
So why can’t classic congestion feedback (as used already by standard ECN) be arranged to provide
similar incentives? Superﬁcially it can. Given ECN already existed, this was the deployment path
Kelly proposed for his seminal work that used self-interest to optimise social welfare across a system
of networks and users [KMT98]. The mechanism was nearly identical to volume charging; except only
the volume of packets marked with congestion experienced (CE) was counted. However, relying on
classic feedback meant the incentives traced an indirect path—the long way round the feedback loop.
For example, if classic feedback were used in Fig 5.1, NB would incentivise NA via ND, R1 & S1 rather
than directly.
Inability to agree what happened: In order to police its upstream neighbour’s congestion re-
sponse, the neighbours should be able to agree on the congestion to be responded to. Whatever the
feedback regime, as packets change hands at each trust boundary, any path metrics they carry are ver-
iﬁable by both neighbours. But, with a classic, sender-aligned path metric, they can only agree on the
upstream path congestion—its offset from its well-known datum at the sender.
Inaccessible back-channel: The network needs a whole path congestion metric to control the
source. Classically, whole path congestion emerges at the destination, to be fed back from receiver to
sender in a back-channel. But, in any data network, back-channels need not be visible to relays, as they
are essentially communications between the end-points. They may be encrypted, asymmetrically routed
or simply omitted, so no network element can reliably intercept them. The congestion charging literature
solves this problem by treating the sender and receiver as entities with aligned incentives. Although
measuring classic ECN marking rates (relative to their datum at the sender) forces a ‘receiver pays’5.1. Incentives 56
model (at each trust boundary the downstream neighbour pays), it is argued that at least this incentivises
the receiver to refer the charges to the sender.
‘Receiver pays’ unacceptable: However, in connectionless datagram networks, receivers and re-
ceiving networks cannot prevent reception from malicious senders, so ‘receiver pays’ opens them to
‘denial of funds’ attacks.
End-user congestion charging unacceptable: Even if ’denial of funds’ were not a problem, we
know that end-users are highly averse to the unpredictability of congestion charging and anyway, we
want to avoid restricting network operators to just one retail tariff. But with classic feedback, we cannot
avoid having to wrap the ‘receiver pays’ money ﬂow around the feedback loop, necessarily forcing end-
users to be subjected to congestion charging.
Receiver Policing Impractical: It might be thought that the egress network ND could police the
receiver, rather than apply a congestion charge. For instance, limiting downloads based on classic ECN
marks arriving from other networks (and from within its own before the egress). Then, as the policer
slowed the data ﬂow, through the normal process of feedback the source would slow down. The ﬁrst
problem with this approach is that it relies circularly on the sender responding to loss in order to police
the sender’s response to congestion. Certainly the policer could stop the receiver beneﬁtting from fast
unresponsive downloads, but it could not stop the sender if it didn’t respond to loss.
Perhaps this would at least be better than nothing were it not for there being a second problem with
egress network policing. All the inter-network incentives to do policing are backwards. If there were
congestion in the sender’s access network NA, the only practical way to give all the egress networks
like ND an incentive to police the ﬂows causing congestion in NA it would be for NA to charge NB
for receiving congestion from NA, then NB would have the incentive to charge ND, this in turn giving
ND the incentive to police the ﬂow. Although this sounds possible when you say it fast, no network NB
would ever pay another network NA to receive trafﬁc that claimed to have experienced congestion in the
originating network. NA controls how much and which trafﬁc it sends to NB, so NB would never want
to advertise any routes to NA. This would just give NA carte blanche to print money by sending NB
congested trafﬁc.
Tosummarisesofar, withclassicfeedback, policingcongestionresponserequirescongestioncharg-
ing of end-users and a ‘receiver pays’ model. Whereas, with re-feedback, incentives can be fashioned
either by technical policing mechanisms (more appropriate for end users) or by congestion charging
(more appropriate inter-domain) using the safer ‘sender pays’ model.
Impractical trafﬁc engineering: Finally, classic feedback makes congestion-based trafﬁc engi-
neering inefﬁcient too. Network ND can see which of its two alternative upstream networks NB and
NC are less congested. But it is NA that makes the routing decision. This is why current trafﬁc engi-
neering requires a continuous message stream from congestion monitors to the routing controller. And
even then the monitors can only be trusted for intra-domain trafﬁc engineering. The trustworthiness
of re-feedback enables inter-domain trafﬁc engineering without messaging overhead (but that is out of
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We now take a second pass over the incentive framework, ﬁlling in the detail more formally.
5.1.2 The Case Against Bottleneck Policers
We borrowed ideas from policers in the literature [OLW99, FF99, PBPS03] for our rate equation policer.
However, without the beneﬁt of re-feedback they don’t police the correct rate for the condition of their
path. They detect unusually high absolute rates, but only while the policer itself is congested, because
they work by detecting prevalent ﬂows in the discards from the local RED queue. These policers must sit
ateverypotentialbottleneck, whereasourpolicerneedonlybelocatedateachingresstotheinternetwork.
As Floyd & Fall explain [FF99], the limitation of their approach is that a high sending rate might be
perfectly legitimate, if the rest of the path is uncongested or the round trip time is short.
XCP [KHR02] bears a superﬁcial resemblance to re-feedback in that routers along the path decre-
ment the change in ﬂow rate requested in-band by the source, which is then fed back from receiver to
source. However, the structure of fairness aimed for by XCP is more analogous to that aimed for by a
bottleneck policer. Indeed both XCP and bottleneck policers are structurally similar to a dynamic form
of RSVP [ZDE+93]. The subtle but important structural difference between XCP and re-feedback is that
XCP’s metric quantiﬁes the service rate (the primal variable), not the impairment introduced along the
path(thedual). Evenifthesetofalltheserviceratesiscombined(e.g.atthecustomer’sattachmentpoint)
nothing can be determined about whether that customer’s use of the whole network is fair, because there
is insufﬁcient information about how much each ﬂow impacts other users at each queue. In addition, in a
non-co-operative setting, the ﬂow rate that each XCP packet claims it is part of has to be policed at each
trust boundary to check it matches the ﬂow rate actually being used, which requires per ﬂow processing.
This was the issue that killed the scalability of the Integrated Services architecture [BBB+97]. “Flow
rate fairness, Dismantling a Religion” [Bri07b] gives a more extensive discussion of the deﬁciencies in
the structure of fairness aimed for by protocols like XCP and RCP [DKZSM05].
5.1.3 Honest congestion reporting
An honest sender will declare a certain downstream path metric (DPM) ρ0 in packets to aim for zero at
the destination after allowing for path congestion. We deﬁne cheating as the difference ∆ρ0c relative
to this ideal, taking overstatement as positive. To rely on the DPM packets carry, we must discourage
dishonesty, whether positive or negative. If the sender declares a certain DPM, a certain rate response
can be policed either speciﬁcally for each ﬂow, or an overall response envelope for all ﬂows from a
particular customer (§5.1.4). For any safe congestion response, the higher the sender’s declared DPM,
to some degree the slower its data rate, and the lower the value it derives. So, to the right of Fig 5.2 we
can show the sender’s utility strictly decreasing with overstatement.
So senders have an incentive to understate DPM, which allows them a higher bit rate. But then the
DPM will turn negative before reaching the destination. If networks discard2 negative packets, the utility
to the sender of the higher bit rate will rapidly collapse, as visualised on the left of the ﬁgure. Therefore
honesty at ∆ρ0c = 0 will be the dominant sender strategy that maximises its net utility. A receiver that
2Various penalties short of discard, e.g. payload truncation, can be imposed in order to preserve the feedback loop, given a
packet may be wrongly penalised.5.1. Incentives 58
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genuinely wants data to be sent as quickly as possible has incentives aligned with the sender, so honest
feedback also returns the maximum net gain.
In fact, the position is complicated by continuous variability of path congestion; even honest trafﬁc
will arrive at its destination spread around zero. Below we describe a dropper that makes allowances
for this variability but still detects understatement of DPM. The best dropper we can currently envisage
suffers some false hits and false misses, blunting the incentive to be absolutely honest (Fig 5.2).
Adaptive dropper
If congestion didn’t vary, a malicious source understating congestion by ∆ρ0c (numerically negative)
would cause a proportionate understatement at the destination of ∆ρnc.3 But congestion does vary, so
if the probability distribution of the DPM at the destination is Pn(ρn) for an honest sender, it will be
shifted to Pn(ρn − ∆ρnc) for the malicious sender.
We propose a dropper2 at the last hop before the receiver. The dropper builds a model of the
prevailing pattern of cheating for all packets leaving the same interface and assumes that each new
packet is characteristic of this recent history; the more recent cheating, the stricter the dropper becomes.
But its strictness is further modulated by how negative ρn is of each packet under scrutiny.
Conceptually, the bell curve in Figure 5.3 shows the probability distribution of arriving packets,
exponentially weighted to favour recent arrivals. We assume this will be the probability distribution
of the DPM of the next packet. Superimposed on a different vertical scale is a conjectured penalty
probability function, p(·) intended to allow through as much negative DPM as positive, but no more.
This can be achieved by ensuring that the distribution remaining after applying the penalty function is
symmetric about zero (the unshaded cusp curve). So for ρn < 0:
 
1 − p(·)

Pn(ρn − ∆ρnc) = Pn(ρn + ∆ρnc). (5.1)
3From Eqn (4.2) ∆ρnc =
 
1 − kn−1
0 m

∆ρ0c5.1. Incentives 59
DPM
probability
distribution, Pn
0
penalty
probability, p
1
downstream path
metric (DPM)
at receiver,
ρn
D D D Dρnc
p(·)
Pn(ρn-D D D Dρnc)
p(·)Pn(ρn-D D D Dρnc)
Pn(ρn+D D D Dρnc) (1 – p(·))Pn(ρn-D D D Dρnc) = 
Figure 5.3: Penalising Misbehaviour Under Uncertainty.
 1e-05
 1e-04
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1  0  0.1  0.2  0.3
honest traffic
truncated
unaffected
penalty prob.
 1e-05
 1e-04
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1  0  0.1  0.2  0.3
dishonest traffic
Figure 5.4: Typical simulated distributions of DPM at the destination.
From honest (top) and dishonest (bottom) sources, also showing proportion of penalised trafﬁc (note
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Initially we choose to keep state and processing to a minimum by modelling prevailing conditions
withjusttheexponentiallyweightedmovingaverageµandEWMvarianceν. Sowemodeltheprevailing
distributionPn(ρn−∆ρnc)asifitwerethenormaldistributionN(µ,ν)reconstructedfromrecenttrafﬁc,
whatever the actual distribution (e.g. Fig 5.4).
At each packet, the EWMA & EWMV are updated:
µ ← γρn + (1 − γ)µ (5.2)
ν ← γ(ρn − µ)2 + (1 − γ)ν. (5.3)
For attack trafﬁc µ → ∆ρnc, converging faster by increasing γ to weight recent values (0 < γ ≤
1). In maintaining the EWMA, positive packets with the ‘certain’ ﬂag cleared (see §4.2) are ignored,
incentivising correct use of the ﬂag.
Then, using the formula for a normal distribution,
Pn(ρn − ∆ρnc) =
1
√
2πν
e−
(ρn−µ)2
2ν . (5.4)5.1. Incentives 60
we can derive the required penalty probability function to apply to each speciﬁc packet with DPM ρn,
by re-arranging (5.1) and substituting from (5.4):
p(ρn,µ,ν) = 0; µ ≥ 0 or ρn ≥ 0
= 1 −
Pn(ρn + µ)
Pn(ρn − µ)
; µ < 0,ρn < 0
= 1 − e
−2ρnµ
ν (5.5)
As required, the penalty becomes stricter the worse the EWMA becomes, but ﬂattens to zero discards
when honest users keep the EWMA to zero.
Where a cheating ﬂow is hidden in a large honest aggregate, it causes a slightly negative EWMA,
leading to some dropping. After Floyd and Fall [FF99] we cache the ﬂow identiﬁers of penalised packets.
Once any aggregate of destination (and/or source) identiﬁers appears more often than would be likely
by chance, a second instance of the dropper is spawned and trafﬁc matching the identiﬁer(s) is ﬁltered
into it.4 Each instance of a focused dropper maintains its own EWMA5 and may spawn further droppers.
These focused droppers should be far more sensitive than the ﬁrst, also shielding honest trafﬁc from the
risk of false hits.
Of course, if cheating negative trafﬁc imitates identiﬁers used in honest trafﬁc, both will be ﬁltered
into the same focused dropper, causing collateral damage to the honest trafﬁc. But by deﬁnition the
cheating trafﬁc will tend to be more negative, which the above penalty function is designed to discrimi-
nate against.
Having isolated suspect identiﬁers, an egress edge dropper can send hints upstream. Any node can
test hints because they point to trafﬁc measurably below an objective threshold. And a node need only
act on the hints if it has sufﬁcient resources. So the hints need not be authenticated (unlike DoS ﬁlter
push-back requests), avoiding vulnerability to ﬂoods of bogus authentication requests. Also, the hints
can safely jump multiple domains without the need for a global key management infrastructure. So
push-back of hints does not depend on the co-operation of high speed core networks, where operators
are more wary of any additional processing.
Even if explicit congestion marking were universally deployed, buffers could still occasionally
overﬂow. So irrespective of any hints, if a router must discard packets, clearly it should bias against any
with negative DPM (§§9 & 12.1.1 develop this point).
4As the introduction to the current Part II of this dissertation explains, since writing this chapter we have realised that designs
like this (and all bottleneck policers that inherited the same idea from Floyd & Fall) are ﬂawed. One cannot rely on the deterrent
effect of policing in bulk against ﬂows that can switch to a whitewashed ﬂow ID whenever they ﬁnd their misbehaviour has been
detected. There can be no deterrent against a cheap pseudonym that can be discarded and replaced instantly at no cost [FR98]. The
new dropper design presented later in §7 ﬁxes this vulnerability to whitewashed identiﬁers.
5From Eqn (5.5) an attacker can reduce dropping probability by increasing variance, e.g. by alternating honest & zero packets.
So a focused dropper should use the EWMV of the top level dropper. We are investigating variants with varying degrees of
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Honest delay reporting
Congestion control and trafﬁc engineering depend on path delay as well as congestion, so we could need
header ﬁelds for both. It is possible that policing the amount of congestion caused (ﬁrst order) will be
sufﬁcient so that policing the dynamics (second order) will not be necessary. But it might be necessary to
police dynamics, in which case a robust way to measure downstream path delay will also be necessary.
The framework we built above (§5.1.3 & Fig 5.2) to incentivise honest congestion reporting relied on
two properties of congestion: it physically cannot be negative; and rising path congestion should lead
to a drop in sending rate (whatever form of fairness is chosen). Delay has exactly the same properties:
negative delay is physically impossible; and rising feedback delay should lead to a lower sending rate.
So, we can use a similar incentive mechanisms to that we used for congestion to ensure the sender
neither overstates nor understates delay. An adaptive dropper, like the one above for the congestion ﬁeld
(§5.1.3), could detect and remove any negative imbalance of delay headers at the internetwork egress.
And at the ingress we can use a policer like the TCP rate equation policer (§5.1.4 below) that punishes
sources sending faster than the ‘TCP-friendly’ rate, which depends inversely on both congestion and
feedback delay. Or preferably we can use the bulk congestion policer which keeps an aggregate of ﬂows
withinanoverallresponsetocongestionbutallowseachﬂowtogiveortakefromothers(alsosee§5.1.4).
5.1.4 Policing congestion response
TCP rate equation policer
In the fastest phase of the TCP algorithm (congestion avoidance), TCP converges to the rate ¯ xTCP ≈
ks/(T
√
p), where k ≈
p
(3/2) and s,T & p are respectively the packet size, round trip time and path
marking (or loss) rate [PFTK98]. Re-feedback ensures that a policer at the network ingress can derive
these parameters from the metrics each packet truthfully declares. It can then calculate a compliant rate
against which to compare the source’s actual rate.
Previous policers had to be placed at every site of possible congestion. With re-feedback, it is
sufﬁcient to place one policer at each ingress to the internetwork. Here, downstream congestion ρ2,1
can be assumed equal to path congestion, p. The policer can approximate the round trip delay as T ≈
T0 + 2ρ1,1, where the upstream round trip T0 can be found by a previous echo test against each source
and the downstream delay ρ1,1 arrives in each packet6.
If the current TTL and ECN ﬁelds in IP were used to implement re-feedback, as sketched in the
SIGCOMM paper on re-feedback [BJCG+05], an ingress policer would have enough information to
mirror the TCP algorithm. Unary congestion marking can take a long time to convey an accurate con-
gestion level.7 Therefore, given the architectural nature of this part of the dissertation, we prefer to focus
6For simplicity, we choose to ignore congestion delay, because simple scaling arguments [Kel00, §2] show that as capacity
continues to grow, congestion delays will become insigniﬁcant relative to ﬁxed propagation delays.
7The TCP equilibrium ﬂow rate ¯ x is proportional to
p
1/p in congestion avoidance [MSMO97], where p is the marking or
loss fraction. Therefore the number of packets between unary congestion marks scales O(¯ x2). As a numerical example, to sustain
10Gbps a ﬂow would only sawtooth every 90mins between marks. Note that currently typical values of ¯ x double every 1.6 years
or so. In contrast, in Kelly’s rate control algorithm ¯ x ∝ 1/p, so inter-mark spacing scales O(¯ x). If packet size stays constant, the
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on multi-bit congestion and delay ﬁelds in future packet headers. §7.7 quantiﬁes how quickly a dropper
could detect misbehaving ﬂows using a unary encoding of congestion that is all that is possible with
today’s IP header. The beneﬁt of using more bits in headers to signal congestion is planned for future
work, building on [GKM01, TC04, AHCC06, XSSK05].
Belowweoutlineonepossiblepolicingalgorithm. Itrequiresperﬂowstate, butthisisn’tnecessarily
a scalability problem at the edge of an internetwork, however it does lay the policer open to resource
depletion attacks. We have also designed an unpublished variant with sub-linear scaling of ﬂow state, but
our goal here is to give a clear implementation example that is concrete but avoids gratuitous distractions.
Thepolicerrequiresatokenbucketperﬂow. Itemptiesthebucketbythesizeofeacharrivingpacket
and ﬁlls it at a rate equivalent to that of a TCP compliant ﬂow experiencing the same path conditions. It
calculates this by deriving p and T from the re-feedback ﬁelds as above. In other words, when a packet
arrives, the policer subtracts the packet size s from the bucket and adds ks∆t/(T
√
p), where ∆t is the
time since the ﬂow’s previous packet.
If the bucket empties, sanctions are applied to the ﬂow. For instance, all future packets might be
discarded, or the policer could choose to take over rate control for the ﬂow. The depth of the bucket
controls the ﬂexibility allowed for a ﬂow to stray from its expected throughput; it is set to α¯ xTCPτ,
where α is the threshold greediness for a ﬂow to be considered non-compliant over a time τ, and ¯ xTCP
is an EWMA of ks/(T
√
p). A ﬂow with a throughput higher than α¯ xTCP will be detected in a time
smaller than τ.
α is chosen so that a compliant ﬂow is most unlikely to trigger starvation of the bucket. For instance,
when p=1%, the average congestion should be 12.3 packets per round-trip. The probability of getting a
window larger than 42 is smaller than 0.01%. Setting α to 42/12.3 = 3.4 and τ = T would guarantee
that less than one compliant ﬂow in ten thousand would be subjected to sanction. Increasing α and τ
would reduce false hits further.
Bulk congestion policer
If one user creates multiple ﬂows, or runs ﬂows for longer than another user (e.g. p2p ﬁle-sharing),
per-ﬂow approaches like TCP cannot arbitrate fairness between users. We can generalise to an adaptive
policer based on MulTCP [CO98] that gives each ﬂow an equivalent rate to w TCP ﬂows. With the
beneﬁt of re-feedback, it can maintain a per user count of congestion sent. But, rather than levying an
unpredictable charge for this congestion [KMT98], the policer can compare the count to whatever the
user chooses to pay. So a ﬂat monthly rate would effectively buy a congestion quota. The closer the
internal congestion count approached this quota, the more w would be squeezed.
This style of policing is similar to that described in [JBM08] and further developed in §11 later.
Edge QoS
Our interest in solving the policing problem was not solely to police a single response to congestion,
such as TCP-friendliness, although that alone is a major contribution. Once timely, truthful downstream
rate response proportional to 1/p, as Kelly’s algorithm does, the time between marks would scale O(1) (i.e. stay constant) as ﬂow
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path information is visible to ingress network operators in data packets, they can offer a spectrum of
responses to incipient congestion. This is equivalent to offering different levels of QoS, perhaps ranging
from a scavenger class, through best effort and premium levels of differentiated service to admission
controlled bandwidth reservations (the right to zero congestion response)—all without any differential
treatment on network elements beyond the ﬁrst ingress (with the caveat below).
Kelly and co-workers [KMT98] pioneered this approach, proving it optimises social welfare across
a network. Further its policing architecture solves the scalability problems inherent in other QoS ap-
proaches, though this is seldom appreciated.
With traditional QoS some identiﬁcation convention must distinguish which trafﬁc the edge has
decided should be given which preferential treatment as it passes to interior domains. Using ﬂow iden-
tiﬁcation (like Intserv) preserves precision, but scales badly. Using class identiﬁcation (like Diffserv)
loses precision at scale.
With edge QoS, instead of the edge identifying the trafﬁc’s QoS for interior routers, interior routers
identify the trafﬁc’s congestion for the edge. Because trafﬁc already carries end-point identiﬁers, regular
packet forwarding carries congestion marking to its destination end-point which in turn feeds it back to
its source—the root cause. Therefore packet markings traverse deaggregation and reaggregation with
absolute precision, and with no need for a separate QoS identiﬁcation convention. The only unequal
treatment of different trafﬁc identities is in the policer at the ﬁrst ingress to the internetwork, where
customer or ﬂow identities have local signiﬁcance.
Siris [Sir02] has proven this approach through simulation. But deployment was conﬁned to a radio
network controller scenario where congestion feedback in the back-channel to the sender could be inter-
cepted and was trusted to be correct—assumptions that can be relaxed with re-feedback, giving general
applicability.
Having sung the praises of closed-loop control, a caveat is necessary. Unusual conditions (link
failure or sudden trafﬁc shifts) can cause trafﬁc in ﬂight to overﬂow queues. So, within a round trip,
strong QoS assurances are only possible if each resource is capable of rudimentary local (open-loop)
trafﬁc class prioritisation until the closed-loop restores order.
Flow start incentives
At the start of each ﬂow, a sender neither knows the state of the path to the destination nor the relative
change the additional ﬂow will cause. TCP’s slow-start phase incrementally ﬁnds out both while also
giving other ﬂows time to make room for the new ﬂow.
The re-feedback incentive framework deliberately presents a dilemma to a sender without recent
path knowledge (e.g. at the ﬁrst packet, or after an idle period). Sending understated DPM increases the
risk of discard at the egress dropper. But sending overstated DPM increases the risk of sanction at the
ingress policer as the ﬂow rises to full rate. The strategies around this dilemma deserve a paper in their
own right, so here we merely provide an outline.
We should think of TCP’s exponential slow-start as dependent on an implicit evolving estimate
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TCP’s steady state rate equation gives ρ ∝ 1
¯ x2 to a ﬁrst approximation. So rate doubling quarters the
implicit path congestion estimate every round trip. To safely pass the policer and the dropper, the sender
should be consistent, also using this implicit estimate of path congestion to set the DPM in each sent
packet. If it reduces its path congestion estimate too quickly (increasing its rate accordingly), it will
undershoot the true path congestion and risk being caught by the egress dropper.
So the re-feedback incentive framework encourages caution at the start of a ﬂow in proportion to
path uncertainty—reminiscent of TCP’s slow start [KM99]. However this claim greatly depends on how
quickly our mechanisms can detect and remove non-compliant behaviour.
It is well-known that repeated unary congestion feedback like ECN takes a long time to signal low
congestion levels. So ECN is not a good basis on which to build responsive policing mechanisms. In
the years it would take to deploy the TCP modiﬁcations needed for our re-feedback extension of ECN
(§6.1.2), TCP will be hitting its own scalability limits.7 So although we believe re-ECN could start to
solve policing problems fairly quickly, we must emphasise that a multi-bit congestion ﬁeld will need
to be considered anyway. It would provide responsive policing even if short ﬂows dominate the future
trafﬁc mix. And at the same time, it would help ﬁx TCP/IP for high capacity scenarios.8
This still leaves the problem of whether the new ﬂow will push a currently uncongested path into
congestion.
5.1.5 Inter-domain incentive mechanisms
The overview of our incentive framework explained why bulk inter-domain congestion charging emu-
lates policing with per-ﬂow precision. We now describe this mechanism.
At an inter-domain interface, only a single bulk counter (and two temporary ones) per direction is
needed. The main counter merely accumulates the DPM ρ in every passing packet over an accounting
period Ta (e.g. a month). At the end of the month, NA should pay NB the charge Ca = λ
PTa ρ+,
where λ is the ﬁxed price of congestion agreed between them. To implement this with the re-feedback
variant of ECN described in §6.1.2, the meter would simply need to increment or decrement by the size
of packets marked with the Positive or Negative code-points respectively.
To protect receiving domains from ‘denial of funds’ attacks, any usage element of a charge should
be ‘sender pays’.9 So λ ≥ 0 and persistently negative ρ should be ignored, given negative congestion
is physically impossible (see §8.2.4). Once neighbours agree that ‘no-one pays’ for persistent negative
congestion, they are incentivised to introduce the dropper (§5.1.3) to remove persistent negative trafﬁc,
which no longer carries any ability to pay for further downstream congestion. ‘Receiver pays’ can
optionally be arranged between edge operators without risk of ‘denial of funds’ through an end-to-end
clearinghouse [BR05].
We should clarify that we neither require nor expect universal inter-domain congestion charging.
However, because it exposes true costs, it is likely to emerge as the competitive equilibrium [BR05].
8An extra multi-bit ﬁeld in IP is already proposed for the allowed congestion window in XCP [KHR02] and for the allowed
sending rate in Quick-Start [FAJS07].
9A capacity charge made to the larger network, whatever the direction of trafﬁc, might well complement congestion charging
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Current tariffs such as 95th %ile peak demand or volume charging may continue. But to compete,
manual price adjustments will be needed to track the congestion price. So congestion charging is likely
to predominate, given it uses a simple, passive mechanism without regard to ﬂows, but automatically
adjusts the price to give the correct upstream incentives to the precise ﬂows that deserve them.
The main alternative to usage charging is the service level agreement, where a network contracts to
keep metrics within statistical limits. Currently, proving whether delay or loss (impairment) budgets have
been exceeded and by whom requires a comprehensive system of trusted echo reﬂectors. Re-feedback
greatly simpliﬁes these problems of SLA accountability, because it ensures downstream metrics are
visible purely locally at each inter-domain border.
5.1.6 Distributed denial of service mitigation
A ﬂooding attack is inherently about congestion of a resource. Because re-feedback ensures the causes
of network congestion experience the cost of their own actions, it acts as a ﬁrst line of defence against
DDoS. As load focuses on a victim, nearby upstream queues grow, requiring packets to be pre-loaded
with a higher congestion metric. If the source does increase the initial metric, its own network’s ingress
policer will throttle the ﬂow. If the source doesn’t increase the initial metric, it will become negative at
the congested resource, which can bias its drop against negative trafﬁc.
Inter-domain congestion charging ensures that any network that harbours compromised ‘zombie’
hosts will have to pay for the congestion that their attacks cause in downstream networks. Therefore, it
is incentivised to deploy our adaptive policer (§5.1.4). The adaptive policer limits hosts that persistently
causes congestion to only send very slowly into congested paths. As well as protecting other networks,
the extremely poor performance at any sign of congestion will incentivise the zombie’s owner to clean it
up.
Note, however, that delay in detecting attacks does leave re-feedback brieﬂy vulnerable (§§5.1.4 &
5.2).
5.2 Dropper performance
The re-feedback incentive framework relies critically on how quickly the dropper (§5.1.3) can detect and
isolate ﬂows that are maliciously understating congestion, and how much collateral damage is suffered
by honest packets. The error in an honest source’s prediction of congestion for re-feedback (Eqn 4.6)
depends on how well path congestion in one round trip correlates with congestion the next. If the
correlation is weak, to avoid falsely dropping honest trafﬁc the dropper has to heavily smooth out all
the variation, making it sluggish to respond to a movement in the average due to an attack. We ran two
experiments to ﬁnd whether a good trade-off between false hits and false misses is possible:
1. The ﬁrst experiment found the fastest smoothing coefﬁcient that still introduced an acceptably low
rate of false hits for honest ﬂows.
2. Then the second experiment checked whether this smoothing was still fast enough to catch dis-
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We chose to use ns2 (v2.26) [ns2] to run a series of simulations with highly demanding sets of ﬂows
arriving at the dropper, some having traversed up to ﬁve potential bottlenecks. Below are the highlights
of the experiments.
We implemented the multi-bit variant of congestion re-feedback carrying real numbers in TCP
Reno using the initialisation and combining functions in Table 4.1. For the local congestion metric
at each router mi, we extracted the real value of the marking probability, pb, used within the RED
algorithm [FJ93, §4] before its transformation into a unary encoded sequence of marks. However, to be
more demanding we still allowed TCP rate control to respond in its usual sawtooth way to unary ECN
feedback and drops. We bounded headers h within [−1,1].
We implemented the dropper within the RED module, simulating packet truncation as its sanction—
in order to preserve the feedback loop. We omitted ﬂow-focused dropping as our initial aim was to assess
feasibility. From Eqn 4.5 we approximated downstream congestion as ρn ≈ −hn, using hz = 0.
Simulation model: We used a parking lot topology of 5 core nodes n1 to n5, connected by 10Mbps
links. Queues at all core routers were RED-ECN in the direction of trafﬁc (n1 to n5), and drop tail in
the reverse direction with sufﬁciently large links to prevent ACK drops. The dropper ran on n5. Trafﬁc
entered the network from all nodes n1–n4 and left it after a number of hops ranging across (1,2,3, & 5).
Transmission delays between core nodes were 3ms, while edge delays deﬁned a range of RTTs between
90–500ms, averaging ˜ 250ms. TCP ﬂows through the dropper were grouped in three classes according to
their typical RTT: low (L), medium (M), and high (U) of the order of 100, 250 & 500ms.
The trafﬁc model consisted of 400 sources of which 110 were TCP-ECN and the rest UDP, with
TCP trafﬁc consistently > 90% of total bits. This reﬂected current [cla98] not necessarily future Internet
trafﬁc (when reduced TCP volume is expected). Packet sizes were all 1500B. We did not explicitly model
HTTP but deﬁned 100 TCP sources as FTP, uniformly varying sessions from small (20pkt) to large
(1500pkt), with sources’ average idle times exponentially distributed. The remaining 10 FTP sessions
transferred inﬁnite-sized ﬁles and traversed all core nodes. The UDP sources were packet trains with
both ON and OFF times Pareto distributed with parameter 1.9. The resulting frequent short-lived and
sporadic long-lived sessions reﬂected long-tailed Internet trafﬁc. Trafﬁc proﬁles were subject to random
variations with RED queue utilisation varying from high 80s to low 100s percentages throughout. Trafﬁc
sources were initially generated at random uniformly between 0 and 20s; statistics collection began 30s
into the 300s simulation. The (gentle) RED parameters were set to the currently recommended values
relative to buffer size.
Simulation results: We used solely honest sources to ﬁnd the dropper’s baseline sensitivity under
various conditions. Fig 5.5 is typical, leading us to use smoothing coefﬁcients just below the knee of
the curve for our later experiments with dishonest ﬂows. That is γ = 0.0005,0.001 or 0.002. Even in
the last case truncation rates were only 1–7:10,000. We expected the subset of ﬂows with below average
RTT (L) to be better at predicting congestion, given it would have less time to change. In fact, they
consistently suffered about 50% worse truncation rates than ﬂows with average RTTs. Indeed, ﬂows
with average RTT were generally better at predicting the next round trip’s congestion than both U and L5.2. Dropper performance 67
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Figure 5.5: Effect of Dropper Smoothing on Truncation Rate.
For honest ﬂows from lower, mid & upper RTT ranges (note: no focused dropper).
ﬂows either side of them. Closed loop trafﬁc behaviour at sub-RTT timescales is a developing ﬁeld, but
we are not aware of any explanation for these results.
We introduced dishonest trafﬁc as a step under-declaring congestion by 0.1 to see how fast a large
change could be detected, then ramping up to see when a small level of dishonesty became undetectable.
Fig 5.6a) shows how if even 10% of ﬂows are dishonest, high truncation peaks occur that would mark
out the ﬂow for focused treatment by a focused dropper. Note how, as levels of understatement decline,
the dishonesty is lost in random ﬂuctuations. Fig 5.6b) shows another example where 50% of ﬂows are
dishonest, thus causing strong near-immediate discrimination.5.2. Dropper performance 68
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Figure 5.6: Truncation Discrimination.
With a) 10% and b) 50% of sources dishonest ∆ρ0c = −0.1 + 0.1 ramp (note: no focused dropper).Re-feedback: Taking Stock
We have presented the beneﬁts of a re-alignment of the datum of path characterisation metrics like TTL
and congestion notiﬁcation. Moving the datum to the destination ensures that each packet arrives at every
relay carrying a view of the remaining path to be traversed by the packet, albeit a round trip delayed.
Despite overhauling the underlying feedback architecture, we will see in the following chapters that
a limited form of re-feedback can be deployed incrementally around unmodiﬁed forwarding elements
using the existing IP header.
Once downstream information is visible, inline equipment can exercise control mechanisms that
were previously impractical, such as rate policing or inter-domain trafﬁc engineering. We describe how
to police TCP’s and other closed-loop rate control algorithms. Not only is it now possible to detect
and remove trafﬁc that exhibits a hostile response to congestion. It is also possible to explicitly permit
applications that require such a response, perhaps given suitable payment in exchange for the enhanced
quality of service.
We have introduced an incentive framework which ensures that the dominant strategy of selﬁsh
parties around the feedback loop will be to declare re-feedback honestly. It relies critically on whether
malicious ﬂows can be detected at the egress, while minimising false hits. We have simulated an adaptive
dropper to show this may indeed be feasible.
Re-feedback allows senders a view of route costs, and networks a view of downstream congestion.
By democratising access to path information, it enables a tussle over whether network control lies with
end-points or the network [CWSB05].Part III
Re-ECN: Unary Congestion Signal
Integrity Mechanisms
70Re-ECN Signal Integrity: Summary
Re-feedback of congestion signalling is a potentially powerful addition to packet networks that could
be used to encourage consideration for others and curb anti-social behaviour. But it will only be truly
useful if its algorithms can be designed and proved to be robust against self-interested or even malicious
strategies. Previous incentive analysis of re-feedback paid no regard to current packet format constraints.
This work focuses on the far more challenging case where re-feedback is applied within the constraint
that no change to the standard ECN forwarding implementation of IPv4 or v6 network equipment will
be necessary, implying only unary congestion signalling can be used. Further, only one extra header bit
is potentially available in each packet header (an extension header is proposed for IPv6 to provide this
extra bit).
The chapters in this part describe a proposed design of the re-ECN protocol and mechanisms to
induce everyone to comply with it in their own interests. It aims to ﬁnd the limits to the claimed beneﬁts
of re-ECN and to more rigorously prove that, within these limits, its incentives and protections work
correctly.
A stated aim of re-feedback is to allow ISPs to adopt a wide range of possible actions and sanctions
using the information about congestion on the path ahead that re-ECN can provide. The focus of this part
is on algorithms to assure the integrity of this information. Algorithms that might use the information to
limit or police congestion responsiveness are out of scope. However, it is very much in scope to ascertain
whether the act itself of using downstream congestion signals will affect their integrity. Therefore one
concrete policer design is deﬁned to allow analysis of the system as a whole.
There follows a guide to the contents of each chapter in this part, which contains the large majority
of the research in this dissertation.Chapter 6
Re-ECN Introduction
In theintervalafter publicationof theoriginal re-feedback paper, theteamworking onre-feedback within
BT thought up a number of attacks against the mechanisms that were ﬁendishly hard to defend against.
Others in the research community came up with similar attacks and some nasty new ones too.
Bauer et al [BFB06] challenged the claims of incentive alignment made for re-feedback, arguing
that a sender wouldn’t be dissuaded by dropped packets if it had no desire to communicate with the
receiver in the ﬁrst place, for example in a denial of service attack. They proposed an attack that was
hard to defend against and also proposed other attacks on congestion pricing in general. Further attacks
have been proposed by Salvatori [Sal05], by others on various mailing lists and in denial of service
research fora (e.g. unpublished attacks from Handley and Greenhalgh that we will describe later).
This part of the dissertation describes the results of a re-think of the re-ECN protocol and incentive
mechanisms. Much of the original ﬂavour remains, and the new mechanisms are, arguably, simpler.
The main difference has been in approach. Design principles have been carefully reﬁned in order to
meet a set of basic constraints. These principles resulted from an iterative process, particularly involving
generalising the known attacks to understand the root of the vulnerability they were targeting. This
approach allows us to test performance against the constraints and against the principles, as espoused
by the design for provability movement [PLD04]. These principles are mostly speciﬁc to the dropper,
although one or two have wider architectural signiﬁcance, making them worth articulating in future
publications. Of course, we also still aim to meet all the ambitious constraints of our original hypotheses
as well.
The biggest change was at the dropper. Reluctantly, the ideal of a dropper that usually monitored
an aggregate, detecting the most misbehaving ﬂows, had to go; for the reasons concerning ﬂow ID
whitewashing, as already outlined.1 Instead we had to accept that the dropper would need to process all
behaving ﬂows, rather than aim to process only all misbehaving ﬂows.
Also much more thought was put into handling dummy trafﬁc, including publication of a workshop
paper [Bri06] on the subject.
No attempt is made to narrate the process that led to both the design principles and to each speciﬁc
design. The design of each element actually represents the outcome of an iterative process across all the
1see §7.3 for the precise architectural discussion on this.73
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Figure 6.1: Re-ECN Incentive Framework.
elements, including occasional revisions of the re-ECN protocol that links them all together. As each
new attack was identiﬁed, it revealed a gap in the understanding of the problem at hand. This led to
deeper understanding of the nature of the problem, which enabled new, deeper requirements and design
principles to be articulated. Then a concrete engineered design was derived from the newly framed
principles.
Most of the attacks invented by the external research community were aimed at the re-feedback pro-
tocol in general, whatever the size of the protocol ﬁelds. In contrast, this part of the dissertation analyses
incentives and strategies for the far more challenging case where the protocol must ﬁt within the limited
header space available in IPv4 or IPv6, without having to alter the ECN behaviour of forwarding ele-
ments. The resultant severely constrained precision brings with it new challenges and new opportunities
to attack the speciﬁcs of the protocol, which we incorporate into the analysis.
The original re-feedback paper [BJCG+05] had brieﬂy proposed a protocol called re-ECN (version-
00), which could be deployed using three existing bits in the IPv4 header. However it was found to be
vulnerable to attacks by unscrupulous network operators (Appendix B.1 explains how). Instead this part
of the dissertation starts from the allegedly hardened (and simpler) re-ECN protocol that is speciﬁed in
version 05–07 of the subsequent Internet Draft on re-ECN [BJMS09a]. Rather than reproduce it here,
we have provided an abstraction of the network layer aspect in §6.1.
This part or the dissertation is organised as follows. It focuses on each of the mechanisms of the
re-feedback incentive framework in turn (visualised in Fig 5.1 from §5.1, which is repeated here for
convenience as Fig 6.1).
Re-ECN wire protocol: §6.1 describes the re-ECN wire protocol that links all the algorithmic mech-
anisms described in subsequent chapters into a complete system intended to create truth telling
incentives. The full protocol details are speciﬁed in IETF Internet Draft format [BJMS09a], but
here it sufﬁces to give an abstraction of the network layer part of the protocol;
Egress dropper: §7discussesadropperintendedtocounterunderstatementofre-ECNsignals. Itwould74
most probably be located at the egress attachment points of the internetwork, but similar functions
might be deployed at any interior location, particularly egress border routers. This chapter is
the most thorough—the core of the dissertation—with pseudocode of all algorithms, analytical
predictions of performance and initial experiments to verify the predictions;
Border incentive mechanisms: §8 discusses hardening of the baseline mechanism proposed in outline
in §5.1.5 earlier to detect and correct understatement of re-ECN signalling before using it to sup-
port congestion-based interconnection contracts. This chapter considers strategies networks might
adopt against each other, and mechanisms to ensure their incentives are aligned to help each other
against attacks from the ends, even if they are commercial competitors. These functions would
monitor trafﬁc arriving at a border router of an autonomous system;
Forwarding element behaviour: §9 is a short chapter that introduces optional enhancements to active
queue management (AQM) algorithms. They exploit re-ECN protocol markings in packet headers
therefore they are only for elements that process the IP header. Two enhancements are proposed:
i) preferential drop to improve robustness against ﬂooding attacks and ii) marking rather than drop
of ﬂow-start packets to improve performance of short ﬂows;
Middlebox Behaviour: §10 is another very short chapter that describes the interactions middleboxes
should have with the re-ECN protocol if they hold ﬂow state. Having reluctantly accepted that re-
ECN requires ﬂow state on its own policing elements, we wanted to provide facilities for middle-
boxes to handle ﬂow state robustly and consistently as a ﬁrst-class part of the Internet architecture;
Bulk Congestion Policer: §11 is yet another relatively short chapter that deﬁnes the most liberal bulk
congestion policer that we believe meets all our design principles and constraints. It is intended
for deployment at the ingress attachment point of an Internet access provider;
The Re-ECN System: The ﬁnal chapter in this part, §12, takes an extensive view of the whole re-
ECN system. First it analyses the effectiveness of the incentive mechanisms against a range of
strategies and attacks designed to play off different parts of the system against each other: ends
against networks, networks against ends, and ends against ends. It also includes an exhaustive
check of Byzantine protocol transitions as a technique to ﬁnd possible new attacks.
The main purpose of this chapter is to pull together the related parts of the system that may have
been introduced in dribs and drabs throughout previous chapters. It summarises the complexity
(simplicity) of the mechanisms proposed in each chapter and their outstanding vulnerabilities.
Throughout the focus is on congestion signal integrity. Mechanisms that rely on the integrity of
these signals are out of scope. Nonetheless, we should not assume the dependency is always one-way. It
may be in the interests of the end-points to understate the congestion signal and live with the resulting
continuous discards of the egress dropper.
In §12.3.1 we prove that the dependency is indeed one-way. In other words, the egress dropper en-
sures that the dominant strategy of a sender wanting to communicate with a receiver will be to declare the6.1. Re-ECN Wire Protocol 75
same shadow price to the network (using re-ECN) as the network declares to the receiver (using ECN),
even if the network then uses the re-ECN shadow price to force the sender to respond to congestion.
Implementation of each element (aside from the protocol) does not need standardisation, but there
aresomeconstraintsontheirbehaviourthatdoneedstandardisation. Tohelpwithdraftingstandardsdoc-
uments later, the relevant standards requirements are highlighted using capitals, using the terminology
deﬁned in IETF RFC2119 [Bra97].
In summary, this part proposes algorithms for each of the elements used to ensure incentives are
aligned for everyone to truthfully contribute to the integrity of unary congestion marking within the
re-ECN incentive framework. The purpose is both to show that the overall proposal is feasible, and
to provide a relatively complete speciﬁcation of an example implementation so that its effectiveness in
meeting the goals stated in Hypothesis 1 (Congestion Signal Integrity) can be analysed.
6.1 Re-ECN Wire Protocol
6.1.1 Justiﬁcation for Building on ECN
The re-ECN wire protocol overloads the explicit congestion notiﬁcation (ECN) wire protocol [RFB01],
which signals congestion in-band—within the headers of data packets. The decision to base re-ECN on
ECN, was not merely to exploit backwards compatibility with an existing practice (there is precious little
deployment of ECN anyway). It was because ECN reveals congestion explicitly and unambiguously in
the IP header and ECN has all the mathematical and structural properties to meet our requirements, each
of which are further elaborated below:
• Disambiguation of Congestion Signalling;
• Congestion Visibility to Network Nodes;
• In-Band Congestion Signalling;
• Unary Encoding.
Disambiguation of Congestion Signalling
Packet drop is a natural consequence of congestion and therefore provides an implicit signal that con-
gestion is happening. However, a packet could be dropped for numerous reasons including:
• bandwidth congestion;
• packet-processing congestion;
• ﬂow-state memory congestion;
• a transmission error (e.g. radio interference);
• a packet size error;
• a routing or addressing error;6.1. Re-ECN Wire Protocol 76
• a resource consumption limit (against the sender, receiver or an intermediate network);
• some other network policy violation (perhaps even based on packet content);
• a badly designed or badly implemented middlebox;
• packet content not understood by the receiver;
• a non-existent, powered down or failed receiver.
Because congestion has considerable economic signiﬁcance, the ﬁrst reason for building on ECN
is to have a congestion signal distinct from packet loss. A network will never be able to remove the
possibility of some losses being due to congestion, but a reasonable aim would be for losses to constitute
a small proportion of congestion signalling.
Congestion Visibility to Network Nodes
In the Internet architecture, drop is designed to be detected by the end-points, which notice gaps in the
sequence space of their end-to-end transport protocol. Sequence numbers are not necessary for stateless
packet forwarding. Therefore, by obfuscating the transport payload, end-points can hide a packet drop
from all network nodes except the one that actually dropped it.
It might seem that a network would be happy to keep its congestion information private from sur-
rounding networks, while only revealing it to the end-points causing the congestion, so they could reduce
their rate in response. That would be true if a congested network could trust all the end-points causing
the congestion to limit the trafﬁc they sent, even if they were attached to other remote networks. Instead,
we assume that a network will have to give its neighbouring networks and end-points incentives to limit
congestion causing trafﬁc, and neighbouring networks will then have to do likewise in turn.
Therefore, another reason we build on ECN is because we need an indication of resource congestion
that is measurable by network nodes without having to inspect a packet any more deeply than the IP
header.
In-Band Congestion Signalling
An ECN-enabled forwarding element marks ECN-capable packets with a probability that has a convex
dependence on incipient congestion of its resources. Marking is oblivious to which ﬂows the packets are
in, but proportionately more packets will be marked in those data ﬂows that send more packets through
a resource when it is more congested.
Packets carry their markings to their destination. The destination end-point is then responsible for
sending congestion feedback to the source. The feedback may or may not be sent. The source may or
may not reduce its bit-rate in response to the feedback.
It may seem convoluted for a forwarding element to signal congestion in-band to the receiver, but
the alternative of signalling directly back to the sender is fraught with problems. In the early Internet,
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proposed for signalling congestion notiﬁcation from a router directly to the sources of the load.2 But this
was superseded by the in-band packet drop model and later by the in-band packet marking model of
ECN, which is considered more robust for the following reasons:
• There is no reason to assume the addressing within the encapsulated payload of a IP packet causing
congestion will be understandable to a middlebox. The middlebox may be in a tunnel that hides
the original end-point identiﬁer of the source of the packet. Packet are naturally constructed so
that a successful response will be possible from the intended destination, but not necessarily from
any arbitrary forwarding element;
• A response from the middle of the network to the source would need its own reliable transport,
whereas in-band signals can piggy-back on the reliable delivery mechanisms of the packets they
mark;
• A response from the middle of the network to the source might be rejected if it did not have the
samesecurityassociationwiththesourceastheoriginalpacket(otherwisehowwouldthismessage
distinguish itself from denial of service trafﬁc?), whereas in-band signals can piggy-back on the
security binding of the packets they mark (whether minimal transport sequence space checks, or
full cryptographic veriﬁcation);
Against these points, one might argue that in-band signalling is wasteful because it requires bits to be
set-aside in every packet header (re-ECN proposes an overhead of three bits in every packet). However,
as long as the per-packet overhead is not too great, it is more efﬁcient for a stressed machine to mark
packets that it is already forwarding than create whole new packets to echo, which requires a transport
payload to be identiﬁed and parsed.
Unary Encoding
Re-ECN signals downstream congestion using the difference between two unary signal encodings. The
use of a unary encoding is to maintain similarity with the implicit congestion signal from resources that
2The earliest reference I can ﬁnd for Source Quench is the IETF RFC famous for introducing the Angle algorithm, but also
including discussion on use of Source Quench for congestion avoidance or recovery (about 2/3 the way through Nagle’s Jan 1984
RFC896 [Nag84]). This led to the use of ICMP Source Quench as the mandatory IETF approach to congestion avoidance &
control for a short while (see §2.2.3 of Postel’s router requirements RFC1009 in Jun 1987 [BP87]). Even at that time, RFC 1009
allowed active queue management for congestion avoidance rather than recovery. However, it was already admitted in that RFC
that SQ wasn’t the ideal solution and research was continuing. The arguments against use of Source Quench that led to the change
of gateway requirements are summarised in RFC1254 (§3.1, Aug 1991 [MR91]), which gives an excellent set of further references.
The arguments seem to have been more a result of an unfortunate sequence of events. Essentially, there were so many different
algorithms for sending source quench that it wasn’t clear what a source should assume was happening when it got one - congestion
onset or a router had actually run out of buffer. Packet drop, on the other hand, was a clearer indication that resources had run out.
By Nov 1994 source quench was a deﬁnite ’SHOULD NOT’ in the draft router requirements RFC (Almquist’s RFC1716 [AK94]).
The alternative approach to congestion avoidance was deliberately vague due to ongoing research, but always involved drop of
packets in some form - outlined in Section 5.3.6, referring to papers of this time such as [MHR+90, Fin89, Nag85, Jac88]. SQ
was described as a weak mechanism, perhaps because of the above arguments, but also perhaps because it was generally only
signalled statistically to avoid congestion avalanche. Use of explicit congestion notiﬁcation ﬁrst appeared in [JRC87] in the DEC
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have to discard packets when they are congested. If a resource experiencing congestion drops packets
with probability p it implicitly signals the expectation of congestion as a sequence of unary encoded
numbers consisting of n − 1 zeroes followed by a one (a drop), where E(p) = 1/n.
Using drop to signal ‘1’ introduces inherent delay while the decoder decides whether a missing
packet is due to reordering or drop. Explicit congestion notiﬁcation (ECN [Flo94]), and the DECbit
scheme [JRC87] on which ECN was based, avoided this delay by creating an explicit way for congested
resources to signal a ‘1’ but without otherwise altering the encoding.
The pragmatic aim was to ensure transports could respond to a mixture of drops and explicit signals
without the strength of response having to be different for each—essentially they realised that universal
agreement on the relative strength of each signal would be unlikely unless the conversion factor was 1.
Other constraints that resulted in this unary encoding were:
Space Efﬁcient: The space used in packet headers should be the minimum necessary.
Stateless: Transports only see a small subset of the packets that traverse a congested resource but the
resource must not have to hold ﬂow state to know which of the packets will be seen by which
transport (anyway it cannot know which packets might subsequently be lost or re-ordered). So
the encoding must be decodable from a randomly selected small subset of packets encoded by a
resource.
Combinable: Packets traversing multiple congested resources will convey an encoded signal that is a
known combination of the signals from each resource using the same combining function as drop;
speciﬁcally, combinatorial, i.e. p = 1 − (1 − p1)...(1 − pn).
Therefore, the decision to base the re-ECN encoding on the unary signal encoding of ECN, was not
merely to exploit backwards compatibility with an existing practice, it was because the rationale for that
existing practice would remain valid as far as we could foresee. We cannot expect all network resources
to become ECN-enabled, and even ECN-enabled resources will sometimes overrun available capacity
and have to drop packets. Therefore, it will always be important to use a congestion signal like ECN that
has a universally understood relationship with simple drop.3
The decision to use combinatorial probability to combine congestion signals from each resource
ended up having a major impact on the complexity of the re-ECN system. However, if we had chosen
instead to use simple addition it is likely there would have been similar or worse complexity having to
cater for the possibility that protocol ﬁelds might overﬂow at high levels of congestion.
6.1.2 Re-ECN Network Layer Protocol
There-ECNprotocolisdescribedinanInternetDraftproposedtotheIETF[BJMS09a]. Forthepurposes
of discussing incentives here, it will usually be sufﬁcient to use an abstraction of the protocol at the
3We are working on a congestion notiﬁcation encoding [Bri07a] that gives itself multiple bits per packet by using an IPv6
extension header (further extending our initial IPv6 re-ECN proposal [BJMS09a]). But it still expects most resources to signal
congestion using the unary encoding of ECN. However, it outlines a way for networks to evolve towards using these multiple bits
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networklayerwithoutworryingaboutexactlywhichbitsaresetinprotocolheadersandwithoutworrying
about how the transport layer at the source arranges packets to be set correctly at the network layer nor
how congestion is fed back from the destination to the source. These issues are speciﬁed in the above
Internet Draft, but they rarely concern us here.
Re-ECN packets may be set to one of ﬁve states (enumerated in Table 6.1), each implying the bytes
of the packet are ‘worth’ one of the three possible values, H = −1,0,+1, representing the expected
volume of congestion that each byte of that packet will cause downstream (or equivalently how much
congestion it will experience) when averaged over a ﬂow. Volume of congestion is deﬁned below in §6.2.
For completeness, Table 6.1 also includes the code-points used for the re-ECN states in protocol headers
and it lists the legacy and unused codepoints at the bottom.
State Notation Worth Variable ECN-RE
Cautious (+?) +1 g 00-1
Positive (+1) +1 z 01-0
Neutral (0) 0 y 01-1
Cancelled (±0) 0 c 11-0
Negative (-1) -1 u 11-1
Not ECN Capable Not-ECT - 00-0
Legacy ECN ECT(0) - 10-0
Currently Unused CU 0 10-1
Table 6.1: Packet States in the Re-ECN Protocol.
The bottom lines tabulate legacy and unused states of the proposed extended ECN (EECN) ﬁeld.
The ‘Variable’ column gives the name we use to represent the proportion of bits with this marking state
in a set of packets.
The ECN-RE column gives the associated settings EE-R of the ECN ﬁeld (EE) and RE ﬂag (R).
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Figure 6.2: Re-ECN Expected State Transitions.
See §12.1.4 for other possible but unexpected or unusual transitions.
The re-ECN protocol arranges the ﬁve possible states of a packet so that unchanged standard ECN
forwarding elements will decrement a packet’s worth more often the more congested they are. That is,6.1. Re-ECN Wire Protocol 80
a pre-existing forwarding element that complies with the ECN proposed standard [RFB01] will signal
congestion by turning Neutral packets Negative (0 to -1) or cancelling the worth of Positive packets from
+1 back to 0 (Fig 6.2). We term this second type of neutral as ‘Cancelled’ to distinguish it from a packet
that started Neutral, and denote it by ±0.
Senders may do whatever is most advantageous to them if they can get away with it, but the egress
dropper (§7) is intended to encourage them to arrange that at least as much positive downstream conges-
tion marking as negative arrives at the destination. So, normally, senders are expected to send Neutral
packets (worth 0). But if a sender expects that some packets will be congestion marked to Negative (-1),
it will try to balance these by sending as many bytes4 with incremented worth (+1). All the bytes within
the same packet have the same worth, so a large Negative packet would be balanced by sufﬁcient small
Positive packets, rounding up to the next whole packet to be safe.
Because of feedback delays, if the sender merely sends a packet of positive worth in response to the
negative worth of each congestion feedback event, the cumulative balance will always be either negative
or zero, so the moving average will always be slightly negative. Given the system is arranged so that it is
in the sender’s interest to maintain a balance of at least zero, the sender will want to build up some credit
at the start of a ﬂow to cover the risk of the largest packets it sends being marked Negative. Then, to
maintain balance, it can re-echo the feedback from each congestion event (-1) by sending a Positive (+1)
packet of the same size. The actual amount of positive credit to send at the start of a ﬂow or hold during
the ﬂow is deliberately left as a dilemma for the sender [BJCG+05, §3.3.3]. Senders more sensitive
to the risk of being sanctioned for allowing a negative balance will send more initial credit and be less
concerned about recovering any credit near the end of the ﬂow. In §7.7 we derive a default that would
be reasonable to standardise into a ﬂow control protocol like TCP.
Because the worth of the packets at the start of the ﬂow may be redundant, or at least overstated, we
introduce a ﬁfth state that is also worth +1, but which a sender can use when it is being cautious at the
start of a ﬂow, rather than responding to actual congestion. We call this cautious positive, or ‘Cautious’
for short, and denote it by ‘+?’. It will be seen as we proceed that being able to distinguish positive worth
from cautious positive worth is very useful in a number of respects.
Currently we deﬁne the value of a cautious positive byte as +1, but we recognise that it may be
preferred in future to allow the relative worth of these Cautious packets to be decoupled from regular
Positive packets, perhaps being determined by a separate market.
The overall effect is that senders have to pre-load enough positive downstream congestion (cf.
credit) into packets to survive being decremented as they experience congestion (cf. debit), without
running out of pre-loaded downstream congestion (cf. avoiding debt). The mechanisms described in this
dissertation give everyone the incentives to ensure they follow such a strategy.
The protocol has been deliberately arranged so that the downstream congestion-volume caused (or
experienced) by a set of packets can be metered in bulk, at least approximately, by a network element or
an end-point, simply by counting the volume of packets marked +1 and subtracting the volume marked
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6.2 Notation, Deﬁnitions and Metrics
Before we deﬁne upstream and downstream congestion, we need to deﬁne some general congestion-
related concepts:
Deﬁnition (Congestion). Both instantaneous congestion mi(t) of resource index i and path congestion
p(t) are deﬁned in §4.A.1 (Deﬁnitions 4.1 & 4.2); Units: Dimensionless 5;
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Congestion-bit-rate). Congestion-bit-rate is the interaction between bit-rate and con-
gestion; The rate at which congestion marked bits are generated or experienced; the instantaneous
product of congestion and the bit-rate of ﬂow f, either generated by resource i as mi(t)xf(t) or expe-
rienced over a path as p(t)xf(t) or over an aggregate set F of ﬂows
P
∀f∈F p(t)xf(t); Typical units:
[b/s];
Deﬁnition 6.2 (Congestion-volume). Congestion-volume is congestion-bit-rate integrated over a time
period T, either for one ﬂow f or the set F of ﬂows
R
T
P
∀f∈F p(t)xf(t)dt. The accumulated volume
of congestion marked bits; Typical units: [b];
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Congestion-intensity). Congestion-intensity is average congestion-bit-rate over
a period T; the average rate at which congestion marked bits are generated or experienced,
R
T
P
∀f∈F p(t)xf(t)dt/T; Typical units: [b/s];
In the following we will start from the marking probabilities mi of each resource i along the path.
Then we will derive an expression for the expectation of downstream congestion at an intermediate point
along the network path after the ith resource, solely in terms of proportions of re-ECN markings visible
locally at that resource (assuming honest marking compliant with the re-ECN protocol).
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Figure 6.3: Re-ECN Markings at Intermediate Points Along a Network Path.
Upstream and downstream of this point there are congested resources that mark the ECN ﬁeld with
probability mu and md respectively. These are the probabilities that an unmarked packet would become
5To check units it can help to think of a marked bit as a distinct unit from a bit. Then instantaneous congestion has the units of
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marked if it traversed the combination of all resources upstream or separately the combination of all
resources downstream. This models the system as if there were just one resource upstream and one
downstream. In other words, the combinatorial probability of ECN marking from resource 0 to i − 1 is
mu = 1 − (1 − m0)...(1 − mi−1)
and the combinatorial probability of ECN marking from resource i to n − 1 is
md = 1 − (1 − mi)...(1 − mn−1).
The top half of Fig 6.3 illustrates this congestion marking. The bottom half illustrates the resulting
proportions of markings in packet headers. The area of each square represents all the packets passing the
corresponding point in the path, and the different sub-areas within each square represent the proportion
of each packet marking. The source determines the vertical proportions of markings, dividing the square
into upper and lower parts. Then as packets traverse the path, each congested network element marks
packets without regard to pre-existing markings. Therefore it superimposes the horizontal proportions
of markings that divide the square into left-hand and right-hand parts. The left-hand part starts at zero
size and grows as more congestion marking is experienced.
We index proportions of packet markings with the resource they are about to arrive at next. The
index zero is used for the origin header before it experiences congestion m0 at the zeroth resource (which
may be within the network stack of the origin machine).
We assume for now that the source only initiates Neutral or Positive markings and we ignore Cau-
tious markings at this stage to avoid them cluttering up the explanations, equations and diagrams.6 It
can be seen from Fig 6.3 that the re-ECN protocol has been arranged so that network marking (vertical
divisions) can be orthogonal to the original source markings (horizontal divisions). Network resources
apply congestion marking to packets regardless of the marking they already carry, so markings accumu-
late by combinatorial probability. Using this fact, Eqn (6.1) tabulates the fractions of each marking at
each point in the network in terms of the Positive marking originally introduced by the source z0 and the
upstream and downstream network marking probabilities mu & md.
Eqn (6.1) deﬁnes the fractions of each re-ECN marking introduced into the network by the source
in the left-hand column. It then deﬁnes the resulting fractions at an intermediate point i and at the end of
the path, having experienced congestion mu and then md.
Positive: z0 zi = (1 − mu)z0 zn = (1 − mu)(1 − md)z0
Cancelled: c0 = 0 ci = muz0 cn =
 
1 − (1 − mu)(1 − md)

z0
Neutral: y0 = 1 − z0 yi = (1 − mu)(1 − z0) yn = (1 − mu)(1 − md)(1 − z0)
Negative: u0 = 0 ui = mu(1 − z0) un =
 
1 − (1 − mu)(1 − md)
 
1 − z0

.
(6.1)
Fractions of each re-ECN marking at the start (i = 0) and end (i = n) of a path and at an intermediate
point i.
6They are properly taken into account in §7.4.56.2. Notation, Deﬁnitions and Metrics 83
If the transport complies with the re-ECN protocol, the source will introduce as much Positive
marking as the sum of Negative and Cancelled markings arriving at the destination in the previous round
trip. Then, assuming congestion is stationary and therefore rises as much as it falls, on average:
z0 = un + cn. (6.2)
We now use this formula to make some preparatory substitutions from Eqn (6.1) towards our goal
of expressing downstream congestion md solely in terms of marking proportions at link i.
z0 = 1 − (1 − mu)(1 − md).
zi =
 
1 − mu
 
1 − (1 − mu)(1 − md)

.
ui = (1 − mu)(1 − md)mu.
zi − ui = (1 − mu)md.
We introduce the notation vi for recent congestion downstream of the ith resource, where
vi = md
=
zi − ui
1 − mu
≈ zi − ui; mu  1 (6.3)
One can think of vi as if it represents a proportion of virtual header markings, i.e. the difference between
the proportions of Positive and Negative markings.
The above approximation removes the slight inﬂation factor 1/(1 − mu). When the condition for
approximation does not hold, we want to put the precise expression for downstream congestion solely
in terms of locally visible markings. Using Eqn (6.1) this can be done either in terms of recent local
Positive and Cancelled markings or in terms of recent local Neutral and Negative markings:
vi =
(zi − ui)z0
zi
= (zi − ui)

1 +
ci
zi

; (6.4)
vi =
(zi − ui)(1 − z0)
yi
= (zi − ui)

1 +
ui
yi

. (6.5)
There are two independent formulae for the same thing because there is deliberate redundancy in the
re-ECN encoding. This fact will be used later (§8.2.7) to double-check against cheating.
The role of the re-ECN protocol (§6.1.2) is to provide packet states that can meter recent down-
stream congestion v and downstream congestion-volume V .7 We will now deﬁne what exactly would be
measured to meter these characteristics, taking account of varying packet sizes.
7Strictly a network provider could use v to signal a downstream shadow price, but we loosely use the term downstream
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We must emphasise that the initial deﬁnitions given here use the above pragmatic approximation
for a downstream congestion metric, which only hold for low levels of upstream congestion (Eqn (6.3)).
We will return to this point in §8.2.5 where the precise correction factors just derived are used to close
off a vulnerability, which can otherwise be exploited whatever the level of congestion.
The ‘downstream congestion-volume’ of a sequence of packets crossing a point in a network is the
volume of congestion these packet cause (or equivalently experience) downstream. It can be measured
in terms of re-ECN markings as
VJ ≈
X
j∈J
sjHj, (6.6)
where sj and Hj are the size8 and ‘worth’ of each packet indexed conceptually (but not actually) by j
and J is the sequence of indices j.9 Note J can be any aggregate passing a point, irrespective of ﬂow
identiﬁers.
This compares with the offered volume over packet sequence J,
SJ =
X
j∈J
sj, (6.7)
The worth H of a packet is an attempt to mark the instantaneous downstream congestion caused by
(or equivalently, experienced by) each byte in the packet. Note the use of bytes rather than packets—all
bytes in a marked packet are deﬁned as marked bytes. If we had enough bits per packet, we could put a
real number for downstream congestion in each packet. Then instantaneous downstream congestion vj,J
at packet index j in the sequence J = 0···j would be the increase of downstream congestion-volume
with respect to total offered volume,
vj,J ≈
dVJ
dSJ
 


j
, (6.8)
But because we have limited space per packet, it is only meaningful to measure recent downstream
congestion over a ﬁnite volume of offered load using moving averages. Then recent downstream con-
gestion up to packet index j in the sequence J is
vj,J ≈
∆VJ
∆SJ


 
j
≈
A
j
k=0(skHk,a)
A
j
k=0(sk,a)
, (6.9)
where the function A
j
k=0(Xk,a) gives the moving average of some characteristic Xk of each packet over
the sequence of packet indices 0···j and a is the discounting factor of the moving average. The two
moving average functions must be the same and both averaging functions must use the same discount
factor so that the characteristics of each packet are weighted identically in the numerator and denomina-
tor.
The nub of these deﬁnitions can better be seen by suppressing all the sequence and index notation
and the discount factors. Then downstream congestion-volume,
V ≈
X
sH, (6.60)
8Packet size includes network layer but not lower layer headers.
9Note that these subscripts denote the indices of packets not, as earlier, the index of the point on the path where packets are
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and recent downstream congestion,
v ≈
A(sH)
A(s)
. (6.90)
Note the following:
• A(sH)/A(s) 6= A(H) because H and s vary independently;
• Re-ECN encodes H into just one of the three possible encoded states (-1, 0 and 1) per packet. So
the discounting factor a must be sufﬁciently small to give consecutive positive and negative marks
a reasonably similar weight, even if interspersed by many zeros;
• The measure of congestion-volume V is deliberately independent of packet order. However recent
downstream congestion v will be unavoidably sensitive to packet reordering, given packet order
determines recency.Chapter 7
Re-ECN Egress Dropper
7.1 Dropper Terminology
We use the term ‘drop’ and ‘dropper’ for brevity, but other sanctions may be applied depending on policy,
such as payload truncation. In scenarios where trust is expected, the sanction may simply be to raise a
management alarm reporting the excess of trafﬁc above that which an honest source would have sent.
We use the term ‘egress dropper’ loosely, because the dropper will often be located at the egress of
a domain and there must be a dropper at the egress of the scope of an internetwork protected by re-ECN.
However, it would be valid (but not usually necessary) to locate a dropper at any network node to detect
and sanction negative ﬂows.
The term ‘ﬂow identiﬁer’ means the identiﬁers common to a sequence of packets at whatever gran-
ularity the source reveals, including within the network layer payload. §7.3 discusses our reluctant
decision to detect ﬂows in the network and our efforts to ensure only the barest minimum of per-ﬂow
constraints.
Re-ECN only needs to classify packets into ‘ﬂows’ to check that downstream congestion in packets
passing a point is consistently non-negative, given a consistently negative ﬂow implies the transport must
be misbehaving. Ideally this requires ﬂows to be examined at the ﬁnest granularity possible. Otherwise,
if only aggregates of ﬂows are examined, a number of slightly positive microﬂows might mask a minority
of highly negative microﬂows. However, in certain circumstances dependent on policy1 it would be
reasonable to detect whether an aggregate was negative before examining ﬂows within the aggregate to
ﬁnd which ones to sanction. If the ﬁnest granularity visible at the edge of a network is an aggregate (e.g.
an IPsec encrypted tunnel), the only option open to the network is to treat the aggregate as one ﬂow,
whether for passive detection or active sanction.
The speciﬁc identiﬁers used for a ﬂow depend on which ‘next header’ ﬁeld is present in the IP
header. For instance, if the next header is TCP, DCCP or UDP, a ﬂow can be deﬁned by the ﬁve-tuple of
source and destination IP addresses, the protocol ID in the IP header and the source and destination port
numbers in the transport header. If the next header is IPsec AH or ESP, the ﬂow is deﬁned by the four-
tuple of destination IP address and next header ﬁeld in the IP header and the security parameter index
(SPI) in the AH or ESP header. For extra entropy the IPv6 Flow Label SHOULD be used in combination
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with the usual 5-tuple ﬂow ID parameters where available (see §7.5.3). Alternatively, other ﬂow-IDs
may be used, or other ways to identify ﬂows that are as yet to be deﬁned.
If the next header ﬁeld is unrecognised, only the 3-tuple of IP addresses and protocol ID can be
used. But in general, a common 3-tuple doesn’t imply that all packets belong to the same contractual
entity, given tunnels, NATs and multi-user hosting machines are common on the Internet. Also, whereas
all packets with a common ﬂow ID will generally follow the same route, all packets with a common
3-tuple need not. If different proportions of one ﬂow pass through different droppers at the same time,
dropper behaviour will be very unpredictable. Switching to a new dropper mid-ﬂow is discussed in §A.1.
If any identiﬁers are unrecognisable, the packet is given a default ﬂow ID we call ‘Bulk’ in common
with all packets not belonging to a well-behaved ﬂow (see §12.2.2 on Forward Compatibility).
7.2 Dropper Behaviour Constraints
The egress dropper for unary marking needs to satisfy the following design constraints:
Minimal False Hits: It SHOULD introduce minimal false hits for honest ﬂows;
Minimal False Misses: It SHOULD quickly detect and sanction dishonest ﬂows, preferably at the ﬁrst
dishonest packet;
Transport Oblivious: It MUST NOT be designed around one particular rate response, such as TCP’s,
or one particular resource sharing regime such as TCP-friendliness [FHPW03], given an important
goal is to give ingress networks the freedom to allow different rate responses and different resource
sharing regimes [GK99b, Bri07b]—unilaterally without coordinating with downstream networks;
Sufﬁcient Sanction: It MUST introduce sufﬁcient loss in goodput so that sources cannot play off losses
at the egress dropper against higher allowed throughput at the ingress policer [Sal05] (§12.1.1);
Manage Memory Exhaustion: It SHOULD be able to counter state exhaustion attacks. For instance,
if the dropper uses ﬂow-state, it should not be possible for sources to exhaust its memory capacity
by gratuitously sending numerous packets, each with a different ﬂow ID.
Identiﬁer Accountability: It MUST NOT be vulnerable to ‘identity whitewashing’, where a transport
can label a ﬂow with a new ID more cheaply than paying the cost of continuing to use its current
ID [FR98];
7.3 Dropper Design Principles
The following design principles have been developed for the dropper design, to satisfy the above con-
straints (Table 7.1 shows which principle satisﬁes which constraint). They are introduced brieﬂy below,
then some are discussed at greater length in the subsequent sections:
1. Source responsibility for delay allowance—aims to make false hits the responsibility of the source;
2. Sanctions proportionate to the crime (equivalence with honesty)—deﬁnes hits and misses, without
being transport speciﬁc, at least within the bounds of the dropper-policer trade-off (§12.1.1);7.3. Dropper Design Principles 88
Required Constraint Design Principle
Minimal False Hits Source Responsibility for Delay Allowance
Minimal False Misses
Transport Oblivious Sanction Proportionate to Crime
Sufﬁcient Sanction (Equivalence with Honesty)
Manage Memory Exhaustion Aggregate Flow State unless Positively Flagged
Identiﬁer Accountability Rely on Flow ID Uniqueness not Reachability
Table 7.1: Which Design Principle Satisﬁes Which Constraint.
3. Aggregate ﬂow state unless positively ﬂagged—ensures the dropper need only allocate memory
for ﬂows that have given at least as much as they have taken;
4. Rely on ﬂow ID uniqueness, not reachability—limits scope of accountability for resource usage to
an identiﬁer, not to the entity behind the identiﬁer.
Sanctions Proportionate to the Crime (Equivalence with Honesty).An honest source complying with
the re-ECN protocol will aim to ensure that the volume of Positive marked bytes is no less than the
volume of Negative marked bytes at the egress, at least on average. The egress dropper SHOULD drop
sufﬁcient trafﬁc so that delivered trafﬁc conforms to that which an honest source would have sent. A
dropper algorithm to achieve equivalence is derived in §7.3.1.
Neutral packets do not contribute to the balance at the egress, but they are not immune from being
dropped in order to comply with the equivalence principle.
An alternative might have been to detect when the balance of a ﬂow at the egress drops below a
threshold then drop all its trafﬁc. However, because the crime in this case has a measurable level, we
can neutralise it rather than punish it. It is also safer to adopt the principle that the sanction should be
proportionate to the crime, otherwise attackers may be able to deﬂect ampliﬁed sanctions onto others.
Merely neutralising misbehaviour creates no deterrent effect; therefore proportionate sanctions
would be ineffective if only applied on a randomly sampled basis. The optimal attack strategy then
would be to misbehave as much as possible, only behaving when forced to. Anyway, as soon as a mis-
behaving ﬂow detects it has been picked for punitive sanctions, it can just take on a new whitewashed
identity [FR98].2 The improbability of universal worldwide source address validation [BB05] drove us
to give up on source addresses having any meaning other than as a label for a sequence of packets, which
in turn led to the need for proportionate sanctions and continual vigilance rather than occasional deterrent
punishments.
Therefore any punishment should be applied in addition to neutralising misbehaviour. Neutralis-
ing misbehaviour acts as a baseline suitable for the generic internetworking layer, without precluding
punishment layered on top under local policy control.
Source Responsibility for Delay Allowance.The re-ECN protocol is designed on the principle that a
source carries its proportion of the risk that its packets will encounter unforeseen congestion in the round
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triptimeaftertheyaresent. Itisthesource’sresponsibility, notthedropper’s, toallowforfeedbackdelay.
The alternative of the network robustly determining each transport’s RTT seemed infeasibly complex.
An honest source will avoid the average of recent congestion going negative under reasonable net-
work conditions by providing sufﬁcient positive credit at the start of the ﬂow to allow for unforeseen
events during the feedback delay. Then, as feedback informs it that congestion costs are being incurred,
it will match the feedback with an equal amount of re-feedback bytes to maintain the same level of credit.
Thus, during a ﬂow, the markings of bytes should balance to no less than zero.
The dropper then has the minimal job of checking that the recent balance of a ﬂow remains non-
negative. This design choice reluctantly requires per-ﬂow processing and state within the network. Once
one accepts that it is untenable to expect hosts to co-operate in determining their own share of resources,
one has to face the question of whether the network can arbitrate resource sharing with only per-packet,
not per-ﬂow processing.
In 1998 it seemed Kelly had ﬁnally devised a ﬂow-oblivious network mechanism using ECN-based
congestion pricing [KMT98]. But sanctioning the receiver created insurmountable problems in prac-
tice [BJCG+05, §3.1]. We tried many avenues to alleviate the ‘receiver-pays’ problem while keeping a
ﬂow-oblivious network, but re-ECN has been the closest we have been able to come to our goal.
Unlike other schemes to police congestion responsiveness3, the network need not make any judge-
ments about rate control behaviour, only about congestion signal integrity. The network can still leave
end-points free to choose how aggressive their rate control behaviour will be, and to weigh up how much
credit they are willing to spend to protect a ﬂow from an unusual burst of congestion.
So, in summary, re-ECN can be transport-oblivious but unfortunately not ﬂow-oblivious. Unless
some completely ﬂow-oblivious but practical network mechanism can be invented, it seems that the
minimum generic network function [SRC84] will have to include per-ﬂow testing of congestion signal
integrity, at least on egress nodes in environments lacking trust. But the network doesn’t need to allow
for round trip delays in these signals, which can remain the responsibility of the end-points.
Aggregate Flow State unless Positively Flagged.The egress dropper cannot determine whether each
packet is correctly congestion marked on its own, because of the need to allow for variation of expected
downstream congestion around zero due to round-trip delays.4 To determine whether to sanction each
packet the dropper must therefore hold state on each ﬂow. Given the dropper is only absolutely required
at the egress edge of the network, we believe this is at least feasible, though not desirable.
Holding ﬂow state could make the dropper vulnerable to state exhaustion attacks from malicious
sources, because they can give a new ﬂow ID to each packet. However, we arrange that a previously
unseen ﬂow ID alone doesn’t make the dropper allocate new ﬂow state; the source must also send a
3They fall into two classes: i) bottleneck policers that detect ﬂows taking much greater than an equal rate; after Floyd and
Fall [FF99]: Stabilized RED (SRED [OLW99]), CHOKe [PPP00], RED with Preference Dropping (RED-PD [MFW01]), Least
Recently Used RED (LRU-RED [Red01]), XCHOKe [CCG+02], and Approx. Fair Dropping (AFD [PBPS03]) and ii) schemes
that aim to isolate ﬂows (or aggregates) from misbehaviour by enforcing equal or weighted sharing of bottlenecks based on fair
queuing (FQ [Nag85]) or weighted fair queuing (WFQ [DKS89]).
4Initially we believed this was a limitation of unary marking, because unary markings are only meaningful when accumulated
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Cautious (or Positive) packet for the dropper to consider a ﬂow to be new. Because a packet must ﬂag
that it wants to be considered as a new ﬂow, it can be held accountable for the ﬂags it raises as it crosses
every network trust boundary from the sender onwards (by the ingress policer or border mechanisms in
the wider incentive framework of Fig 6.1).
Therefore, the dropper’s vulnerability to state exhaustion attacks is limited because sources must
consume their own ‘credit’ for the privilege of having the egress dropper allocate memory to allow
through a new unique ﬂow unimpeded. In addition, the regular re-feedback rules ensure each source
must keep each ﬂow’s state alive, by regularly include positive worth in further packets at a rate matching
the congestion markings from its network path.
Rely on Flow ID Uniqueness, not Reachability.The egress dropper uses ﬂow identiﬁers solely as
labels—to isolate ﬂow IDs from each other—not to push anything back towards the source. So a ﬂow
can be made to behave correctly as long as its identiﬁer is currently unique—it does not need to be
labelled ‘correctly’ (i.e. with the reachable source of the packet). This is a useful property that is robust
against a source that has no desire to receive a reply and therefore need not correctly identify itself in
order to send datagrams to something else. Consequently, the re-ECN protocol is insensitive to whether
identiﬁers are set honestly or correctly, except in so far as they carry a packet to the particular egress
dropper in question.
Together, the two principles ‘ignore reachability of the origin address’ and ‘source responsibility
for delay allowance’ ensure that packets can, in themselves, be held accountable for their resource us-
age.5 As packets cross an internetwork, the packets themselves carry accountability information from
the sender to the ﬁrst network, then from the ﬁrst to the second and so on. Each party can be made
accountable to the next using the packets passing between them as intermediaries, because the packets
themselves contain sufﬁcient information about rest-of-path congestion.
The egress dropper deﬁnes a ﬂow solely by the uniqueness of its ﬂow identiﬁers while it is active,
and it will not recognise a new unique ﬂow without some investment of resources by the source (see
‘Aggregate Flow State unless Positively Flagged’ above). Therefore we are only concerned by spoofed
source identiﬁers if they manage to break the uniqueness property of someone else’s ﬂow, by mimicking
all its identiﬁers (see §7.5.3).
Note that this principle implies that the dropper will never carry over a balance (whether positive or
negative) from one ﬂow to another, even if the ﬂow appears to belong to the same end-points—because
it attaches no meaning to end-point identiﬁers other than their uniqueness.
7.3.1 Proportionate Sanctions
(Equivalence with Honesty)
At this initial stage, we are only concerned with the integrity (honesty) of Positive markings. We assume
that Negative markings are introduced as packets traverse the internetwork, with no bias towards marking
any particular types of packet more than others (§12.1.2 analyses this assumption). Then an honest
5Multibit downstream congestion information is not necessary for this property, due to ‘source responsibility for delay al-
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Figure 7.1: Misbehaving Trafﬁc a) Before and b) After Discard by the Egress Dropper.
Its output aims to be equivalent to trafﬁc from an honest source.
source is deﬁned as one that never tries to send less Positive bytes than the Negative bytes introduced by
the network, and an honest ﬂow is deﬁned as the result.
So as not to disrupt the main ﬂow of the explanation, we assume the source doesn’t initiate any
Cancelled packets (±0), which only result from the network randomly marking packets that happen
already to be Positive (+1). Until later, we also count Cautious packets (+?) in with Positive (+1). We
defer deeper questioning of these assumptions to §7.4.
While the recent balance between positive and negative trafﬁc for a ﬂow is in credit, the dropper
does nothing. But if the recent balance is in debt, by the principle of equivalence with honesty, the
dropper aims to reduce the ﬂow’s trafﬁc as a whole so that the recent volume of Negative marked trafﬁc
after drop will be no greater than the recent volume of Positive trafﬁc before drop.
Fig 7.1 shows the concept of equivalence with honesty graphically in two dimensions, using the
same visualisation conventions as in Fig 6.3. It illustrates volumes of trafﬁc markings dividing up a) the
larger square before and b) the smaller square after drop. The notation for the fractions of each marking
is the same as that deﬁned in Eqn (6.1). After the dropper, Positive and Negative markings balance,
while before there is less Positive than Negative. The area of the enclosing rectangle on the right that
includes the trafﬁc discarded by the dropper (grey hatched) is the same as that of the left hand square, as
are the areas of each marking within them.
By equivalence with honesty, the same proportion of Neutral markings should be dropped as Neg-
ative. This is because congestion marking should be applied randomly by upstream networks. So if we
would expect to see less Negative marks from an honest source, we would also expect less trafﬁc that
would become Negative if marked, i.e. less Neutral trafﬁc. Then, if this reduced trafﬁc had been that sent
by an honest source, as many bytes would have been marked Negative as the dropper actually received
marked Positive, which leads to a dropper output that is equivalent to that from honest behaviour.
In Eqn (6.6) we deﬁned downstream congestion-volume V so that it could be measured as the
volume of Positive marked bytes less the volume of Negative marked bytes during the lifetime of a ﬂow.
An honest ﬂow will try to ensure V ≥ 0 throughout its lifetime. Similarly to Eqn (6.90), we deﬁne the
fraction of Positive marked bytes arriving at node index i in the recent past using the function A(·) for a
moving average:
zi =
A(sH
+
i )
A(s)
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and the fraction of Negative bytes similarly6 as
ui = −
A(sH
−
i )
A(s)
. (7.2)
What ‘recent’ means is determined by the discounting factor a of the moving average, which we
will tune to minimise false misses and false hits (§7.8). We have suppressed this factor from the notation
along with all the extraneous detail of packet indexes and sequences, as was done between Eqn (6.9) and
Eqn (6.90).
From Eqn (6.3), if the moving averages of packets marked with each worth are each measured
separately as they pass a point, they will sum to a moving average of recent downstream congestion,
vi ≈ zi − ui. (6.3)
The approximation becomes an equality when testing whether vi = 0.
If the recent balance of markings at the egress dropper is in debt (vn < 0), the dropper makes sure
delivered trafﬁc is equivalent to that from an honest source by reducing the recently delivered fraction
of Negative bytes to uN = zn, where indices n and N denote the points before and after the dropper.7
But it only drops trafﬁc if a ﬂow’s lifetime downstream congestion-volume Vn < 0 as well. This allows
an honest ﬂow to post a credit to protect itself from bursts of congestion that would otherwise make its
recent balance look negative. So the drop probability of Negative bytes πu should be such that
uN = un(1 − πu)
= zn
=⇒ πu = 1 −
zn
un
; Vn < 0,vn < 0. (7.3)
The drop probability of Neutral bytes πy should be the same as that of Negative bytes πu by our
earlier arguments. We don’t drop any Positive packets, because they act as the baseline that would have
been sent by an honest source. We also don’t drop Cancelled packets, but only because we have another
way to normalise the proportion of Cancelled packets that enter the dropper, which will be introduced
later (§7.4.1). In summary the dropper should discard each packet marking with probability:
πy = πu; Vn < 0,vn < 0
= 1 −
zn
un
, (7.4)
πz = 0,
πc = 0.
(7.5)
§7.6 gives simple algorithms that implement these drop probabilities.
Fig 7.2 visualises the dropper reducing the various packet markings sent by an attacker understating
downstream congestion. It shows re-ECN markings along a network path ending in an egress dropper.
6Except we negate the deﬁnition so that ui can be numerically positive.
7This does not remove congestion notiﬁcation signals, because packet drop is always at least an equivalent notiﬁcation to
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Figure 7.2: Egress Dropper for Unary Re-ECN Marking.
The transport is understating Positive markings so the dropper is removing sufﬁcient Negative and Neu-
tral markings so that it delivers trafﬁc that is equivalent to that an honest source would have sent. If
instead the dropper discarded packets randomly to reduce the ﬂow as a whole, the proportion of Positive
to Negative markings would incorrectly remain the same.
The converse of proportionate sanctions as a goal is stealth as a non-goal. That is, the dropper needs
to actively sanction offending trafﬁc, therefore it cannot hide its own existence. It doesn’t matter if the
dropper is predictable if it predictably prevents any misbehaviour. Consequently, if the dropper allows
false misses (see §7.7.2), attackers will be able to probe its limits to ﬁnd and exploit its trigger level.
7.3.2 Source Responsibility for Delay Allowance
The re-ECN protocol is designed on the principle that a source carries the risk of its packets encountering
unforeseen congestion in the round trip time after they are sent. This allows a source the freedom to
increase its window of packets in ﬂight more aggressively than others, but it must take responsibility for
the risk of exercising this freedom.
The aim is to move away from the traditional TCP constraints that all sources must increase their
window equally per round trip time, but they may increase exponentially at the start. Not only does
the traditional rule constrain new behaviours (e.g. attempts to improve ﬂow start performance), but
it is also being routinely ﬂouted by applications that open multiple ﬂows simultaneously. We need to
recognisediverseapplicationneeds, ratherthanpretendingthateveryoneiscomplyingwithimpractically
restrictive rules [CWSB05].
Because many trafﬁc sources will all simultaneously be taking the risk of increasing their window
of packets in ﬂight, each source should carry its proportion of the risk, which depends on currently
observed path congestion, its current bit-rate, and its increase in bit-rate per round trip time.
“Carries the risk” means the source pays for the risk in advance of the round trip. This distinguishes
the re-ECN protocol from the form of congestion pricing suggested by Gibbens & Kelly [GK99b] in
which congestion is only paid for after the event—if it happens. Under re-ECN, if an unexpected burst
of congestion happens, and if the source hasn’t paid to cover this risk in advance, it risks packets being7.3. Dropper Design Principles 94
dropped. This is more generic than congestion pricing, because the source can either choose to pay credit
to avoid the risk of drop, or choose to suffer some unexpected drops by spending less on credit. Once a
burst of congestion has happened, the source only has to pay to balance its cost if it wishes to top up the
credit that turned out to be necessary in order to to continue the ﬂow with the same cover.
This re-ECN design choice translates into the dropper design principle that the source, not the
dropper, should allow for feedback delay.8 But, because a re-ECN source only pays its conservative
expectation of congestion within the next window, this may not be sufﬁcient to cover all possible un-
foreseen events within the round trip. If an unusually high burst of congestion occurs, the dropper will
not deliver packets if they are not covered by sufﬁcient credit. In other words, the source cannot expect
the dropper to give credit whenever the source’s own credit turns out to be insufﬁcient. Thus a ﬂow risks
losing packets in proportion to its underestimate of the worst-case cost within a round trip.
A ﬂow that knows it is about to complete, particularly as it approaches the ﬁnal window, may recoup
some of the credit it invested by not re-inserting all feedback.9 But, even if a ﬂow continues to re-insert
feedback until the last, a debit may be left at the end of a ﬂow if heavy congestion is experienced in the
last window. Nonetheless, over many ﬂows, it is highly unlikely that all the possible debits at the end
will exceed the credits added at the start.
These considerations have an informal microeconomic interpretation. On the supply side, all the
credits that turn out to be paid unnecessarily can be considered as funding sufﬁcient extra capacity to help
absorb the prevailing proportion of bytes in round trips in which ﬂows start (or rapidly increase) versus
those in steady state. While on the demand side, making sources responsible for the risk of congestion
during round trip delays ensures that sources won’t increase their window aggressively unless they are
willing to pay their proportion of the resulting extra risk of congestion.
Conditions for stability have been derived that place limits on ﬂow aggressiveness [KMT98, KV05].
Making sources responsible for the risk of congestion will not directly prevent them overstepping this
limit. But this stability limit does seem to present a natural step in the shadow price, which should
more strongly discourage sources from causing instability. If a source is aggressive enough to cause
instability, the resulting oscillations will disproportionately increase the expected price. Although all
competing sources will suffer, not just the one causing instability, this price step should strengthen the
barrier against behaviour so aggressive it causes instability.10
7.3.3 Dropper State Management
Middlebox Flow-State: Pros and Cons
The design of the re-ECN egress dropper reluctantly introduces the minimum per-ﬂow function into
the network that we could achieve (see §7.3). Although re-ECN avoids embedding any subjectivity or
value-judgement in the network about the required congestion responsiveness of ﬂows, it does require
the network to implement one per-ﬂow test of behaviour: whether the balance of positive and negative
8However, the dropper is responsible for allowing for any delay introduced by its own algorithm (e.g. a moving average).
9The strategy to adopt at the end of a ﬂow can be derived from the analysis in §7.7, but it does not affect the analysis presented
here (so its details are left for further work).
10Except if a source is sending dummy trafﬁc to be malicious.7.3. Dropper Design Principles 95
bytes is in credit.
No matter how minimal this per-ﬂow function, it necessarily requires per-ﬂow state in the network.
The ‘shared fate’ design principle of the Internet [Cla88] advises that the end-points alone are best placed
to hold ﬂow state, so that the state will usually only be lost if either end-point fails, in which case the
ﬂow will have failed anyway.11
Once we admit the need for ﬂow state on a middlebox, we have to handle failure or startup of the
middlebox during a ﬂow, or the reroute of a ﬂow in progress through the middlebox. Later we present
two dropper algorithms:
1. the ‘Continually Vigilant’ algorithm primarily designed to start at the beginning of a ﬂow (§7.6.1);
2. the ‘Mid-Flow’ algorithm (§A.1) designed speciﬁcally to pick up a ﬂow in the middle and imme-
diately start testing its behaviour.
We recommend the ‘Continually vigilant’ algorithm because it is more precise (better trade-off
between false hits and misses) in normal operation and it will recognise packets from the middle of a
ﬂow as if they were a new ﬂow, but only after a round trip with some degree of loss. It only recognises
mid-ﬂow packets as a new ﬂow after it has received a Positive packet, which a ﬂow should send at least
occasionally in response to drops anyway.
The dropper could use the alternative mid-ﬂow algorithm for ﬂows in progress when it boots up.
But it would be harder for the dropper to recognise a rerouted ﬂow and know to use this algorithm instead
of the one for a whole ﬂow lifetime. Ideally, the dropper would have to know to expect the arrival of
mid-ﬂow packets by some out of band means—perhaps through participating in the routing system. We
therefore recommend the ‘Continually Vigilant’ algorithm, because the alternative seems too complex.
Further, once we allow a need for network ﬂow state, we have to admit that the network layer needs
access to ﬂow IDs. In general terms, as a minimum in order to communicate, two computing processes
don’t have to reveal their IDs to the network nodes between them. The Internet architecture recognises
that ﬂow IDs are not essential to the functioning of the network layer. It makes ﬂow IDs a property of
the transport layer, which can choose not to reveal them to the network layer12. Indeed, the facility in
IPv6 that allows the transport layer to volunteer a ﬂow label to the network has not so far been taken up.
Therefore, as we explained in §§7.1 & 7.3 the dropper only needs a ﬂow ID to be unique; it doesn’t
need to identify reachable ﬂow end-points. The best it can do is to use the most ﬁne-grained aggregate
identiﬁer available. This means that a misbehaving ﬂow or ﬂows could besmirch the balance of other
well-behaved ﬂows sharing the aggregate (see §7.5.2 for details of this attack and countermeasures).
11One technique to avoid network ﬂow state is to expect the end-points to regularly refresh soft ﬂow state in the packets they
send. A middlebox can even use an authenticated cookie-style mechanism [KM97] when it doesn’t trust the end-points to store its
state faithfully, by signing the latest state and expecting the end-points to return the signed state in future packets. But in the case
of the re-ECN dropper, the network’s ﬂow state changes from packet to packet so none of these tricks will work.
12E.g. by aggregating many ﬂow IDs together in some form of tunnel between two intermediate addresses between the processes
and encrypting all mention of any IDs to be used for demultiplexing beyond those tunnel end-points7.3. Dropper Design Principles 96
Dropper State Machine
Precisely, the only properties the egress dropper requires of a ﬂow are:
• An arriving packet is considered to belong to (or match) a ﬂow if all its identiﬁers match the
identiﬁers of an active ﬂow;13
• A new active ﬂow starts when a packet carrying the Cautious (+?) or Positive (+1) marking arrives
that doesn’t match an existing active ﬂow;14
• A ﬂow MAY be considered to have ceased to exist if no matching packets arrive within a ‘ﬂow
state minimum timeout’ ([BJMS09a] fairly arbitrarily deﬁnes this timeout to be 1s—enough for
about four round trips halfway round the world and back).
The above deﬁnitions allow an egress dropper (and any other elements) to manage ﬂow state deter-
ministically, clearing it after an idle period of 1s if necessary. If a transport re-uses its own (or someone
else’s) identiﬁers after inactivity greater than the timeout, it will require initialisation by a new packet
marked positively and the egress dropper will not necessarily consider it as the same ﬂow.
We expect ingress networks will hold sources accountable for packets marked Cautious or Positive
by considering delivery of each byte in them as a cost. This will tend to limit the rate at which sources
send packets that open new ﬂows (see §12.1.3). Sending subsequent packets using the same ﬂow ID
should cost the source nothing other than further Positive packets required to balance any cost of con-
gestion encountered. But this does place an ultimate limit on the amount of dropper state that a source
can keep alive (see §12.1.3 for the worst-case scenario).
The design of a dropper is fairly hemmed in by all the constraints it faces. Nonetheless only the
constraints would need standardising, not design details or implementation. We propose two example
designs. We will focus here on the ﬁrst design called ‘Continually Vigilant’ (§7.6), because it maintains
state for each ﬂow that has proved itself well-behaved, whereas the second, termed ‘Mid-Flow’(§A.1)
maintains less ﬂow-state at the expense of precision.
Themorestateful(‘ContinuallyVigilant’)dropperconsiderspacketstobelongtomisbehavingﬂows
if they use a ﬂow ID that has not ﬂagged itself as new. It treats all misbehaving ﬂows as one ‘Bulk’ ﬂow
to avoid holding state for each of them and treats them all equally badly. It will only protect a new
ﬂow from the risk of the high drop rate suffered by the bulk of misbehaving ﬂows if it starts with a
Cautious (or Positive) packet and if its lifetime balance remains in credit. We categorise such ﬂows as
‘Compliant’.
There is a small chance (quantiﬁed in §7.7.1) that a Compliant ﬂow will experience a burst of
congestion marks within one window and that the dropper will wrongly consign packets to Bulk status
before the source can send sufﬁcient credit to make up the shortfall. Therefore, the egress dropper should
continue to hold the state of a ﬂow that has gone into debt for at least the ﬂow state minimum timeout
13Additionally, if it is larger than any packet so far matching the ﬂow, at least as many bytes of credit must have been posted to
the ﬂow as its size, otherwise it is not considered to match the ﬂow. This negates ﬂow ID whitewashing attacks (§7.5.1).
14To be clear, if a Cautious packet matches an active ﬂow it doesn’t start a new ﬂow.7.3. Dropper Design Principles 97
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Figure 7.3: Re-ECN Dropper Flow State Machine.
(currently deﬁned as 1s). We term this being on ‘Remand’. If a ﬂow is still on Remand after this timer
expires, its ﬂow state may be removed, leaving it to be treated with the Bulk of misbehaving ﬂows.
If sufﬁcient Positive bytes arrive while still on Remand to make the lifetime balance V ≥ 0, the ﬂow
returns to the Compliant status.
Even for Compliant ﬂows, the dropper’s ﬂow state may time out if the ﬂow has remained idle for
no less than a similar duration of 1s. The path congestion that a transport algorithm learns from the
network becomes stale during idle periods much longer than this anyway. Therefore a ﬂow that is idle
for at least this long MUST restart as if it were a new ﬂow by conservatively setting Cautious in at least
the ﬁrst packet after the idle period. If the egress dropper has removed its state for this ﬂow, this action
will re-establish it. Whether the dropper’s state has been removed or not, this action will be treated as a
credit.15
Fig 7.3 summarises the above discussion by showing diagrammatically the state machine of a drop-
per design that keeps state for the lifetime of all Compliant ﬂows. As each packet arrives, its ﬂow ID is
compared with the ﬁlter-specs already created for ﬂows in progress. If it matches none, a new ﬁlter-spec
need only be created if it is a Cautious (or Positive) packet. Otherwise it can be processed with the Bulk
of unclassiﬁed packets. Having classiﬁed which ﬂow it belongs to, the dropper then uses the packet’s
extended ECN ﬁeld to update both the lifetime balance and the recent balance of that ﬂow. The new
value of the lifetime balance determines the larger categorisation of the ﬂow as either Compliant, on
Remand or Bulk. If the ﬂow is then categorised as on Remand or Bulk, the packet can be sanctioned
according to the recent balance held for that ﬂow, using an algorithm such as that in §7.6.
15To be clear, this does not mean that a ﬂow must send a heartbeat every second. Even if it is idle for much longer, it only
needs to send one Cautious packet when it re-starts. Also note that the above restart is only with respect to the network layer; it
is completely separate to any transport layer behaviour following an idle period. This may have been deﬁned elsewhere for each
transport layer protocol.7.4. Dropper Handling of Other Markings 98
Dropper Flow-State Congestion
The re-ECN system design takes the following precautions to minimise the memory the dropper requires
for ﬂow state:
• Re-ECN ﬂow state is only absolutely required at egress nodes at the very edge of the network
where it will limit scalability less;
• The design variants we propose limit vulnerability to state exhaustion attacks by only holding state
for ﬂows that have proved they are well-behaved;
• We provide a complementary dropper design (§7.6.1) that requires per-ﬂow state only for a sample
of ﬂows, but still has a high likelihood of catching misbehaving ﬂows;
Nonetheless, unusually large numbers of active ﬂows, whether malicious or innocent, might ex-
haust the dropper’s memory capacity, however well-provisioned it is. In the re-ECN protocol, the state
transition from Cautious to Negative has been reserved for any middlebox (not just the re-ECN dropper)
to signal exhaustion of its ﬂow state resources (see §10.1).
Below we consider how this signal would be used by the dropper. Although we recommend this
protocol transition for signalling ﬂow-state memory congestion, we have not taken it further than the
initial design in §10.1 and we do not include it in the example algorithms.
The memory congestion function should sit logically after a dropper function on the same machine.
SothedropperdecisionwouldnotcountanyNegativemarkingduetoitsownmemorycongestionagainst
a packet. If a Cautious packet arriving at the dropper did not match an existing ﬂow it would conceptually
create a credit for itself, then request long term memory to store its ﬂow state. Approaching memory
exhaustion would increase the probability of this request being rejected leading to the Cautious packet
being marked Negative before forwarding.
However, if a Cautious packet arriving at the dropper did match an existing ﬂow, it would add to
the credit stored for the ﬂow. As no request for extra long term memory would be required, it would be
forwarded with its Cautious marking intact, even if memory was approaching exhaustion.
Even if the dropper had absolutely no more memory, it could still forward Cautious packets. In this
case all Cautious packets for new ﬂows would depart marked Negative, while those matching established
ﬂows would be forwarded with their Cautious marking intact.
7.4 Dropper Handling of Other Markings
This section handles a number of more detailed protocol issues.
7.4.1 Cancelled Markings
It will have been noted that the re-ECN dropper never drops Positive or Cancelled packets. It might seem
reasonable to spare Positive packets, because they have unambiguously paid their way, but it seems that
a source could cheat by initialising the majority of its packets to Cancelled in order to spare them all
from sanction at the dropper.7.4. Dropper Handling of Other Markings 99
The logic for the dropper not considering Cancelled packets for sanction relies on them having once
been Positive and having suffered the same random congestion marking as Neutral packets. But a source
that deliberately initialises packets as Cancelled breaks the basis of both these assumptions. Further, all
its Cancelled packets will be immune from further congestion marking, so any congestion experienced
will never need balancing with Positive markings.
§8.2.7 presents a simple solution to this apparently serious ﬂaw, involving normalising the pro-
portion of Cancelled packets to that expected from the proportions of other markings. This will deter
a source from attempting this otherwise serious attack. Rather than explain the solution here, we de-
fer all discussion until §8.2.7 because normalising Cancelled markings solves other problems between
interconnected networks which will be described ﬁrst in §8 on Border Incentives.
As well as justifying why the dropper never discards Cancelled packets, we also need to justify why
the drop probability of Negative and Neutral markings in Eqn (7.4) takes no account of Cancelled bytes
when it does take account of Positive. The reasoning is as follows. For equivalent behaviour to honesty,
the source will send Positive bytes in response to feedback of Negative bytes uN. If it gets feedback
reporting that these Positive bytes themselves have been marked (producing a fraction of Cancelled
bytes cn) it will send further Positive bytes to top up the balance (z0 = uN + cn). Therefore, at the
egress, for stationary congestion Positive bytes should match Negative alone (zn = z0 − cn = uN).
Diagrammatically, in terms of Figure 7.1b), this is equivalent to saying the Negative rectangle should be
reduced to the same area as the Positive rectangle but the Cancelled square makes no difference.
7.4.2 Cautious Markings
There is a possibility that the ﬁrst packet of a ﬂow was originally marked Cautious by the source, but
subsequently it has been over-written as Negative by a congested forwarding element (§9.2) or by a
middlebox running short of memory (§10.1).16
It is then not possible for the dropper to know whether the ﬂow started well-behaved or not. Such a
packet will not cause creation of ﬂow state in the dropper and will therefore have to suffer the prevailing
drop rate for the bulk of misbehaving ﬂows.
In §9.2 we recommend that congested links should re-mark Cautious packets to Negative rather
than drop them. Why go to all this bother if the resulting Negative packet will be dropped anyway by the
dropper further down the path? There are two reasons:
Not all Cautious packets are initial packets of ﬂows. Probably the majority of Cautious packets will
be later packets that top up ﬂow credit. If they arrive at the dropper having been re-marked Nega-
tive, they will match pre-existing ﬂow-state and reduce the balance as any Negative packet would.
The receiver will feed the Negative marking back (not necessarily knowing it was originally Cau-
tious). This follows the best practice of notifying congestion explicitly rather than by drop that we
espoused in §6.1.1: to avoid the performance hit of timeouts, to disambiguate congestion from all
the other possible reasons for drop and to make congestion visible to the network (§6.1.1);
16Or, a non-TCP source may start a ﬂow with multiple packets and the ﬁrst to be sent may not arrive ﬁrst.7.4. Dropper Handling of Other Markings 100
The dropper doesn’t drop all initial Negative packets. Whether a dropper will drop packets in the
bulk of misbehaving ﬂows depends on whether misbehaving ﬂows predominate. The dropper
suggested in §7.6.1 folds all the left over credits at the end of behaving ﬂows into the Bulk bal-
ance. When this results in a positive Bulk balance, initial Negative packets will get through. When
it doesn’t, they won’t.
If a Cautious packet is the ﬁrst of a ﬂow; and if it is marked Negative; and if it does still get through
the dropper, the eventual receiver will feed that fact back to the source.
As we explain in §10.1, the receiver’s response to a Negative initial packet must be overloaded with
the two meanings (exactly how depends on the transport):
• ‘Flow state not stored’ (transport layer congestion);
• and ‘Echo Congestion Experienced’ (network layer congestion).
Having received this feedback, the source must proceed more carefully with the subsequent ﬂow of
packets (e.g. backing off its initial window) and it must repeat its attempt to have ﬂow state stored for its
ﬂow, whether on the server or on middleboxes along the way (§10.1 gives an example in the context of
TCP SYN cookies).
If a source receives feedback implying a Cautious packet experienced congestion (whether by Neg-
ative marking or drop), the source SHOULD send the next packet as Cautious as well. In addition, the
source SHOULD increase its count that determines how many bytes it must mark as Positive on future
packets. Following this procedure ensures that eventually as many positive bytes are sent as negative
bytes received as well as building up the intended credit at the dropper.17
The source must also check whether the receiver’s response shows it supports re-ECN [BJMS09a],
and if not, it must behave as if its original packet was dropped. But, because the congested link explicitly
marked rather than dropped the original packet, the source doesn’t have to wait in limbo, not knowing
why a response hasn’t been returned.
7.4.3 Legacy ECN Markings
Three codepoints of the extended ECN ﬁeld fall outside the deﬁnition of the re-ECN protocol:
Not-ECT, ECT(0) and CU (see Table 6.1 on p79).
Packets carrying the ‘currently unused’ or CU codepoint, SHOULD be treated exactly the same as
Neutral packets, as recommended for forward compatibility in §12.2.2.
Packets that are not ECN-enabled (Not-ECT codepoint) or set to the legacy ECN codepoint
(ECT(0)) should pass through the re-ECN dropper unscathed, even if they match a ﬂow ID in the
dropper. A network managing resource sharing using re-ECN is advised to rate-limit packets with these
two codepoints at the ingress (and at some or all links if it chooses), therefore it is safe for the egress
dropper to ignore them.
17If the Cautious packet experiencing congestion is the ﬁrst of the ﬂow, it is likely the dropper will not record the negativity of
this packet against any ﬂow ID. But the source cannot be sure of this, so it should act conservatively.7.4. Dropper Handling of Other Markings 101
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In addition to the above codepoints, legacy ECN ﬂow will include some packets marked with the CE
(congestion experienced) codepoint. The re-ECN protocol overloads the original congestion experienced
(CE) codepoint as a Cancelled marking. Therefore Cancelled packets that also do not match a ﬂow ID
in the dropper should be allowed through the dropper unscathed, rather than being treated to the drop
probability of the Bulk of misbehaving ﬂows. This is safe, because re-ECN ingress and border policing
already corrects for excess Cancelled packets.
It is possible that a legacy ECN ﬂow might use the ECT(1) codepoint if the ECN nonce [SWE03] is
ever implemented and deployed, but re-ECN overloads this codepoint to mean a Positive marking. The
ECN nonce RFC has experimental status within the IETF standardisation process, but it has not been
implemented to anyone’s knowledge (except on the machine of its author). If it were implemented and
deployed, it would make it look as if about 50% of the packets of a ﬂow were Positive. This would not
be a problem at the re-ECN dropper. But such ﬂows would have to be recognised and separated out at
an ingress policer and at borders, otherwise they would rapidly reduce the congestion allowance of the
party sending or forwarding them.
7.4.4 Congestive Loss
So far we have only considered congestion that leads to explicit congestion notiﬁcation, not congestion
that leads to loss (implicit notiﬁcation). Unless the network’s congestion notiﬁcation is explicit, re-ECN
policers and droppers cannot in turn check whether the source is correctly reinserting these congestion
notiﬁcations into the network. Therefore a network won’t invest in re-ECN droppers and policers without
also making sure ECN is turned on in its forwarding equipment.
However, some congestive loss will always be present. Older equipment may not support ECN,
or may take time to be upgraded, and ECN equipment will occasionally overﬂow its buffers, just by
happenstance.
Positive markings are introduced by the source to balance congestion marking introduced further
down the path. Loss will have a different effect depending on whether it occurs before or after Negative
ECN markings are introduced (Fig 7.4a):
• If loss occurs after Negative markings are introduced, on average all Positive and Negative mark-
ings will be reduced proportionately;18
18Assuming the network operator is not actively biasing its loss—see §12.1.2.7.4. Dropper Handling of Other Markings 102
• If loss occurs before Negative markings are introduced, there will be proportionately less loss of
Negative markings than Positive.
A transport can detect losses, but it cannot easily ﬁnd out where on the path they are being intro-
duced. If the transport detects loss of a packet that it originally marked Positive, its safest strategy19
is to introduce a replacement Positive marking, as in Fig 7.4b). It will be seen that this leads to slight
overstatement of Positive markings if any loss occurs before ECN markings are introduced, which is
safe.
A loss may not be due to congestion, for instance it may be a deliberate sanction imposed by a re-
ECN policer or dropper. However, we have made sure that the dropper doesn’t drop Positive or Cautious
packets, and the policer only drops Positive or Cautious packets as a last resort.20
7.4.5 Downstream Congestion Analysis Revisited
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Figure 7.5: Effect of Cautious Markings on the other Re-ECN Markings after the Egress Dropper.
So far, although we have considered the effect of congestive losses informally (§7.4.4), we have
not included loss in our formal analysis. Also, in §6.2, where we deﬁned metrics for recent downstream
congestion in terms of re-ECN markings, we ignored Cautious markings. But we promised to revisit our
analysis to include them. The additional analysis is below, but it ends up deciding to continue to ignore
these aspects as they make no difference. This section may therefore be skipped on a ﬁrst pass through
the document.
The bytes in Cautious packets have nominally the same worth as bytes in Positive packets. But
unlike Positive packets, which become Cancelled if they experience congestion, Cautious packets can be
marked Negative.21
Congestion marking Cautious packets to Negative is NOT a REQUIRED behaviour of forwarding
elements—care has been taken to ensure no changes are required on forwarding elements between ECN
and re-ECN. Therefore marking of Cautious packets introduces an additional complication because it
19The speciﬁcation of re-ECN for TCP [BJMS09a] adopts the more generous strategy of introducing Positive bytes to balance
any bytes experiencing congestion, whether signalled by ECN marking or loss. However, Positive markings to balance losses
would be purely voluntary, as the re-ECN mechanisms cannot detect non-compliance.
20§11.3.1 introduces a way for a policer to covertly signals that it is dropping Positive or Cautious packets, otherwise a trans-
port that accidentally exhausts its congestion allowance in the ingress policer can become trapped in an avalanche of increasing
sanctions.
21We have already brieﬂy mentioned this aspect of the re-ECN protocol in which forwarding elements and middleboxes can
optionally be upgraded to mark Cautious packets to Negative when congested. The details of each are introduced in §9.2 (on
forwarding element bandwidth congestion) and §10.1 (on middlebox memory congestion).7.5. Attacks Perverting the Dropper 103
is separately optional from ECN marking. Before re-ECN, a box either did ECN marking or it didn’t.
But we will now have to take into account that some network equipment will congestion mark all ﬁve of
the re-ECN codepoints while older equipment (that has been made ECN-aware but not re-ECN-aware)
will congestion mark only four and drop those marked Cautious when it is congested. We will denote
the proportion of trafﬁc experiencing congestion marking of all ﬁve re-ECN codepoints as ψ and the
proportion of Cautious marking arriving at the ith resource is denoted by gi.
Neutral: y0 = 1 − z0 yi = (1 − mu)(1 − z0 − ψg0) yn = (1 − mu)(1 − md)(1 − z0 − ψg0)
Cautious: g0 gi = (1 − mu)g0 gn = (1 − mu)(1 − md)g0.
(7.6)
Fractions of each re-ECN Marking where including Cautious alters Eqn (6.1)
Eqn (7.6) tabulates the proportions of Neutral and Cautious markings at the start and end of a path
and at an intermediate point i. When we take Cautious markings into account, the proportions of the
other markings remain unchanged from Eqn (6.1).
Cautious bytes are intended to allow the source to create credit at the egress dropper, given we
have chosen to make the source responsible for any allowance for round trip delays. If the source uses
Cautious markings strictly in addition to Positive markings, then none of the analysis in §6.2 changes.
The source still introduces a Positive byte in response to feedback of every Negative or Cancelled byte
(z0 = un+cn)asinEqn(6.2). Thisleadstothesameapproximateformula(vi ≈ zi−ui)fordownstream
congestion in terms of the other markings as in Eqn (6.3) and the same precise formulae as Eqns (6.4)
& (6.5). This is because Cautious credit requires a one-off contribution, while these formulae represent
downstream congestion under stationary conditions.
The only difference will arise if the source understates Positive marks because it thinks the Cautious
marks it had to send to open a ﬂow will be sufﬁcient to prevent its ﬂow going into debt, without having
to send a Positive byte for every Negative byte. However, our steady state equations can ignore these
initialisation effects. Nonetheless, we will take the markings of single packets into account when we
consider attacks (§7.5 below).
7.5 Attacks Perverting the Dropper
This section only includes attempts to attack the re-ECN egress dropper or to pervert its intended effect.
Combined attacks playing off the dropper against other components of the re-ECN system are described
in §12.1, “System Attacks on Congestion Signal Integrity.”
7.5.1 Flow ID Whitewashing
§7.3 explained that the egress dropper deﬁnes a ﬂow solely by the uniqueness of its ﬂow identiﬁers
while it is active, and it will not recognise a new unique ﬂow without some investment of resources by
the source.
This raises the question of how much initial investment is sufﬁcient to ensure that ﬂow ID white-
washing attacks do not pay off. We outline the attack here, and then analyse it later, in §7.7.2.7.5. Attacks Perverting the Dropper 104
An attacker can whitewash a ﬂow ID simply by abandoning the ﬂow ID at the ﬁrst feedback of a
Negative mark and continue transferring data with a new ‘whitewashed’ ﬂow ID.22 Therefore the initial
investment must be at least as great as the worth of one Negative packet.
However, an attacker could routinely start a whitewashed ﬂow by investing credit in one tiny Cau-
tious packet, followed by much larger subsequent Neutral packets. Then, whenever one of these packets
was congestion marked, it would always have cost the network a lot more than the original credit in-
vested, giving a considerable pay-off to the attacker over time.
This attack would be thwarted if the dropper records the largest packet so far seen in the ﬂow and a
larger packet was only deemed to match the ﬂow ID if the credit against the ﬂow (in bytes) was at least
as large as the new largest packet.
This raises the question whether requiring just one maximum sized packet’s investment is a sufﬁ-
cient incentive for a source to maintain the same ﬂow ID beyond each Negative packet. We now compare
the gain from the whitewashing strategy with that from behaving as re-ECN expects.
Whitewashing Strategy: We imagine a transport creates a whitewashed ﬂow ID every time it receives
feedback of a Negative packet, but it starts each whitewashed ﬂow with a full-sized Cautious packet. It
sustains its ﬂow rate as if there had been no change of ﬂow ID by carrying over all the congestion control
state between ﬂow IDs. Then the source will pay as much in Cautious credits as it would have to match
each Negative packet with a Positive. At the dropper, each time a Negative packet arrives, the ﬂow’s
balance will drop to exactly zero (which will not create any problem) while the last window of packets
in ﬂight plays out. Straight after the last packet in ﬂight, a packet with the new ﬂow ID would arrive at
the dropper carrying with it a new Cautious credit. Thus far, the benign whitewashing behaviour would
not be sanctioned any more than a normal ﬂow, and it would cost no more to maintain (except the extra
ﬂow state for the transport and for the dropper).
However, the dropper makes this whitewashing behaviour lose out whenever there happens to be
more than one congestion event per window (see §7.7.1). If two or more congestion events occurred
in one window, the whitewasher’s dropper balance would fall below zero and the remainder of its ﬁnal
window would suffer loss. The whitewasher would however avoid paying for all but one of the Negative
packets when it started the new whitewashed ﬂow.
Compliant Strategy: If, on the other hand, the source had not been continually switching ﬂow IDs, the
dropper could be much less harsh on the occasional temporary fall into debt. The Continually Vigilant
dropper pseudocode in §7.6.1 allows the source to post a one-off per ﬂow credit that protects it against
occasional multiple congestion events23.
But the Continually Vigilant dropper is designed so that a dive straight into debt early on in a ﬂow
leads to a much higher drop probability than if there had been a long record of good behaviour before
the drop into debt, assuming the same initial credit in both cases. For instance, a balance of -1 caused by
a Positive then two Negatives will lead to ∼50% drop, while the same balance of -1 but preceded by 9
alternating Positive then Negatives would only lead to ∼10% drop. This effect is illustrated in Fig 7.10
22A colleague, Toby Moncaster proposed this attack.
23And it could even recover most of the credit near the end of the ﬂow7.5. Attacks Perverting the Dropper 105
on p131 later.
7.5.2 Dragging Down an Aggregate
A misbehaving ﬂow or ﬂows could besmirch the balance of other well-behaved ﬂows sharing an ag-
gregate, assuming each of the ﬂows’s separate identiﬁers had been hidden in some form of obfuscating
tunnel.24
This becomes problematic if impairment sanctions (e.g. drop) are used in the middle of a network,
e.g. at trust boundaries (borders), where aggregates might consist of ﬂows belonging to entities with few
interests in common. However, we recommend ﬁnancial sanctions in the middle of a network with drop
sanctions applied closer to the edges where ﬁne-grained ﬂows are more likely to be visible (§8.1). In
the case of a tunnel, this would mean that the tunnel decapsulator would be able to operate a dropper
to isolate and sanction the offending ﬂow(s). If it detected misbehaving ﬂows it could also ask the
encapsulator not to allow them to hide within the aggregate.
7.5.3 Dragging Down a Spoofed Flow ID
This attack uses the dropper to amplify a DoS attack on someone else. An attacker can understate
congestion (e.g. not send any positive packets at all), while spooﬁng another ﬂow ID. Because the attack
packets match the destination IP address, they will pass through the same egress dropper with reasonably
high probability whatever location they actually come from. If the dropper cannot distinguish attack
from compliant trafﬁc it will sanction both indistinguishable ﬂows based on the proportion of Negative
to Positive bytes across both taken together.
The attacker may blindly spoof other ﬂows by a brute force search of the most highly utilised parts
of the ﬂow ID space, or it may target an attack on a ﬂow ID known by some other nefarious means (e.g.
a secondary man-in-the-middle attack).
However, it is harder for a blind attacker to launch the attack, as single attack packets have limited
effect. A train of packets all with the same ﬂow ID and all matching an active ﬂow will cause a lot of
harm, but the attack loses any effect soon after the last packet of a train. If the attacker cannot sense when
the attack is having any effect (which it cannot because its spoofed source address gets no responses),
it must send long trains of negative packets to the same ﬂow ID in the hope some of them will hurt
something active at the same time. If the attacker is located as a man-in-the-middle, it can sense if it is
having an effect, but then it can just drop the trafﬁc anyway.
Nonetheless, if an attacker knows approximately when victim ﬂows might be active and has at least
some clue of the destination identiﬁers, a targeted attack would be relatively trivial. The attack is much
easier than hijacking a transport connection, because it only requires spooﬁng of the ﬂow ID, it does
not also need to spoof transport (or application) layer sequence numbers within a valid receive window.
Network ingress ﬁltering is not a universal defence, because an attacker merely has to attach to the
Internet or take over a zombie where ﬁltering is not deployed.
For instance, if there are s bits of entropy remaining in the ﬂow ID, the probability of the event X
that an attack train of n packets hits a continuously active ﬂow would be P(X) = 1 − (1 − 2−s)N/n if
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a total of N packets were sent. If the protocol ID, both IP addresses and the destination port number are
known (or a part of the ID space is highly utilised and the attacker doesn’t care which ID it hits), this
would leave s ≈ 15b of entropy in the source port if it is randomised [LG09]. Therefore only ∼30,000
trains of packets with different ﬂow IDs each containing n packets would have a 60% chance of dragging
down one ﬂow.
Beyond port randomisation, defences against this attack are limited, at least for IPv4. We do not
recommend the dropper trying to communicate with the apparent source of a ﬂow to signal that a network
policing element is the cause of its high drop rate (which might otherwise help the application understand
how to solve the problem). The dropper is designed on the principle of “ID uniqueness not reachability”,
precisely because a middlebox cannot always be expected to extract the source end-point identiﬁer from
a packet. Two possible alternative defences come to mind:
Destination Port Hop: During this attack, the destination would experience a very high drop fraction, a
very high fraction of out of window packets (for TCP—or the equivalent for other transports) and
potentially large numbers of packet veriﬁcation errors if authentication were being used. Under
these circumstances, if the destination application reset the connection and started again with
different port numbers at least it would immediately ﬁnd a working connection and avoid the
attack continuing.
IPv6 Flow Label Nonce: For IPv6, we recommend (§7.1) that the dropper SHOULD use ﬂow labels
seen on the initial packet as part of the ﬂow ID. A spooﬁng attack not using the same ﬂow label
would simply not match the ﬂow ID. This would afford 20 extra bits of entropy. This approach is
similar to Blake’s proposal to overload the IPv6 ﬂow label as a transport layer nonce [Bla08] (but
we use it for what is effectively a ‘ﬂow-ID sub-layer’ rather than the ‘transport layer’ as such).
7.6 Dropper Algorithm Implementations
We will present two possible egress dropper algorithms to give sources the incentive to comply with the
re-ECN protocol:
Continually vigilant: An algorithm that requires ﬂow state for every ﬂow that has proved itself well-
behaved from the start;
Mid-ﬂow: An algorithm that can start mid-ﬂow, therefore one can choose how much ﬂow state it re-
quires by applying it to ﬂows picked randomly to test for compliance. But as a consequence this
algorithm may allow more false hits and more false misses. That is, it could wrongly sanction
some behaving ﬂows and it could insufﬁciently sanction some misbehaving ﬂows.
The latter, mid-ﬂow algorithm can pick up a ﬂow part-way through, therefore it doesn’t know how
much credit the ﬂow has allowed itself (or needs) to stay in credit over a round trip. Therefore it cannot
discourage a ﬂow from ‘whitewashing’ its identity if it goes negative, whereas the former algorithm can.
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contrary to our design principle of ‘Source responsibility for delay allowance’ §7.3 discusses both these
points in depth.
Thereforethemid-ﬂowalgorithmshouldnotbeusedasanalternativetothecontinuallyvigilantone,
only as a complement. For instance, the latter might be used for random ﬂow sampling at interconnect
borders, while the former could continually guard the egress of the internetwork, later on the path. Or
the mid-ﬂow algorithm might be used as an expedient when an egress dropper ﬁrst boots up—to test the
balance of ﬂows already in progress. As the mid-ﬂow algorithm introduces no new concepts over the
former ‘Continually Vigilant’ algorithm, it is relegated to Appendix A.1.
7.6.1 Continually Vigilant Dropper Algorithm
This algorithm requires state per well-behaved ﬂow but is expected to cause few false hits and few false
misses. Its description will be built up in three stages, from low to high level:
• the algorithm for applying sanctions;
• the algorithm for maintaining the moving averages of the marking fractions;
• the management of ﬂow state.
Algorithm for Applying Sanctions
This algorithm can be applied both to packets matching recognised ﬂows, and to those in the bulk of
misbehaving ﬂows treated as if they all share a wild ﬂow ID.
By Eqn (7.4) the drop probability πy = πu = 1 − z/u, where z is the recent balance of Positive
markings and u the recent balance of Negative markings. But drop is only applied if both the recent
balance and the lifetime balance are in debt: (v ≈ z − u < 0) and (V < 0). The probDrop()
algorithm below subjects each packet to the appropriate drop probability, taking the relevant z and u for
the ﬂow as inputs.
The algorithm that maintains the moving averages of z and u stores them within a ﬂow-state struc-
ture, fState from one packet to the next of each ﬂow.25 For convenience we pass the whole structure
fState into and out of the function that applies sanctions, even though it only uses three of its variables
and only updates one. In full, the fState structure holds the following ﬂow state variables:
fID: ﬂow ID
z: recent +ve bytes per -ve mark
u: recent -ve bytes per -ve mark
r: remainder carried to next drop
V: downstream congestion over ﬂow life
lastGoodTime: time V was last +ve
25The pseudocode variables z and u are actually scaled transformations of the z & u given in the earlier formulae (see later).7.6. Dropper Algorithm Implementations 108
smax: max packet size over ﬂow life
All the pseudocode that follows takes liberties for brevity by assuming fState as the context of any of
these variables, unless otherwise stated.
/* Drop packet with probability (1-z/u)
*/
probDrop(packet, fState) {
if (u > z) {
if (r == -1) {
r = rand[0,u)
/* Note: (0 <= r < u)
when initialised */
}
r += z
if (r > u) {
r -= u
} else {
drop(packet)
}
}
return(fState)
}
In order to minimise per mark processor cycles, this deterministic algorithm avoids the apparent
need for a division or multiplication in the drop probability formula. It uses only adds, compares and
subtracts. The ﬂoating point variable r is the algorithm’s remainder that the dropper stores to carry it
over until the next packet of the same ﬂow arrives. It also avoids running any pseudo-random functions
except once during each ﬂow, to initialise r. When ﬂow state is ﬁrst created, r is initialised to -1 as a ﬂag
to trigger its randomised initialisation the ﬁrst time the function is called within a ﬂow (see ‘Flow-State
Variable Initialisation’ below).
We haven’t thought of a way, but it might be possible for an attacker to exploit the predictability of
this deterministic algorithm relative to the congestion markings it detects, in which case a randomised
alternative would have to be used. The other potential danger of deterministic drop is synchronisation,
but that is unlikely to be a problem for a sanction that should be only seldom applied, and which is driven
from markings that are themselves spaced by a random process.
Algorithm for Maintaining the Moving Averages of the Marking Fractions
In order to ensure the current drop rate only reﬂects recent behaviour, it is necessary to discount events
that happened further in the past using a moving average. We use an exponentially weighted moving
average (EWMA) because it discounts past events evenly and it is very easy to implement.
By the design principle ‘Source responsibility for delay allowance’ (§7.3), the sender not the drop-
per is responsible for ensuring there is enough credit to survive the delay after each debit, including
bursts of multiple debits within one round trip time. Therefore probabilistic drop sanctions should start
to be applied as soon as the moving average goes negative (but only if the lifetime balance is also in
debt). If the dropper did allow for round trip delay, it would have to track the evolution of round trip time
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implement, let alone efﬁciently (see §A.1 for a constant conservative approximation of this strategy).
From Equations (6.9), (7.1) & (7.2) it can be seen that z & u are both measured with respect
to the same metric; the moving average of packet size. But the metric with respect to which they are
measured becomes irrelevant for both the purposes they are put to; when z & u are divided their identical
denominators cancel out; and when their difference is compared to zero their identical denominators
don’t matter.
In all our algorithms we exploit the fact that z & u can be measured with respect to anything, as
long as the same anything is used for both. In fact we will measure positive and negative bytes with
respect to negative marks (justiﬁed below). Perhaps confusingly, we use the variables z & u in all the
pseudocode, even though they are measured with respect to a denominator that is different to that of the
z & u in our earlier formulae for proportionate sanctions.
The discussion in §6.2 noted that the discounting factor of the moving average to measure recent
downstream congestion “must be sufﬁciently small to give consecutive positive and negative marks a
reasonably similar weight”. Given congestion and hence inter-mark spacing can vary greatly, it seems
impossible to choose a discounting factor that will cater for all levels of congestion. But the trick is to use
the marks themselves to clock the moving average. Thus instead of measuring downstream congestion-
volume with respect to volume, with respect to the packet count, or with respect to time26, it can be
measured with respect to congestion marks themselves.
This works because the absolute level of recent downstream congestion isn’t needed. It is only
necessary to compare Positive with Negative, either to establish whether the balance is in debt or to
know their relative proportions to determine drop probability (Eqn (6.9)). As long as each stage of the
moving average discounts Positive and Negative marks the same relative to each other, they don’t have
to be discounted consistently from stage to stage. Instead, all that is necessary is to ensure that whenever
one EWMA is updated the other is as well. Then, the EWMAs can be self-clocked by the arrival of
Positive or Negative packet marks.
We decided to clock the moving average solely with respect to Negative marks. It was safer to clock
the moving average on marks that are meant to be generated by the network, not the source. If we had
also clocked on Positive marks, the source could have gamed the dropper by sending numerous small
positively marked packets in place of bigger Positive packets. Whereas the source cannot determine
the sizes of Negatively marked packets unless it sends them itself which would cost it more in Positive
packets to balance them.
The principle of ‘Source responsibility for delay allowance’ (§7.3) implies that the source sends
26This is fortunate, because otherwise an event-based EWMA would be required, which is complex to implement. Often an
event-based EWMA can be avoided if the arrivals of the events are Poisson [Wol82], but in the case of honest re-feedback of
congestion marking, the arrivals are not Poisson. This is because the honest sender’s re-ECN algorithm tends to make the arrival
process of Positive marks a time-shifted version of the arrival process for Negative marks. Another reason one might think arrivals
are not Poisson is that the RED algorithm used for Negative marking includes a stage to regularise the inter-mark spacing [FJ93,
§4]. However, we show in §7.7 that the RED algorithm only spaces marks regularly across the aggregate of ﬂows served by a
link. But within each ﬂow, this apparent marking regularity unravels to become i.i.d. (unless the ﬂow is large relative to the total
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each Positive mark to counteract the next Negative mark, not the previous one, even though the source
mechanistically sends a Positive mark in response to the previous Negative one. Therefore, the algorithm
should collect up any Positive marks seen since the previous Negative mark and discount both Positive
and Negative marks at the same time, when the next Negative mark appears. Even if a Negative mark
never appears again (perhaps because congestion suddenly stops), any Positive markings arriving still
immediately improve the ﬂow’s balance—it is only the discounting stage of both EWMAs that clocks
on Negative marks.
We have to strike a balance between quickly punishing a misbehaving source and falsely punishing
an innocent source that just happens to have suffered an unforeseen burst of losses. We do this by
deciding whether to drop a packet before we use the packet’s worth to update the moving averages.
Then, whenever a negative packet arrives, the drop probability it experiences for itself doesn’t take into
account its own negativity. But its negativity is used to calculate the drop probability of subsequent
packets in the ﬂow.
In this way, the negative packet that ﬁrst puts an honest source into debt will not be dropped,
so it will reach the receiver and honest feedback will allow the honest source to correct the balance.
Similarly, in the unlikely event of any further negative packets taking an honest source by surprise, each
will be dropped with less probability than the following packets will suffer, increasing the chance that
the integrity of the feedback loop holds good for an honest source.
But this leniency only lasts for one packet. So, if a misbehaving source has no intention of making
up the balance sufﬁciently, the relative growth rates of the two recent balances will immediately increase
the drop rate starting with the next packet. This doesn’t quite “sanction dishonest ﬂows, preferably at the
ﬁrst dishonest packet” as our “Minimal False Misses” constraint requires, but it only gives one packet’s
grace. This is safe, because Negative markings are under the control of the network, not the end-points,
and we have ensured end-points cannot gain by sending Negative packets (§8.2.5).
We should also make sure we don’t unnecessarily drop Cancelled packets, which also carry con-
gestion notiﬁcations to the receiver. But a Cancelled packet makes no difference to the relative values of
z and u so it doesn’t need any extra leniency.
By delaying recalculation of the drop probability until after deciding whether to drop a packet,
it seems that a positive or cautiously positive packet cannot use its own worth to save itself from being
dropped. However, as inEqn(7.4), the algorithmensuresthatpackets withPositiveorCautious markings
are immune from drop anyway.
The resulting EWMA algorithm ﬁts around the above drop probability algorithm as shown below.
Note that a is the discounting factor of the EWMA. The function readEECN(packet) reads the
extended ECN ﬁeld of the packet. The valid states of the EECN ﬁeld are:
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CAUT: Cautious
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CANC: Cancelled (or Legacy CE if no re-ECN ﬂow state)
NEUT: Neutral
CU: Treated as Neutral
Not-ECT: Legacy
ECT(0): Legacy
/* Maintain flow congestion balances
in the fState flow state structure.
The parameter s is the packet size.
*/
newBal(s, fState) {
eecn = readEECN(packet)
if (eecn == POSV || CAUT) {
V += s
z += a*s
} elseif (eecn == CANC) {
z -= a*z
u -= a*u
} else {
/* NEGV, NEUT or CU */
if (V < 0) {
fState = probDrop(packet,fState)
}
if (eecn == NEGV) {
V -= s
z -= a*z
u += a*s
u -= a*u
}
}
return(fState)
}
The implementation of the EWMA needs a little explanation as it is unorthodox and the pseudocode
is rather terse. An EWMA can be implemented27 by the recursive formula
¯ xi+1 ← as + (1 − a)¯ xi; 0 < a < 1.
We are only concerned about the relative values of two EWMAs, so we can multiply ¯ x by a constant to
transform it to ¯ x0 = (1 − a)¯ x. Then
¯ x0
i+1 = (1 − a)¯ xi+1
= (1 − a)(as + (1 − a)¯ xi).
Therefore, an alternative EWMA implementation is
¯ x0
i+1 ← (1 − a)(as + ¯ x0
i).
27This algorithm understates a true EWMA by  = 1 + a
ln (1−a). But a constant understatement is irrelevant for our purposes,
because we merely want to compare two EWMAs, either to ﬁnd the ratio between them or to ﬁnd whether one is greater than the
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This EWMA is fastest to implement in the two half steps used in the newBal() pseudocode, and shown
below,
x += a*s
x -= a*x
We use this transformed algorithm because, between two Negative marks, it allows us to collect any
number of increments to the EWMA of Positive bytes. Then we can discount the result just once during
the same step as we increment then discount the EWMA of Negative bytes, as justiﬁed earlier.
The processing cycles required for each multiplication can be minimised if a is chosen so that
a = 2−b where b is an integer. Then we can use a right bit-shift a*x = x>>b.
Management of Flow State
The algorithm below maintains all the ﬂow state. As each packet arrives it checks whether it already
holds matching ﬂow state. If so, it uses the newBal() algorithm above to update the balances of
lifetime and recent downstream congestion-volume in the ﬂow state. If the resulting lifetime balance
is good (non-negative), the dropper stamps the ﬂow’s state with the current time. If the ﬂow’s lifetime
balance subsequently goes bad (negative), this time-stamp can then be used to determine the duration
since the ﬂow was last not in debt, so it can be timed out if memory becomes in short supply (see later).
In order to protect against ﬂows giving themselves a new ID whenever their balance goes negative
(‘identiﬁer whitewashing’: see §7.5.1), the egress dropper requires all new ﬂows to lodge a positive
deposit of at least as many bytes as the largest packet seen in the ﬂow. Therefore the dropper has to
record the largest packet seen in a ﬂow. If the dropper detects a larger packet than the maximum so
far and the ﬂow’s balance currently doesn’t cover its size, the packet is not deemed to match the ﬂow
ID and treated as Bulk. The ﬂow’s state is not discarded, as future packets can each be judged on their
merits—the offending packet may simply have arrived before a packet that carried the necessary credit
but was delayed in the network.
Of course, a packet may not match any existing ﬂow state. In such a case, the dropper only allocates
ﬂow state if a Cautious (or Positive) packet initialises the ﬂow. Otherwise the packet experiences the
prevailing (perhaps high) drop rate of the bulk of misbehaving ﬂows.
/* maintainFlowState()
Maintain flow state in fState structure
*/
foreach packet {
s = readLength(packet)
eecn = read EECN(packet)
flowID = readFlowID(packet)
fState = matchFlowID(flowID)
if (fState != NULL) {
/* Existing re-ECN flow */
if (s > smax) {
/* Bigger max packet size*/
if (V >= s) {
/* Compliant */
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} else {
/* Non-compliant packet
treat as BULK */
fState = BULK
}
}
fState = newBal(s,fState)
if (V >= 0) {
/* Compliant status flow */
lastGoodTime = timeNow()
} /* else Remand status
so lastGoodTime unchanged*/
} elseif (eecn == CAUT || POSV) {
/* New Compliant flow */
allocate(fState)
fID = flowID
smax = s
V = 0
u = 0
z = 0
r = -1
fState = newBal(s,fState)
lastGoodTime = timeNow()
} elseif (eecn == Not-ECT || ECT(0)
|| CANC) {
/* LEGACY: forward unimpeded */
} else {
/* New or old misbehaving flow
set status to BULK */
fState = BULK
/* update balances of BULK
and probabilistically drop */
fState = newBal(s,fState)
}
}
Initialisation of Flow State Variables
Initialisation of the variables u, z to zero is deliberate not arbitrary. Over a long-lived well-behaved ﬂow,
u and z will tend to (1-a), so we could have initialised them at this value. But we initialised them
at zero to counter the strategy where a ﬂow sends an initial credit (which keeps it out of the very high
bulk drop rate), but never sends another positive packet. The countermeasure of initialising u and z to
zero should cause the drop probability to jump to the correct level as quickly as possible (as motivated
in §7.5.1 and analysed in §7.7.2).
On the other hand, if a ﬂow is well-behaved for a while, both u and z will grow together in the
correct proportions relative to each other. Then any slight understatement of Positive markings will lead
to a slow rise to the appropriate drop probability if the understatement persists, but if the understatement
is quickly corrected, very little drop will have ensued.
r is initialised to -1 as a ﬂag to indicate that it needs initialisation (during normal operation of the
probDrop() function r ≥ 0). The probDrop() function is designed to avoid an expensive random
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use within a ﬂow. However, r should be initialised in the range 0 ≤ r < u. But because u grows from
zero as the ﬂow progresses, r cannot be randomly initialised until it is ﬁrst used. Hence the need to ﬂag
that r needs randomised initialisation before ﬁrst use.
Flow State Time Out
The re-ECN dropper deliberately makes no attempt to detect the last packet of a ﬂow explicitly (e.g.
by looking in to the transport layer headers for transport-speciﬁc indications like a FIN in TCP). This
prevents the dropper getting confused due to lost ﬁnal packets, or due to misbehaving transports either
deliberately suppressing ﬁnal packets or spooﬁng the ﬁnal packets of other ﬂows. Instead it deallocates
all ﬂow state by timeout.
The re-ECN protocol speciﬁcation [BJMS09a] sets the rule that a ﬂow must send a credit packet
(Cautious) as if it was starting afresh whenever it has been idle for more than a speciﬁed time (currently
deﬁned as 1 sec). This allows any middlebox such as the dropper to time out ﬂow state that has been
stale for more than this timeout. A middlebox is free to hold ﬂow state for longer, but a transport should
not rely on this behaviour.
We have not written pseudocode to describe garbage collection (ﬂow state time out), but the general
idea is as follows. The ﬂow state structure includes a variable lastGoodTime which is updated to
hold the current time whenever the lifetime balance of a ﬂow V is still positive after having updated the
moving averages of the ﬂow’s balances.
Two buffers (linked lists) of pointers to ﬂow state structures are maintained. One for ﬂows cat-
egorised Compliant (V ≥ 0) and another for ﬂows categorised on Remand V < 0. Every time
lastGoodTime is updated, a pointer to the ﬂow state it belongs to is brought to the front of the relevant
linked list. Every so often (or when memory usage crosses a threshold), a garbage collection process
deallocates ﬂow state, working along the linked lists from the back. Flow state can be deallocated if
lastGoodTime shows the ﬂow has been idle or on Remand for longer than the timeout. Complaint
but idle ﬂow state SHOULD be kept in preference to ﬂows on Remand.
Before each ﬂow’s state is deallocated, its variables should be merged in to the Bulk ﬂow state.
This aspect of the algorithm has not been written in detail, but a reasonable strategy would be to treat the
lifetime balance of the ﬂow as the worth of a single newly arriving packet in the Bulk. This deliberately
ignores the recent balance variables, because their size relative to other ﬂows will be meaningless given
the EWMA is clocked on negative marks. Further work is needed to establish whether this is a reasonable
strategy. It could make misbehaviour pay off because it doesn’t discount the past (for positive or negative
balances).
The re-ECN protocol has been designed so any middlebox can manage approaching ﬂow state
exhaustion by marking or eventually dropping Cautious packets that would consume more memory (see
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7.7 Predicted Dropper Performance
7.7.1 Predicted False Hits
Even if congestion is stationary, congestion marking is a random process, so unusually high numbers
of marks will appear during some round trip delays. The design of the re-ECN egress dropper adopts
the principle that the sender is responsible for allowing sufﬁcient credit for any marking that may arise
during the delay while feedback returns to the sender (§7.3.2). But, whatever level of credit an honest
source posts, it will never be immune to suffering some false hits from the dropper.
Conversely, the principle of ‘source responsibility for delay allowance’ gives the system designer
a blank cheque to meet the requirement of ‘minimal false negatives’; any false negatives can always be
blamed on the source posting too little credit. As we said in §7.3.2, passing off this dilemma onto the
source is a deliberate design choice that has a microeconomic interpretation—sources choose how much
risk they are willing to carry to get their trafﬁc through the unknown conditions of the next round-trip.
Below we model the probability that a ﬂow will receive more then m marks in one round trip time
(RTT) in various circumstances. This analysis can then be used:
• For a transport to predict the credit level it will require to keep the incidence of false hits below a
threshold;
• To predict the probability of false hits for a certain credit level, so the system designer can evaluate
whether it is ‘reasonable’ to transfer the risk of trafﬁc uncertainty to the end-points.
The ultimate test of what is ‘reasonable’ is whether end-points are willing to take on this risk by adopting
the re-ECN system. If they are not, then some alternative system design, perhaps with knowledge of
round-trips in the network, will have to be considered. This is essentially a question of whether the
end-to-end design principle is ‘reasonable’. All that can be achieved here is to quantify the effect of this
design decision.
Marks per Window. As marking probability rises, a congestion responsive transport will reduce its
window of packets in ﬂight. Therefore, the marks per round trip should not rise without bound. We will
now derive expressions for the marks per RTT, then apply this expression to different transports; to TCP
in congestion avoidance and to a generalised weighted α-fair transport.
Assumption 7.1. The marking fraction, p varies on timescales longer than an RTT, being stationary
during round trip time R.
This assumption is examined more closely on p118 at the end of this sub-section.
We denote the discrete random variable representing the number of marks per round trip by M. We
want to ﬁnd the probability P(M>m) that this credit will be exhausted in one RTT if the sender invests
credit m.
Independent & Identically Distributed? Before we can continue modelling the probability of a certain
number of marks per RTT, we need to establish whether the probability of marking a packet will be
correlated with previous markings. In order to do this, we need to justify that the following assumption
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Assumption 7.2. ECN marking of each packet in a ﬂow on the production Internet will be independent
and identically distributed (iid) wrt. the marking of other packets in the ﬂow, as long as the ﬂow rate is
small relative to the capacities of links it traverses.
Justiﬁcation: For re-ECN we are only concerned with ECN marking, which, unlike loss, can only
be generated by an active queue management algorithm, such as random early detection (RED [FJ93]).
The primary aim of AQM is to prevent global synchronisation, which causes sequences of losses to hit
speciﬁc ﬂows.
Unfortunately, we have found few studies that measure whether deployment of AQM has been
successful in this aim. There are certainly no measurement studies of temporal correlation of mark-
ing in production networks, because few Internet packets or queues are ECN-capable. We can ﬁnd
only two Internet measurement studies of temporal loss correlation where the year of data collection
was after RED could have been deployed—after the IRTF published its strong recommendation to use
RED [BCC+98] in 1998. Zhang et al [ZD01] (1999–2001 data) found nothing to contradict earlier stud-
ies [Pax99, YMKT99] showing losses were not iid but arrived in strongly correlated bursts. But Brosh et
al [BLSS05, §IV] (2002 data) claimed that the distribution of about 150,000 measured loss burst lengths
was consistent with iid packet loss, contradicting earlier ﬁndings of loss correlation.28 Brosh et al ven-
tured the explanation that more widespread RED deployment may have been the cause, or perhaps there
were now more ﬂows at tail drop queues.
Short of gathering empirical evidence ourselves (which is beyond the scope of the present research),
our assumption will have to rely on the intent of known AQM algorithms. We do test how well AQM
algorithms match our theoretical model of their intent, but only using simulations of AQM algorithms
(§7.8), not production ones.
The intent of the recommended algorithm for RED was not only to remove the correlated losses that
tail drop introduced, but to reduce bunching of marks still further—even less bunching than that expected
from iid marking. Using the recommended ‘Method 2’ algorithm described in the original paper on RED
appears not to mark each packet independently, because the aim was to make the distribution of inter-
mark spacing uniform, rather than geometric.
RED Method 2 works as follows: We denote the discrete random variable (r.v.) representing the
packets between marks in the whole aggregate as Za. The marking probability increases as a function of
how many unmarked packets, z there have been since the last marking P(Za=z) = pb/(2−(z +1)pb),
where pb is the target expectation of marking probability used to drive the algorithm.
Are RED Markings Uniformly Distributed?Nonetheless, this algorithm is applied to the whole ag-
gregate at a link, oblivious to ﬂows. By the following reasoning, we argue that, although RED ‘Method
2’ is ingenious, it will not achieve its intended aim of uniformly distributing markings within the same
ﬂow. Instead, within a ﬂow, the marking of each packet will be independent of previous markings, as
long as the ﬂow rate is small relative to the link capacity.
Consider ﬂow j consuming proportion rj of the link capacity, where 0 < rj  1, that is the ﬂow is
28Unfortunately, this ﬁnding was incidental to the primary focus of the paper so the data analysis was not published.7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 117
small relative to the link.
Assumption 7.3. The probability that a packet will arrive from ﬂow j depends only on the relative rate
of the ﬂow rj, and is independent of the ﬂow IDs of previous packet arrivals.
After ﬂow j has been marked, we count the marks applied to any ﬂow in the aggregate up to and
including the next mark to hit ﬂow j again. Let Yj be the discrete r.v. representing this count. By
Assumption 7.3, the probability that the next mark to hit ﬂow j is y marks in the aggregate after the
previous one is P(Yj=y) = rj(1 − rj)y−1, because ﬂow j will not be hit y − 1 times with probability
1−rj, then once with probability rj. In other words, Yj follows the geometric distribution Yj ∼ Geo(rj)
and therefore the expectation of the number of marks until another hits ﬂow j is E(Yj) = 1/rj  1.
The discrete r.v. representing the integer number of packets in the aggregate between marks that hit
ﬂow j is ZaYj. And we denote the discrete r.v. representing the number of packets in ﬂow j between
marks in ﬂow j as Zj = rjZaYj.
Thus, even though Za follows a uniform distribution, Zj the inter-mark spacing within ﬂow j, is the
result of adding Yj outcomes of Za together, where Yj results from an iid process. Therefore, because
E(Yj)  1, Zj will follow a geometric distribution as if it were the result of a single iid process.
In summary, the ‘Method 2’ variant of the RED algorithm was contrived to make the inter-mark
spacing follow a uniform rather than geometric distribution, but it only achieves this in the aggregate.
The independent arrivals of packets from different ﬂows makes the inter-mark spacing within any small
ﬂow revert to following a geometric distribution, unravelling RED’s attempt to space the marks more
uniformly. Thus RED ‘Method 2’ seems to be redundant, implying this extension to RED could be
removed without detrimental effect wherever it has been implemented.
This concludes our rather convoluted justiﬁcation for Assumption 7.2.
Distribution of Marks per Window.We can now continue to derive an expression for the probability
P(M>m) that credit m will be exhausted in one RTT.
P(M>m) = 1 − P(M≤m)
= 1 −
m X
i=0
P(M=i). (7.7)
Using notation W for the sending window (the number of packets sent in a RTT), the probability of
exactly i marks in W packets is a binomial situation:
P(M=i) =

W
i

pi(1 − p)W−i
Substituting in (7.7)
P(M>m) = 1 −
m X
i=0

W
i

pi(1 − p)W−i. (7.8)
We can now apply this formula to two transports: TCP in congestion avoidance and a generalised
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Idealised TCP in Congestion Avoidance
For any congestion control algorithm, the window, W will itself be a function of the marking fraction, p.
For general congestion controls we will see later that the window is also a function of packet size, RTT
and other parameters, but if we use a simpliﬁed model of TCP in its congestion avoidance phase (taking
the most signiﬁcant terms from [PFTK98]), the window is only a function of p:
WTCP−CA =
s
3(1 − p)
2p
(7.9)
SubstitutingTCP’swindowformulaintoEqn(7.8)resultsinaformulaforP(M>m)solelyinterms
of end-to-end marking fraction p. This formula for the probability that a stable TCP will experience more
than m marks per round trip is plotted in Fig 7.6 for the ﬁrst few values of m = 0,1,2,3,4.
Fig 7.6a) displays the probabilities of TCP experiencing more than each number of marks, m in
one congestion window. As the probabilities rapidly diminish with increasing m they are plotted on a
log scale, but Fig 7.6b) shows them on a linear scale to help visualise their shape even though all the
probabilities of seeing more than two marks can hardly be distinguished from the zero axis. In all cases
a log scale is used for the marking fraction p. Also note that the simpliﬁed model of TCP’s window
is increasingly inaccurate for very high congestion levels (above around 10%). Note that only discrete
points are plotted because the probability of experiencing an integer number of marks is undeﬁned for
non-integer window sizes. Fig 7.6a) also labels the coordinates of the maximum probability for each
m, although we reemphasise that the accuracy of our TCP model for p > 0.1 becomes increasingly
questionable.
For high marking fraction, p > 0.1 TCP’s window falls to only a few packets. Clearly the probabil-
ity that there are more than 2 marks in a window with only 2 packets is strictly zero, which is why each
plot in Fig 7.6b) hits a peak then the next point drops to zero.29 For instance, the plot of the probability
that there are more than 2 marks per window peaks at 0.29% where the window is 3 packets and the
marking fraction is 14%. The window reduces to exactly two packets by 27% marking fraction, where
the probability of more than two marks will be precisely zero.
Tentative Conclusion.We can tentatively conclude that it is ‘reasonable’ to expect the source to be
responsible for delay allowance, at least for TCP transports. If our TCP model bears even a slight
resemblance to reality, a credit of just two packets would only be insufﬁcient in just under 0.3% of
round trips at a congestion level of 14%, when it would be likely that congestion itself would be causing
signiﬁcant levels of drop, not just ECN marking. At a more typical congestion level of 1%, this credit of
two packets would only be insufﬁcient for 0.02% of round trips (1 in 5,000). For sources highly averse
to drop, a credit of 3 packets would sufﬁce in all but 0.0054% of round trips (nearly 1 in 20,000), even
with worst case congestion. And at a more typical 1% congestion, 3 credit packets would sufﬁce in all
but 0.00052% of round trips (nearly 1 in 200,000).
Justiﬁcation for Assumption 7.1.It must be remembered that this interim conclusion is based on a
model that is static over a round trip. The RED algorithm aims to smooth its marking fraction over RTT
29The points with zero probability obviously disappear off the bottom of the log-scale plots.7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 119
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Figure 7.6: Modelled Probability of ECN Marks per Window in TCP Congestion Avoidance.
Plotted against marking fraction p (model breaks down at higher p).
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Figure 7.7: Modelled Probability of ECN Marks per Window in 10-MulTCP Congestion Avoidance.
Plotted against marking fraction p (model breaks down at higher p).7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 120
timescales. Then transports don’t have to respond to spikes in queue length due to coincidental bursts
of packet arrivals that could disappear without any need for a congestion response. This supports our
stationarity assumption.
However, ﬂows with a wide range of round trip times may be present in the same queue. An
alternative architecture could expect each transport to ﬁlter spikes in its own congestion signal (another
end-to-endargument). ThenshorterRTTﬂowswouldbeabletomorequicklycompensateforcongestion
changes at their timescale.30 However, a unary signal of one bit per packet already makes decoding fast
changes to congestion sluggish—we wouldn’t want to further damp the control loop with too much
low-pass ﬁltering.31 Therefore low-pass ﬁltering in the queue where there is more aggregation makes
sense.
Without knowing the RTT of each ﬂow to which each packet belongs, any AQM must choose
a smoothing timescale that prevents long RTT ﬂows reacting unnecessarily to queue spikes while not
preventing short RTT ﬂows responding to peaks and ﬁlling troughs at their timescale.32 Floyd’s ad-
vice [Flo08], informed by the considerable literature on setting RED parameters, is to aim for a smooth-
ing time of 1s, or 30 times the propagation delay of the local link, whichever is greater. If production
networks mirror this advice, even remotely, then our assumption of stationary marking rate over a round
trip is eminently reasonable for typical terrestrial round trip times.
Nonetheless, in §7.8 we provide an initial validation of our model in simulations designed to create
highly varying congestion levels.
Average Marks per Window. Note that for TCP in congestion avoidance phase (at least for our simpli-
ﬁed model of it in Eqn (7.9)) the expectation of marks per RTT stays below 1 for all loss fractions:
ETCP−CA(M) = pW (7.10)
=
p
3p(1 − p)/2,
which peaks at
p
3/8 = 0.61 when p = 0.5.
TCP Slow-Start
The slow-start phase of TCP increases the window exponentially at the start of a ﬂow aiming to quickly
ﬁnd the operating point of the path. On receiving feedback from a congestion marked packet, the TCP
source considers it found its operating window a round trip ago and halves its window back to the point,
thus ending slow start and starting congestion avoidance phase.
By the following argument, two packets should be sufﬁcient credit to avoid TCP slow-start driving
the balance of a ﬂow into debt at the dropper, at least if we assume sufﬁcient aggregation so that single
30Padmanabhan[PQW03](Dec2000data)isoftencitedasevidencethatlossratesremainrelativelyconstantforseveralminutes.
However, the deﬁnition of constant used in this paper is rather weak, only requiring the loss rate to remain within one of a set of
loss-rate bands.
31This is another motivation for previously mentioned proposals to add more precision per packet to signal congestion.
32For an EWMA to smooth over time R∗ requires it to smooth over CR∗ packets, where C is the link packet rate. If the discount
factor per packet of the EWMA is a, it will weight the packet it processed CR∗ packets ago by 1/e if CR∗ = −1/ln(1 − a).
Therefore setting the EWMA discount factor a = 1 − e−1/CR∗
will discount congestion events R∗ in the past by 1/e of their
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losses will be prevalent. We also assume the source has sufﬁcient data to reach the end of the slow-start
phase.
Imagine the nth packet the source sends will be the ﬁrst to be congestion marked. Before feedback
about this event returns to the source, it will have released as many packets into ﬂight (unacknowledged)
as have been acknowledged. So, when the feedback from the congestion event on its nth segment
returns, the source will have sent n further packets that will still be in ﬂight. At that stage, the source’s
best estimate of the network’s packet marking fraction will be 1/n. So, as the source will have sent about
2n packets, it should have already posted two packets of credit (marked two Cautious) in order to have
marked a fraction of 1/n. In fact, the ﬁrst and third packets should be marked Cautious, because the ﬁrst
is sufﬁcient credit to cover the second.
Generalisation to a sudden increase.In [BJMS09a, Appx D] Jacquet generalised this argument for any
sudden increase in packet rate (e.g. variable bit-rate video), based on the same conservative assumption;
to provide enough Cautious marking to cover the possibility that the next acknowledgement received
will be congestion marked. It introduced the following notation for the numbers of markings sent or
received so far (codepoint names that help explain the letters are given in parentheses):
S: segments sent
F: Cautious (FNE) segments sent
R: Positive (Re-Echo) segments sent
A: acknowledgments received
C: acknowledgments echoing congestion received
The result is the following algorithm for determining how to mark each packet from the start of a sudden
increase:
when about to send packet (S+1)
if (R<C)
writeEECN(packet, Positive)
elseif (F+R) < (S+1)*(C+1)/(A+1)
writeEECN(packet, Cautious)
else
writeEECN(packet, Neutral)
Applied to TCP slow-start, this indeed results in marking the ﬁrst and third data packets as Cautious,
as we originally argued.
One of the motivations behind re-ECN is to turn this discussion on its head and derive ﬂow start
behaviour parameterised by how much congestion the transport is willing to risk causing or equiva-
lently how much credit it is willing to post. Thus we can have weighted ﬂow-start as well as weighted
congestion response. This will be taken up in future research (§13.2), building on [KM99].7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 122
Weighted α-Fair Transport
An important class of elastic congestion avoidance algorithms that includes TCP can be parameterised
by the weight (or aggressiveness), w and curvature, α of their congestion response function [MW00].
The setting is distributed so that each resource marks trafﬁc with a shadow price (marking fraction) p
and each transport optimises the difference between its instantaneous rate of utility for bit-rate x,
U(x) =
wαx1−α
1 − α
, (7.11)
and the cost rate px of congestion at that bit-rate.
The transport’s optimisation will converge to the solution of d(U −px)/dx = 0. Therefore, bit rate
x will converge to
xα =
w
p1/α
or Wα =
Rw
sp1/α, (7.12)
where Wα is the window of packets per RTT corresponding to bit-rate xα, given packet size s and RTT
R.
This formula parameterises all the main distributed elastic network resource allocations:
• With w = 1,
α → 0 models maximum throughput;
α → 1 models proportional fairness [Kel97a];
α → ∞ models max-min fairness [Jaf81];
• While free choice of w provides a similar but weighted resource allocation in each case [Kel97a,
SCM01];
• w =
p
3/2(s/R), α = 2 corresponds to TCP’s resource allocation [MSMO97];
• And w = n
p
3/2(s/R), α = 2 corresponds to MulTCP acting as n TCP ﬂows [CO98].
Reasonable Responsibility? To establish whether it would still be ‘reasonable’ to make the source re-
sponsible for delay allowance in all these cases, we need to establish that the required credit does not
scale super-linearly with weight w. A transport chooses a credit, m to cover both the mean marks
per window, E(M) and a number of standard deviations k
p
Var(M). We will say k
p
Var(M) =
λE(M);λ > 0 so that we can say more simply m = (1 + λ)E(M).
A higher weight, w will lead to a proportionately higher congestion window, increasing the sample
size within the window by w. With a larger sample of trials at the same marking probability p, the mean
and variance of the marks per window will grow to approximately wE(M) and wVar(M) respectively
(Central Limit Theorem).33 Therefore, to achieve the same probability of false negatives, the weighted
ﬂow will have to post a credit
m0 = (w + λ
√
w)E(M).
33The approximation improves with larger window sizes.7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 123
Thus weight-normalised credit grows as
m0
mw
=
1 + λ/
√
w
1 + λ
, (7.13)
or alternatively we can say the required credit scales O(w +
√
w) = O(w).
The variance ((1 − p)/p2) of a geometric distribution is signiﬁcantly greater than the expectation
(1/p) for low marking probabilities, therefore the
√
w term will dominate the scaling of credit until w
gets extremely large.
Example.Intuition for this effect can be gained from an example. We take one value of α (TCP with
α = 2). Then we determine how much more credit a MulTCP [CO98] ﬂow needs if its weight is 10×
greater than a single TCP ﬂow. Fig 7.7 shows the probabilities of more than m marks per window for
a MulTCP transport with weight 10× that of TCP. We take the single TCP in Fig 7.6 with a credit of
two packets as our baseline. We normalise the extra credit MulTCP needs relative to its extra weight.
At p = 0.01% the 10-MulTCP only needs 20% of the weight-normalised credit of TCP, rising to 33%
at p = 1% and 45% at p = 10%. This increase in weight-normalised credit with marking fraction is
explained by having to cover the increasing expectation of marks per round trip. But, in all cases, 10×
the weight requires considerably less than 10× the credit, because the variance considerably dominates
the expectation over the range of this example.
It is important to ensure transports will be able to use weights smaller than 1 as well as greater,
otherwise weight inﬂation increases congestion marking (and the risk of drop) for no extra useful work.
Transports that reduce their weight to less than 1 will not be able to proportionately reduce the credit
they have to post. In other words, the up-front cost of such a ﬂow will not reduce as much as its running
cost will. However, it seems more likely that a low weight will be used for large transfers,34 so the extra
up-front cost should be small relative to the whole ﬂow cost.
Average Marks per Window.For weighted α-fair congestion controls the expectation of marks per RTT
Eα(M) = pW
=
Rwp(1− 1
α)
s
. (7.14)
Reducing α from 2 (TCP) towards 1 (weighted proportional fairness [KMT98] or WPF) reduces the
dependence of marks per RTT on p until the expectation for WPF
EWPF(M) = Rw/s,
becomes independent of the marking fraction p. Thus, a WPF transport (or any transport with α ≈ 1)
does not need to adjust the credit it posts dependent on prevailing congestion conditions.
Predicted False Hits: Summary
Earlier, once we had analysed TCP, we came to the interim conclusion that the credit required for any
TCP ﬂow is not unduly onerous—two or at most three positively marked packets to protect against
34The converse of prioritising shortest jobs.7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 124
occasional multiple marks within one round trip. We have now provided a model that quantiﬁes the
credit required for a generalised weighted α-fair transport. And we have proved that a congestion control
with weight w aggregates the risk of suffering unusual bursts of marking within a round trip—a risk that
w sub-ﬂows would otherwise each have to carry individually.
We can therefore tentatively conclude that the credit a transport requires to minimise false negatives
is not unduly signiﬁcant for a wide range of possible transport behaviours and therefore the dropper
design principle of source responsibility for delay allowance is unlikely to be a barrier to deployment.
Using simulation, §7.8 will verify whether these results remain broadly correct in highly dynamic sce-
narios.
7.7.2 Predicted False Misses
In this section, payoffs from gaming a re-ECN dropper are calculated, assuming the ‘Continually Vigi-
lant’ algorithm in §7.6.1. Active attacks to pervert the intent of the dropper have already been assessed
in §7.5. This section concerns behaviours that transports could discover (whether through malice or in-
nocent experimentation) that might pay off even though they do not behave as the dropper intends, i.e.
they do not preserve the integrity of the re-ECN congestion signal.
Inallthefollowingcases, z&uarethevariablesthatthe‘ContinuallyVigilant’algorithmmaintains
for respectively recent Positive bytes per Negative mark and recent Negative bytes per Negative mark.35
Negative marks are indexed by i with the convention that i = 1 for the ﬁrst Negative mark after the ﬁrst
missing Positive mark. a is the discount factor of the EWMA (0 < a < 1). To simplify the analysis, we
initially consider a packet ﬂow continuing indeﬁnitely, with constant packet sizes s, stationary packet
rate and path congestion marking fraction remaining stationary at p throughout. Then we treat dynamics
discursively rather than analytically, discussing the effect of varying each parameter in turn.
Miss One Payment
We ﬁrst check whether the transport gains from missing just one Positive packet.
Assume the transport had originally posted only one Cautious packet as up-front credit. Further
assume the transport has been balancing every Negative mark with a Positive for sufﬁciently long that
the dropper’s recent balance of both Positive and Negative marks (after processing each Negative mark)
has stabilised to (1 − a)s.36 To save space, we use transformed variables u0
r = ur/(s(1 − a)) and
z0
r = zr/(s(1 − a)), given every term of both variables in the following analysis has the factor s(1 − a)
in common.
After one missing Positive mark puts the balance into debt, the variables evolve as follows:
u0
1 = (1 − a) + a
u0
2 = ((1 − a) + a)(1 − a) + a
u0
r = 1.
35Both equally scaled relative to the z & u deﬁned in §7.3.1, as justiﬁed when the algorithm was explained.
36Our algorithm produces an unconventional EWMA that is deﬂated by 1 − a (§7.6.1 explains).7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 125
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Figure 7.8: Dropper Drop Probability πr due to Missing One Positive Mark.
A mark is missed at each of congestion mark indices, r = 25 & r = 250 (note: the drop plot bursts
from zero to the top of each curve once per index); EWMA discount factor a = 1/32.
The event at r = 455 is due to a Positive mark delayed until after the next congestion mark.
The evolution of the positive balance will lack a +a term at the core of the sequence, which we re-
introduce and subtract again outside the sequence (the two balancing terms in each case are shown
underlined:)
z0
1 = (1 − a) + a − a
z0
2 = ((1 − a) + a)(1 − a) + a − a(1 − a)
z0
3 = (((1 − a) + a)(1 − a) + a)(1 − a) + a
− a(1 − a)2
z0
r = 1 − a(1 − a)r−1.
Therefore, from Eqn (7.4), the drop probability after the rth Negative mark
πr = 1 −
zr
ur
= a(1 − a)r−1 (7.15)
After missing one payment, the source will send subsequent Positive marks as normal. Each time
one arrives at the dropper, the dropper’s recent balance will return to credit. But each time a further
Negative mark appears, the ﬂow’s balance will fall into debt again until the next credit arrives. Therefore,
after one missing payment, the dropper will inject a sequence of bursts of light loss between every
Negative mark and the following Positive. Each burst will be reduced in amplitude indeﬁnitely by the
above formula.
The event after r = 250 in the middle of Fig 7.8 visualises the effect of missing one payment after
the ﬂow has had enough time to establish itself (in this case the EWMA discount factor a = 1/32).7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 126
Incidentally, the event after r = 25 in the same ﬁgure shows how missing a payment while the ﬂow
is establishing its record as a ‘consistent payer’ causes the dropper to hit the ﬂow harder initially. The
analysis of this case is not given here, but it is similar to that used in §7.7.2, when the source stops
payment completely after q marks. The spike after r = 455 is yet another case (‘Delay One Payment’)
discussed in the next section.
The gain the transport will make (in terms of trafﬁc volume, not microeconomics) from the ‘Miss
One’ behaviour is
G(−) = 1 −
Trafﬁc dropped
Trafﬁc that should be dropped
.
The trafﬁc dropped can be calculated by summing all the drop probabilities after each Negative mark.
To determine how much trafﬁc should be dropped, recall that we have made the source responsible
for allowing for round trip delays (§7.3.2). Therefore, by our principle of ‘Equivalence with Honesty’,
if a payment arrives late, over time the dropper should eventually drop as much trafﬁc as the volume
forwarded between the ﬁrst mark to go into debt and the next Positive mark that brings the balance into
credit again. The total loss should add up to the same as if there were 100% loss in one of these intervals.
Consider the delay between a Negative packet and each subsequent Positive remains constant (i.e.
the RTT remains constant). Then, by the above argument and using Eqn (7.15), the gain from the ‘Miss
One’ behaviour,
G(−) = 1 −
r X
i=1
πi
,
1
= 1 − a
r X
i=1
(1 − a)i−1.
This geometric progression simpliﬁes to
G(−) = 1 − a(1 − ar)/a
= 0; r → ∞.
It is not surprising that there is no gain, as the whole point of a moving average is to ensure this happens,
at least in a stationary case. However, we have now checked that the ‘Continually Vigilant’ algorithm
does indeed achieve this.
As an example, consider a continuous ﬂow with bit-rate x = 10Mb/s consisting of packets of
size s = 1500B experiencing congestion marking fraction of p = 0.01%. On average there will be
1/p = 10,000 packets or s/p = 15MB from one congestion mark to the next (a round), with the average
duration of a round being τ = s/(xp) = 12s. Imagine the source misses a Positive mark completely,
then sends each subsequent Positive mark to arrive R =30ms after the Negative mark that triggers it
(due to round trip delay). Then, if every subsequent payment arrives 30ms after the Negative mark it
balances, the dropper should aim to remove R/τ × 15MB = Rx = 37.5kB of trafﬁc (or Rx/s = 25
packets) eventually altogether.
Further consider that the dropper EMWA discount factor is a = 1/32. In the ﬁrst round, the
dropper will aim to discard a × 37.5kB = 1.172kB, or less than one packet (i.e. it will drop one packet7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 127
with probability 1172/1500). However, if the source repays the missing payment in the next round, all
the dropper will have discarded is this fractional packet in the ﬁrst round (the spike at r = 455) in Fig
7.8). But if the source never makes up the missing payment, the dropper will go on to remove the full
37.5kB (or 25 packets) if the ﬂow continues for sufﬁcient subsequent rounds (the ski-slope in the middle
of Fig 7.8).
Even if it mistakenly misses a payment, a source can ensure it only ever suffers the ‘spike’ punish-
ment, never the full ‘ski-slope’. It can just always conservatively respond to a packet drop with a Positive
packet.
Dynamics after One Missed Payment. The transport can vary the speed at which the EWMA clocks
on negative marks without changing its bit-rate by sending more smaller packets or less larger packets.
However, the dropper counts its balances in bytes, not packets. So if the source clocks the EWMA faster
by sending smaller packets, its balances will merely evolve in smaller steps (and vice versa).
If, after missing one payment, the sender increases the delay between each Negative and Positive
mark, it will suffer proportionately more drop, as it should. If it reduces payment delay it will suffer less
drop, as it should.
The EWMA spreads out punishment for missing a mark over time. So if the marking fraction
reduces after missing a payment, the punishment will merely take longer, rather than being less severe
overall (assuming each round trip delay between mark and payment is the same). The converse is also
true; that a higher marking fraction will drop the same volume of trafﬁc but faster.
If the sender increases its bit-rate after missing a payment, all other things being equal, its trafﬁc
will collect congestion marks more rapidly. It will then lose the same proportion of trafﬁc but more
rapidly. However, it will be the same proportion of a higher volume of trafﬁc, losing more overall. This
is correct, because delaying payment at a different bit-rate is a different crime. Conversely, missing a
payment then slowing the bit-rate will reduce the total amount of trafﬁc removed. Again, this is correct
because a source that delays each payment for less bits should be punished less, even though each delay
is for the same time.
The careful (and consequently rather convoluted) logic behind this assertion is as follows. A Posi-
tive mark is meant to pay for the right to send trafﬁc from one Negative mark to the next. Negative marks
are generated based on the instantaneous product of bit-rate and resource congestion. Directly paying
for Negative marks (as Gibbens & Kelly originally proposed) naturally pays for the instantaneous trafﬁc
between them. But paying for Positive marks is intended to solve all the issues with receiver-pays con-
gestion pricing. The dropper checks that Positive marks balance Negative and that they arrive no later
than the Negative mark they balance. If they do arrive later, the dropper’s sanction should be to remove
all the instantaneous trafﬁc between the two events. But removing all this trafﬁc immediately would hit
accidental transgressions extremely harshly.
Therefore, instead, the dropper spreads the punishment over time. It removes a proportion of the
total required punishment while the lifetime balance is negative, but it ceases punishment whenever the
balance is non-negative. If the source misses one payment after the mark indexed i = 1, but pays for7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 128
every subsequent mark after a round trip delay, it is fair to count the payment after the second mark
as if it were the missed payment after the ﬁrst mark, rather than considering the ﬁrst payment to have
been missed forever. In other words, one missed payment is equivalent to all subsequent payments being
delayed (and the last missed). Then it is appropriate that the dropper’s sanction for each recent payment
delay should relate to the volume of trafﬁc sent during that recent delay, not that sent during the ﬁrst
payment delay.
This logic justiﬁes the dropper algorithm remembering the proportion of trafﬁc to remove, rather
than remembering the absolute volume of trafﬁc to remove.
Delay One Payment
If the source delays a Positive marking until after the following Negative congestion mark, from the
dropper’s point of view it is as if one more congestion mark has occurred within a round trip than the
source posted as an initial Cautious credit. The dropper’s recent balance will temporarily fall into a debt
of one packet. If the source is following the re-ECN protocol it will respond to feedback about each
congestion mark with a Positive packet. As soon as the ﬁrst Positive marking arrives at the dropper, the
balance will be returned to zero. Then further Positive marks will restore the initial credit.
We assume both the dropper’s recent balances start equal to each other (z0 = u0). After one missing
payment the dropper’s recent balances update to
z1 = (1 − a)z0
u1 = u0.
From Eqn (7.4), the drop probability from the next congestion mark until the ﬁrst Positive marking
repairs the balance is
πr = (1 −
z1
u1
)
= a
For example, a spike of drop probability 1/32 due to a delayed payment is shown at index r = 445 in
Fig 7.8, which is unsurprising because the dropper’s EWMA discount a = 1/32.
The source’s gain from the ‘Delay One’ behaviour is zero, by the same argument as that for the
‘Miss One’ behaviour.
Pay Once Only
A ﬂow could legitimately initialise itself with sufﬁcient Cautious credit on its ﬁrst full-sized segment,
giving itself the right to ﬂow state in the dropper, but then never send any further positive markings. At
each congestion marked (Negative) packet, the transport would just continue sending Neutral packets,
so the dropper would increase the proportion of drop.37 But we need to check how much trafﬁc the
‘Continually Vigilant’ dropper algorithm in §7.6.1 allows through in excess of that paid for.
No ﬂow-state timeout is modelled, as one use for the results will be to determine the dropper’s best
ﬂow-state timeout policy. So far we have assumed it can be lazy, removing stale ﬂow state only when
37The ‘Pay Once’ behaviour obviously assumes that the transport does not respond to any subsequent drops with Positive marks.7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 129
memory is scarce. But the dropper may need to actively detect ﬂows with a continually reducing balance
and either set their drop probability to 100% or remove their ﬂow-state.
The dropper will evolve its recent balance variables as
zr = as(1 − a)r
ur = as[(1 − a) + (1 − a)2 + ...(1 − a)r].
From Eqn (7.4), the forwarding probability after the rth congestion mark
φr = (1 − πr)
=
zr
ur
=
1
Pr−1
i=0(1 − a)−i.
Simplifying this geometric progression gives
φr =
a
(1 − a)
 
(1 − a)−r − 1
 (7.16)
→ 0. r → ∞
One positively marked packet pays for the average volume of trafﬁc arriving at the dropper from
one congestion mark to the next. The gain, G(+) to the transport from the ‘Pay Once’ behaviour is best
stated in terms of trafﬁc forwarded (unlike before in terms of trafﬁc dropped):
G(+) =
Total volume forwarded into future
Volume single packet payment covers
− 1.
Note that the gain is not dependent on packet size. An attacker could send larger packets after the initial
Cautious packet, to get more bits through per EWMA clock cycle (from one negative mark to the next),
but these would be rejected by the dropper as larger than the maximum size credit packet seen in the ﬂow
and handled instead with the Bulk of misbehaving ﬂows.
Therefore, thegaindependsonthesumofalltheproportionsoftrafﬁcthedropperforwardsbetween
each congestion mark (the area under φr for all r from Eqn (7.16)):
G(+) =
a
(1 − a)
∞ X
r=1

1
(1 − a)−r − 1

− 1. (7.17)
It doesn’t seem possible to simplify this expression for the gain,38 but it converges fairly rapidly
against r, so numerical techniques will be accurate enough. It is plotted for a range of values of EWMA
discount factor (plotted as lg(a)) in Fig 7.9. G(+) = −ln(a)− seems to be a reasonable estimator for
the expression, with 0 <  < 1 over the range plotted.
Even though drop quickly rises, particularly for larger values of a, a transport adopting the ‘Pay
Once’ behaviour obviously always gets more trafﬁc through than it has paid for, for all a. Discussion
of how to negate this positive gain is deferred until the end of the next section that models the ‘Stop
Payment’ behaviour, which is a generalisation of ‘Pay Once’.
38It is the most basic form of a Lambert series, which no-one has (yet) been able to simplify further.7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 130
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Figure 7.9: Gain from the ‘Pay Once Only’ Behaviour.
Plotted against lg(a), where a is the EWMA discount factor (the plot of G(+) is not quite straight,
whereas for comparison −ln(a) is).
Stop Payment
We now establish whether and how much the source would gain from completely stopping sending any
Positive marks mid-ﬂow. In the previous section (§7.7.2) this strategy was adopted straight after the ﬁrst
Positive mark. This time, we assume the source pays q Positive marks (including one initial Cautious
credit) to balance q Negative marks before stopping Positive marking completely. Consistent with the
previous analyses, we use the convention for indexing Negative congestion marks that i = 1 at the ﬁrst
mark after payment stops. Therefore the ﬁrst congestion mark of the ﬂow is at i = 1 − q. The ﬂow
continues for r marks after payment stops (i = r).
The dropper initialises both recent balance variables z−q = u−q = 0 and they both evolve over the
same geometric series while the source behaves normally, until at i = 0:
u0 = z0 = sa
0 X
i=1−q
(1 − a)i+q
= s(1 − a)(1 − aq).
Once the source stops sending Positive marks, the dropper’s recent balance variables diverge until
at i = r:
zr = s(1 − a)(1 − aq)(1 − a)r
ur = s
r X
i=1−q
(1 − a)i+q
= s(1 − aq+r).7.7. Predicted Dropper Performance 131
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Figure 7.10: Dropper drop probability πr due to stopping Positive Marking.
Marking stops in 3 scenarios, after congestion mark indices r = 1,25,250; EWMA discount factor
a = 1/32.
Therefore, the forwarding probability after the rth Negative mark,
φr =
zr
ur
=
(1 − aq)(1 − a)r
(1 − aq+r)
(7.18)
Fig 7.10 visualises the dropper’s drop probability as the index of arriving congestion marks, q +r rises.
Three cases for when the source stops payment are shown, q = 1 ‘Pay Once’, q = 25 & q = 250. It
can be seen that the sooner payment stops, the faster drop probability rises, which the algorithm was
deliberately designed to do.
Similarly to the ‘Pay Once’ behaviour, the gain to the transport for the ‘Stop Payment’ behaviour is
G(0) =
Flow lifetime volume forwarded
Volume paid for
− 1
=
P∞
r=1 φr
q
=
(1 − aq)
q
∞ X
r=1
(1 − a)r
(1 − aq+r)
. (7.19)
This expression generalises the gain from the ‘Pay Once’ scenario. As in that case, the expression is too
complex to simplify as r → ∞. But again it is amenable to numerical analysis as it converges fairly fast.
The headline conclusion is that gain immediately goes positive as soon as payment stops. Therefore the
gain from this behaviour will need to be negated long before r → ∞.
At the end of §7.6.1 we adopted the attitude that the dropper held a record of which ﬂow-state was
most stale, so it could time out this state lazily, as and when it needed more memory for new compliant
ﬂows. Our analysis of ‘Pay Once’ and its generalisation to the ‘Stop Payment’ behaviour shows that drop
clocks up too slowly if the dropper just leaves its regular algorithm running for a ﬂow that has simply7.8. Simulated Dropper Performance 132
stopped paying.
Such a ﬂow will be obvious to the dropper. The ‘Continually Vigilant’ algorithm categorises a
ﬂow as ‘On Remand’ as soon as its lifetime balance goes negative, and records the time its balance was
last positive. If a ﬂow has been on Remand for more than the ﬂow-state minimum timeout it seems
necessary to increase its drop probability much more aggressively than the algorithm currently does
(assuming sufﬁcient memory to continue to hold its ﬂow state). We could simply increase drop of on
Remand ﬂows to 100% after the timeout, or drop could perhaps rise with time on remand.39 This would
actively drive such ﬂows out of the system, rather than timing out their ﬂow state and treating them with
the Bulk of other misbehaving ﬂows. Then ﬂow-state could still be lazily recovered as needed.
The best strategy for the dropper to adopt is left for further research. We do not want to unnec-
essarily hit ﬂows too hard too quickly if there is a chance an innocent ﬂow might accidentally get into
this state. And we already know further research is needed to review how we transition a ﬂow’s state
when it is consigned to the Bulk (see §13.2). We also don’t want to timeout the state of a ﬂow that is
obviously misbehaving if we don’t need the memory—it might be better off in the Bulk, being treated
with an uncontrolled mixture of Negative inputs from misbehaving trafﬁc and Positive remainders from
timed out compliant ﬂows.
Predicted False Misses: Summary
We have now analysed a few tractable cases where the dropper might wrongly miss sanctioning trans-
ports that are not preserving the integrity of downstream congestion signals. As expected, the drop-
per correctly prevents any gain from a delayed payment. Where one payment is missed, the dropper’s
sanction is correct, although it took some effort to argue this for cases where the ﬂow’s bit-rate is non-
stationary. Where payments stop completely (a missing payment taken to the extreme), the dropper’s
baseline sanction algorithm is insufﬁcient. The dropper has all the information it needs to actively in-
tervene in such a case, so it could actively introduce a more aggressive drop policy after the ﬂow-state
minimum timeout. But we have left investigation of precisely what is the best dropper policy in these
cases for further research.
7.8 Simulated Dropper Performance
Simulations were conducted40 to test the predictions of dropper performance. The simulation plan is
listed below:
1. Characterise mean and variance of congestion experienced by test ﬂows;
2. Verify theoretical model of distribution of marks per window, as used to predict false hits (§7.7.1);
3. Sensitivity analysis of false hits against EWMA weight;
4. Sensitivity Analysis of false misses against EWMA weight.
39The need for further research to identify a meaningful objective to judge what should be done is recorded in §13.2.
40The simulations were planned and designed by the present author. However, a colleague, Toby Moncaster, implemented and
executed them.7.8. Simulated Dropper Performance 133
In all cases, only initial runs have been completed; repeat runs are in progress so the results should only
be taken as indicative at this stage.
7.8.1 Simulation Environment
The simulations were designed to create a hostile congestion environment for the dropper, with relatively
highcongestionthatalsovariedconsiderablyonfasttimescales. Twoscenarioswereused, bothwithhigh
congestion and high congestion variance, but one lower than the other:
HCHV High congestion, high congestion variance
LCLV Lower congestion, lower variance
In each case, three different test ﬂow scenarios were used with different RTTs.
Simulated Implementation.The simulation was conducted in the ns-2 packet simulator [ns2] v2.30.
Draft-07 of the re-ECN protocol in IP and TCP [BJMS09a] and the continually vigilant dropper algo-
rithm v00R41 (§7.6.1) were implemented in the simulator.
Unless stated otherwise, the dropper was conﬁgured to merely log that it would have dropped a
packet, rather than actually dropping it. This allowed us to maintain a stable testing environment without
the extra confusion of the transport’s rate reduction response to each discard from the dropper as if it
were congestion. Actual drop was turned on only in the experiment to ﬁnd the knee of drop sensitivity
against EWMA weight.
Even when the dropper was conﬁgured to actually drop packets, the transport was conﬁgured not to
send a Positive packet in response to a drop. This simulated what a cheating source would most likely
do. Without conﬁguring it this way, the transport was ‘too good’ to ever allow any drops after the ﬁrst
one or two.
When we tested the transport with it conﬁgured to respond to a drop with a Positive packet, it
became apparent that this would be a very robust way for a long-running honest transport to ‘learn’ how
much credit to give to the dropper—if it had previously underestimated. One or two additional Positive
packets in response to drops sufﬁciently topped up the credit to prevent any further packets from being
discarded by the dropper—for as long as we could subsequently run the simulation. This is what we
mean by ‘too good’.
Simulated Topology.In order to achieve high congestion variance, a parking lot topology was arranged
so that trafﬁc bottlenecks shifted rapidly from one link to another during the simulation. Network topol-
ogy consisted of 5 core routers R1–R5 connected by 4 bottleneck links. Senders generating background
trafﬁc were connected to each of the ﬁrst four routers (R1–R4) and receivers were connected to each of
the last four routers (R2–R5), all with 10Mbps links.
Link latencies were designed to give a range of RTTs, but shorter RTT paths were omitted to
increase the chance of congestion overruns as new ﬂows arrived. Fig 7.11 shows the topology with link
41This dissertation avoids details of design iterations in response to early simulation results—in fact there was only one; to
randomise initialisation of the remainder in the probDrop() function.7.8. Simulated Dropper Performance 134
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Figure 7.11: Simulation Topology to Test the Re-ECN Dropper.
latencies. Table 7.2 shows the different RTTs of the ten resulting paths through the network, from each
set of sources to each set of destinations.
dst2 dst3 dst4 dst5
src1 470ms 390ms 610ms 580ms
src2 420ms 640ms 610ms
src3 820ms 790ms
src4 620ms
Table 7.2: Simulated Round Trip Times between each Source and Destination.
Link capacities are also shown in Fig 7.11. Average congestion for the two main scenarios was
controlled by altering the capacities of the bottleneck links, as speciﬁed in Table 7.3. The source test
node, C1 was connected to R1 and the destination test node, D1 was connected to R5 via a re-ECN
dropper, Dr1.
Background on-off
Model Bottleneck TCP parameters
capacity, Mean Packet train
C idle length
LCLV 10Mb/s 5s 20–1500 pkt
HCHV 8Mb/s 2s 20–150 pkt
Table 7.3: Simulation Parameters Varied to Create the Two Trafﬁc Scenarios.
All the queues used the RED AQM algorithm conﬁgured with the default parameters for ns-2.
Speciﬁcally, this implies RED is attempting to uniformly distribute its marks, which we predict won’t
make any difference (§7.2), and it is scaling down the marking probability of smaller packets42.
Three different RTT scenarios are used for the test trafﬁc path, as we wanted to explore the be-
haviour of ﬂows with RTTs comparable to the lowest, middle, and highest RTTs of competing ﬂows
(none of which were small for the reasons already given):
Short RTT 150ms
Medium RTT 380ms
42Which we deprecate in [Bri08a].7.8. Simulated Dropper Performance 135
Long RTT 800ms
A shorter test trafﬁc RTT of 80ms was used in one extra set of simulations. Different test ﬂow RTTs
were achieved by varying the access link latencies (Fig 7.11 shows the Medium RTT scenario).
Simulated Trafﬁc Models.All simulated TCP trafﬁc was ECN-capable and used a packet size of 576B.
Background trafﬁc consisted of:
• 100 on-off TCP ﬂows (10 per route) with exponentially distributed idle times and uniformly dis-
tributed packet trains, characterised by the parameters in Table 7.3. This created the distinction
between the congestion variances of the two trafﬁc scenarios.
• 10 continuous TCP ﬂows (1 per route) carrying trafﬁc that modelled FTP behaviour with inﬁnite
ﬁle size so there was always data ready to be sent.
• 290 UDP ﬂows (29 per route) carrying trafﬁc that modelled aggregated VoIP behaviour [HGB06]:
exponentially distributed on-off sources with packet size of 70B; mean burst times of 7.24s and
mean idle times of 5.69s. Data rate during bursts was 10.2kb/s.
The test trafﬁc consisted of a continuous FTP source over TCP, which ensured there was always data
available to send. In all experiments, results affected by the synchronised transient of the simulation
start-up were discarded.
7.8.2 Simulation Results
Characterise Mean Congestion and Variance
Without the dropper operating, the simulator was run with the trafﬁc models speciﬁed above to record
congestion experienced by the test ﬂow. Mean congestion was measured as the total ECN marked bytes
divided by total sent bytes. Variance was measured by collecting results into 1sec bins, and taking the
variance of all the binned measurements. A bin size of 1sec was considered sufﬁciently small, because
the characteristic time of RED’s EWMA to smooth its marking probability (the time for the EWMA
to decay events in the past to 1/e of their original size) was conﬁgured to the default of 1sec on all
links. The overall results are tabulated below (Table 7.4). Note that the table records measurements of
Scenario RTT/ms E(p)
p
Var(p)
HCHV 150 1.302% 1.676%
HCHV 380 1.223% 2.433%
HCHV 800 0.210% 2.136%
LCLV 150 0.325% 0.927%
LCLV 380 0.270% 0.841%
LCLV 800 0.219% 1.173%
Table 7.4: Congestion Mean & Variance for the 6 Simulated Scenarios.
congestion experienced by one ﬂow (the test ﬂow), therefore variance depends on how many packets the
ﬂow sends during the binning time. Less packets per second will naturally lead to more variance, because7.8. Simulated Dropper Performance 136
the discrete steps in congestion levels are greater for smaller numbers of packets. We deliberately took
this approach, because we wanted to understand how our test ﬂow saw congestion varying.
As well as recording the above results on ‘dummy runs’ without the dropper operating, mean con-
gestion was recorded during all experimental runs and generally matched these results.
Absolutely all congestion experienced by the test ﬂow in all experiments was signalled explicitly
with ECN marks—the test ﬂows experienced no drops due to link congestion. This in itself was quite
unexpected, given the relatively high level of congestion simulated. It was particularly unexpected in the
HCHV scenarios with numerous short ﬂows, where many exponential TCP slow-starts were injecting
trafﬁc bursts into the queues.
Verify Analytical False Hits Model
This simulation was run to test our theoretical analysis of the distribution of marks per window, which we
used to predict likely false hit fractions in §7.7.1. We had used the analytical model as the basis for the
dropper design, so we wanted to see whether it reﬂected reality, when large numbers of TCP and UDP
ﬂows are interacting in a highly dynamic rather than stationary environment. In particular the HCHV
scenario simulated a high rate of ﬂow-arrivals and departures, which added to the mix a high proportion
of ﬂows in TCP’s exponential slow start, even though our theoretical model had only modelled TCP’s
congestion avoidance phase.
At ﬁrst the six trafﬁc scenarios speciﬁed above were simulated for 3000s each. Then very long runs
of 15000s were repeated 8 times with different seeds for two scenarios (LCLV with 150ms & 80ms) to
establish conﬁdence intervals (see below). The dropper was conﬁgured to not drop any packets from the
test ﬂow in order to ensure its TCP algorithm only responded to congestion events. Instead the dropper
was modiﬁed to measure ECN marks per window for different congestion levels. The results of an initial
single run for each test are plotted in Fig 7.12. They are shown as larger symbols overlaid on the original
theoretical predictions, shown as similar but smaller symbols.
Theprobabilitiesofonemarkperwindowwereclosetothetheoreticalpredictions. Butprobabilities
of higher numbers of marks per window (Ps(M > 1)) were all considerably higher than the theory
predicted. This was perhaps not surprising as the analytical model we used assumed stationarity, not
including ﬂow starts (or any congestion variability) which would lead to brief bursts of queue growth.
This would tend to collect more of the overall number of marks into bursts within windows, with less
spread evenly throughout the period.
Congestion varied considerably throughout the runs (see the previous experiment), so the average
over the whole of each run was used (marked bytes to total bytes in the test ﬂow). Analytical results
are only possible for integer values of congestion window, which map to a set of discrete values of
congestion p. Therefore linear interpolation between the discrete analytical results was used to produce
theoretical predictions at exactly comparable values of congestion.
Further simulations are planned with completely stationary trafﬁc to prove whether the analysis is
accurately reproduced by a simulation under the same stationary conditions as assumed in the model.
In the initial 3000s runs, the probabilities of higher numbers of marks per window (Ps(M > 2)) are7.8. Simulated Dropper Performance 137
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Figure 7.12: Distribution of Marks per Window for TCP against Congestion p.
(Log-log scales); Initial simulated results (the larger symbols labelled Ps(M > m)) superimposed over
original analytical predictions for congestion avoidance phase (smaller symbols labelled Pa(M > m)).
95% conﬁdence intervals are shown for the results at p = 0.74 & p = 0.87.
p Scen- RTT Ps(M>m)/% for m = Pa(M>m)/% for m =
/% ario /ms 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
0.21 HCHV 800 5.65 0.19 0.028 0 0 5.51 0.15 0.0026 3.3E-5 3.1E-7
0.22 LCLV 800 5.72 0.19 0.027 0 0 5.55 0.15 0.0026 3.3E-5 3.2E-7
0.27 LCLV 380 6.35 0.13 0.039 0 0 6.16 0.19 0.0036 5.0E-5 5.3E-7
0.32 LCLV 150 6.85 0.17 0.040 0.02 0.01 6.74 0.22 0.0047 7.0E-5 8.0E-7
0.74 LCLV 150 11.17 1.19 0.095 0.009 1E-4 9.76 0.46 0.014 2.8E-4 4.1E-6
95% Conﬁdence ± 0.05 0.03 0.008 0.002 2E-4
0.87 LCLV 80 10.02 1.63 0.203 0.023 0.002 10.70 0.55 0.018 3.8E-4 6.1E-6
95% Conﬁdence ± 0.03 0.01 0.007 0.002 7E-4
1.21 HCHV 380 12.91 0.33 0.051 0 0 12.61 0.76 0.027 6.8E-4 1.1E-5
1.30 HCHV 150 13.18 0.28 0.040 0.005 0 13.02 0.81 0.030 7.6E-4 1.3E-5
Table 7.5: Distribution of Marks per Window for TCP against Congestion p.
Initial simulated results (labelled Ps(M > m)) beside original analytical predictions for congestion
avoidance phase (labelled Pa(M > m)).7.8. Simulated Dropper Performance 138
based on extremely sparse samples. Despite simulating 1.25 million packets in the test ﬂows (alongside
about half a billion in 400 other simulated ﬂows) only nineteen runs of 3 marks, two of 4 marks and
two of 5 marks were measured over all six simulations. Therefore the points plotted for runs longer than
two marks should be interpreted as part of a potentially wide spread of results. In particular, it should
be noted that eight points signifying zero probability of 4 & 5 mark runs could not be plotted on the log
scale. The plotted data is also recorded in Table 7.5, which does show the zero results.
The much longer and repeated runs produced a signiﬁcant number of RTTs with 5 marks per RTT
(31) in the p = 0.87% case (LCLV with 80ms RTT) but only one in the p = 0.74% case (LCLV with
150ms RTT). Only three windows contained 6 marks, all in the 80ms case. Over 33 million packets were
simulated in the test ﬂows alone, with well over 10 billion packets in the background ﬂows.
95% Conﬁdence intervals are plotted for all those results involving repeat runs using different
seeds.43 Although the points without conﬁdence intervals cannot necessarily be trusted, if those with
conﬁdence intervals sit within their respective intervals, they seem to imply that the results as a whole
do not sit on a smooth line. This would be expected if stationary simulations did sit where predicted
and the upward shift was due primarily to congestion variability—at least if the congestion variability
correlates with the upward shifts. This suggests a further set of simulations, which are in progress and
will be reported in future work.
Our original goal of limiting the false hit rate to the same order as background drop turns out to
be rather challenging, given we can detect no background drop at all with ECN enabled ubiquitously,
even with fairly hostile dynamic conditions. At least over the working range of these results, they imply
that two packets of credit per ﬂow would lead the dropper to introduce on the order of 0.1% additional
losses in a network running at about 1% explicit congestion marking. Most current production networks
(residential access in the developed world) would typically aim to provision for an order of magnitude
less than 1% congestion. But these results imply it is borderline whether 2 credits will be sufﬁcient and
we may need to consider 3 as a rule of thumb. However, we must bear in mind these simulations were
deliberately designed to create a very dynamic hostile congestion environment.
We can also tentatively conclude that implementations of re-ECN in TCP could reasonably post a
constant hard-coded credit, rather than having to do a more complex adaptation to run-time conditions.
False Hits: EWMA Sensitivity
Various values of dropper EWMA weight were used with an ‘honest’ transport to try to minimise the
fraction of false hits—drops punishing relatively innocent behaviour. The term ‘honest’ is strictly rel-
ative, given we make the transport responsible for allowing sufﬁcient credit to cover its own feedback
delay (§7.3.2). By ‘honest’ we mean the transport was conﬁgured to post 2.07 full-sized packets of credit
(that is, two full-sized packets plus a 40B TCP SYN). A later experiment tested whether higher credit
was necessary in some circumstances.
Fig 7.13 shows the results for all six scenarios in the test matrix after a calibration run had been
conducted to ﬁnd the general area of the knee of the curves. Figs 7.13a)&b) show the full range of
43The lower bound of the interval for the lowest point could not be plotted on the log scale as it was negative.7.8. Simulated Dropper Performance 139
a) b)
re-ECN dropper algo CV00R;
credit = 2+SYN; no Posv on drop;
Low congestion; Low variance
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.6%
0.7%
0.001 0.01 0.1 1
EWMA weight a
d
r
o
p
p
e
r
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n LCLV150ms
LCLV380ms
LCLV800ms
re-ECN dropp algo CV00R;
credit = 2+SYN; no Posv on drop;
High congestion; High variance
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.6%
0.7%
0.001 0.01 0.1 1
EWMA weight a
d
r
o
p
p
e
r
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n HCHV150ms
HCHV380ms
HCHV800ms
c) d)
re-ECN dropper algo CV00R;
credit = 2+SYN; No Posv on drop;
Low congestion; Low variance
0.00%
0.05%
0.10%
0.15%
0.20%
0.001 0.01 0.1
EWMA weight a
d
r
o
p
p
e
r
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
LCLV150ms
LCLV380ms
LCLV800ms
re-ECN dropp algo CV00R;
credit = 2+SYN; no Posv on drop;
High congestion; High variance
0.00%
0.05%
0.10%
0.15%
0.20%
0.001 0.01 0.1
EWMA weight
d
r
o
p
p
e
r
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
HCHV150ms
HCHV380ms
HCHV800ms
Figure 7.13: Re-ECN Dropper Sensitivity to false hits against EWMA weight a
EWMA weights tested. The wiggles for higher RTTs at higher values of EWMA weight were not due to
insufﬁcient samples, but seem to be due to some form of synchronisation. Although sufﬁcient runs to do
conﬁdence tests are yet to be performed, these wiggles were repeatable in general form, and remained
even for simulation runs an order of magnitude longer. In this experiment the dropper was conﬁgured
to actually drop packets, therefore TCP was reducing its rate considerably in response to the drops.
Given the extremely high EWMA weights used at the top end, it is perhaps not surprising that odd
synchronisation effects appeared in the presence of intermittent very high bursts of drop. There may also
have been interactions between the long RTTs used and the approximately similar smoothing time of the
RED algorithm.
Figs 7.13c)&d) zoom in on the more usable results where false hits are much lower at a ≤ 0.1. The
drop fraction was expected to continue decreasing as the EWMA was decreased further (but the rate of
decrease to ﬂatten out). The results seem to ﬂatten off completely at low EWMA weights, but repeat
runs would need to be performed to test the signiﬁcance of the data.
This simulation gave us sufﬁcient conﬁdence in the stability of the results, to be able to use
only three values of EWMA from just below the knee of the curve in all our future experiments:
a = 1/16,1/32,1/64 (choosing fractional powers of two reduces the complexity of EWMA imple-
mentation, as already explained).7.8. Simulated Dropper Performance 140
False Misses Sensitivity
This experiment is designed to ﬁnd the smallest level of cheating that the re-ECN dropper cannot detect.
Rather than cheating in whole packets, it involves the source cheating a byte at a time. The source
correctly sends a credit of one SYN and one full-sized segment, and it responds to feedback of every
congestion mark with a Positive packet, but it stints on the size of each Positive packet.
Rather than simulating numerous scenarios with slightly different levels of cheating until the drop-
per notices, we fold all levels of cheating into each run of the experiment. Very gradually, the source
increases the amount by which it cheats (decreasing the size of Positive packets). We call this ramp-down
cheating. Then we measure how long it takes for the dropper to notice—when it starts to drop packets.
We also reverse the experiment to see how asymmetrically the dropper behaves because of the
EWMA delay. That is, from a certain level of cheating, the source gradually decreases how much it
cheats (increasing the size of Positive packets back to their proper full size). Then, once the source is no
longer cheating, we measure how long it takes for the dropper to stop falsely hitting it with drop.
These behaviours are not particularly meant to represent a clever cheating strategy; just a way to
test the sensitivity of the dropper to very small amounts of cheating.
Simulated Scenarios.The experimental set-up continues as before, but only using the HCHV scenario,
not LCLV. This halves the number of scenarios to simulate, given we are more interested in the dynamic
cases. A 3×3 matrix of simulation scenarios is used, with the 3 values of RTT as before, but also with
the 3 values of EWMA weight found from the previous calibration experiment, a = 1/16,1/32,1/64.
Full-sized packets are still 576B.
The test ﬂow starts 20s after the simulation. Its precise cheating behaviours are as follows:
• ‘Ramp-down’ starts by correctly declaring one full-sized Positive packet per congestion mark.
Every 20s for 2000s it decrements its Positive packet size by 1B, therefore ending up sending
every Positive packet 100B smaller than full-sized (under-declaring by 17.4%)
• ‘Ramp-up’ starts by making each Positive packet 60B smaller than full-sized in response to each
congestion mark (regularly under-declaring by 10.4%). Every 30s for 3000s it increments its
Positive packet size by 1B, ending up sending Positive packets 40B larger than full-sized (a regular
over-declaration of 6.9%)
In both cases, the source posts an initial credit of one full-sized packet and a TCP SYN (40B).
Although the effect of this disappears into the noise relatively quickly, we realised (unfortunately after
having run the initial experiments) that we should have allowed time for the initial credit to decay out of
thesystembeforethesourcestartedtorampdown. Thisexperimentalstrategyhadsuccessfullybeenused
to test a much earlier incarnation dropper, as reported in the original paper on re-feedback [BJCG+05].
It will be used in future runs.
In the ramp-up case, the test of whether a ﬂow’s lifetime balance is Positive was commented out of
the simulated dropper implementation. This left the test ﬂow only protected from the possibility of drop
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Also, in the ramp-up case, we realised after having run the experiments that we had also wrongly
changed two things at once—when the test-ﬂow starts, it introduces a step-change in cheating at the
same time as TCP starts its exponential slow-start. Future runs will allow TCP as well as the simulation
to settle before introducing the initial step change in cheating. Then, as well as examining the ramp
behaviour, we can also measure how quickly and how correctly the dropper responds to a step change in
cheating of a certain size (equivalent to the ‘Stop Payment’ behaviour of §7.7.2, but with a smaller step
than a complete stop).
Results.The results from the initial run could not be used for their primary intended purpose (dropper
sensitivity to tiny levels of cheating), as they were marred by the above teething problems. And further
runs could not be conducted given the deadline for this dissertation. Nonetheless, the results from these
initial runs are displayed in Figs 7.14 & 7.15 as they reveal some interesting and unexpected effects.
Each column of ﬁgures shows all nine scenarios, grouped three per graph. On the left of each page,
each group (a–c) has a common EWMA weight to compare the different RTT scenarios. On the right,
each group (d–f) has a common RTT to compare the different EWMA weights. Each plot is labelled
RXXX-aYY, where XXX is the RTT R in ms, and YY is the reciprocal of the EWMA weight 1/a.
Ramp-down:The spike of drop at the start of some runs is probably a result of TCP’s slow start with
only one packet’s initial credit to protect it. This will be shifted out of the way of the start of the ramp in
future runs, so it can be analysed separately.
The plots clearly show that it takes much longer for the dropper to catch a long RTT ﬂow. We
predict this result is produced by two effects in tension against each other. TCP’s packet rate is inversely
proportional to RTT, so for the same level of congestion, it is picking up far fewer congestion marks over
any speciﬁc duration. Therefore it will take longer for the initial credit to decay from the system. At the
same time, even though it is cheating, each Positive packet partially makes up the balance at the dropper.
But the longer RTT means it takes longer before it even partially makes amends. Therefore, the dropper
should drop more from a longer RTT ﬂow. But it seems the former effect dominates the latter in these
experiments.
A slower EWMA at the dropper seems to harm the cheating ﬂow more strongly. The long-RTT-
slow-EWMA case (R800-a64) contradicts this trend and the slow-EWMA case with medium RTT
(R380-a64) cannot make up its mind. Otherwise the trend seems to be present. This is because the
ramp effectively turns into a case of continually worsening late payment (§7.7.2 explains that a missed
payment is equivalent to continual late payments). A slower EWMA takes less note of a late payment. It
effectively says “I’ll only believe you do intend to pay in full when I see more evidence that you have”.
Note that the drop fraction is signiﬁcantly less than the cheating fraction in all cases. This is because
the cheating fraction is nominally stated as the worst amount of cheat between each Negative mark, not
the average. Each time a Positive packet arrives at the dropper, the lifetime balance of the ﬂow is less
than this worst-case number, which we have used to nominally describe the cheating level. In future runs
we will plot the actual cheating level, corrected for RTT and mean inter-mark spacing.7.8. Simulated Dropper Performance 142
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Figure 7.14: Drop Fraction against Time as the re-ECN Dropper Handles a Slowly Ramping Down
Cheat.
a)–c) compare RTTs R holding EWMA weight a constant. d)–f) compare EWMA weights holding
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Figure 7.15: Drop Fraction against Time as the re-ECN Dropper Handles a Slowly Ramping Up Cheat.
a)–c) compare RTTs R holding EWMA weight a constant. d)–f) compare EWMA weights holding
RTT constant.7.8. Simulated Dropper Performance 144
Ramp-up:The transient at 20s when the test ﬂow starts (not when the simulation starts) can be explained
by TCP’s slow-start. We assume the receiver feeds back one or two congestion marks when slow-start
ﬁnds the bottleneck operating rate. Then the TCP source will halve its rate, but at the same time it is
arranged to partially under-declare how much congestion it saw. In the next few round trips, this drives
the dropper balance strongly Negative, causing a huge spike of reported drops.44 This is due to dropper
beingdeliberatelydesignedtobemoresensitivetomisbehaviouratthestartofaﬂow(seethecomparison
between ‘Pay Once’ and ‘Stop Payment’ in §7.7.2).
As the source continues to partially pay its way, two effects work against each other. The dropper
becomes gradually more forgiving as it gets further from the ﬂow start. But at the same time, the ﬂow
continues to underpay, so drop becomes harsher. The two eventually balance out (which naturally takes
longer for the long RTT ﬂow). Then the drop fraction correctly tracks the reducing level of cheating
(rising under-declaration) to zero.
On the way an interesting synchronisation effect seems to occur. All the short RTT ﬂows show
three shark’s ﬁn bumps at about the same times (in independent simulations), all the medium RTT ﬂows
each exhibit one bump at the same times and the long RTT ﬂows are all smooth. These are reminiscent
of ‘aftershocks’ from the transient, but a proper explanation eludes us at this stage.
We now move on to what we intended to learn from this experiment. The slower EWMA clearly
seems to hurt the test ﬂow more—for the same reason as given above for the ramp-down case. The
fastest EWMA seems to hurt ﬂows very little at all. This is because it takes account of a good proportion
(1/16=6.25%) of each late payment for most of the duration of each inter-mark period (all of it except
the ﬁrst RTT). Once cheating drops below 6.25%, the dropper only sanctions the cheating ﬂows heavily
for 1RTT after each Negative packet, then not at all until the next Negative packet.
Other than delaying recovery from the transients at the start, we cannot notice a discernible effect
due to RTT in these cases. More runs will be needed to tighten the experimental variance so we can
interpret more predictable plots.
Once cheating falls to zero (at 1720s), periods of 20s or more with no drop at all immediately start
to appear in nearly all the scenarios, except the fastest EWMA which takes 2–3 minutes (it is the fastest
to punish a cheat and it takes longest to forgive). Periods of no drop lengthen from then on, but it takes
about 15mins before all drop-free periods are longer than 2mins. By this point it is difﬁcult to discern
whether drop is due to the after-effects of the ramp, or the typical level of accidental false hits. The
source is still some way from building up sufﬁcient credit to protect against all false misses (see the
earlier experiment designed to validate our theoretical predictions of false hits 7.8.2).
44Recall that we have conﬁgured the dropper to suppress actual dropping in these experiments.Chapter 8
Re-ECN Border Incentive Mechanisms
8.1 Border Architecture
8.1.1 Baseline Border Mechanism
The ‘big idea’ of re-feedback is to include information in packets that will be updated as it traverses a
network so that, at any point it will reveal the characteristics of the rest of the path. Then this information,
particularly congestion information, can be used by the parties either side of a trust boundary to control
each other’s incentives.
Re-feedback’s congestion signal integrity depends on the fact that congestion is a physical metric
that can never be negative. Therefore a persistently negative ﬂow can never be valid.
The ‘big idea’ of re-ECN is a practical way to instantiate rest-of-path congestion information in the
IP header without having to change forwarding elements and ﬁtting within the very limited space left in
the IPv4 header. Further, re-ECN is designed to allow metering mechanisms to accumulate an aggregate
of downstream congestion-volume over time with minimal complexity.
The baseline mechanism proposed to achieve this is simply to separately count the volume of pack-
ets with Positive and Negative markings in a whole aggregate crossing a trust boundary. Then down-
stream congestion-volume is simply the Positive count minus the Negative.
In this section we will introduce attacks that threaten the simplicity of this baseline border mech-
anism (§8.2). They were all proposed by others and they all, in some way, use or hide ﬂows that are
persistently negative.
We then propose defences against these attacks, which harden the simple baseline mechanism. But
they also add complexity. Nonetheless, the solutions keep to design principles that we believe maintain
the essence of the original simplicity.
8.1.2 Border Mechanism Constraints
The re-ECN border mechanism should meet the following constraints:
Processing Scalability: It SHOULD keep additional per-packet operations to a minimum (we cannot
expect sub-linear scaling in the strict complexity theory sense, because counting marked packets
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Storage Scalability: Ideally it SHOULD require no trafﬁc-dependent state (e.g. per ﬂow-state). But if
it uses ﬂow-state, it must be optional, growing sub-linearly with number of ﬂows. That is:
• it MUST NOT make ﬂows fail if they move routes;
• how much ﬂow-state to store MUST be controlled by policy, NOT by the number of ﬂows
potentially created by malicious sources of trafﬁc.
Incentive Alignment for Congestion Signal Integrity: It MUST ensure that the parties either side of
a border have no incentive to pervert the integrity of congestion signals and that each party in turn
has the incentive to pass on this incentive to its neighbours.
Attacker Model: Mechanisms MUST be strong enough to ensure congestion signal integrity whether
potential attackers are rational or malicious. While the malice of users can be unbounded, the
malice of networks can be assumed to be bounded (deﬁned below).
Below some extra detail is given on a couple of these constraints:
Scalability:A useful technology target is to require no operations that would prevent all-optical packet
switching at a border with no electronics, given the likely minimal processing and storage capabilities of
photonic devices in the next decade or so.
Re-ECN recognises and exploits a distinction between the typical threats posed by networks and
those posed by users (deﬁned next). This allows active policing to be located only at the interface
between end-users and their network providers, shifting the active policing burden away from the more
performance-critical interfaces between high-speed networks.
Attacker Types: The re-ECN framework is primarily an incentive alignment system but it can also be
used to enforce policies. Incentive alignment is a highly desirable property of any large distributed
system, but its power must not be overstated. If an attacker is immune to incentives, coercion is also
necessary.
The original statement of the motivations of users and networks in our paper on re-
feedback [BJCG+05] considered a range of motivations, but only explicitly enumerated two types:
Rational users: those who want to communicate with each other as fast as possible at minimal charge;
Rational network providers: those who compete amongst themselves for the custom of users by in-
vesting in network resources.
The paper hinted that it believed re-feedback could deal with DDoS attacks, but it avoided making
formal claims on this front. As we wish to attempt to deal with entities sending trafﬁc with no intent to
communicate, we need to deﬁne language for a wider attack model. Beyond rational entities, we deﬁne
two further types (each with user and provider sub-types):
Bounded malicious: a party that is willing to cause costs to others as long as strictly less cost to itself
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Unbounded malicious: a party who is willing to cause cost to others even if the cost to itself is the
same or greater.
Assumed Attack Model:In the following section attacks are proposed where one network can gain from
attacking another with dummy trafﬁc. We therefore propose the following ambitious assumption that is
much harsher on the system designer than simple rationality.
Assumption 8.1. If networks are malicious their malice is bounded, but the malice of users may be
unbounded.
We believe this assumption is a reasonable model of the real Internet. Some would consider it a
somewhat paranoid assumption, as large networking organisation will usually ‘play by the rules’ and
compete with each other for legitimate business, rather than use subterfuge against each other. However,
our ambitious aim is to offer an internetworking solution that relies minimally on inter-network trust.
The Internet should be able to include ad hoc networks of nodes operated even by single individuals, not
just large corporate providers with ethical business policies.
The original re-feedback incentive framework [BJCG+05] made similar assumptions, but didn’t
articulate the attacker types precisely. It assumed that network providers are rational most of the time but,
although most users behave rationally most of the time, we cannot rely on all users to behave rationally
all the time. By omitting to deﬁne the malice of networks, it missed potential attacks by networks on
each other.
Re-feedback and re-ECN are designed to provide information on top of which network operators
can build engineering mechanisms like policers. Then they can physically block their locally attached
unboundedmalicioususersfromcausingunreasonableharmtoothers. However, theoriginalre-feedback
paper omitted to check whether networks might be tempted to compromise the integrity of congestion
signals in order to make gains from other networks, which in turn might compromise their ability to
police end-users. The present chapter corrects that omission.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that the malice of networks is not likely to be unbounded.
This leaves open the possibility that coercion mechanisms can be conﬁned to the end-customer trust
boundaries of the Internet. While at the higher speed borders between networks incentive mechanisms
should be sufﬁcient where it is more critical to minimise complexity.
Before we move on, a clarifying statement is necessary. The division between incentive alignment
and coercion mechanisms that we propose is not set in stone. One should not confuse the mechanisms
we describe with those that network operators could build on top of the information re-feedback pro-
vides. Network providers are not limited to applying re-feedback information with the mix of incentive
and enforcement mechanisms that we propose. They can encourage sociable behaviour or use coercion
wherever, however and in whatever mix they wish. Our proposed mechanisms are merely canonical
examples that demonstrate how the re-ECN framework can be deployed with minimal additional com-
plexity and minimal constraint on user freedoms while still ensuring congestion signal integrity.
Minimal constraint on user freedoms may not always be desirable. For instance, it will usually
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of innovative behaviour as DDoS attacks, which most operators will want to shut down. Rather than
embeddingthechoiceofwheretodrawthislineinthesystemdesign, weleavethechoicetoeachnetwork
operator. But some possible example border enforcement mechanisms that use re-ECN information to
detect anomalies are brieﬂy explored in §8.2.8 (fully speciﬁed in [Bri08b, §5.7]). The preferential drop
mechanisms in §9 (fully speciﬁed in [BJMS09a, §5.3]) are further examples, which we propose to use
against ﬂooding attacks in §12.1.1.
Effectively these mechanisms recognise that even entities that are ostensibly rational sometimes
might behave irrationally and wish to be protected from themselves when they do. For instance, they
may have misconﬁgured something or been infected by malware. These protections allow thresholds to
be placed within the system that prevent a ﬂow, a user or a network from running up costs at an anoma-
lously high rate. A network provider can offer these mechanisms as a service to protect its customers or
neighbouring networks from their own failings.
8.1.3 Border Design Principles
The following design principles articulate the lessons learned during the process of developing defences
against the more perverse attacks against the re-ECN border mechanisms. Some deliberately run counter
to currently accepted research directions. As with all good design principles, they are intended to en-
courage a designer to give a really good reason before contravening them; they are not intended as
unbreakable rules:
Bufferless Border Control: (aka. ‘Prefer Measurement to Intervention’:) Measurement can be con-
ducted passively, in parallel to transmission, while active intervention (e.g. scheduling) requires
packets to be held back until each is deemed acceptable to release. Measurements can be used to
inﬂuence incentives on longer timescales, creating the incentive to deal with per-packet problems
closer to the edge of the internetwork.
Neutralise Don’t Over-Penalise Systems shouldn’t automatically unleash punitive sanctions on an-
other network thought to be perverting the integrity of congestion information. Otherwise a third
party attacker could fool network NA into penalising NB by spooﬁng an attack from NB on NA.
If negative ﬂows are merely neutralised instead, the problem is at least sufﬁciently dealt with and
no such amplifying attacks are possible.
No Reliance on Push-Back Push-back is an attempt to ensure that unwanted trafﬁc is squelched at
source. However, the data plane of a packet network only reliably moves packets forwards. If
a control system wants to send messages backwards along a path, it shouldn’t take the source
address of packets in the data plane as reliable evidence for where ‘backwards’ is. The route may
well be asymmetric, and the source address may be spoofed.
Below we discuss each principle in a little more detail.
Bufferless Border Control.Packet networking is meant to be agnostic to underlying link technologies.
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line speed, congestion avoidance & control becomes problematic in photonics if a buffer has to exist just
in order to generate the congestion information needed to control a transmission line. If, instead, on the
forwarding element itself congestion avoidance only requires passive metering, high speed interfaces can
play their part in congestion control with only a tiny buffer [AKM04, GM06] or perhaps no buffer at all
and just a virtual queue [CW96, KS01, Ear09a] to reduce or to eliminate the need for payload storage.
This principle implies a general structural assumption that usage of re-ECN congestion information
will tend to conform to the following pattern: i) at the borders between networks congestion information
will mostly be used to underpin contractual penalties based on metering ii) while between networks and
their end-customers it could also drive active sanctions, such as drop.
The bufferless border control principle implies it is sufﬁcient to passively measure trafﬁc at borders,
not actively remove it. If there is trafﬁc that is polluting the integrity of congestion signals (by under-
stating congestion), this further implies that it is only necessary for border mechanisms to discount the
polluting information in the trafﬁc, not to remove the trafﬁc itself. To remove trafﬁc requires buffering it
while testing it, but metrics can be counted (or ignored) in parallel to forwarding. It is more important to
ensure the integrity of the information that reveals the incentives to remove trafﬁc and passes the incen-
tives from network to network. Then the correct networks will have the incentive to remove the trafﬁc
itself, but each can proceed in this task more lazily.
Neutralise Don’t Over-Penalise. During the development of re-ECN we proposed a (misguided) for-
mula for use in the meter between two networks that turned any negative balance over the duration of
a ﬂow into positive. The supposed rationale was that this would not just remove the incentive to allow
a ﬂow to go negative, but it would turn any gain into an equivalent loss, thus strongly driving negative
ﬂows from the system. In effect, this earlier proposal added twice as much congestion-volume as was
measured in negative ﬂows.
However, we quickly realised that we should only neutralise the gain from negative ﬂows, not
reverse it. Otherwise we opened up a whole new set of attacks where trafﬁc could be sent into a network
sothat itwent negativewithin thenetwork, causingthe network topay extrato itsdownstream neighbour.
This parallels the ‘Proportionate Sanctions’ design principle proposed for the re-ECN dropper (§7.3).
No Reliance on Push-Back.In the original re-feedback paper [BJCG+05] we argued against exces-
sive push-back on similar grounds to the ‘Neutralise Don’t Over-Penalise’ principle above. If network
equipment is meant to heed a message asking it to drop trafﬁc, it must be pretty certain the message is
authentic. But veriﬁcation itself takes resources.
Instead we argued that re-ECN information itself provides sufﬁcient means to test whether a ﬂow
is non-negative using only local information. Therefore we proposed the egress dropper could send
hints upstream, with no danger of introducing further attacks, because they would not need authentica-
tion [BJCG+05, §3.2.1]. Rather than instructing an upstream network to sanction a ﬂow, they hinted
that it should merely check the ﬂow for itself. However, we did not propose a mechanism that knew in
which direction to send the hints, unless the source address was not being spoofed. Also hints cannot be
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We continue to hold this view as a guiding principle. The re-ECN mechanisms aim to be able to
work solely on local information, or at minimum only pass information forwards, without any need for
reliance on backwards reachability of the source address of packets. If hints can be sent backwards, all
well and good, but we don’t rely on them. This parallels the ‘Source ID Uniqueness not Reachability’
design principle proposed for the re-ECN dropper (§7.3).
8.2 Border Attacks and their Defences
8.2.1 Attacks and Defences: Executive Summary
The attacks in the next section (§8.2) fall into two distinct categories:
Dummy Trafﬁc Attacks: These attacks create negative ﬂows using dummy trafﬁc with no intention of
communicating any data.
Signal Poisoning with Cancelled Markings: These attacks exploit the fact that congestion marking
probabilities combine probabilistically, not additively. The subtraction approximation of the base-
line border mechanism relies on the additive approximation, which is only valid at low congestion
levels. These attacks distort and exploit the error in the approximation, even at low congestion
levels.
The two defences in the intervening sections address each category of attack:
• Dummy trafﬁc attacks are handled by ‘Sample-Based Downstream Congestion Inﬂation’ (§8.2.4).
The general idea is to correct the bulk packet measurement of downstream congestion taken at a
border, by removing the likely contribution from negative ﬂows. As well as bulk packet metering,
a sample of ﬂows crossing the border is taken to estimate the likely contribution to downstream
congestion from negative ﬂows. Then rather than removing the trafﬁc in the negative ﬂows, we
explain why it is more important, and sufﬁcient, to merely prevent the contribution from negative
ﬂows polluting the bulk measurement—not counting the information but not necessarily removing
the trafﬁc that carries it.
• Attacks that poison border marking proportions are handled by ‘Normalising Cancelled Markings’
(§8.2.7). Put simply, this is a way to measure downstream congestion without relying on the
approximation that congestion marking combines additively. But the challenge is to preserve the
simplicity of the original approximate mechanism.
8.2.2 Attack #1a: Dragging Down a Border Aggregate
In early 2006, a colleague, Salvatori, invented a class of attacks between re-ECN networks involving
dummy trafﬁc—that is, trafﬁc sent without any desire to communicate with anyone. Network NA can
generate negative trafﬁc itself, which it can send across a border to reduce the congestion charge it pays
to its neighbour NB. The attacking network can optionally limit the initial TTL so that it expires once8.2. Border Attacks and their Defences 151
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Figure 8.1: Scenarios with different levels of understatement of downstream congestion.
The ﬂow becomes negative a) never; b) in the egress network ND; c) in transit network NB; d) in the
ingress network NA; e) at the sender.
the trafﬁc has crossed the border.1 Then, if the only detection of negative ﬂows were at egress edge
droppers, nothing would even detect the attack.
Example Scenario.As examples of Salvatori’s attack we will use the scenarios in Fig 8.1. The bottom
half of the diagram shows the topology of network interconnection. NA is paying congestion charges
to its downstream neighbour NB based on the downstream congestion level signalled in packets and
likewise NB is paying ND. The top half of the diagram visualises downstream congestion-volume
against resource index along the path shown. In scenarios (a)–(e) the congestion signalling introduced
by the various networks is the same2. But in each case the source initialises Positive markings at different
levels so that downstream congestion ﬁrst becomes negative at the different resource indices i
−
b to i−
e
within the different networks along the way. In Salvatori’s attack the source is under the control of
network NA.
Gain & Cost: If upstream network NA contracts to pay NB related to3 the amount of downstream
congestion it forwards across the border to NB, then NA gains immediately from including negative
ﬂows in trafﬁc crossing the border, as in scenarios (d) & (e).
No network gains by accepting ﬂows from upstream that will go negative in its own network. But
any network does have an incentive to pass negative ﬂows undetected to onward networks. For instance,
network NB will lose in scenario (c) if ND removes any contribution to border settlements from negative
ﬂows. But if NB can somehow conceal negative ﬂows under the cover of other ﬂows, network NB will
be willing to accept the ﬂows in scenarios (c)–(e) just as readily as those in (a) & (b).
There is no immediate cost to a network like NA from mounting dummy trafﬁc attacks, other than
the risk of sanctions if its attack is detected.
Means & Opportunity: This class of attacks can be classiﬁed into two forms:
1The normal behaviour of Internet routers is to decrement the TTL and discard packets when the TTL reaches zero.
2Each trace is slightly staggered from the next, merely to avoid confusing overlaps.
3We use the phrase ‘related to’ deliberately, because any contract based on some sanction against downstream congestion will
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1. The introduced trafﬁc uses ﬂow IDs unrelated to any existing trafﬁc;
2. The introduced trafﬁc imitates ﬂow IDs already present in the trafﬁc mix, but it introduces just
enough Negative marking to completely or partially negate the Positive markings already in the
ﬂow.
Flow ID imitation is easier for networks than for users because networks can trivially monitor the ﬂow
IDs of existing trafﬁc.
Such attacks can be further classiﬁed depending on whether the attacking network arranges the TTL
to expire before the destination, thus leading to the two orthogonal classiﬁcations of attack in Table 8.1.
No expiry Expiry
No ID imitation 1-i 1-ii
Flow ID imitation 2-i 2-ii
Table 8.1: Classes of Border Dummy Trafﬁc Attack
Risk of Detection: If the attacking network NA deliberately expires the TTL early in neighbouring
network NB (class ii), persistent TTL expiries can be detected by routers as anomalous, particularly if
the majority of their re-ECN markings are negative.4 This could trigger management action to trace
the attack back at least to the previous upstream neighbouring network. If NA uses NB as a transit
and arranges the TTL to expire in some network ND beyond, the attack becomes harder to trace back
especially if the source addresses used create a false trail. But the ﬂow would already have to be negative
before entering NB (scenario d or e in Fig 8.1) otherwise NA would not gain.
If TTL expiry is not used, the attacker has to choose the destination address it uses with care. In
the form of attack using new ﬂow IDs but no TTL expiry (class 1-i), if the attacking network sends
packets to invalid destination addresses, numerous ‘no route’ errors from negative packets will also raise
alarms. If it sends to existing but unwary hosts, they will probably silently absorb the packets in the
general noise of everyday DoS attacks on the Internet. The attacking network would also have to choose
a source address for its attack packets. If it chose invalid source addresses but valid destinations, the
chosen destinations might again silently absorb the trafﬁc.
In the form of attack imitating existing IDs (class 2-i), the attacking network would run a higher
risk of detection given ﬂow ID imitation is a clear contravention of accepted practices and neighbouring
networks could arrange for test trafﬁc to cross a suspected networks to detect if imitation trafﬁc was
being added.
In summary, it seems class 1-i attacks have least risk of detection, where the TTL doesn’t expire and
existing ﬂow IDs are not imitated. As long as all attack trafﬁc is sent to valid and powered up destination
addresses it stands lowest risk of being detected as long as alarms raised within the chosen destinations
are not reported to their network operator.
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However, we will stop there, before this taxonomy of detection methods becomes too tedious, as
our defence against this attack below aims to remove any gain to the attacking network from launching
the attack in the ﬁrst place.
As long as the likely gain can be minimised, even a tiny risk of detection is likely to deter a network
operator from cheating a neighbouring network. If any subterfuge were ever discovered, signiﬁcant loss
ofreputationwouldresult, leadingnearlyallnetworkstorefusetointerconnectwiththeattackerforsome
considerable time. Even if a network operator could invent a ‘perfect crime’ with no risk of detection, it
would still risk whistle-blowing by disgruntled staff.
8.2.3 Attack #1b: Dummy Background Congestion
Before moving on, we note that Bauer and Faratin have proposed two dummy trafﬁc attacks that have
similarities to Salvatori’s ‘Dragging Down a Border Aggregate’ attack.
• The ﬁrst [Bau05] is a strategic attempt to use other people’s money to confuse another network
into investing in capacity. It is discussed under the heading ‘Strategic Confusion of Investment
Signals’ in §12.1.1 rather than here, as it is an attack against the whole re-ECN system (indeed,
against congestion charging), not just the border mechanisms.
• In the second attack [BFB06] a source sends large amounts of trafﬁc without inserting any Pos-
itive packets, just to increase congestion costs for everyone else. Again, because it is an attack
against the whole system, it is discussed in §12.1.1 under the heading ‘Dummy Neutral Back-
ground Load’.
We mention these attacks here because they could be launched by networks (rather than users)
against other networks. They are also mentioned here because the ‘Sample-Based Downstream Conges-
tion Inﬂation’ defence should remove a network’s motivation for these attacks in the same way as for
Salvatori’s (if the defence works as claimed). Although the attacks need not cost anything directly, a
network is usually also concerned about the cost to its reputation if detected.
8.2.4 Defence #1: Sample-Based Downstream Congestion Inﬂation
We now present a solution that aims to remove the incentive for networks to include negative ﬂows in
the bulk of trafﬁc crossing into a neighbouring network, leaving no motive for networks to perpetrate the
above dummy trafﬁc attacks. It doesn’t directly remove the incentive for users to mount these attacks,
but it should push back the motivation for hunting out and controlling such users to the network where a
ﬂow ﬁrst becomes negative.
The proposed solution is to use per-ﬂow state for a small but truly random sample of the trafﬁc
crossing a border. Then the bulk congestion-volume metered passing from an upstream network to a
downstream neighbour can be inﬂated by the proportion of excess Negative bytes found in persistently
negative ﬂows in the sample.
We have not established whether sampling would work precisely enough in practice nor what size
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chitectural direction than a fully worked through mechanism. We openly admit that these ideas currently
sit on weak foundations and more work is needed before we can claim there is potential in this direction.
First we will give the rationale for this solution, which runs counter to currently accepted research
directions. Then we will describe the steps in the process of sample-based downstream congestion
inﬂation, each covered in subsequent sub-sections:
1. the formula for inﬂating the congestion-volume
2. a random sampling mechanism
3. a process for neighbouring networks to agree on the inﬂated charge
Downstream Congestion Inﬂation: Rationale
Example Scenario.As an example we will use scenario (c) in Fig 8.1, where an attack source in network
NA arranges for a ﬂow to go negative in the middle of network NB. Note that this is not the same
scenario as Salvatori’s attack ((d) or (e)), but we use it to explain the more general beneﬁts of downstream
congestion volume inﬂation.
The scenario (c) ﬂow is still positive when it crosses into network B. So, irrespective of any down-
stream congestion inﬂation, NA would always pay NB the same amount for this ﬂow, which would only
cover the cost of congestion just part-way through NB’s network—insufﬁcient to cover NB’s congestion
costs, let alone those of networks further downstream.
The Problem with Negative Flows. If the scenario (c) ﬂow went undetected and was merely counted
by a bulk meter without any downstream congestion inﬂation, NB would pay a negative charge to ND
for the contribution of this ﬂow. This implies money contributing to this ﬂow would actually pass from
ND to NB, against the data ﬂow. We must emphasise that there would not actually be an itemised bill
showing this single negative ﬂow—there would just be one item on the bill for the bulk of all packets.
We are merely saying that the contribution from this ﬂow’s metered packets would subtract from the
bulk bill.
This reverse money ﬂow would cover NB’s congestion costs, but the ‘wrong’ network would be
paying for them. ND would not be able to raise the revenue to pay this charge without levying a charge
against the receiver. But we always want to avoid money ﬂows having to start at receivers, otherwise
they become vulnerable to denial of funds attacks. Therefore ND bears the cost of a problem that started
in NB.
Outcome of Downstream Congestion Inﬂation.We now further assume that all the networks are ap-
plying sample-based downstream congestion inﬂation to the bulk congestion metering between them
and, for now, we assume that it works correctly.
With downstream congestion inﬂation, NB pays ND nothing for ﬂow (c). But NB still doesn’t
receive enough income from NA to cover the cost of the congestion caused by the ﬂow. Also ND
receives nothing to cover the cost of congestion caused in its network. Therefore ND and NB have an
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only detect this negativity at its egress (if at all). Networks downstream of the point where the ﬂow goes
negative (ND) might detect ﬂow (c)’s negativity at their ingress and their egress (if at all).
NA, on the other hand, has no problem and can see no problem; its congestion is fully paid for,
because it gets less from the source S1 but also pays less to NB. If the source were the one lying about
downstream congestion, NA would allow it to send at a faster rate. But as far as NA is concerned, it
would allow S1 to go that fast for the congestion just within its own network. NA has no local evidence
that the ﬂow is negative, so if downstream networks have allowed the ﬂow to go negative, NA can rightly
say that is their problem.
Therefore there is no problem until downstream of NA. ND has insufﬁcient income, but its up-
stream neighbour, NB already has an incentive to solve the problem. So NB is left with a problem that
no-one upstream has, so no-one except NB and beyond is incentivised to solve it.
Summary so far. The network where a ﬂow ﬁrst goes negative is in the position where it has a problem,
it knows it has a problem, and it can probably ﬁnd which incoming interface is causing the problem. The
network where negativity ﬁrst arises is left with a problem that no-one upstream cares about, so no-one
except itself and networks further downstream is incentivised to solve it. This doesn’t sound good, but it
gets better, and the alternatives are much worse.
Removing Inter-Network Attack Motives. What downstream congestion inﬂation does achieve is to
remove the incentive for networks to attack each other with dummy trafﬁc. In scenarios (d) or (e), NA
no longer reduces its bill by sending negative dummy trafﬁc into NB, for instance. If we assume the
malice of a network is bounded, it will not risk being detected attacking another network for no gain.
Therefore, if we assume the malice of networks is bounded while the malice of users is unbounded
(Assumption 8.1), at least all networks are now either on the ‘same side’ or ‘neutral’—none are on the
‘dark side’.
An example of a ‘neutral network’ is NA in scenario (c), which doesn’t care about NB’s or ND’s
problems. But with downstream congestion inﬂation at least NA no longer has an incentive to use
dummy trafﬁc to take money from NB using an attack scenario like (d) or (e). Examples of networks on
the ‘same side’ are NB & ND in scenario (c), who both want to solve the same problem.
Downstream congestion volume inﬂation (if sufﬁciently precise) ensures all entities whose malice
is bounded have the incentive to co-operate against those entities with unbounded malice. This argument
generalises to any scenario that lacks congestion signal integrity, such as any of (b)–(e) in Fig 8.1.
Cement Network Co-operation First.Faced with a ﬂow such as the one in scenario (c), we do not
directly propose that NB or ND should ask NA to squelch it at source. Our ‘No Reliance on Push-Back’
principle doesn’t require that (§8.1.3). Rather we propose that it is paramount to encourage networks to
co-operate against a common enemy ﬁrst, by removing incentives to attack each other.
Local Solutions Second.Once aligned (by downstream congestion inﬂation or perhaps a better future
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proceed lazily (i.e. not at round-trip time-scales).5 The downstream congestion inﬂation process samples
ﬂows locally looking for negative ones anyway. So as it ﬁnds them it can also trigger a rule to route them
to the null interface. And other ways may be found/invented to locally seek out and destroy persistently
negative ﬂows.
Trace-Back Hints Third.We can also consider sending hints backwards along a path, as brieﬂy outlined
above in §8.1.3. As we have already pointed out, ‘backwards’ is an ill-deﬁned concept in a packet
network. We do not propose to include trace-back solutions in this dissertation—that research ﬁeld is
large in itself and distinct from the work here [Bel00, SPS+02]. The one contribution we can add is that
re-ECN allows the negativity (and therefore undesirability) of a ﬂow to be tested locally. So whether
trace-back solutions are hop by hop or edge-to-edge [HH07], their authentication requirements can be
weak or non-existent, as the messages can merely be hints to check locally whether ﬂows are negative.
Attack the Root Cause Lazily.Even if NA never squelches the ﬂow at source, everyone’s trafﬁc prob-
lem would be sufﬁciently solved if NB discards the ﬂow at its interface with NA. NB could then send a
message to NA across their local border interface saying “I’m discarding ﬂow (c), so if you want to save
paying me for it, you can discard it for me.” Then NB needs one less ﬂow ﬁlter and NA can save a little
money. NA may eventually ﬁnd the source and deal with the root cause. But all this can proceed at the
time-scale of a management system, rather than of packet control.
Against Punitive Sanctions. We have already argued (§8.1.3) that NB’s problem SHOULD NOT be
solved by altering the border incentives any more than by neutralising negative congestion-volume. Oth-
erwise we would introduce new possibilities for attack.
Downstream Congestion Inﬂation Formula
Consider a set of ﬂows J. Each ﬂow, index j, if metered on a per-ﬂow basis would consist of some
positively marked volume V
+
j and some negatively marked V
−
j (the latter variable being considered
numerically negative). The sum of these two volumes is the downstream congestion volume caused by
each ﬂow, Vj = V
+
j + V
−
j . A set of such ﬂows can be visualised laid out along the horizontal axis in
Fig 8.2, ranked for visual convenience in order of downstream congestion-volume.
It may help to visualise this sum Vj using each shaded area shown in each ﬂow. The inset on the left
of the ﬁgure explains the graphical shorthand used for one of the ﬂows. The left of the inset shows the
actual values of V
+
j &V
−
j and the right of the inset shows shading from zero to the midpoint, which is a
useful half-scaled representation of their sum Vj. The volume of Neutral packet markings is irrelevant,
so not shown.
We want the sum of downstream congestion caused by all ﬂows, except ones that are negative6:
Vf =
X
∀j∈J
(V
+
j + V
−
j )+. (8.1)
5We shall see (§12.1.3) that a re-ECN ingress policer can considerably slow down unwanted trafﬁc that changes ﬂow ID
continually. Therefore, to launch a more serious attack implies having to keep the same ﬂow-ID for more packets, giving more
time to remove them.
6The notation (X)+ means X if X ≥ 0 or zero otherwise. Perhaps confusingly, the notations V + & V − use the same
operator, but on a packet-by-packet basis before summing packets together.8.2. Border Attacks and their Defences 157
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Figure 8.2: Visualisation of the Border Congestion Metering Problem.
This can be visualised as twice the black shaded area shown above the axis.
If we just meter the bulk congestion-volumes of Positive and Negative packets in all ﬂows crossing
an interface over an accounting period, we will get the (incorrect) bulk metered volume of congestion,
Vb =
X
∀j∈J
V
+
j + V
−
j . (8.2)
This would be represented graphically by the black area above the axis minus the (red) striped area below
it, all doubled. The problem is how to exclude the striped areas below the axis, but without accounting
separately for every ﬂow.
Assume for a moment that we can take a truly random sample of trafﬁc comprising the subset of
ﬂows I ⊂ J. If the sample is small enough so that accounting separately for each ﬂow is feasible, then
we can measure downstream congestion both for the whole of the sample and solely for those ﬂows in
the sample that are positive. We denote the ratio between the two measures found in the sample:
εI =
P
∀j∈I(V
+
j + V
−
j )+
P
∀j∈I(V
+
j + V
−
j )
− 1 (8.3)
Then we can inﬂate the bulk downstream congestion-volume measured without regard to ﬂows to get an
estimate of downstream congestion excluding persistently negative ﬂows.
E(Vf) = (1 + εI)Vb
However, even if all sources were honest, a very small proportion of downstream congestion-
volume could be contained in ﬂows that are negative overall. For instance, numerous honest ﬂows would
only contain a single datagram, and even if every single datagram ﬂow were started with a Cautious
packet, some would be congestion marked to Negative. Therefore, we actually want a deﬂated fraction
of the above estimate to take account of the inﬂation factor (1+εH) that would be found if we performed
the same two measurements (sample and bulk) on a set H of purely honest ﬂows.
E(V ) =
1 + εI
1 + εH
Vb, (8.4)
where εH is deﬁned for the set H of purely honest ﬂows, just as εI was deﬁned for the set I in Eqn (8.3)
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Congestion-Volume Sampling
Taking a truly random sample for inﬂating the bulk congestion measure requires some careful thinking.
Each honest ﬂow will tend to start with a positive balance, which it will maintain by balancing Negative
with slightly delayed Positive throughout its duration, but sometimes there may not be a ﬁnal balancing
Positivepacket. Therefore, ﬂowscannotbepickedbyrandomlyselectingpacketsthenlookingforfurther
packets with the same ﬂow ID. This would tend to bias towards the end of ﬂows, often missing off the
credit at the start, while always including the debit at the end.
If we want to avoid per-ﬂow state for all ﬂows, we cannot randomly select from packets that start
ﬂows. This is because we cannot rely on the ﬁrst packet of every ﬂow being honestly set to Cautious,
because we are trying to also detect malicious ﬂows. And it is only possible to know that a packet starts
a new ﬂow if a list of all the currently active ﬂows is maintained, which contravenes our original goal.
One possible sampling mechanism is to randomly pick a subset of the possible ﬂow IDs, and detect
all packets that match the subset over a period, before moving on to another subset. Then, it would be
necessary to take the average of all the inﬂation factors from each subset weighted by the volume of
trafﬁc each subset matched. Obviously, the ﬂow IDs used by Internet hosts are not random, because IP
addresses, protocol IDs and port numbers are unevenly allocated and unevenly used, particularly because
the port number space includes a number of well-known ports. Also, it is quite likely that misbehaviour
is concentrated into certain parts of the ﬂow ID space. Therefore, over an accounting period, the aim
would be for the samples to have collectively covered most of the possible address space.
Even if all the ﬂows are positive when accounted for as a whole, whenever a sampling technique
only measures part of some ﬂows, it will erroneously ﬁnd some ﬂows that appear to be negative overall.
Therefore, the period over which a sample should be taken must be many times longer than the duration
of ﬂows that most trafﬁc is in. Note the careful wording, “...the duration of ﬂows that most trafﬁc is in”
is not the same as “...the duration of most ﬂows”.
Agreement between Neighbours
Whenever two neighbouring networks determine the size of the settlement that one must pay the other
by measuring trafﬁc crossing between them, they must trust each other or a third party. Even if they both
meter the trafﬁc, either party can simply lie about what their meter said in order to dispute the other’s
reading. However, even if they both don’t deliberately lie, one can only build trust in the other if the
other party’s reading consistently agrees with the one read privately.
If the charge between neighbours depends on a bulk measure metered continuously but inﬂated by
a sampled measure, it is important that the party in control of the trafﬁc cannot infer when sampling
is occurring. Otherwise it can condition trafﬁc to be well-behaved during sampling and behave badly
otherwise.
It may be possible for both parties to hire a trusted third party to conduct the measurements inde-
pendently of each of their interests. The third party might actually operate the meter physically secured
against both interested parties, or it might produce a tamper-resistant meter for them to use that neither
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If sampling is used but without a third party, given neither interested party will want to inform the
other when or what they are sampling, it will not be possible to ensure that both parties measure the
same data. The two parties can only build trust in each other if their two readings are close, or if they
are neither persistently higher nor lower than the other. The two parties readings will only be close to
each other if the sampling technique is strongly representative of the trafﬁc in total. Experiments will be
necessary to establish whether this is the case.
In summary, the problem of neighbouring networks agreeing on a meter reading is not fundamen-
tally different if sampling is used, but sampling does make it more difﬁcult to build trust in each other’s
measurements if the resulting readings are unlikely to match closely.
8.2.5 Attack #2a: Signal Poisoning with Cancelled Markings
Even though it is not a normal part of the re-ECN protocol, there is nothing to stop packets being
initialised with Negative or Cancelled markings (see §12.1.4 for an exhaustive check of all the possible
but invalid state transitions of the re-ECN wire protocol).
In the previous section we discussed the possibility of a network sending packets that it created Neg-
ative in the ﬁrst place. The protections against persistently negative ﬂows that we describe elsewhere7
should deal just as well with malicious Negative marking when packets are ﬁrst initialised as when they
are forwarded. So if any sender were to initialise packets with Negative marking, it would have to ini-
tialise as many extra packets to Positive marking to ensure the ﬂow was not detected as persistently
negative.
Cancelled as Poison. However, there are no such protections against an attack ﬁrst proposed by Hand-
ley8 involving initialisation of packets with Cancelled marking.
Cost & Gain: Any packets that a source initialises as Cancelled have no worth (±0) so they can be sent
without any cost to the sender, but they are immune to further congestion marking (they are effectively
already marked), and they need no Positive packets to balance them. This seems to open up a ﬂaw
where a malicious source can initialise many, or even all, packets with Cancelled marking and achieve
resistance to Negative marking. Then it can send at whatever rate it wants, and it will never have to send
any subsequent Positive packets.
This attack is shown in Fig 8.3ii) relative to how the marking proportions should be in Fig 8.3i).9
If fake cancelled markings are introduced early in the network path, they will reduce the proportion of
Negative marking (because they are immune to further marking). Thus they will also reducing the need
for the source to mark so many bytes Positive. Hence in Fig 8.3ii) the fake Cancelled markings have
been shown replacing some Negative, some Neutral and Some Positive markings.
Risk of Detection:We introduced the Cancelled state, to remove a vulnerability of the previous re-
ECN protocol coding, which had just three states, Positive, Neutral and Negative (see Appendix B.1).
7Congestion volume inﬂation at borders (§8.2.4) and the re-ECN dropper incorporated into the ingress policer (§11.3 described
later).
8At the 5th CRN/CFP architecture working group on a Denial-of-Service Resistant Internet, Cambridge, UK, 21 Nov 2005
9Cautious markings are ignored as already discussed in §7.4.5.8.2. Border Attacks and their Defences 160
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Figure 8.3: Signal Poisoning with Cancelled Markings.
i) Correct case; ii) Faked Cancelled markings reduce Negative and Positive markings; iii) Detection
(see text).
The Cancelled state was also added to introduce some useful redundancy to enable detection of biased
marking by networks. Happily this also allows Handley’s proposed attack to be easily detected.
We refer to Fig 8.3iii), which has the same areas shaded as Fig 8.3ii) but just rearranged. If a
network sees a proportion of bytes congestion marked above the horizontal line as Negative (presumed
originally sent Neutral), it should see the same proportion congestion marked below the line as Cancelled
(presumed originally sent Positive). Therefore the divide between Cancelled and Positive should be at
the dashed line. If the proportions have moved to the right, as shown by the arrow, it knows some up-
stream network or user is artiﬁcially introducing more Cancelled packets. This balance between marking
proportions should always exist at any point on a path, no matter how much congestion marking is still
to come.
8.2.6 Attack #2b: Extreme Upstream Congestion
Even though Handley’s attack can easily be detected, a different form of the attack is still possible
to mount with congestion marking proportions that balance properly—passing the above test to detect
Handley’s attack. For instance, consider a path over two networks. The upstream network can say
congestion in its network is very high, say 90.9% (conveniently chosen because it is 10/11), much
higher than in the downstream network, which for the sake of example we will say is 1%. Then the
correct fractions of each marking (ignoring Cautious) to 3 signiﬁcant ﬁgures will be (Fig 8.4):
• 8.27% Positive
• 82.7% Cancelled
• 0.818% Neutral
• 8.18% Negative
It can be seen that claiming high upstream congestion levels allows a network to legitimately send very
high proportions of Cancelled bytes. Note that the proportions of Neutral to Negative and Positive to
Cancelled are both the same (about 1:10), so the upstream network is immune from the downstream
network forcing these proportions to be the same—they already are.8.2. Border Attacks and their Defences 161
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Figure 8.4: Signal Poisoning with Extreme Upstream Congestion.
The upstream network seems to do very well from this attack. All the Cancelled packets it sends
cannot be further congestion marked. And if the downstream network charges it by subtracting Negative
bytesfromPositive, downstreamcongestiononlyappearsto be0.09%, whenin factitis1%; eleven times
greater. Therefore it seems to be very much in a network’s interest to appear to be highly congested to the
downstream network; by marking a lot of packets Negative and even more Cancelled. This is a particular
problem if the sender operates its own network (e.g. a home or campus network). It can claim that it is
experiencing very high levels of congestion as an excuse to send a very large proportion of Cancelled
(and Negative) packets.
8.2.7 Defence #2: Normalising Cancelled Markings
It will be recalled that Handley’s attack to poison the congestion signal by introducing faked Cancelled
markings (§8.2.5) is fairly easy to detect given the deliberate redundancy in the re-ECN wire protocol
encoding. However, the similar attack with extremely high congestion marking by an upstream network,
although detectable, seems to be perfectly legitimate—the proportions of redundant markings can be are
perfectly balanced. But the upstream network has to pay signiﬁcantly less to its downstream neighbour
if it is charged by Positive minus Negative bytes transferred.
Fortunately, there is a fairly simple way to thwart both these attacks. The key to the solution is not
to use the approximate formula zi−ui for recent downstream congestion. In §6.2 we derived the precise
formula10:
vi =

1 +
ci
zi

(zi − ui)+. (6.4)
This accurate formula inﬂates the approximation we have used up until now by c/z (removing sub-
scripts). In the example above, for instance, the approximate formula for downstream congestion yields
0.09%, whereas this precise formula results in an inﬂation factor of 11, yielding the correct answer:
(1 + 82.7/8.27)0.09% = 1.00%. This removes the incentive to send Cancelled packets.
Unfortunately, this still isn’t a solution. If a downstream network charges an upstream network
using this formula, we will now prove that it becomes in the upstream network’s interest to reduce the
volume of Cancelled packets it sends below the correct proportion.
Consider a network is also the source of trafﬁc, so it is free to alter the proportions of markings,
but it is being charged for downstream congestion in trafﬁc it forwards by Eqn (6.4). Further consider
10Now that we are considering attacks, we include the additional constraint (zi − ui)+ = max(zi − ui,0).8.2. Border Attacks and their Defences 162
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Figure 8.5: Deﬂating Cancelled Markings to Gain from Metering applied using Eqn (6.4).
it adopts this strategy (illustrated in Fig 8.5): it alters Positive by ∆z, but it keeps z − u and z + c
unchanged by also altering Negative by ∆u = ∆z and altering Cancelled by ∆c = −∆z. Given
downstream congestion is
v =
(z − u)(z + c)
z
then, by deﬁnition, the numerator is constant, therefore the change in downstream congestion that the
network is charged for will be
dv
dz
= −
(z − u)(z + c)
z2
= −
v
z
. (8.5)
This derivative being negative proves that, if the source network is charged by Eqn (6.4), its strategy
of increasing Positive and Negative markings while decreasing Cancelled markings accordingly will
signiﬁcantly reduce the charge it pays.11
Nonetheless, there is an approach to thwart all these strategies, ensuring integrity of the congestion
signal. §6.2 shows that we can also express the inﬂation factor of the subtraction approximation for
downstream congestion in terms of u & y:
vi =

1 +
ui
yi

(zi − ui)+. (6.5)
If this formula were used to determine the upstream network’s charges, the upstream network would
want to shift markings back; inﬂating Cancelled and deﬂating Negative markings (moving the divisions
in the opposite direction to those shown in Fig 8.5).
Because of the redundancy in the marking fractions, both these formulae (6.4) & (6.5) are equiva-
lent. Therefore, the trick is for a downstream network to use them both and takes the higher result of the
two to measure the charge its upstream neighbour should pay.
vi =

1 + max

ci
zi
,
ui
yi

(zi − ui)+. (8.6)
Then the best strategy of the upstream network will be to keep the ratios of Cancelled and Negative
bytes balanced. For typical low congestion conditions, these formulae produce only very small inﬂation
11This is not necessarily the network’s optimal strategy, but it is always a highly gainful strategy that is simple to describe.8.2. Border Attacks and their Defences 163
factors.12
Thereasonattack#2b(extremeupstreamcongestion)workedwhenchargeswerecalculatedwithout
these formulae was because an upstream network could fake very high congestion in its own network,
which led to a high level of Cancelled bytes. With the approximation, these weren’t taken into account.
With the precise formula, they are, thwarting the attack.
However, if just one of the formulae is used, a cheating network can still unbalance the proportions
of the two pairs of markings to reduce its charge. But a cheating network cannot mount this attack when
both formulae are used, because a gain on one formula leads to a loss on the other.
Precise Downstream Congestion Meter Algorithm
Below we give a pseudo-code algorithm that can output the result of Eqn (6.4) continuously as a moving
average of downstream congestion from a live aggregate packet stream. It also simultaneously outputs
the integral of downstream congestion-volume. It only uses single cycle machine instructions (adds,
subtracts, comparisons & bit-shifts) in order to minimise processing cost. Developing a similar algorithm
for Eqn (6.5) has been left for future work. It looks similar but transforming the algorithm will not be
completely straightforward.
Appendix A.2 gives the pseudocode for an earlier algorithm we used to implement the full formula
(8.6). The same appendix also gives the results of tests on the implementation in C of that earlier algo-
rithm. Subsequently the simpler more elegant algorithm below was invented. It is therefore presented in
preference, even though only one of the pair of formulae to compare has been coded and tested.
The new algorithm below exploits a simple trick. Rather than inﬂating (z − u) by (1 + c/z) it
deﬂates (z + c) by (1 − u/z), because (z − u)(1 + c/z) = (1 − u/z)(z + c).13 The same functions,
variable names and names for constants are used as in the dropper algorithms in §7.6.
/* Downstream congestion meter */
meterDownCong() {
/* Initialise variables */
V = 0 /* downstr congestion-volume*/
v = 0 /* recent downstr congestion*/
z = 0 /* recent Positive markings */
u = 0 /* recent Negative markings */
r = 0 /* remainder */
a = EWMA_WEIGHT
foreach packet {
s = readLength(packet)
eecn = readEECN(packet)
switch(eecn) {
case NEGV:
u += (s-u)*a
z -= z*a
case POSV:
12Recent whole path congestion (as opposed to downstream congestion) is always given by z + c anywhere on the path. Path
congestion, not downstream congestion, would be the measure needed to drive a per-ﬂow rate policer (speciﬁed in [BJMS09b,
Appx B2.]). But per-ﬂow rate policing is merely an attempt to force compliance with an arbitrary standard; there is no implication
that the use of path congestion can be related to incentives. Nonetheless, in such cases, the inclusion of the fraction of Cancelled
bytes provides a different disincentive against re-marking packets to Cancelled when they should be Neutral.
13Inﬂating by (1 + c/z) is possible, but inelegant and long-winded—that was the ﬁrst attempt!8.2. Border Attacks and their Defences 164
z += (s-z)*a
u -= u*a
case CAUT:
/* Will probably want to
count separately */
case (ECT(0) || Not-ECT):
/* Depends on policy
e.g. may rate limit */
case default:
/* NEUT & CU: do nothing*/
}
if (eecn == (POSV
|| CANC)) {
r += u
if (r < z) {
/* 1-u/z CANC or POSV
pkts reach here */
V += s
if (u < z) {
v += (s-v)*a
} else {
/* don’t count -ve
downstr cong */
v -= v*a
}
} else {
r -= z
}
}
}
}
The algorithm works broadly as follows. The assignments within the (switch(eecn)) logic
maintain two moving averages for recent Positive and Negative markings, z & u respectively, depending
on whether the packet’s extended ECN marking is Positive or Negative. As with the dropper, their values
are meaningless other than relative to each other. Both EWMAs clock on the same events (a Positive or
Negative mark) to ensure this is so.
The most elegant part, that calculates (1 − u/z)(z + c) without division or multiplication, is in
the last three nested ifs. Whenever a Positive or Cancelled packet arrives it is a candidate for counting
towards downstream congestion (the (z + c) term). The remainder variable r increments by u each
time such a candidate appears and also decrements by z whenever it has climbed to be greater than z.
Therefore, r will climb for (1−u/z) of the candidates and sawtooth down every (u/z) of the candidates.
It adds all the candidate packets except those picked by the downward sawtooth to its running total of
downstream congestion-volume, so it selects (1−u/z) of the Positive or Cancelled packets to add. Note
that whenever u > z the algorithm takes downstream congestion as zero.
Fig 8.6 shows the evolution of the algorithm’s main internal variables including the remainder r
sawtoothing between u and z. The algorithm’s output, recent downstream congestion v, is also shown.
It might be possible for an attacker to synchronise with this algorithm to get its smaller packets
picked and its larger ones not. But if the synchronisation drifted by just one packet nothing would be8.2. Border Attacks and their Defences 165
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Figure 8.6: Inﬂation of Downstream Congestion to allow for Cancelled Markings.
Evolution of the Algorithm’s Internal Variables. The horizontal axis is an index of arriving non-neutral
re-ECN markings. The remainder variable r can be seen sawtoothing between u and z (see text). The
downstream congestion intensity measured separately over this run was 31.6%, which the algorithm
metered with a +0.11% error (EWMA weight, a = 1/64).
gained. If this did prove a problem, some randomisation could be added to desynchronise the determin-
istic sawtooth a little.
As already mentioned for previous dropper EWMA algorithms, multiplications by the EWMA
weight can be implemented as bit-shifts if the EWMA weight a is chosen as an negative integer ex-
ponent of 2.
Meter Implementation and Testing
An earlier more complicated algorithm was implemented and tested satisfactorily. The simpler algorithm
above has not been fully tested due to lack of time. It has been implemented and brieﬂy tested over a
stream of uniformly random markings (not in a network simulator, just a stream of numbers). Early
results while the EWMAs settled were discarded. Totals of each marking were collected separately and
the result from the meter compared with the result of substituting the totals directly into the Eqn (6.4).
Extremely high downstream congestion was simulated to ensure there was a difference to measure.
Stationary values of 40% for path congestion and 10% for upstream congestion were used (each inde-
pendently randomised), leading to expected values for z,u & c of 36%, 6% and 4% respectively and
33.33% for the output v. However, it would not have been appropriate to test the accuracy of the meter
by continuous comparison against these numbers, as the randomisation should lead the instantaneous
values to vary. Therefore, these values were merely used to drive a randomised marking process.
To verify the accuracy of the meter, the total downstream congestion-volume it accumulated was
recorded along with the total numbers of each marking it actually generated over each run. Because the
marking process was deliberately arranged to be stationary, substituting the total of each type of mark8.3. Border Incentive Mechanisms: A Review 166
directly into the Eqn (6.4) gave a baseline downstream congestion-volume against which the meter’s
gradually accumulated total could be compared.
Over 30 runs of 500 packet markings, the sum of all readings was +0.11% greater than the correct
result. The standard deviation of the errors from each of the 30 runs was 2.03%. A much larger number
of tests will be necessary to establish whether there is any bias in the algorithm, but these initial results
seem promising.
8.2.8 Defence #3: Using Congestion Marking to Detect Anomalies
We have assumed (Assumption 8.1) that networks are often rational, but if they are malicious their malice
is bounded. We have already said that some may consider this a little paranoid, but it may sometimes be
too na¨ ıve. Even if a network intends to behave rationally, it can sometimes (usually accidentally) behave
irrationally, often due to human error.
Re-ECNisfundamentallyasystemtoalignincentives, witheachpartyexpectingotherstobehaveas
they would expect a rational individual or organisation to behave. But the congestion signalling re-ECN
provides is not just limited to providing incentives, at least as long as the congestion signals themselves
are not tainted by some human error so that they always appear reasonable, even during anomalies.
As well as congestion charging mechanisms at borders, there could be additional protections that
use the information re-ECN signals provide to detect seriously anomalous behaviour. For instance, a very
high bit-rate of a ﬂow or aggregate with very high congestion marking, might be considered sufﬁciently
abnormal to trigger management action to block it.
In the speciﬁcation of re-ECN for use with pre-congestion notiﬁcation (PCN) [Bri08b, §5.7] we
describe random selection of Negative packets and subsequent monitoring of further packets in the ﬂow
these packets belong to, in order to watch for highly negative ﬂows. Unlike the above downstream
congestion inﬂation mechanism, the random selection required in this case is deliberately biased towards
highly negative ﬂows by picking randomly from the subset of packets that are Negative.
The referenced section should be read for further details. This section has merely been included for
completeness, highlighting that both downstream congestion inﬂation and anomalous ﬂow detection are
recommended at borders—one is not a substitute for the other.
In a similar vein, re-ECN information could better discriminate between otherwise similar looking
anomalies. Examples already mentioned include unusual proportions of Internet Control Message Proto-
col (ICMP [Pos81]) ‘time expired’ or ‘no route’ errors from packets which also have a Negative re-ECN
ﬁeld.
8.3 Border Incentive Mechanisms: A Review
Neither of the two approaches introduced in this section to harden re-ECN’s baseline border mechanism
have been fully built or tested.
Defence #1: As admitted up-front, ‘Sample-Based Downstream Congestion Inﬂation’ is offered as an
architectural direction. Although the architectural arguments might be plausible, the likely pre-
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works, it would remove the motivation for dummy trafﬁc attacks #1a) & #1b). Without any gain
from the attacks, but with considerable risk of detection and consequent loss of reputation, we
assume networks would be unlikely to mount such attacks.
Defence #2: Normalising Cancelled Markings sits on a little stronger ground. Prototypes of the algo-
rithm have been built and it seems to work as claimed. But much more testing is required. Also
the full algorithm has only been implemented rather inelegantly. Half the algorithm has been re-
implemented based on a new idea producing simple elegant code, but the whole algorithm will
need to be implemented and fully tested before any claims can be made with more certainty.
Again, if the algorithm proves to give unbiased results under further testing, it will remove any
gain from attacks #2a) & #2b) that attempt to poison congestion markings with excess Cancelled
packets.
These sentiments can be formalised into a brief review of whether the two proposed extensions to
re-ECN border mechanisms stay within our original constraints:
Processing Scalability:
• To normalise Cancelled marks, per-packet operations (using an admittedly incomplete al-
gorithm) can be described as minimal. Excluding reading packet ﬁelds, the longest path
through the unoptimised code (for Positive packets) is 14 operations, each a single cycle.
For the majority of packets (Neutral), only one per-packet operation is required (to decide to
do nothing). Negative packets require 6 single-cycle operations.
• For downstream congestion inﬂation, per-packet operations are only necessary for picking
ﬂow IDs to sample. Although the code has not been implemented, subsequent per-packet
operations for picked ﬂows should take just one extra operation on top of reading packet
ﬁelds.
Storage Scalability:
• To normalise Cancelled marks no per-ﬂow state is required.
• For downstream congestion inﬂation, an unknown proportion of sampled ﬂow-state would be
necessary. But state would very likely scale sub-linearly with number of ﬂows and malicious
trafﬁc cannot cause state to exhaust.
Congestion Signal Integrity & Incentive Alignment: Within the attack model of Assumption 8.1 the
arguments for the two schemes to harden re-ECN’s border mechanisms have proved that the in-
tegrity of congestion signals is assured (if the mechanisms work as claimed).Chapter 9
Re-ECN Forwarding Element Behaviour
We have assumed throughout that the contribution of forwarding elements to the re-ECN system is very
simple: they merely implement a standard ﬁrst in ﬁrst out (FIFO) active queue management (AQM)
algorithm such as RED [FJ93] to mark packets that are ECN-capable. As we have already made clear
(§7.4.4), the re-ECN incentive framework is designed to share the resource of those parts of an internet-
work with ECN deployed. It is reasonable for re-ECN to be designed on the basis that ECN is already
deployed, given that we can expect any network provider that does decide to deploy re-ECN policers,
droppers and border meters around its network to also turn on ECN.
Re-ECN requires no changes to forwarding elements that are already ECN-capable. However, two
optional (but recommended) changes are proposed below:
• The section on ‘Congestion marking of Cautious packets’ proposes that forwarding elements op-
tionally congestion mark one of the two extended ECN codepoints (Cautious) that would not be
marked if the current ECN speciﬁcation [RFB01] were followed;
• The section on ‘Preferential Drop’ is not about how an AQM algorithm writes congestion signals
into packets, but about how it might read re-ECN markings—using them to determine its own
drop treatment of arriving packets when under stress.
Only informal analysis of these aspects of the re-ECN protocol has been conducted (e.g. in §12.1.1 on
ﬂooding attacks).
9.1 Re-ECN Preferential Drop
As pointed out in §7.4.4, one cannot assume an ECN queue will never overﬂow and consequently dis-
card packets. One can only assume drop will be rare as a normal operating behaviour. Also an ECN
forwarding element might even have to discard packets for an extended episode, for instance during a
concerted denial of service attack, or due to some misconﬁguration.
Once trafﬁc carries re-ECN markings, the opportunity arises for forwarding elements to use them to
determine which trafﬁc it drops ﬁrst. A link under severe congestion (e.g. a DoS attack) will congestion
mark most of the packets that it manages to forward, and drop the rest. A well-behaved receiver will feed
these back to the source. And a well-behaved source should reduce its rate and set the Positive marking
on nearly all the packets it sends in future rounds.9.1. Re-ECN Preferential Drop 169
Therefore, if a queue is overloaded, it SHOULD drop packets with markings not used by re-ECN
ﬁrst (Not-ECT and ECT(0)). Then, if still stressed, it should drop Negative, Neutral and Cancelled1
packets before ﬁnally dropping Cautious and Positive packets if absolutely necessary. These drop pref-
erences are summarised in Table 9.1.
EECN codepoint Drop Preference
Cautious 3
Positive 3
Neutral 2
Cancelled 2
Negative 2
CU 2
ECT(0) 1
Not-ECT 1
Table 9.1: Proposed Drop Preferences for a re-ECN-aware Forwarding Element.
1 means drop ﬁrst.
A misbehaving source or receiver might not be trying to communicate data, but merely sending
trafﬁc to create congestion (a denial of service attack). It may not be concerned whether all its trafﬁc
can get through the re-ECN dropper. Therefore, it may understate the fraction of Positive markings
on its path to avoid being throttled severely by an ingress policer. Therefore, if a forwarding element
preferentially drops non-positive packets during severe congestion, it will tend to bias its service away
from such ill-behaved sources.
Note that Table 9.1 proposes that Cautious packets should be treated to the lowest drop, along
with Positive packets. This reﬂects their equal worth, byte-for-byte. It would be wrong to give either
more preference than the other, perhaps under the mistaken impression that Cautious packets start new
ﬂows and the system should not allow in new ﬂows when under stress. If such a policy were adopted,
an attacker with sufﬁcient ﬁre-power might use Positive packets to block new ﬂows from the system.
Likewise vice versa.
Similarly, there is no reason not to treat all other re-ECN packets with equal drop preference. Neg-
ative, Neutral, Cancelled and CU2 packets should all be treated equally. There are no grounds, for
instance, for dropping Negative packets more, just because they have already experienced congestion
upstream.
And ﬁnally, there are no grounds for dropping Not-ECT packets before ECT(0). Networks have
no known practical way to limit the load of either any more than the other, if they are not responding to
congestion.
Note that this discard behaviour is not applicable whenever a forwarding element can mark the
1If it were not for legacy concerns Cancelled packets could be dropped last with the same preference as Positive and Cautious.
But the Cancelled codepoint overloads the congestion experienced (CE) codepoint used for legacy ECN. An operator SHOULD
conﬁgure a forwarding element to treat Cancelled packets to the same drop preference as Cautious and Positive if it is certain all
arriving legacy CE trafﬁc will have been tightly rate-limited.
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arriving workload of ECN-capable packets without any need for drop. Preferential drop of packets
that would normally be ECN marked would only be relevant once the AQM algorithm was beyond its
congestion avoidance operating range, where it had to drop something.3
Implementing and deploying preferential drop based on re-ECN markings is optional, as such for-
warding elements can interwork with other routers that do not implement preferential dropping. How-
ever, forwarding elements that do not implement re-ECN-based preferential drop will simply not protect
themselves (and other elements downstream) so well from DoS attacks. In addition, network operators
would be strongly advised only to deploy preferential drop based on re-ECN markings where they were
sure that all routes towards the queue in question were covered by a re-ECN policing function.
These preferential drop semantics are fully speciﬁed in the re-ECN Internet Draft [BJMS09a, §5.3].
9.2 Congestion Marking Cautious Packets
Although re-ECN works with unchanged forwarding elements, the Cautious marking uses a codepoint
in the IP header that won’t be congestion marked by existing forwarding elements, but it would be better
if it was marked than dropped. Therefore, forwarding elements could be upgraded to recognise the
Cautious marking as ECN-capable, and mark it as they mark other ECN-capable codepoints.4
The re-ECN wire protocol is arranged so that, if a forwarding element congestion marks the ECN
ﬁeld of a Cautious packet to 11 it will become Negative. Re-ECN transports are designed to understand
what to do with such packets. Non-re-ECN transports would never send a packet with the Cautious
codepoint (unless they operated some proprietary or Byzantine protocol).
§7.4.2 discusses how other system elements are expected to handle Cautious packets that have
been congestion marked to Negative. It also discusses a second overloaded meaning given to Cautious
packets marked Negative (see also §10.1 next); if they carry a ﬂow-state setup message in their payload
a Negative marking can also mean ‘Flow-state not stored’.5
3A few days before this dissertation was due, an apparently serious ﬂaw was noticed in the RED algorithm—at least in the
algorithm that research papers discuss. The ﬂaw concerns RED’s drop behaviour rather than its marking behaviour. The outcome
is that RED strongly favours unresponsive trafﬁc if it forms a large proportion of arriving load. Therefore, this RED problem does
not directly affect the re-ECN protocol as a whole. But it does strongly impact on how to modify an AQM to do preferential drop
based on re-ECN markings. A quick check of open source code revealed that at least one implementer had noticed the problem and
tried to work round it. Rather than try to include analysis of a hurried correction to RED in this dissertation, this section has been
modiﬁed to abstract it away from reliance on RED as it stands. A summary of the discovered problem with RED is also included
in Appendix C.
4Caution is advised on this statement. We have not decided on a good marking strategy, and if forwarding elements are being
changed, changes to their AQM could also be considered. The recent realisation that the RED protocol’s drop behaviour under
extreme load is extremely wrong (Appendix C) warns that RED’s ECN marking behaviour under extreme load might be improved
too. Indeed, re-ECN would work much better under a DoS attack if RED did not mark 100% of Cautious packets. Otherwise
all new ﬂows would be starved by the dropper. If the Preferential Drop proposal of §9.1 were implemented at the same time as
Cautious marking (which would make sense), then it is feasible that Positive and Cautious markings could be marked less than
100% while other packets were being dropped—given normal congestion avoidance would clearly be considered to have broken
down.
5Indeed, this wouldn’t even violate the ﬁrst meaning of this protocol transition, as a forwarding element that never stores
ﬂow-state can always truthfully say ‘Flow-state not stored’.Chapter 10
Re-ECN Middlebox Behaviour
10.1 Flow-State Congestion Signalling
In §7.3 we introduced the need for the re-ECN dropper to be ﬂow-aware (though not otherwise aware of
the transport). Once a design includes ﬂow state on a middlebox, it also has to be able to manage even
innocent situations where provisioned memory becomes insufﬁcient—a further consequence of violating
the shared fate principle.
Memory exhaustion is, of course, congestion of a physical resource, so we want to be able to treat it
in a similar way to congestion of network capacity. Rather than just discarding ﬂow-start requests when
memory is exhausted, an explicit signal would give a timely unambiguous indication of memory con-
gestion. The ﬁrst packet of a ﬂow is particularly vulnerable to drop for the other reasons than congestion
listed in §6.1.1, so it is doubly important to distinguish congestion signalling explicitly.
Therefore, we propose to use the re-ECN protocol to signal congestion of ﬂow-state. Rather than
conﬁne this facility to the re-ECN dropper, there is no reason not to allow any middlebox (e.g. a network
address translator) to use this facility.
If we put ﬂow-state congestion signals in the IP header as a transport-independent mechanism,
we will need to distinguish ﬂow-state congestion from congestion of bit-capacity so that sources can
respond accordingly by damping ﬂow arrivals (rather than bit arrivals). In the re-ECN protocol, we use
the transition from Cautious to Negative as a signal of ﬂow-state memory congestion. This overloads
the use of this transition for normal bandwidth congestion. The two can be distinguished by a transport,
because the ﬂow-state-related meaning only applies if the payload of the packet contains a request to
store ﬂow-state (e.g. a TCP SYN or the equivalent for other transports, whether explicit or implicit).
This proposal deliberately uses the same structure of in-band congestion signalling as ECN. That
is, it provides a way for a middlebox to ask the intended receiver of a packet to issue a response to the
sender saying ‘ﬂow state not stored’.1 Even though this seems more convoluted than sending a special
ﬂow rejection signal directly back to the sender, it is much more robust for all the reasons given in §6.1.1.
Well-designed transports SHOULD provide an explicit application-independent way to reject a re-
quest to initialise ﬂow state. A combination of TCP ﬂags for such a ﬂow rejection response has been
1The remote possibility of a ﬂow initialisation request spanning more than one packet might have to be considered for some
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reserved in the speciﬁcation of the TCP transport over re-ECN [BJMS09a].2 A server could return such
a rejection response for a number of reasons:
• exhaustion of its own ﬂow-handling resources;
• exhaustion of the ﬂow-handling resources of a middlebox on the path;
• unwillingness to allocate ﬂow-state without more evidence that the client is genuine.
Re-ECN’s in-band congestion signalling deliberately doesn’t preclude a middlebox echoing a ‘ﬂow-
state not stored’ response on behalf of the intended receiver. Indeed, a middlebox might be deployed to
spare a server the routine task of echoing challenges. For instance, the rejection response could be sent
with a nonce, crypto-puzzle, TCP SYN cookie3 or something similar [Edd07].
Note the response means ‘ﬂow state not stored,’ which is subtly different from ‘ﬂow-start request
rejected.’ This is particularly helpful in the case of SYN cookies. SYN cookies were cleverly devised
to work with unaltered clients. Unfortunately, this means that clients cannot tell whether the server has
sent them a SYN cookie. So receiving a SYN cookie can lead the client to think the server has taken
everything it asked for into account, when in fact it just blindly returned a SYN cookie. A response to a
re-ECN client saying ‘ﬂow state not stored’ would tell the client ‘I’ve stored no more ﬂow state than you
see in this response.’ Then, if the client had requested some new or esoteric TCP option, it would know
the server had ignored that aspect of the request and be able to ask again.
Finally, note that re-ECN’s in-band congestion signalling deliberately doesn’t preclude multiple
middleboxes on the path (e.g. one at the sender edge and another at the receiver edge), all possibly trying
to tell the receiver how it should respond. Any one of a sequence of middleboxes can ask for a ‘ﬂow
state not stored’ response by switching the re-ECN ﬁeld to Negative. This is why we do not advise that a
server or middlebox discards non-Cautious packets just because they do not match an existing ﬂow ID,
although a machine under stress is entitled to discard them preferentially (see §12.1.3 on initial packet
attacks).
Signalling ﬂow-state congestion is a tentative part of the re-ECN protocol. Most of its many ram-
iﬁcations have been considered, but there are a few outstanding questions. For instance: i) should the
signal mean ‘Flow state stored but approaching exhaustion’ or ‘Flow state not stored’? ii) Should mem-
ory congestion be signalled to packets holding open existing state, or only to packets asking to allocate
new state? At present, the design described above takes the latter answer in each case.
2The speciﬁcation also allows for the possibility that the server is a legacy one that doesn’t understand a congestion marking.
If the response from the server shows it didn’t understand the request to use ECN or re-ECN, a re-ECN client MUST follow the
congestion control behaviour it would have if the ﬁrst packet had been lost.
3SYN cookies are “particular choices of initial TCP sequence numbers by TCP servers”. The server calculates the initial
sequence number from information it will be able to reconstruct later from a valid acknowledgement. It then does not need to hold
any connection state until it receives an acknowledgement with a sequence number one greater than the server would have created
itself for what would have been the previous packet in the connection.Chapter 11
Re-ECN Bulk Congestion Policer
11.1 Bulk Congestion Policer Model
Our high-level aim is to show that users of an internetwork can be made to pay the cost of the congestion
their trafﬁc causes to others, but without having to suffer the unpredictability of a variable usage charge.
We want network operators to be able to use rationing not just pricing [Bar89, Odl97, §5] to ensure their
customer’s incentives to manage load can be aligned with the interests of all.
We set the constraint that the customer pays a ﬂat monthly fee to its ISP. This is purely a commercial
acceptability constraint. This funds a constant contracted rate, wC of congestion tokens ﬁlling a token
bucket1. Of course, ISPs may give customers the choice between different values of wC. Unlike with
a classic token bucket, only bytes marked for downstream congestion consume tokens. So tokens are
not consumed based on the amount of bytes sent, but on the volume of congestion the source expects
the trafﬁc to cause. Therefore, if the customer sends ﬂows indexed j at bit rate x1,x2,...xj,... each
with an expectation of rest-of-path congestion of respectively v1,v2,...vj,..., tokens will be consumed
1Atokenbucketisamodelthatrepresentsastorednumberf oftokens(modelledasthebucketﬁlllevel), ameansforsubtracting
tokens and an algorithm to add tokens at a continuous rate. Usually this is implemented by storing the time, tr−1 when a token
was last removed. Then when the next request to remove tokens arrives at time tr (i.e. the next marked packet size s in our case)
fr = fr−1 + wC(tr − tr−1) − s .
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at rate
P
vjxj (Fig 11.1). In contrast a classic token bucket would empty at rate
P
xj. Consuming
tokens against downstream congestion ensures a customer continually suffers the congestion cost of its
behaviour on others, while only having to pay a ﬁxed fee for a ﬁxed token ﬁll-rate.
So long as the customer’s usage stays below the congestion allowance, the policer merely moni-
tors the congestion bit rate passively. but whenever sustained excessive congestion bit-rate empties the
bucket, the policer may penalise the whole aggregate of customer trafﬁc entering the internetwork.
The depth B of the bucket absorbs bursts of congestion, allowing for ﬂuctuations in network condi-
tions and in the needs of customers and their applications. The depth may be ﬁnite or effectively inﬁnite.
If bucket depth is ﬁnite and if tokens are consumed too slowly, the stream of ﬁlling tokens may overﬂow
and be wasted. Operators would most likely not just limit the token ﬁll-rate but also peak token con-
sumption using a ‘dual token bucket’. That is, to consume tokens a packet must satisfy two token bucket
constraints at once, one with ﬁll-rate wC and depth B, the other with ﬁll-rate b wC  wC but depth of
just one MTU (the maximum transmission unit of the link). With the second token bucket, there would
be less need to limit the ﬁrst bucket’s depth. To be concrete for this dissertation we assume B → ∞ and
that the operator limits peak token consumption to b wC.
Unlike a traditional trafﬁc conditioner based on bit-rate, congestion bit-rate has largely the same
value and meaning however much it is shifted in time or space, therefore the bucket can potentially
absorb bursts over periods of hours or weeks. The depth B of the bucket is more a commercial policy
issue, effectively limiting how much unused congestion-volume quota the ISP allows the customer to
‘roll-over’. However, the depth of all the other customers’ buckets on the Internet does determine the
predictability of any single customer’s service experience.
The peak token consumption rate b wC primarily limits anomalous behaviour, whether malicious
(malware), accidental (buggy applications) or deliberate (highly inconsiderate use - e.g. scripted execu-
tion of vast numbers of ﬂow instances).
The particular design of congestion policer we propose here is not intended to be generic to all ISPs.
It is a design of policer that satisﬁes the ﬂat monthly fee constraint of a particular commercial approach,
while still aligning incentives to respond to congestion. It was the primary aim of this research to be able
to offer ﬂat-fee Internet access and align incentives, and it is an important contribution if re-ECN has
enabled such a simple policer design to achieve this aim.
But we have another reason for proposing this particular design in this dissertation. We need to
establish whether re-ECN can assure the integrity of congestion signals even when they are used (see
§12.3.1). We have proposed this particular policer design as one that we believe gives the maximum
freedom to a customer and to developers of new application and transport behaviours, but within the
constraints of a ﬂat fee and incentive alignment.
11.2 Policer Diversity
Re-ECN could be used by ISPs to give customers more freedom. Re-ECN could be used for sender-pays
congestion charging, much as Kelly suggested ECN could be used for receiver-pays congestion charg-
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charges regularly result in the same usage fee each month.
But we propose this congestion policer because we want to deﬁne a concrete artefact that ISPs
could use to offer and enforce a moving congestion limit. This approach allows network operators
to impose limits when incentives are not enough; for instance in times of crisis, or against customers
whose machines have become infected with malware. It is likely to be more commercially viable than
dynamic congestion charging, which seems to offer too much freedom to be palatable to both providers
and customers alike.
It should be emphasised that this policer is an application of the congestion signal integrity that
re-ECN aims to provide. An architectural aim of re-ECN is to encourage diversity of policer designs to
meet different commercial objectives; to encourage ‘Tussle in Cyberspace’ [CWSB05]. For instance, we
have proposed other design examples ourselves:
• In a workshop paper co-authored with Jacquet and Moncaster [JBS05], we proposed a similar bulk
token bucket congestion policer to the one described here, but one which discards all ﬂows equally
when the bucket empties. That proposal aims to give a customer the incentive to self-police each
ﬂow (whether elastic or inelastic) without the policer having to. The discards when the token
bucket is empty effectively add a cross-ﬂow element to the apparent congestion that each ﬂow
experiences. Customers who fail to self-police bring this cost on themselves, but it also allows a
customer to choose to allow inelastic ﬂows to complete even if their cost to the customer’s other
activities increases after they have started;
• The Internet Draft Motivating re-ECN [BJMS09b, Appx B2.], also co-authored with others, pro-
poses a per-ﬂow policer that aims to force each ﬂow to respond to congestion as TCP or a TCP-
friendly [FHPW00] transport should;
• Network operators might deploy ‘service-oriented’ [WK08] congestion policers that specialise a
virtual network to a certain service or services;
• Network operators might enforce a ‘walled-garden’ around their networks to limit customers to
only a certain set of applications identiﬁed by their rate response to congestion signals in combi-
nation with other information perhaps gathered using deep packet inspection (DPI) technology to
inspect the payloads of packets.
We hope and expect congestion policers will become an important policy enforcement point (PEP)
at the ingress to the internetwork, not just for ﬂow admission control [YPG00], but to control trafﬁc
admission at any granularity from packet [Cla95] to service. Re-ECN should allow some networks to
adopt liberal policies on what trafﬁc they allow (as the policer proposed here would do), while simulta-
neously other networks can enforce conservative policies, without all having to lose the beneﬁts of full
interconnection. Networks with conservative policies will still be able to protect their services and their
investments using the border mechanisms of §8. And any network will be able to decide to change its
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Effectively, re-ECN turns the end-to-end principle with respect to transport control into an optional
policy rather than a design principle embedded deep in the architecture. And this policy is applied
once per customer, at the outer edge of the internetwork. Thus it is amenable to change through the
simple change of an individual bipartisan contract, without depending on changes to any contracts with
operators in the rest of the internetwork.
Different token bucket ﬁll-rates (wC) effectively provide a differentiated spectrum of network ser-
vices without explicitly using differentiated scheduling (Diffserv [BBC+98]) (for a technology advan-
tage of this approach see ‘Bufferless Border Control’ in §8.1.3). But downstream congestion information
complements and improves Diffserv too. New forms of trafﬁc conditioning agreement (TCA) for any or
all classes of service could be based on downstream congestion.
Currently, if a Diffserv TCA polices trafﬁc without regard to destination, each network link has to
be provisioned statistically based on the expected variation of the whole trafﬁc matrix. The advantage of
enforcing a TCA against downstream congestion information would be to manage network load even if
the trafﬁc matrix was unusual. This would also allow cheaper, less generous provisioning by leveraging
most customers’ abilities to respond elastically to temporary congestion most of the time.
Downstream congestion has another potential advantage over straight bit-rate for policing. TCAs
based on bit-rate are only useful at high levels of aggregation—for larger sites comprising many sources
of load. Bit-rate TCAs are hard if not impossible to apply for small sites characterised by long periods of
complete inactivity and occasional intense ﬂurries—network provisioning would either be prohibitively
expensive, or the assurances that could be offered would be worthlessly poor. However, TCAs based on
downstream congestion integrate properly over long periods of time. Thus congestion-based TCAs are
potentially useful for consumer as well as business customers.
We have deliberately used the term ‘customer’ rather than ‘end-user’ throughout this discussion
to denote a ‘locally attached contractual entity’. The customer relationship need not be commercial
although it often will be; for instance it may be a relationship between an academic institution and its
internal network operations department. The term customer includes customers with large numbers of
users as well as sole-user customers. A customer could even operate a commercial network themselves,
in which case this policer would effectively be a border mechanism that is actively intervening in the
packet stream (§8.2.8), in contrast to the passive border mechanisms recommended in the rest of §8.
Finally, we propose this bulk congestion policer design because it would be extremely cheap to
implement. Therefore it could be suitable for distribution to low-cost access equipment at every attach-
ment point of an access network, e.g. on the input ports of a digital subscriber line access multiplexers
(DSLAM), hybrid-ﬁbre-coax node (HFC-node) or cellular base-station (Node B in UMTS). It is usu-
ally more cost-efﬁcient to centralise the implementation of policy controls because the ﬂexibility they
need tends to lead to complexity. But it is preferable for a policing function to be cheap enough to
distribute right to the network edge, in order to physically block unruly incoming trafﬁc from causing
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11.3 Bulk Congestion Policer Design
The bulk congestion policer proposed here (from here on just called ‘the policer’) puts no individual
constraints on the transport behaviours of different ﬂows, other than limiting total long running expected
downstream congestion for all ﬂows as a whole.
Like the egress dropper (§7), and unlike the bulk congestion policer we proposed in [JBS05], if the
aggregate bucket has emptied, each ﬂow is sanctioned distinctly. Thus ﬂows expecting no congestion
on their path can continue unaffected by the policer’s lack of tokens, while ﬂows causing considerable
congestion will be hit the hardest. The policer effectively consists of two modules, a bulk token bucket
meter for all ﬂows called on by per-ﬂow instances of droppers that re-use the principles, design and
implementation of the dropper we have already described for the egress.
The meter module uses the algorithm in §8.2.7 based on Eqn (6.4) to normalise any poisoned
cancelled markings in arriving packets. This produces a ‘virtual packet marking’ of the moving average
of recent downstream congestion, v, which determines how many tokens each packet consumes. If the
network(s) between the source and the policer are uncongested, this will be equivalent to counting just
packets marked Positive. But if there has already been some congestion (e.g. in the customer’s own
network, or into the line from the customer to their provider), the policer removes it from its count by
calculating downstream congestion v.
How Much Drop?We now consider how much drop is appropriate if there are insufﬁcient tokens in the
bucket to ‘pay’ for the markings of expected downstream congestion. Rather than just drop everything
as suggested in [JBS05, BJMS09b, Appx B1.], conceptually we follow the principle of ‘Proportionate
Sanctions’ (§7.3).
The dropper module can assume that every incoming Positive mark was triggered by an earlier
Negative mark that it would have been able to count if it were at the egress. So it maintains a per-ﬂow
moving average of Negative marks counting real Negative marks as well as Positive and Cancelled marks
(but not Cautious) as if they also represent Negative markings.
If the meter module (the bucket) is empty, we propose that the dropper module should change an
arriving Positive marking to Neutral. We call this ‘covert’ marking’ because we do not want it to be seen
as a congestion mark by the transport (see below).
The rationale for this behaviour is as follows. An arriving Positive marking can be likened to the
customer saying to the network, “Charge this to my account.” When the bucket is not empty the network
operator can forward the Positive mark saying in turn to the next network’s border meter, “Charge this
to my account.” But if the original customer’s account is empty, the ﬁrst network says “Your account is
empty; I refuse to commit to paying the next network if you haven’t paid me enough.2” At this stage no
packets have been dropped—the dropper is still measuring what to do.
Even if the bucket is empty when one Positive marking arrives, it may be reﬁlling sufﬁciently
quickly for some Positive markings to be allowed through unchanged. The policing module therefore
maintains a moving average of Positive markings, not counting any it has changed to Neutral.
2Different policies may allow certain customers some credit, or course.11.3. Bulk Congestion Policer Design 178
The policer having removed some Positive markings, the ﬂow will be understating its expectation
of downstream congestion, v. The policer then determines drop as a proportionate sanction in exactly
the same way as the egress dropper of §7 does.3 From Eqn (7.3) the drop probability for Negative
and Neutral4 marked packets is πu = πy = 1 − z/u;(if z < u & V < 0), while packets with other
markings(Positive, CautiousandCancelled)arenotdroppedatall. Packetsmarkedwithlegacymarkings
(Not-ECT and ECT(0)) are likely to be rate-limited separately as we have already said.
11.3.1 Covert Marking as Policer Signals
This is a tentative extension to the re-ECN wire protocol that is not yet documented in the formal re-ECN
protocol speciﬁcation, and may be changed.
It may have been noted that we have chosen to remove Positive markings by re-marking them to
Neutral, which is not a valid re-ECN protocol transition (§6.1.2). All the valid transitions in the re-ECN
wire protocol only require the network to alter the ECN ﬁeld, not the RE ﬂag. The wire protocol has been
designed so that end systems can double-check that the RE ﬂag is unchanged, to give some assurance that
the network has not cheated by making a protocol transition that it should not normally make (§12.1.4).
The policer deliberately uses this ‘illegal’ transition as a way for it to signal to the transport that
the drops being experienced are most likely due to policing, not congestion. This keeps to our design
principle of using in-band not backwards signalling (§6.1.1). Assuming some covertly marked packets
are not dropped by the policer,5 the end-to-end transport can detect a change to the RE ﬂag on packets it
originally sent as Positive. It can then respond to drops differently, suspecting they are due to policing.
The precise response to policer-induced drops is up to each transport. Each will probably still
respond to these policer drops by reducing its rate, but it would be advised not to respond to each drop
with a Positive marking in the next round. This would otherwise drive it deeper into debt with the token
bucket.
The approach of each transport to being policed is out of scope of this dissertation. Also out of
scope are the details of whether the token bucket toggles to covert marking in one step, or as a gentle
ramp as the bucket empties. This dissertation only needs to say enough about the policer to give:
• an existence proof of ﬂat-charging with aligned incentives;
• a concrete instance of the most liberal policer we believe is possible, so that we can model it in
§12.3.1.
3And, of course, if real Negative markings arrive with insufﬁcient Positive markings to cover even them, then an even higher
level of drop will automatically ensue.
4Neutral also implies Currently Unused (CU see §12.2.2).
5Because the policer re-uses the algorithms of the regular dropper from §7.6 it gives one packet’s grace to covert markings,
tending to drop subsequent packets instead.Chapter 12
The Re-ECN System
12.1 System Attacks on Congestion Signal Integrity
The rudimentary goal of re-ECN is to ensure that the integrity of congestion signalling information in
re-ECN packets can be trusted to be accurate. This section aims to quantify or at least estimate the limits
under which this property of re-ECN will still hold under various attacks.
12.1.1 Endpoints Against Networks
FEC Trade-Off Attack
Salvatori [Sal05] describes this attack against the re-ECN system, which involves the source playing off
the egress dropper against the ingress policer. A similar attack was also mentioned independently the
following year in [BFB06]. The source inserts erasure codes [BLMR98] (forward error correction or
FEC)1 into the data stream which inﬂates the bit-rate, but allows the original data to be reconstructed if
a proportion is lost. The source then understates downstream path congestion knowing the dropper will
discard some data, but this also consumes less tokens at the ingress policer so it can go faster for the
same ‘charge’. We call this the ‘FEC trade-off’ attack.
The FEC trade-off attack was aimed at an earlier variant of egress dropper design, which was
consequently updated to that in §7. We will now prove that the updated design prevents the FEC trade-off
attack from giving a source-destination pair any gain from understating expected downstream congestion
at the network ingress relative to congestion marking emerging at the egress. We will ﬁrst deﬁne the
scenario and its notation.
FEC added by the source inﬂates the data rate to Φ times its original bit-rate, where Φ ≥ 1. We
assume the FEC source does not re-transmit any repairs of losses, as this would cost even more on top of
the FEC overhead. We compare cases where FEC is added and where it isn’t. Variables are subscripted
with f in the case where FEC is added, and not when it isn’t.
As previously deﬁned, the recent fractions of Positive and Negative re-ECN marked bytes are z
and ui at node index i along the network path (as the dropper does not drop Positive packets z remains
unchanged along the path). Index i = 0 represents the source before FEC is added, i = 1 represents
arrival at the ingress policer, which is also equivalent to the point of departure from the source after
1Note, not error-correcting codes, which are different.12.1. System Attacks on Congestion Signal Integrity 180
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Figure 12.1: The Futility of the FEC Trade-Off Attack.
any FEC is added. i = n on arrival at the egress dropper and i = N on departure for delivery to the
destination. To simplify matters, but without loss of generality, we will assume that u1 = 0 at the ingress
policer, that is, there is no congestion marking within the source’s own network.
Theorem 12.1. An end-to-end ﬂow with useful bit-rate x0 and free choice in declaring expected down-
stream congestion z cannot gain by sending bit-rate x1 which includes added redundant FEC data, as
long as the network makes the user accountable for cost zx1 at the ingress and discards non-Positive
packets with probability πd = 1 − z/un (z < un) at the egress.
Proof. Whether in the FEC case or not, we assume no drop of the ECN-capable packets between ingress
and egress, that is x1 = xn. We also note that all packet marking fractions and bit-rates cannot physically
be less than zero.
In the base case with no FEC, the source ensures z = un so that there is no drop at the dropper.
Therefore xN = xn = x1 = x0.
In the FEC case, as shown in Fig 12.1, we split the data ﬂow into two parts: i) a bit-rate equivalent
to the base data the source wishes to send xf0 = x0 and ii) the added FEC xf1−x0. To ensure bit-rate x0
gets through the dropper with no loss, a Positive bit-rate of zx0 needs to be sent where z = un, given the
marking fraction introduced along the path is un. Thus the base data can be considered self-contained
with just enough Positive bit-rate to sustain its delivery.
Considering the additional FEC data as a separate ﬂow, if none of it is marked Positive, it will all
be dropped. It would be pointless to mark any of the additional FEC data as Positive just in order to
deliver additional data that isn’t needed, as this would cost more than if FEC had not been used at all.
This proves that a drop probability of πd = 1 − z/un (z < un) is sufﬁcient to ensure no gain can be
made from the FEC trade-off attack.
Put another way, any additional Neutral bytes attract proportionately more Negative markings. So,
unless the source marks more packets Positive, the dropper will discard all the additional Neutral packets
sent.
Salvatori’s FEC trade-off attack originally played off the ingress policer against the egress dropper
(hence its inclusion in this section on attacks against the whole system). However, the above argument
proves that the new egress dropper design alone is sufﬁcient to negate any gain from the attack.
For those who would prefer a less terse proof, the following may help.2
2Arnaud Jacquet suggested this second form of proof in place of my earlier erroneous proof.12.1. System Attacks on Congestion Signal Integrity 181
Proof. Consider that the source sends a bit-rate of zx0 Positive packets, which will be forwarded by the
dropper with no loss. If the source uses FEC data to inﬂate the remaining bit-rate by Φ, then the bit-rate
of Neutral packets leaving the source will be Φ(1 − z)x0.
Once proportion u of these Positive and Negative packets have been marked, the bit-rates of Positive
and Negative packets will respectively be (1 − u)zx0 and uΦ(1 − z)x0. Therefore the drop fraction of
non-Positive packets will be
πd = 1 −
(1 − u)zx0
uΦ(1 − z)x0
(12.1)
Adding the unscathed bit-rate of originally Positive packets zx0 to the bit-rate of originally non-Positive
packets forwarded by the dropper, the overall delivered bit-rate through the dropper will be
xN = zx0 + (1 − πd)Φ(1 − z)x0
=
z
u
x0. (12.2)
This is clearly independent of the FEC inﬂation factor Φ, proving again that addition of FEC without
any Positive markings can have no effect on delivered throughput.
The source always has to conservatively estimate the amount of FEC to add because it doesn’t know
in advance the rate of congestion marking, which the dropper algorithm uses to determine the drop rate.
Therefore the FEC trade-off attack will actually always result in worse goodput than not using FEC at
all, aside from any additional overhead or inefﬁciency in the FEC scheme.
It is interesting to note that Raghaven & Snoeren’s ‘Decongestion Control’ [RS06] also falls foul
of the same unpredictability problem with FEC. Decongestion control involves everyone always sending
at maximum line rate and everyone varies the redundancy of their erasure codes, in place of the rate
response of traditional congestion controls. Decongestion and congestion control would be equivalent
were it not for the extra redundant data needed to cater for the unpredictability of loss. This has an-
other interesting analogy with the per-ﬂow credit that the re-ECN dropper requires due to the ‘Source
Responsibility for Delay Allowance’ principle. In place of decongestion control’s redundant overhead
packets, re-ECN unnecessarily consumes downstream congestion quota. Both redundancies can only be
identiﬁed in hindsight.
Strategic Confusion of Investment Signals
Bauer and Faratin [Bau05]3 claim to identify a strategising attack against congestion charging in general,
thattheytermthe‘CapacityExpansionGame’. Theyarguedthatcongestion-basedincentivemechanisms
are only myopic incentive-compatible, not long-term incentive-compatible. Although this attack is not
speciﬁcally against re-ECN4 we deal with it here, as re-ECN depends in turn on accountability for
congestion in order to align incentives. We only argue discursively about this attack, as it is exceedingly
hard to pose a realistic scenario in which it might work and that is also tractable.
3There is no formal reference to cite for the ‘Capacity Expansion Game’ aspect of the authors’ work other than this slide
presentation.
4Their speciﬁc attack against re-ECN is dealt with elsewhere.12.1. System Attacks on Congestion Signal Integrity 182
In the capacity expansion game, a strategising player predicts that it will have higher demand in the
future. It sends a small amount of dummy trafﬁc when it has no demand, which it properly pays for. It
aims to cause other players who do have demand at those times to pay more in congestion charges than
they would have otherwise. It banks on this collective behaviour eventually sending an investment signal
to the operator to invest in more capacity, using the funds mostly provided by customers other than the
strategising player. After the investment in more capacity, the strategising player can satisfy its own
higher demand as predicted, but at a lower congestion charge. A simulation shows the strategy works
for heavy users against light users, even if many players adopt it.
This game is effectively a strategising attack not just on congestion charging but on microeconomics
itself. It is equivalent to gaming a vendor of apples (or any perishable good). Strategising players who
know they will want more apples in the future can reduce the future price of apples by buying a few more
than they need now, thus increasing supply and reducing the price for the future.
It is certainly true that this game can succeed sometimes. For instance the authors pointed to certain
players like Content Distribution Networks that might be in a strategic position to sufﬁciently predict
future demand of themselves and others.5 But this strategy can also fail. It is possible that there could
be situations where a player ﬁnds itself in a position it can take advantage of. But the strategy is only a
fundamental problem if it can be systematically exploited.
The probability of success depends on:
• the relative elasticities of demand (the primal rate response to congestion marking) and of price
(the dual marking response to congestion);
• whether congestion charges are likely to be higher or lower in the future.
On the demand side, if one user tries to increase the price by increasing demand, other users will
reduce their demand, thus reducing the price (this was not included in Bauer & Faratin’s model). There-
fore, strategising players might have to spend a lot to get the market as a whole to spend enough extra to
trigger signiﬁcantly earlier investment.
On the supply side, in a growing market, congestion charges are likely to be lower in the future any-
way if there is an economy of scale (the marginal cost of capacity reduces as more capacity is installed).
The game assumed that capacity expansion would occur in steps leading to a temporary uncharacteristic
drop in price. However, it would be as likely that network operators would mark based on gradually
increasing logical limits, rather than actual physical capacity constraints. One can think of this as a
counter-strategy against the game by network operators.
Anderson et al [AKS06] suggests another potential operator counter-strategy. The paper recognises
that pure congestion charging alone can be exploited by strategising players at the expense of myopic
ones. It proposes that network operators could offer ﬁxed price bandwidth contracts, but allow buyers
freedom to use more or less bandwidth in the resource pool. The operator applies balancing charges
(positive or negative) at the end of each contracting round so that its total revenue remains ﬁxed, but
5We should add that players using signiﬁcant market power to distort market signals are generally expected to be handled by
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customer charges end up proportionate to the amount of congestion they caused. The paper proves that
each customer’s incentives are still aligned with the interests of others, but they also have no incentive
not to be honest in their estimation of future bandwidth demand.
Returning to Bauer & Faratin’s contribution, in general it is unlikely that any player will have sufﬁ-
ciently perfect information to be able to predict a network’s capacity expansion plans, which depend on
competition, equipment cost movements, internal company politics and performance, growth in demand,
variations in the cost of borrowing and so forth.
Similarly, strategising players would have to predict the future behaviour of other players, to predict
overall future demand. The strategy was shown to succeed for the set of heavy users against the set of
light users, each acting independently. But it conveniently didn’t allow users to switch providers, while
it expected the provider to invest in capacity as if it were under the competitive threat of its customers
switching to an alternative supplier. If some light users became fed up with the generally high level of
congestion being caused by the strategising players, they might leave for another network, removing the
need for the provider to invest in capacity. Then the strategising players would lose all they had invested
in the game without getting the provider to expand capacity before their demand increased as they knew
it would, causing them further congestion costs.
We have not, and cannot, prove whether the capacity expansion game could be systematically suc-
cessful. If it were successful in some scenarios, it would imply that the integrity of re-ECN pricing
signals can be confused by a strategising player. But we hope that we have cast sufﬁcient doubt to
place it in the background, as a possible opportunistic attack rather than a systematic ﬂaw requiring a
systematic solution.
Bandwidth Flooding Attacks
The re-ECN protocol introduces the possibility of some protection against bandwidth ﬂooding attacks.
No hard claims can be made about re-ECN’s ability to mitigate DDoS, but it does have the potential to
considerably raise the bar against attacks and to transfer liability for the cost of attacks back towards the
source, providing information and incentives to deal with them at source.
Considerable attention has been paid to DDoS issues since the brief explanation of re-feedback’s
DDoS mitigation capabilities in the original re-feedback paper [BJCG+05, §3.5], including publication
of a workshop paper on the issue [Bri06], the work in §8.2 on networks attacking each other with dummy
trafﬁc and the work below.
Bauer and Faratin [BFB06] published a dummy trafﬁc attack on re-feedback that they mentioned
could be used to deny service. However, their primary target was to show that strategic users could
increasing congestion marking for others. This class of attacks is dealt with in §8.2
Re-ECN’s defence against bandwidth ﬂooding relies on the ﬂooded forwarding element(s) imple-
menting the optional preferential drop scheme recommended in §9.1. Then, whenever a queue is highly
congested to the point it is dropping packets, it will preferentially enqueue arriving Cautious and Positive
packets. This protects the forwarding service at the very ﬁrst step of the queuing process. Therefore, any
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This is because a highly congested queue will be marking most packets that it does serve as ei-
ther Negative or Cancelled. So a well-behaved re-ECN source would have to respond to the resulting
continuous congestion feedback by sending all packets as Positive (after the initial Cautious packets).6
We will now derive formulae for the force of such an attack, then roughly quantify the mitigating
effect of the re-ECN system.
Initially, we will assume the case of a malicious source sitting behind the most liberal re-ECN
congestion policer we believe will be deployed (§11). The policer limits the source’s congestion-bit-
rate to a contracted peak of b wC and to a contracted ﬁll rate wC  b wC once any built-up congestion
allowance has been used up.
As we have shown that only positively marked packets can carry any attack force, the contracted
congestion-bit-rate limits essentially act as limits on the total bit-rate xA that an attack source can con-
tribute to a bandwidth ﬂooding attack, that is
xA ≤ b wC
and once any stored allowance is used up
xA ≤ wC.
A typical contracted congestion-bit-rate wC will allow for path congestion conditions averaged over
a month ¯ p; a reasonable activity factor over the month υ; and a reasonable expected proportion η of peak
access bit-rate X when active, such that
wC = ¯ pυηX. (12.3)
Typically, a site’s contracted peak congestion-bit-rate would prevent it causing unreasonably high con-
gestion levels b p, even at its full access bit-rate.
b wC = b pX. (12.4)
And, if a site were allowed to store up B unused congestion allowance (in units of bucket ﬁll-time), it
could sustain this peak congestion-bit-rate for a maximum time (from full bucket to empty) of
b TC =
wC
b wC
B
=
¯ p
b p
υηB. (12.5)
For a typical residential customer, the following ‘ball-park’ values for these parameters seem rea-
sonable:
¯ p average congestion: from 0% to 3% at worst, with perhaps 0.2% a reasonable average [CC08];
υ activity factor: perhaps 20%;
6Assuming there is a re-ECN dropper function after the congested link’s marking process, sending any Neutral packets would
risk running into debt at the dropper, without easily being able to balance it with a Positive packet, because all Positive packets get
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X peak access bit-rate: 100Mb/s;
η expected proportion of access rate attained when active: perhaps 70%;
b p maximum allowed congestion: 10%;
B stored unused congestion allowance: 6hrs ﬁll-time.
Thus giving estimates of
xA ≤ b wC ≈ 10Mb/s
for duration b TC ≈ 1minute
and thereafter xA ≤ wC ≈ 30kb/s.
Even 100Mb/s customers expecting 100% of their access rate all the time (η = υ = 100%) would only
need to contract for a congestion policer ﬁll rate wC ≈ 200kb/s. So if the scenario were otherwise the
same, their token bucket would be able to sustain a peak congestion-bit-rate 10Mb/s attack for at most
about 7 minutes before limiting the attack to 200kb/s.
Thus, a single attacker with a 100Mb/s access link would only be able to sustain a ﬂooding attack
in the tens or low hundreds of kb/s. Therefore, to saturate a 10Gb/s link, it would take a botnet of about
100,000 residential sites. Although botnets of this size are not uncommon, the take-away point is that, if
congestion policing were prevalent, botnets would need to be about three orders of magnitude larger to
achieve the same effect.
Of course, candidate hosts for a botnet can be selected from those not behind residential congestion
policers. Various attack strategies that might be adopted are tabulated in Table 12.1 against a suitable
remedy in each case.
Active Detection and Intervention. So far we have considered how the re-ECN incentive framework
strongly damps ﬂooding attacks merely as a fortunate side-effect of getting end-points to manage their
regular every-day congestion. Nonetheless, networks can further exploit the congestion information
re-ECN reveals to them. Flooding attacks appear as a stream of trafﬁc towards a common destination
address or preﬁx with marking approaching 100% downstream congestion (i.e. nearly all positively
marked packets). Essentially, re-ECN information greatly ampliﬁes the visibility of ﬂooding attacks at
source for attack detection systems to pick up, and it provides an incentive for the network at the source
to do so.
This was the theme of the workshop paper by the present author “Using Self-Interest to Prevent
Malice; Fixing the Denial of Service Flaw of the Internet” [Bri06]. Active detection of DoS attacks is
outside the scope of this dissertation, but the general idea will be brieﬂy summarised here.
The goal of re-ECN is to allow evolution of a wide range of innovative transport behaviours in
response to congestion, while providing incentives that cajole all approaches towards a responsible,
responsive middle ground—neither insensitive nor unnecessarily over-sensitive.
One could describe a ﬂooding attack as an innovative response to congestion. (Using other people’s
congestion allowances is even more innovative :) But on the spectrum of responses to congestion, one12.1. System Attacks on Congestion Signal Integrity 186
Strategy Remedy
Attack sources could be selected in networks
not policing congestion, and still programmed
to send Cautious or Positive re-ECN packets.
Networks using re-ECN to limit congestion
would deploy bulk congestion policers at their
borders with any network not deploying re-ECN
congestion policers.
Attack sources could send legacy packets with-
out re-ECN markings.
On congested forwarding elements employing
preferential drop based on re-ECN markings,
legacy packets would have no attack force
against re-ECN packets, as already discussed.
Also, one would expect bulk congestion policers
around a network to also limit the straight bit-rate
of packets without re-ECN markings.
Attack sources on larger sites (e.g. enterprise
networks or campuses) might sit behind a bulk
congestionpolicerforthewholesitethatwould
less stringently limit the congestion-bit-rate
they could cause.
But, of course, this would limit the force that
could be amassed from a number of attack
sources in one site. Indeed, one would expect
a contracted peak congestion-bit-rate to be much
lower for a congestion policer serving a large ag-
gregate, because the variance in congestion-bit-
rate over time should be greater for single users
than aggregates.7
Table 12.1: Further DDoS Attack Strategies and Remedies.
would expect a wide expanse of clear water between even an inelastic transport and a DDoS ﬂooding at-
tack. The difference is only apparent if congestion is compared with bit-rate. An inelastic transport might
temporarily exhibit no response to congestion when congestion is low (perhaps having used congestion-
based ﬂow admission control). But if both congestion and bit-rate are extremely high, a transport that is
still unresponsive will be highly suspect.
If a host attached to network NA is part of a ‘zombie’ army (controlled by a botnet master) causing a
high volume of congestion in network NB, the re-ECN border mechanisms (§8) will ensure the network
NA harbouring the source recompenses network NB.
But this cost, in itself, is not a sufﬁcient incentive to make network NA want to act against the
offending trafﬁc, because the re-ECN incentive framework ensures that a source cannot cost a network
more than it has paid. Even if the victim of the attack is in the same network (NA) as the source,
one could argue that network NA is fully recompensed for the reduced network quality that its other
customers experience, by the allowance it draws from its ‘zombie-customer’.
However, network NA does have a strong incentive to help its zombie-customer; either silently, by
discarding the attack trafﬁc before it uses up the customer’s allowance; or more actively, by helping the
customer remove the offending malware. The zombie-customer gets no utility from the attack trafﬁc and
effectively loses some access rate. So a network that continues to cash-in from such trafﬁc will merely
appear more expensive and lower quality than a competitor.
7Congestion is non-linear, so it would be unlikely to be normally distributed over time. If it were, its variance would scale
O(1/
√
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Effectively, the network has two customers in one: a white-market and a black-market customer.
But the network cannot gain from the parasitic black-market without risking losing a white-market cus-
tomer. Although black-market revenues could be quite large, they would never be worth the risk of losing
much greater white-market revenues, because a parasite cannot survive without a healthy host.
Single Packet Flow Attacks
Negative Single Packet Flows. An attacker (or an accident) might create many single packet ﬂows,
each consisting of a Negative packet. These would not decrement the token bucket at the ingress bulk
congestion policer. Indeed it might seem as if they would conceptually consume negative tokens and
therefore act to ﬁll the bucket. They would eventually reach the egress dropper and be treated with the
Bulk of misbehaving packets. This would rapidly cause the dropper’s Bulk ﬂow state to accumulate a
highly negative balance and discard them all. But on the way, it seems they could wreak considerable
havoc traversing intervening networks. They could drag down the metering of downstream congestion at
any borders they crossed, at least until they were picked up in a sample of the Downstream Congestion
Inﬂation mechanism.
Happily, the proposed ingress policer of §11 should stop Negative packet attacks at source. It
includes a module to determine how much to discard which is identical to the per-ﬂow egress dropper
of §7. This dropper would treat all these Negative single packet ﬂows in the Bulk of misbehaving ﬂows,
just as an egress dropper would; rapidly leading it to discard them all. Alternative ingress policer designs
SHOULD make sure they also included dropper behaviour that would block such attacks.
Cancelled Single Packet Flows.It might seem that numerous ﬂows of single Cancelled packets could
be used as a dummy trafﬁc attack (or as the result of an error). The egress dropper (§7) deliberately
allows them through untouched, on the grounds that they might be congestion marks within legacy ECN
trafﬁc. However, the ingress policer of §11 comes to the rescue again in this case. Its algorithm for
metering downstream congestion to consume tokens from the bucket counts Cancelled packets as part of
its normalisation of downstream congestion (§8.2.7). Thus, such attacks would be blocked as the token
bucket rapidly emptied.
Dummy Neutral Background Load
Bauer & Faratin [BFB06] pointed out that sources could be motivated to send dummy trafﬁc at little
or no cost to themselves just to increase congestion marking levels within some interior network, not
intending to cause any drop. Such sources might be motivated by a desire to confuse the network into
investing in capacity at other people’s expense (§12.1.1), or simply to cause expense to others (whether
targeted or random others).
A source could simply send Neutral packets whenever it had nothing else to communicate. Neutral
packets might not get very far if they all used separate ﬂows IDs, because the dropping module within
the ingress policer would include them in the Bulk of misbehaving ﬂows, perhaps dropping most of
them. But, for the cost of a single Cautious packet, valid ﬂow-state could be opened in the ingress
dropper allowing through large numbers of Neutral packets. There would be no need to send any Positive
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ingress policer. The source would not need to balance any Negative congestion marking added later on
the path. Its nefarious purpose would have been met if it caused congestion somewhere in the middle of
the network. The source wouldn’t care if the ﬂow became Negative to be discarded by an egress dropper
before leaving the Internet.
Bauer & Faratin correctly point out that, for a ﬂow causing some congestion, no network element
before the ﬁrst dropper after the congestion can rely on the expected downstream congestion the ﬂow
declares. Therefore, to strictly assure congestion signal integrity, every network element would have to
run a per-ﬂow dropper. Taken to this extreme, the re-ECN wire protocol would allow a negative ﬂow to
be immediately identiﬁed locally at whatever point it became persistently negative.
However, the ‘Sample-Based Congestion Volume Inﬂation’ process (§8.2.4) is proposed as a prag-
matic alternative to ubiquitous deployment of droppers. It aims to eventually remove under-declaring
ﬂows, at least from the point where they become negative, but only lazily. Push-back further isn’t re-
quired, but is optional using hints. The most important aim, though, is to remove the polluting effect of
negative ﬂows from border measurements. This removes any ﬁnancial motivation for networks to attack
each other.
This process accepts that not all congestion signals will always be sound. It prioritises aligning
all the networks’ incentives to remove negative trafﬁc above actually removing it. A detailed rationale
is given in §8.2.4, which admits that it is more an architectural direction than a detailed mechanism
proposal at this stage. Brieﬂy, the following steps are proposed:
1. Remove inter-network attack motives, align the incentives of all networks to remove negative
ﬂows;
2. Use localised sampling solutions to detect negative ﬂows;
3. Optionally pass on trace-back hints;
4. Attack the root cause lazily.
12.1.2 Networks Against Endpoints
‘Faked’ Congestion Marking
A network operator being able to fake ‘congestion’ marking is a feature of the re-ECN framework,
not an attack. When we ﬁrst deﬁned ‘congestion signal integrity’, we warned that it should strictly be
termed ‘shadow-price signal integrity’. If packet marking is used for market pricing, it is only equivalent
to congestion marking in a perfectly competitive market [MMV95]. Then the market price will tend
towards the congestion price.
In a network, some links may suffer less competition than others, and competitiveness may change
over time. Certain key links may provide the only route to a particular part of the world. Or there may
be a temporary surge in interest in communicating between two parts of the world, but no quick way
of providing extra capacity. There may be commercial or political barriers to entry that make it hard to
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In such cases of imperfect markets for speciﬁc connectivity, an incumbent network operator might
well ECN mark packets more often than they would need to if they were only signalling congestion. One
could say this ‘faked’ the existence of congestion in order to raise the price. But, if a market is generally
competitive, one cannot really argue that the originator of a price signal shouldn’t be allowed to set the
price as they see ﬁt. A high price for scarce but popular connectivity encourages competitors to invest in
alternative routes, which is all part of the competitive process that drives the price downwards towards
the marginal cost of capacity, below which no competitor wants to go—at least not for sustained periods.
One motivation for the contract & balancing mechanism mentioned earlier [AKS06] is to prevent
networks proﬁteering from congestion marking once they have signed up their customers. The opera-
tor’s total revenue is ﬁxed at the initial contract stage, because the balancing charges must all sum to
zero. However, no mechanism is proposed (and none seems viable) for customers to check whether the
operator has indeed set all the balancing charges so they sum to zero as promised.
It would be possible for strategising networks to attempt the ‘Predation Game’ [BFB06] where they
route trafﬁc onto paths heavily used by competitors to increase their price disproportionately. However,
this game assumes a convenient network topology for the attacker, so that the ‘predatee’ network cannot
itself react to the high price and move its trafﬁc to other paths— indeed it may both reduce its own price
and counter-attack against the predating network, reﬂecting the original strategy.
In general, if congestion signalling is widely used to align user and network incentives, one would
expect trafﬁc to continually shift [KV05], continually aiming to converge towards equal congestion at
all links [WHBB08]. As soon as any one network attempted the predation game, end-points and other
networks would shift trafﬁc around to continue to try to converge towards equalised congestion.
Thus, routing is the foundation of competition in networks. And routing based on packet marking
information would tend to create a highly competitive market. Indeed, by revealing the price from
any point in the network interior to a destination, re-ECN could oil the wheels of competition further.
However, routing needs to see the cost of all paths, while re-ECN doesn’t reveal a price unless a path
carries trafﬁc. Nonetheless it would potentially be possible for the local routing process to ‘ﬁll in’
the cost of jumps from paths where ﬂowing data would reveal the downstream congestion cost to all the
otherpointswithout dataﬂowingtothatpreﬁx (described inmoredetailin anearlytechnicalreporton re-
feedback [BCSJ04]). By adding up measured congestion at each link along the jumps, the routing system
could gradually ﬁnd lower cost paths than those currently offered by the routing system. However, no
detailed research on this topic has been attempted, and further discussion on using re-ECN to offer new
lower cost routes is outside the scope of the present dissertation.
Although competition is generally intensiﬁed through congestion-informed routing, there is one
case of particular concern; the termination monopoly, discussed below.
Termination Monopoly
The term ‘termination monopoly’ originated in telephony markets. Most individuals only have one
telephony provider at a time. Once an individual has chosen their access provider, the only route to that
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to that individual is set by the terminating access provider, it has what is termed a termination monopoly.
This charge by the monopolist may not be separately visible to the party paying for the call; it may
only be visible as an internal charge on the interconnection market. But overall, retail prices will increase
to cover the monopolist’s internal charge.
The re-ECN framework is vulnerable to exploitation by termination monopolies. Re-ECN deliber-
ately uses a ‘sender-pays’ model, to avoid ‘denial of funds’ attacks against receivers. This is similar to
the ‘originator-pays’ model common in telephony, but at the packet rather than the call level. Once a
receiver has chosen its Internet access provider, senders have to route packets through that ISP to reach
the receiver; the ISP has a termination monopoly. If the monopolist ISP increases packet marking, the
sender has no choice but to consume more tokens if it wants to communicate with that receiver.
We argue that the termination monopoly problem should not be solved by re-ECN per se, but by
adding an end-to-end receiver-pays model over re-ECN—at a higher layer. Below, we outline multiple
reasons why a mix of sender-pays and receiver-pays is necessary and desirable, including to solve the
termination monopoly problem. But we argue that it could be dangerous to add a ‘receiver-pays’ model
at the packet network layer.
Termination monopolies are a consequence of two factors, each of which will be dealt with sepa-
rately below:
• The tendency for network access to be a natural monopoly;
• The economic externality of the receiver’s choice on the sender in a two-sided market.
Natural Monopoly of Network Access. Simple geography works against competition for physical net-
work access to a dispersed set of customers. Consumers can get little beneﬁt from a second competing
access provider. Competition may bring down monopoly prices, but the base-cost per customer increases
when two (or more) physical networks cover an area—each network has to cover the same geographical
area, but for a sparser set of customers [Com02]. This argument applies even for competing technologies,
e.g. cellular wireless and copper access.
Because access network monopoly has a natural cause, remedies usually need to be regulatory. In
some jurisdictions, the regulator simply sets retail price caps. A successful regulatory strategy used in
the UK residential market is for the incumbent network operator to be forced to lease its lines to compet-
ing retailers at a regulated price (termed local loop unbundling). Typically, conditions are also placed on
the time and effort required for a customer to change providers (termed ‘switching costs’). Thus, local
loop unbundling creates largely unregulated retail competition by creating regulated wholesale competi-
tion [DR04].
Internet access is a logical layer on top of physical network access. If physical access is monop-
olistic, the monopolist can use its advantage to dominate in the Internet access market as well. But if
physical access is properly regulated, Internet access is not a natural monopoly in its own right. As long
as there are not other lock-in factors (like non-portability of network addresses) it is relatively straight-
forward for multiple Internet access providers to compete to provide service through one single physical
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Although not common (yet), it is possible for a customer to multi-home Internet access over a
single-homed physical access. At the Internet layer this completely removes any cost and effort barrier
to switching providers. Multiple providers would be accessible simultaneously, so switching providers
can be achieved on a per-packet basis. This could be achieved by a transport protocol in the end-point
that could use multiple interfaces simultaneously [WHBB08]. Rather than each provider selling a ﬁxed
portion of the access capacity and losing the beneﬁts of multiplexing, all providers could offer the whole
of the available bandwidth. Then the customer could use any of the providers to access the Internet
(in either direction), only noticing any difference in how packets are routed and in available capacity
beyond the access link. Effectively, the multi-provider Internet resource pool could start at the home
access router [JBM08].
Two-Sided Market.Even if the receiver is multi-homed, this alone doesn’t solve the termination
monopoly problem. The problem is a consequence of communications markets being naturally two-
sided [FW06]. In a two-sided market a platform sells a product to two types of customer. Customers of
one type (e.g. senders) only get any value from the product if they can use it to access the other type (e.g.
receivers).
The re-ECN requirement to support ‘sender-pays’ as a default does not stem from a commercial
requirement, it stems from a technology constraint. Re-ECN is designed to ensure that the party directly
causing a cost can be held accountable.8 In a packet network, the sender directly causes the costs—the
receiver may ask the sender to cause the costs, but ultimately the sender can choose whether to or not.
It is necessary to make ‘sender-pays’ the default model for usage at the packet internetworking
layer. Otherwise, any charge to the receiver opens it to having to pay for unsolicited packets, while the
senders bears none of the cost [Bri99b].
Nonetheless, commerciallyitisdesirableandnecessarytosupportamixofsender-paysandreceiver
pays. Most transmissions are not unsolicited, and therefore both parties accrue some value from them. It
can often happen that the sum of the utilities of both sender and receiver is greater than the marginal cost
of a transmission, but neither alone are greater than this cost. Therefore if the sender, say, has to bear
all the cost, it will choose not to communicate on many occasions when it would have otherwise—if the
cost had been shared [Bri99b].
This problem can largely be solved by covering usage costs with a subscription, rather than per-
transaction charges [Arm06]. There is a subtle distinction between an unlimited-use subscription and
an allowance or quota. An unlimited use subscription solves the two-sided market problem but opens
up a new free-riding problem. A quota (as used by our congestion policer in §11) prevents free-riding
but doesn’t solve the two-sided market problem, because one party bears the cost of each transaction.9
Therefore, we still need a receiver-pays model.
We will now explain why support for ‘receiver pays’ can solve the termination monopoly problem
8The abominable term ‘cost-causation’ is used in the telephony interconnection literature, where the call originator is the
analogue of the packet sender.
9However, psychologically, a bulk quota can tend to merge the gains and losses from individual transactions in different
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too. When a receiver chooses its access provider or providers, its choice represents an economic ex-
ternality for senders who will have to pay to communicate with the receiver. Senders not receivers can
experience higher costs as a side-effect of the receiver’s choice. The receiver has no direct incentive to
choose a provider that minimises costs to senders.
Certainly, if the terminating ISP introduces higher packet marking, the sender’s congestion control
will tend to respond by reducing its rate. This seems to give receivers an incentive to choose an ISP
with lower downstream marking—a quality rather than price incentive. But the receiver can compensate
for this quality degradation by downloading in parallel from multiple senders (known as a swarming
download). If many receivers do this, marking will increase in the terminating network further still.
But until the marking represents real congestion (i.e. drop) receivers can always improve quality while
senders have to pay for it.
Therefore the only sure way to give a receiver the incentive to choose an access ISP that doesn’t
inﬂate its marking is to make it possible for a sender to ask the receiver to pay for (or at least contribute
to) the cost of a download. To avoid vulnerability to denial of funds attacks, it should be possible to
arrange ‘receiver-pays’ for a whole ﬂow, but it would rarely be appropriate for a single packet ﬂow,
except where trust prevails. That is why we argue it is only appropriate to arrange ‘receiver-pays’ at a
higher layer than the packet network, and for ‘sender-pays’ to otherwise be the default.
Arranging for the receiver to be accountable for the congestion markings on packets within a par-
ticular session is an interesting question, and there are a number of ways it might be done, but they are
out of scope of this dissertation. Here we only need to know that it is not appropriate to solve the termi-
nation monopoly problem in the network layer re-ECN protocol, and that it should be possible to solve
this important problem at higher layers.
Biased Congestion Marking
So far we have assumed that network AQM algorithms do not discriminate between packets when mark-
ing the presence of congestion. But we should consider whether adding price semantics to different
markings gives a network any incentive to mark some re-ECN packet types more than others. We are
solely concerned here about whether a network would want to discriminate how it spreads a total amount
of bytes of marks that it has already decided to apply. Given a network can chose the overall amount
of marked bytes at each link, there is no reason why it would want to mark more or less than this over-
all. Therefore below we consider whether there is any motivation to ECN mark packets arriving with
particular re-ECN codepoints more or less than others.
Marking a Positive or Neutral packet decrements the worth of either by one (to Cancelled or Nega-
tive respectively). So byte-for-byte there cannot be any reason to mark one more than another. Anyway,
there is an incentive not to mark them with different probabilities, because the downstream congestion
metering formula of Eqn (8.6) takes the maximum of the two marking fractions if they differ.
Congestion marking either Negative or Cancelled packets has no effect, because they are already
marked. One might therefore imagine that a network would prefer to mark other packets. Alternatively,
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packets that were already marked. In fact neither view is correct.
A packet that is already marked on arrival at a link in network NB, may either have been marked
by an upstream network or by an upstream resource within NB. If the packet stream in question entered
NB from NA at the upstream border with NA, previously marked upstream congestion costs should have
been taken into account using the precise downstream congestion formula (8.6) from §8.2.7.10 Similarly,
at the next downstream border, say into network NC, this precise formula will also be used.
These precise formulae inﬂate downstream congestion allowing for the combinatorial probability
that previously marked packets cannot be marked again. Therefore, if a link wants to add a certain
amount of bytes of marking, its simplest strategy is to add that amount of marking to packets of all four
markings discussed so far with the same probability as each other. This will result in less bytes of added
marking. But the border formulae will inﬂate their meter readings so that the outcome results in the
required amount of marked bytes being considered to have been added.
There is no incentive to treat Negative and Cancelled packets with anything other than the same
probability, because neither marking has any affect anyway.
Marking a Cautious packet decrements its worth by two, rather than one (because a Cautious mark-
ing is worth +1 and when marked it becomes a Negative packet worth -1). If a network just marks all
packets with equal probability, the greater the proportion of Cautious packets in the trafﬁc mix, the more
the network will overstate its marking relative to the amount it intended. On these grounds, a network
might wish to bias packet marking away from Cautious packets.
The proportion of bytes marked Cautious on the Internet is likely to be low, because the large
majority of bytes has always resided in large ﬂows [Wis07], which should only have a few Cautious
packets at the start. Therefore a network may not consider it important to worry unduly about reduced
marking of Cautious packets, which would probably be complex to implement.
Marking Cautious packets has a higher chance of delaying a new ﬂow from starting than marking
other packet types. In times of low congestion a network would not want to disproportionately mark
packets that might bring in new trafﬁc. In times of high congestion, the network might consider marking
Cautious packets a useful strategy that afforded some degree of ﬂow admission control.
Discriminatory marking of Cautious packets is deferred for further research. As far as can be
brieﬂy ascertained, it does not seem to cause any particular harm to mark Cautious packets with the
same probability as other packets.
Of course, there are pre-existing incentives to bias congestion marking against packets in more
valuable ﬂows—simple price discrimination. Although this is an interesting subject, the introduction of
re-ECN doesn’t change the incentives, therefore such bias is out of scope of this dissertation. Nonethe-
less, the availability of transparent congestion markings should allow customers to more easily test which
particular operators are biasing congestion marking against certain types of trafﬁc.
10This also applies if the upstream border is with an end-customer—we recommended congestion policers should also use the
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12.1.3 Ends Against Ends
SYN and Initial Packet Attacks
Public servers can be high proﬁle targets, particularly when the information they hold is in high demand
(e.g. during ﬂash crowds). At such times it takes minimal extra effort for an attack to push a server into
overload and causes maximum loss in value to the victim service and its clients.
Public servers (or stateful middleboxes protecting them) that intentionally listen for connection
attempts from any address (an ‘unbound’ LISTEN) cannot discriminate between initial packets of le-
gitimate ﬂows and initial packets that they will later discover were unwanted. Both necessarily contain
unfamiliar source addresses so they cannot know whether the source address in the request might be
spoofed or whether the source intends to continue the connection attempt. At least they cannot know
without responding to the request and checking for a valid response. Initial packet attacks can have either
or both of two intended effects:
• they can exhaust connection setup memory on a server (or on a stateful middlebox);
• and they can exhaust link bandwidth (either of a server’s interface or further into the network).
§12.1.1 outlined how re-ECN considerably raises the bar against bandwidth exhaustion attacks. The
present section discusses how re-ECN is also intended to help mitigate memory exhaustion attacks.
With intimate knowledge of the transport semantics, it is sometimes possible to prevent ﬂow initia-
tion packets consuming memory on the server by turning round the connection state into a well-crafted
response, e.g. using SYN cookies in TCP or similar approaches in more modern transport protocols like
SCTP or the HIP base exchange [Edd07]. It would be useful to be able to ofﬂoad this initial connec-
tion validation to middleboxes, but we want to avoid this resulting in middleboxes that never allow new
transport protocols to evolve.
Deciding whether a communication is unwanted is inherently a multi-layer process. For instance,
an e-commerce site might consider sessions as unwanted if they seem not to be heading towards a
sale [CP98]. Nonetheless, each layer should detect and reject any activity that does not meet the basic
requirements of communication at that layer. And it should contain any generic hooks that will help the
next layer up expedite such a decision.
The introduction of the Cautious marking into re-ECN has been overloaded with more than just
network layer semantics in order to help higher layers—but taking care not to do anything that is not
generic for all higher layers.
To a server, any packet without the Cautious marking means, “If your storage resources are stressed,
and if you have no matching ﬂow state, this packet can be discarded, whether or not it claims at the higher
layer that it is the start of a ﬂow.” Then a stressed server can concentrate on those initial packets that
show they were willing to ‘pay their way’ to get across the internetwork. This does not imply ISPs have
to charge or account for Cautious packets. But servers that want this protection can attach to ISPs that
limit Cautious packets at their outer borders.
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a middlebox. They can either turn round initial packets on behalf of servers, or they can forward on valid
initial packets to the server. The architecture supports chains of middleboxes, so that there is no problem
if independent deployments place more than one middlebox on a path. Middleboxes can protect their
own memory in the same way that re-ECN is designed to protect a server’s memory resource.
The various elements that re-ECN provides to help higher layers with initial packet have been
introduced in a rather piecemeal way throughout this dissertation. Therefore, §12.2.1 entitled ‘Flow
Start Architecture Revisited’ brings all the elements together. We defer further discussion to that section.
Sufﬁce to say, the new architecture gives higher layers as much generic help as possible with packets that
might start new ﬂows. However, the IP header remains generic—as stated above, the Cautious marking
doesn’t even mean ‘ﬂow start’.
We have also deﬁned a congestion signalling channel to support this relationship between middle-
boxes and servers. It allows a middlebox to warn a server if it has not stored ﬂow-state for an initial
packet due to memory congestion (§10.1). And forwarding elements can also congestion mark initial
packets if their bandwidth is congested (§9.2). Then the server can feedback the congestion status of an
initial packet request, so that valid clients quickly know what has happened and what hasn’t happened.
State Keep-Alive Attack
This attack can be launched by an end-point against any machine that holds ﬂow-state, whether a server
or a middlebox such as the re-ECN dropper itself. It will be described as an attack against the re-ECN
dropper to be concrete.
A malicious source can try to exhaust the memory of the dropper by creating many single small
packet ﬂows, with Cautious markings. The dropper could be forced to create as much ﬂow state as could
be triggered by single packet ﬂows sent within one idle ﬂow state minimum timeout. One source with
uplink capacity C could hold open memory S = MCTi/smin, where M is the memory held per ﬂow
entry, Ti is the minimum idle ﬂow-state timeout and smin is the minimum packet size that can legally
initiate ﬂow-state.
This would be costly to the source, given it is likely to be limited by its network provider in how
much Cautious trafﬁc it can send in a certain period (for example, using the congestion policer of §11, in
which case C would be taken as the maximum rate of Cautious packets). But a source may still achieve
its malicious objectives to launch the attack for a short while without regard to its own long term welfare.
Particularly, if the attack is launched from a zombie host under the control of some other malicious party.
The maximum memory that a set of misbehaving source can cause the dropper to allocate is ulti-
mately limited by how much they can hold open, not how much they can open in the ﬁrst place. This is
a much more efﬁcient attack, because each memory entry only has to be paid for once. Having opened
some ﬂow-state with a Cautious packet, at least one packet per ﬂow-state entry per timeout period is
needed to hold the memory open (the sender need not ‘pay’ anything more for these so-called ‘keep-
alive attack packets’). Even if Cautious packets are rate limited, more and more memory can be opened
as tokens become available for further Cautious packets, as long as sufﬁcient capacity is left for all the
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it will have to consume Positive quota to hold open dropper memory as well as Cautious packets to open
new ﬂows.
Ultimately, the maximum memory that can be held open will still be that predicted by the above
formula for S; at least one packet per ﬂow per timeout period. But C should not then be taken as the
maximum rate of Cautious packets. Instead it will be the maximum line rate for Neutral keep-alive attack
packets (for a whole set of attacking sources). Beyond this point, a set of misbehaving sources would
be unable to make the dropper consume more memory; in order to cause the dropper to allocate more
memory they would simultaneously have to release the same amount.
Receiver Suppression of Feedback
For a source-destination pair that are trying to communicate, re-ECN creates an incentive for the receiver,
not just the source, to assure the integrity of the downstream congestion signal declared to the network
by the source. If the receiver suppresses congestion feedback in the hope the source will go faster,
the dropper will still detect that the source is under-declaring actual path congestion and proportionately
discardtrafﬁc. Inotherwords, downloadratedependsasmuchonhonestfeedbackashonestre-feedback.
However, the dropper’s sanction only hurts if the receiver wants the downloaded data. If, instead,
the receiver merely wants to make the sender consume its own congestion quota, or its own bandwidth
resources, it can do so by suppressing congestion feedback. This class of attacks potentially harms the
integrity of the re-ECN congestion signal, although that is likely to be a side-effect, not its intent.
The attacking receiver doesn’t gain itself from this attack, which merely moves money into the
pocket of a network operator at the expense of a remote sender. But even though the receiver doesn’t
gain, it’s attack could be motivated by a grudge against the server.11 Further, the receiver and the gaining
network might be acting in collusion or, indeed, they may actually be one and the same entity.
Before we point to solutions to this class of problems, we will argue next that the end-to-end trans-
port or application layer is the appropriate place for solutions, not the network layer.
An End-to-End Problem. Ultimate control over sending lies with the sender. If a receiver fools a server
into dedicating a large fraction of its own resources (whether bandwidth or congestion quota) to that
receiver, the server only has itself to blame. A server doesn’t have to apportion its resources according
to the congestion experienced across the network path of each connection. That is probably a sensible
strategy if the server is not the bottleneck. But otherwise, the server should consider its own congestion
as well. And there is no reason why the server cannot determine its own sharing policies.
A server might use a congestion control that always consumes a constant token rate for each con-
nection (i.e. proportionally fair ﬂow rate). Then if a receiver under-declares path congestion, the source
will go faster for that connection, but still consume tokens at the same rate per connection. But one
destination may open many connections from the same server, but make the server think they are all
different. Or one destination might open many more connections over time than others, but use different
addresses for each one. The network itself might be creating fake requests in order to swell its revenues
by triggering multiple payments for deliveries of content from the server to itself.12
11Recall by Assumption 8.1 our attack model allows end-points unbounded malice.
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If a server were concerned about such ‘Sybil’ (split identity) attacks, it has it within its power to
counter them, perhaps using end-to-end authentication to tie each connection to a real-world identity, or
some pragmatic alternative13. This is an end-to-end authentication matter that we shouldn’t try to solve
in a network layer protocol.
It has become common for many public servers to offer content to all-comers. If there are attendant
delivery costs, the server chooses to take the risk of paying for all the delivery costs even if some transfers
to some receivers don’t warrant any payment, or if some receivers overuse the service. If a server is
concerned about abuses of its generosity, it shouldn’t offer to pay for delivery to all-comers without ﬁrst
establishing the real identity of its customers. This is an end-to-end matter that is likely to be separate
from the network layer accountability that re-ECN offers.
Why Not an End-to-Middle Problem?As we have seen, a receiver that is only interested in causing
costs to a server can under-declare path congestion. The tokens the server consumes will only cover the
cost of congestion up to a point part way along the path. Networks up to this point do not suffer any
harm as they are fully recompensed for the externality of their congested transmission. Networks beyond
this point can detect there is a problem with negative ﬂows and remove the offending trafﬁc to protect
themselves against losses, albeit not instantly (see §8.2.4 on Sample-Based Downstream Congestion
Volume Inﬂation).
Therefore, it seems that the hapless server is left exposed. Networks can cover their backs, either
ensuring their costs are covered, or removing trafﬁc if they are not. But networks seem to have no
incentive to advise the server that it is paying them to transmit data partway across the Internet only for
it to be discarded in the middle.
In fact, networks do have an incentive to help servers pay them less; by helping to remove unwanted
trafﬁc. My paper on “Using Self-Interest to Prevent Malice” [Bri06] explains that a network that helps a
sender stop spending on useless data transfers gains a competitive advantage over another network that
quietly pockets the proceeds, as summarised in §12.1.1—gains from the black market aren’t worth losing
a much greater volume of white market business. Therefore networks have an incentive to use the ‘lazy’
process of tracing back negative ﬂows to their root cause, as described in §8.2.4. If this process leads a
network to accuse an innocent sender of being the root cause of attacks to certain destinations, it should
be within that sender’s power to test and black-list the offending destinations.
As we show below, it is indeed within the sender’s power to test the integrity of congestion feedback
from any destination on an end-to-end basis without any help from the network.
Proposed Solutions.The ECN nonce [SWE03] is an experimental network layer solution to this prob-
lem. The ECN ﬁeld provides the redundancy of two states to mean ‘not congestion marked but able
to understand marking’. The source can weave a nonce into a stream of packets by setting either of
these states in a pattern it stores. Then it can detect if the receiver or any network element has tried to
charges depend only on its access capacity, the network can generate fake server demand to increase the capacity the server needs
to buy.
13For example, from the author’s personal experience, Google servers under stress from a perceived DDoS attack issue
CAPTCHAs—Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart.12.1. System Attacks on Congestion Signal Integrity 198
‘unmark’ a congestion mark, or deny a drop. A congestion mark sets the ECN ﬁeld to a third codepoint.
For every acknowledgement claiming no congestion was experienced, a TCP14 receiver is asked to feed
back a one-bit sum of all the nonces seen since the last congestion event. So if anyone15 tries to unmark
a packet, or deny a drop, they have to guess which of the two ECT states the sender originally set. The
sender can then detect whenever they guess wrongly with a 50:50 chance per acknowledgement.
Due to pressure on IPv4 header space, re-ECN had to re-use the same codepoint as the ECN nonce
for one of its encoding states (Positive). Therefore both cannot be used simultaneously in the same
internetwork (for IPv4 at least). The reasoning for proposing to sacriﬁce the ECN nonce was that re-
ECN covered a much greater attack space and, as far as anyone can ascertain, the nonce has never been
implemented anyway.
However, although the attack space re-ECN covers is much larger, it is not a complete superset of
that covered by the ECN nonce. The one part of the attack space covered by the ECN nonce but not by
re-ECN is that described above—where the receiver doesn’t care about getting any data, it just wants to
cause expense to the sender (see ‘Why Not an End-to-Middle Problem?’). Although re-ECN networks
should eventually be able to trace the attack back to the sender, if the sender knows it is innocent it needs
a way to check whether the receiver is indeed the root cause of the attack, or whether it has been falsely
accused by its network provider. If such an end-to-end test were possible, the sender could obviously
use it to identify a non-compliant receiver at any time, not just in response to an accusation from the
network.
Moncaster et al [MBJ07]16 proposes such an end-to-end test. It is speciﬁc to TCP and has the
advantage that it does not require a receiver implementation to be modiﬁed in order to be found guilty.
A modiﬁed source picks a receiver to test, then occasionally randomly adds a small delay to a segment,
so it appears slightly out of order at the receiver. If a receiver reports receipt of the segment in order it
comes under suspicion, but is not proven guilty. The second phase of the test delays a packet by more
than an RTT, which can prove the receiver is lying—if it acknowledges receipt of an unsent packet.
Moncaster et al also provides a survey of this class of attacks and other end-to-end defence tech-
niques, including Savage et al’s end-to-end transport layer nonce proposal [SCWA99].
To summarise, receivers can launch some very nasty attacks on senders that threaten the integrity
of congestion signals. However, solutions to receiver suppression of end-to-end feedback should be
end-to-end, not in the network layer. Good end-to-end solutions are available that complement re-ECN
congestion signal integrity protections at the network layer. Therefore, further detailed coverage of this
issue can be ruled out of scope for the present dissertation, as it is sufﬁciently covered by the above
references.
Single Packet Reﬂection Attacks
This class of attacks is targeted at servers that are designed to automatically respond to datagram queries
with reasonably large datagram responses (e.g. DNS servers). A client can send high volumes of small
14The 1-bit nonce only works for transports like TCP that provide in-order delivery.
15Whether receiver or network
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datagram queries and cause the server greater cost by responding to each query with a larger response
datagram. To get these datagram responses through the re-ECN system it has to mark them as Cautious.
The client could spoof different source IP addresses each time.17
This attack actually exposes two separate problems.
• Services that are expected to turn round quick, small responses to queries are vulnerable to spoofed
queries. This is a problem that predated re-ECN and has many proposed solutions. This ﬁrst aspect
of the problem is therefore out of scope of this dissertation.
• Re-ECN requires ﬂows to start with a Cautious marking, the relative cost of which increases
excessively for shorter ﬂows.
So far, we have conveniently been able to dismiss this cost, tending to amortise it over a mix of
longer and shorter ﬂows. However, if large numbers of single packet ﬂows all have to use the Cautious
marking, it could make running a directory server far more expensive than would be warranted by the
actual costs of congestion even if the uncertainty of predicting congestion for single packets is added.
We have already mentioned (§6.1.2) that the worth of a Cautious marked byte need not equate to a
Positive Byte, but instead ﬁnd its own market price. This is the proper solution to this problem, but our
dropper design would have to be considerably modiﬁed as it assumes these two markings are equivalent.
The problem this issue really highlights is lack of space in a packet header to allow anything other than
a unary price for each byte in a packet.
Other work-rounds are possible, but they all move the problem around rather than solving it prop-
erly.
• One could argue that re-ECN merely exposes the cost of opening many single packet ﬂows without
knowing the state of resources on their path. A directory server often has long-lived relationships
with a set of clients. If re-ECN gave it the incentive, it may well switch to maintaining TCP
connections with these, rather than using UDP datagrams.
• A directory server serving a mix of datagram and connection clients might rate limit use of Cau-
tious markings so it would prioritise long-lived relationships when under stress.
• The directory server could mark some responses as Neutral when under stress and risk them being
dropped by a re-ECN dropper;
• A directory server might expect clients to ’pay’ from their quota to assure a response, using an
end-to-end quota transfer mechanism (see §12.1.2 on solving Termination Monopolies);
• §12.1.4 includes speculation that a proxy might aggregate short ﬂows into fewer larger ﬂows, using
its aggregated knowledge of congestion on fewer shorter paths. In turn queries to and responses
17A colleague, Adam Greenhalgh ﬁrst pointed out this issue at the 5th CRN/CFP architecture working group on a Denial-of-
Service Resistant Internet, Cambridge, UK, 21 Nov 2005. Mark Handley also pointed out an ampliﬁcation of this attack that he
had previously identiﬁed (separately from re-ECN): a client can greatly amplifying the necessary size of responses by requesting
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from directory servers could be directed via such proxies, which might reduce the need for sin-
gle packet ﬂows by aggregating together queries and responses to and from numerous directory
servers. However, for each connection with a directory server that is split by a proxy, two concate-
nated connections will generally result. Only the split connections from the proxy to the directory
can be aggregated, while the individual connections between each client and the proxy would all
still be on separate paths. Thus the cost of opening multiple connections would simply shift from
the directory server to the proxy.
Further research is therefore needed on whether re-ECN’s high relative cost to services offering single
packet responses can be mitigated. directory services.
12.1.4 Byzantine State Transitions
End-to-End Integrity Checks
The encoding of the re-ECN wire protocol [BJMS09a] has been devised so that all legal transitions
within the protocol do not change the RE ﬂag (the extra header bit used to extend the two-bit ECN ﬁeld)
once it has been set by the source. This allows an end-to-end transport to detect if any illegal transitions
have occurred in transit, by comparing the RE ﬂag sent and received.
In IPv4, the RE ﬂag is considered mutable (even though a use for it has not previously been deﬁned).
Therefore it is masked out before applying IPsec authentication, so it is not covered by end-to-end
integrity checks. In IPv6, we also arrange for the extension header used for the RE ﬂag to be considered
mutable by IPsec. We took this approach to allow proxies to change the ﬂag on behalf of the sender.
Therefore, if the source or the transport wishes to check the integrity of the RE ﬂag setting, it will
need to arrange it’s own higher layer integrity check. This would be relatively easy to do, but we have
not made any speciﬁc proposals on this. Such a proposal would either require the sender to trust the
receiver’s feedback or to arrange to include this bit in end-to-end integrity checks (§12.1.3).
It would seem that simple feedback without any cryptographic checks would typically be sufﬁcient.
In the re-ECN protocol, there are no cases where the sender relies on feedback from the receiver of a
change to the RE ﬂag (because it is not expected to change). Therefore if the source asks a receiver it
doesn’t trust to feed back the setting of the RE ﬂag it received, receivers seem to have little independent
incentive to lie—other than to falsely accuse the network of changing the ﬂag, or to collude with the
network to hide a change in the ﬂag.
The tentative ‘Covert Marking’ proposal in §11.3.1 to extend the re-ECN protocol is an exception
to the above. The policer changes the RE ﬂag on Positive packets to warn the transport that the drops
it is experiencing are probably due to policing, not congestion. A robust feedback mechanism for this
extension in the presence of an untrusted receiver is yet to be designed (see §§12.1.4 & 13.2).
Re-ECN Unexpected State Transitions
Figure 12.2 shows unexpected transitions between re-ECN protocol states. It was compiled by taking all
the possible transitions between the ﬁve re-ECN codepoints and subtracting those deﬁned for the re-ECN
wire protocol (see Fig 6.2), leaving the remainder shown in the diagram.12.1. System Attacks on Congestion Signal Integrity 201
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The horizontal (dotted) divide through the middle of the diagram separates two sets of codepoints
that are distinguished by different settings of the binary RE ﬂag. The wire protocol has been devised so
that all legal transitions within the protocol do not cross this divide. Then an end-to-end transport can
detect whether any unexpected transitions have occurred in transit (see ‘E2E Integrity Checks’ in §12.1.4
above).
It will be noted that the large majority of unexpected transitions are those that cross this divide
(shown dashed). There is no harm in the end-points making these transitions; the source would only be
fooling itself and the receiver is not relied on to report anything that would be affected by any of these
transitions (as just pointed out under ‘E2E Integrity Checks’).
The only exception to this statement is the tentatively proposed use of ‘Covert Marking’ as a sig-
nalling channel from a policer to the transport. This is also discussed under ‘E2E Integrity Checks’ in
§12.1.4 above.
There are two remaining types of unexpected transition that are less easy for the transport or the
source alone to detect, as they do not cross the horizontal divide:
‘Wiping’, ‘Double Wiping’ or ‘False Start’: Wiping or Double wiping reverses congestion marking.
§12.1.3 on ‘Receiver Suppression of Feedback’ discusses this issue and points to end-to-end solu-
tions, arguing this should not be treated as a network-layer problem. Networks could theoretically
reverse congestion markings, but they have no incentive. A marking inserted by a forwarding el-
ement earlier in the path can either have been added by the local network (NB) or an upstream
network (say NA). The local network NB has no incentive to remove its own markings, and it
has no incentive to remove markings already added by an upstream network such as (NA. If NB
removes Negative markings the feedback loop reduces Positive markings, making the whole effect
equivalent to NB giving money to its upstream network NA. Regarding ‘False Start’, a network
has no incentive to revert a Neutral packet to Cautious either (again, equivalent to paying money
upstream).
The anomaly detection mechanisms introduced in §8.2.8 are designed to protect against accidental
wiping of markings due to misconﬁguration or other human error.
‘Cautious Marking’: This is the one transition a network could do that doesn’t change the RE ﬂag, but
isn’t covered by re-ECN’s wider incentive framework.18 It involves changing a Cautious marking
to Neutral, without actually congestion marking the packet (i.e. the protocol doesn’t deﬁne a Neu-
tral packet as a congestion mark, even though the end-points could work out between them that it
used to be a Cautious packet). We cannot see any motive for a network to make this transition, but
if a well-motivated attack is identiﬁed, we will have to ﬁnd a way to protect against it. If a receiver
made this transition it would have no effect (because no-one relies on the receiver telling them it
has received a Cautious mark).
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Re-ECN Unexpected State Initialisation
Figure 12.3 shows initial packet markings that a re-ECN source would not be expected to set if it com-
plied with the protocol. It was compiled by taking all the ﬁve possible initialisations of re-ECN code-
points and subtracting those deﬁned as valid for the re-ECN wire protocol (see Fig 6.2), leaving the
remainder shown in the diagram.
This section is merely included to show that an exhaustive check has been made of all possible
state transitions. Both the resulting unexpected state transitions have already been covered in §12.1.1 on
attacks using Negative and Cancelled packets.
Re-ECN Unexpected State Removal
Unexpected removal of the state of a wire protocol is merely a convoluted way of saying ’packet drop’.
Re-ECN has been designed to be robust to drop, by carrying all numeric values as unary encodings (jus-
tiﬁed in §6.1.1). Treatment of drop as implicit congestion signals is discussed in §7.4.4 on ‘Congestive
Loss’.
Re-ECN Proxy State Transitions
Figure 12.4 shows a subset of the unexpected state transitions of Fig 12.2 that would probably be nec-
essary for a proxy to act on behalf of a re-ECN source. The transitions shown are speculative, given
deﬁnition of a re-ECN proxy is for future study. This ﬁgure is merely included for completeness.
The transition denoted ‘Regular Aggregation’ is worthy of note. The re-ECN wire protocol was
speculatively designed so that a proxy could silently intercept re-ECN ﬂows and aggregate them into
fewer larger ﬂows, given its position closer to the middle of the Internet. The thinking was to provide
the incentives to keep the Internet’s congestion accountability mechanisms safe and efﬁcient even if the
trafﬁc mix became dominated by short ﬂows, including single packet ﬂows (a possible prerequisite for
the vision of ubiquitous computing [Wei91]). Otherwise such a trafﬁc mix would leave the Internet
without the beneﬁt of path feedback for most of its trafﬁc. There would be a strong incentive to operate
such proxies if the proxy could absorb the excess value of all the Cautious packets initiating the small
ﬂows, because it would need less Cautious packets for the aggregate it could create from all the tiny
ﬂows. However this is all for further study because the receiver side of this proxy would require a
different commercial arrangement with the network from that we have described so far for a regular
receiver (zero income even from positive ﬂows).
Tunnelling Re-ECN Codepoints
Tunnelling in the context of the re-ECN protocol is deﬁned in the protocol speciﬁcation [BJMS09a]. The
proposed extended ECN (EECN) ﬁeld in the re-ECN wire protocol is deliberately divisible into the ECN
ﬁeld for forwarding elements to alter, and the RE ﬂag that they do not touch.
Because congestion is exhaustion of a physical resource, if the transport or higher layers are to
deal with congestion, congestion notiﬁcation must propagate upwards; from the physical layer to the
transport layer. The transport layer can directly detect loss of a packet (or frame) by a lower layer.
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incipient congestion, this marking has to be explicitly copied up the layers at every header decapsulation.
So, at each decapsulation of an outer (lower layer) header a congestion marking has to be arranged
to propagate into the forwarded (upper layer) header. It must continue upwards until it reaches the
destination transport. Then typically the destination feeds this congestion notiﬁcation back to the source
transport.
As IP packets traverse the internetwork, they can be tunnelled within outer IP headers, or the head-
ers of any other protocol including, of course, logical link protocols. If any of these outer protocol
headers support explicit congestion marking, it is necessary to arrange similar propagation of congestion
notiﬁcation up the layers. For instance, ECN and its propagation up the layers has recently been speci-
ﬁed for MPLS [DBT08]19, and forward explicit congestion notiﬁcation is being considered for Ethernet
protocols.
It is not necessary to propagate the RE ﬂag down the layers and back up again, as it should not
change end-to-end. However, it must be visible whenever a packet crosses a trust boundary, so that
downstream congestion can be correctly metered if required. It is assumed that IP headers will generally
be visible at trust boundaries, given IP is intended as the internetworking protocol. Therefore, re-ECN
border mechanisms should all work correctly as long as the RE ﬂag is copied on encapsulation by another
IP header. Header copying is speciﬁed in the re-ECN protocol spec. [BJMS09a], but it is typically the
default behaviour for IP tunnel encapsulators anyway.
However, during standardisation of the ECN protocol in IP, an exception to header copying was
speciﬁed for tunnel encapsulators. The reason was a perceived security requirement that turned out
later not to be a concern. IPsec tunnelling has since been re-speciﬁed to mandate header copying. The
IETF Transport Area is currently working on a draft to make header copying the default for all IP in IP
tunnelling [Bri09]. Without this change, tunnels might reveal incorrect ECN values to re-ECN border
mechanisms. This draft (written by the present author) explains all the issues with ECN tunnelling.
An analysis of possible opportunities for tunnelling to be used to cheat the re-ECN protocol is
providedin[Bri08b, §6]. Thebroadconclusionisthattherearenonewthreatsaslongastunnelendpoints
disappearing or emerging in the middle of networks are treated as potential border gateways, which is
already standard security practice.
12.2 Re-ECN Protocol Reconsolidated
12.2.1 Re-Architecting Flow Start
This section brings together various parts of the new ﬂow-start architecture that have been hinted at in
a piecemeal way throughout this dissertation. It complements the initial deﬁnition of the re-ECN wire
protocol in §6.1.2.
The initial packet of a ﬂow is, by deﬁnition, a ﬂow-related concept that doesn’t seem to belong
in the internetwork layer of the current Internet architecture. However, we have to revisit the current
architecture because it gives the providers of network resources no role in mediating the conﬂicting
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resourcedemandsofhosts. Theminimumresourcesharingfunctionwehavebeenabletomusterrequires
per-ﬂow checking of congestion signal integrity at the network layer (see §7.3). Therefore, although we
intend to prove that the resource sharing function can be transport oblivious (§12.3.1), we believe it
cannot be ﬂow-oblivious. This is a similar position to the recent proposal that end-point identiﬁers
should be considered as a sub-layer between the network layer and the transport layer (an end-point ID
sub-layer [FI08]20).
Having added per ﬂow checks to the network layer, we also had to add the minimum necessary
support at the network layer to protect this per-ﬂow function against cheating. To this end, we provided
the Cautious marking that a source MUST use on the ﬁrst packet of a ﬂow if it intends to use other
re-ECN codepoints. It MAY also mark some subsequent packets as Cautious. For re-ECN, the Cautious
marking has the semantic “Each byte of this packet can be considered as a credit, which may be counted
towards an account identiﬁed by the packet’s ﬂow ID.”
But we also deliberately designed the Cautious marking so that it could be used as a transport-
independent facility to ﬂag that the packet may contain a request to set-up ﬂow state. A network-layer
state set-up bit has been argued for independently by Handley & Greenhalgh [HG04], who in turn ac-
knowledged Clark as the originator of the idea.
Architecturally, we place the Cautious marking in the IP header because it provides a transport-
independent way for servers and middleboxes to handle the resource congestion aspect of ﬂow state, as
part of the resource congestion signalling function of the IP header21.
In contrast to the Handley proposal, the ﬂow-start meaning of the Cautious marking is idempotent;
a source can send more than one Cautious packet with the same ﬂow ID to signify the start of a ﬂow, and
the ﬁrst to be received implies a ﬂow start, while any others have no extra effect22. This allows sources
to insure against loss of Cautious packets and it allows the Cautious marking to be overloaded with two
meanings: i) idempotent ﬂow start and ii) re-ECN credit (which is additive not idempotent).
Also, rather than using a whole bit, the Cautious marking uses just one codepoint of the 3-bit
extended ECN ﬁeld (3/8 of a bit), given none of the other codepoints would be relevant on the ﬁrst
packet of a ﬂow.
Because we broadly agree with the motivations for a ﬂow-start ﬂag given in the Handley proposal,
they are listed below.23 Annotation in square brackets highlights where we differ slightly:
• a transport independent way for servers or stateful middleboxes to identify packets needing special
validation;
• a [stressed] server or middlebox receiving a connection set-up request with this ﬂag not set would
[could] simply discard the packet;
20However, agreeing to this sub-layer doesn’t imply agreeing to the ﬂow-regulation sub-layer idea in the same proposal!
21We avoid the term ‘network layer header’, given we believe there are generic aspects of the transport layer that are also best
carried in the IP header [Day07], such as resource congestion.
22If a node times out its ﬂow state, then receives another Cautious packet with the same ﬂow ID, the new Cautious packet will,
of course, have an extra effect; the node will consider a new ﬂow has started.
23One of their motivations is omitted completely, being speciﬁc to another proposal in their paper—separation of client and
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• packets without this ﬂag set can [may] be discarded by [stressed] servers or stateful middleboxes
if no matching ﬂow state is found;
• Sites [networks] might rate-limit state-setup packets sent by some clients at their outgoing [incom-
ing] edge;
• a way for stateful middleboxes (e.g. ﬁrewalls) to permit evolution of network protocols without
always needing to know the protocol semantics, and to do some degree of transport-independent
validation of encrypted trafﬁc.
We prefer not to automatically discard non-Cautious packets with no matching ﬂow state or non-
Cautious ﬂow start requests. Instead a middlebox or server MAY discard them before Cautious requests,
particularly if its resources are under stress. This allows middleboxes to pick up mid-ﬂow following
a reroute. It also entertains the possibility that middleboxes could explicitly mark and forward rather
than discard ﬂow-start requests (ﬂow admission control—see §7.3.3). We believe this would be a more
principled way to explicitly signal rejection of a ﬂow-start packet. The alternatives are either i) to drop
the packet which is confusable with all the other reasons for dropping a packet or ii) to bounce the request
with a rejection packet from the middle of the network, which may not have access to or understand the
end-to-end transport (the same justiﬁcations as given already in §6.1.1). Instead, we send unambiguous
explicit feedback via the receiver, which will understand the origin address of the transport.
The Cautious marking does not replace the SYN ﬂag for TCP ﬂows, but it complements it. The
SYN ﬂag has a stronger meaning of ﬂow re-start; “Every time you receive a SYN, discard all your
previous ﬂow state and start a new TCP ﬂow using the enclosed initial sequence number.” In contrast,
any packet without the Cautious marking means, “If your storage resources are stressed, if you have no
matching ﬂow state, this packet can be discarded, whether or not it claims at the higher layer that it is
the start of a ﬂow.”
12.2.2 Forward Compatibility
It is important to ensure that a protocol contains some space for adding things that become important in
the future.
re-ECN Wire Protocol.In IPv6, the re-ECN wire protocol [BJMS09a] uses one bit of a proposed IPv6
extension header, with 127b reserved for other uses (we have some in mind already). However, in the
IPv4 header we have more of a space problem. Extending the ECN ﬁeld uses up the very last unused bit
in the IPv4 header.
Re-ECN uses ﬁve of the eight possible states of this proposed three bit extended ECN ﬁeld. The
original ECN wire protocol uses three states, but we have ensured re-ECN usage overloads two. A
further state indicates a non-ECN-capable packet. Thus one 3-bit codepoint is left ‘currently unused’ or
‘CU’: 10-1, where the notation XX-Y means an ECN ﬁeld of XX and an RE ﬂag of Y.
One codepoint isn’t much, but it’s not a bad trade for the last bit, given all the re-ECN achieves.
But, if the Internet community decides to go ahead with re-ECN, there is another forward compatibility
issue with this CU codepoint: what should equipment do if a packet arrives with a CU codepoint?12.2. Re-ECN Protocol Reconsolidated 207
• It would be wrong to advise that such packets should be dropped. That would create a huge
bootstrap problem for any future use of the codepoint.
• It would be wrong to say nothing. That would leave unnecessary uncertainty for any future use
of the codepoint. It would also subtly imply that any such packets might present a security risk,
which would probably lead to security equipment dropping them anyway.
• A better approach is to specify that, in the interim until it is deﬁned, CU should be treated the same
as another codepoint. But which one? Candidates are:
Not-ECT (00-0) We can reject Not-ECT on the assumption that any future use would more
likely build on the latest protocol features than the oldest, so it would be unlikely to want
congested legacy forwarding equipment to drop rather than mark CU
Legacy ECN (10-0) If re-ECN is deployed, it is likely that network operators will rate limit
non-re-ECN packets (otherwise they would represent a loophole to avoid re-ECN policing).
Therefore, CU packets would probably get rate-limited if they were given the same semantics
as legacy ECN packets.
Neutral re-ECN (01-1) Therefore, in the absence of any better suggestion, we recommend that
equipment SHOULD treat CU packets as if they were re-ECN packets marked Neutral. Net-
work equipment MAY log the presence of CU packets. But it SHOULD NOT treat them as
any more of a security risk than a Neutral packet.
Future Role of Legacy ECN. If re-ECN is adopted, there will be no future role for the ECT(0) codepoint
currently used by ECN, but not by re-ECN. Today only a tiny proportion of packets carry this codepoint,
due presumably to the vanishingly small chance of one of a small proportion of ECN clients talking with
one of the small (but larger) proportion of ECN servers. If this situation remains, it may be decided that
those sources that upgraded to ECN early can be encouraged to upgrade to re-ECN too. Then the ECT(0)
codepoint could be made available for some other use in the future, along with the CU codepoint (10-0
& 10-1 respectively).
Flow IDs. The re-ECN dropper effectively recognises ﬂow IDs as a sub-layer of the internetwork layer.
However, the Internet architecture should allow novel end-to-end protocols to make-up their own ﬂow
ID syntax and semantics. We have had to recommend (§7.1) that the dropper treats any unrecognisable
ﬂow IDs with the bulk of misbehaving ﬂows. This is at least better than recommending such packets
should be dropped, but it is not much better. This effectively raises a barrier against any future end-to-end
transport protocol using a new protocol identifer at the IP layer.
Even if re-ECN dropper can be updated to understand a new protocol identiﬁer (e.g. a new protocol
ID for DCCP has recently been standardised), the ﬂow-ID uniqueness requirement of the dropper also
places a requirement that packets of the same inter-process ﬂow should all contain the same ID. For
instance, if some novel security protocol wished to obfuscate the fact that a series of packets all belong
to the same ﬂow, it would not be able to use a pseudorandom sequence as a ﬂow ID, without sharing the
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We can think of no way round these issues, but we felt they should at least be stated.
12.3 Re-ECN System Properties
12.3.1 Transport Oblivious Congestion Signal Integrity
When constraints on the re-ECN dropper were listed (§7.2), the two paraphrased here appeared to be
irreconcilably in tension:
Sufﬁcient Sanction: The dropper MUST introduce sufﬁcient loss in goodput so that sources cannot
play off losses at the egress dropper against higher allowed throughput at the ingress policer;
Transport Oblivious: It MUST NOT be designed around one particular rate response. An important
goal is to give ingress networks the freedom to allow different rate responses and different resource
sharing regimes.
There is another way of stating the same problem. It seems one can only know whether an individual
ﬁndsitworthwhiletoplayoffdropsanctionsagainstthepolicer, ifoneknowshowstronglytheindividual
values increasing bandwidth. From Mo & Walrand’s work [MW00]24, we know that the curvature of an
individual’s marginal utility for bandwidth gives the individual a direct incentive to use a transport with
a particular rate response to congestion. Therefore it seems the question of whether dropper sanctions
are sufﬁcient may not be oblivious to the transport.
To claim re-ECN can be transport oblivious, we need to establish whether the re-ECN system
creates a one-way barrier against individuals perverting the integrity of congestion signals, however
much the individual values bit-rate, and however strongly their valuation grows with increasing bit-rate.
To prove the re-ECN incentive framework can be transport oblivious, we use the following model and
assumptions.
We use the bulk congestion policer of §11 as a canonical example of a transport oblivious policer.
When we described it, we justiﬁed its inclusion in this dissertation by saying “We will need to establish
whether re-ECN can assure the integrity of congestion signals even when they are used.” The partic-
ular policer design we proposed allows customers freedom to choose whatever short-term response to
congestion they wish, except they know that they are held accountable for the congestion they cause,
because their long-term congestion bit-rate is limited.
As previously deﬁned, the recent fractions of Positive and Negative re-ECN marked bytes are z
and ui at node index i along the network path (as the dropper does not drop Positive packets, z remains
unchanged along the path). Index i = 1 on arrival at the ingress policer, i = n on arrival at the egress
dropper and i = N on departure for delivery to the destination. To simplify matters, but without loss
of generality, we will assume that u1 = 0 at the ingress policer, that is, there is no congestion marking
within the source’s own network.
24The weight and utility curvature in Mo & Walrand’s model parameterise a similar space to Bansal & Balakrishnan’s increase
and decrease parameters published the following year in their set of Binomial Congestion Control Algorithms [BB01]. We use Mo
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It is reasonably assumed that the user’s utility for bit-rate x satiates, therefore the user’s utility
function for delivered bit-rate U(xN) is assumed concave over the operating region of the network (see
later for further justiﬁcation). The notation Υ(x) is used for the user’s net utility (utility of delivered
bit-rate xN minus the cost of the quota used by bit-rate x1 at the ingress policer). In our distributed
setting, the source optimises the net utility of its delivered bit-rate Υ(xN) = U(xN) − zx1 as its primal
part of the wider system optimisation [KMT98].
Theorem 12.2. A customer with concave utility for the delivered bit-rate xN of an end-to-end ﬂow and
free choice to declare expected downstream congestion z has no incentive to misrepresent z relative to
path congestion un if the network makes the user accountable for cost zx1 at the ingress and discards
non-Positive packets from arriving bit-rate xn(= x1) with probability πd = 1 − z/un (z < un) at the
egress.
Proof. In the setting of Kelly’s optimisation, there is no dropper and the customer pays for the bytes
actually congestion marked after having traversed the network. A customer with utility U(xn) uses a
rate controller that chooses optimal bit-rate x∗
n to maximise net utility Υ(xn) = U(xn) − unxn, which
occurs where
U0(x∗
n) = un. (12.6)
In the setting of the re-ECN framework, the customer’s transport can choose to mark any fraction z of
sent bit-rate x1 and only use up quota zx1. We will consider two cases: z ≤ un and z > un.25
Understateddownstream congestion z ≤ un. In this case the dropper will reduce the bit-rate delivered
to
xN =
z
un
x1. (12.7)
The price p of delivered bit-rate that a re-ECN sender effectively experiences is the quota used divided
by the delivered bit-rate:
p =
zx1
xN
= un. (12.8)
Therefore, when a re-ECN customer uses up quota zx1, it is equivalent to being charged unxN. In
turn, when this customer optimises net utility Υ(xN) = U(xN) − zx1 it is equivalent to optimising
Υ(xN) = U(xN) − unxN, which is identical to Kelly’s optimisation. Therefore the customer’s rate
controller will choose an identical optimal bit-rate x∗
N such that
U0(x∗
N) = un. (12.9)
It seems as if net utility is unaffected and the chosen optimal delivered bit-rate is unaffected whether
z < un or z = un. However, if z < un, to compensate for expected discards at the dropper the sender
25z = un is strictly a third case, but it acts as a limit to either case, so for brevity we treat it within the ﬁrst case.12.3. Re-ECN System Properties 210
has to send faster (which it can afford to do because it understates path congestion). While if z = u
the dropper discards nothing. The two are clearly not equivalent in practice, because the sender cannot
know in advance which data the dropper will drop. Therefore there will always be more delay introduced
while lost data is repaired, or more overhead will be necessary to send forward error correction (FEC)
conservatively (see a similar argument in §12.1.1).
Overstateddownstream congestion z > un. If the customer chooses to use more quota than is necessary
to ensure trafﬁc traverses the dropper without loss, nothing is gained and more quota is lost.
Therefore, through testing both cases we have proved that the customer’s best strategy is always to
choose z = un, rather than choosing a z that misrepresents un. This means the re-ECN framework can
be oblivious to the transport while still assuring downstream congestion signal integrity—on condition
that the customer’s utility function is concave.
Examples over a range of concave utility functions. We now give some examples to show that it
is advantageous to maintain downstream congestion signal integrity for a whole range of transports—
transports that would be chosen by users with a whole range of concave utility functions.
Functions of utility against delivered bit-rate xN represent human judgements so they can only be
determined empirically and they will not follow any simple mathematical form. However, after Mo
& Walrand [MW00], we can parameterise a set of utility functions that might approximate different
people’s utility, while conﬁning ourselves to a set of functions that are continuously differentiable for
positive bit-rate x:
U(xN) =

 
 
w
αx
(1−α)
N
(1−α) , α ≥ 0,α 6= 1;
wln(xN), α = 1.
(7.11)
This is called α-utility.26 The parameter α represents the concavity of the utility function and, as utility
is assumed concave, (α ≥ 0). The exception at α = 1 ﬁlls the discontinuity in U that would otherwise
result. w represents the weight of the utility. Both α and w are intended to be held constant over a ﬂow
of data, but they may be allowed to adapt slowly.27
We will consider the three cases where downstream congestion claimed by the source is correct,
overstated and understated. The special case where α = 1 will be dealt with separately later.
Correctdownstream congestion (z = un)
In this baseline case, net utility (α ≥ 0,α 6= 1) is
Υ(=)(xN) =
wα
(1 − α)
x
(1−α)
N − zx1
=
wα
(1 − α)
x
(1−α)
N − unxN.
Differentiating, ﬁnding the bit-rate xN that maximises net utility, and substituting back into this equation
26See also Eqn (7.11) in §7.7.1
27The denominator (1 − α) and the exponent α of w merely simplify the form of the ultimate results.12.3. Re-ECN System Properties 211
gives optimum net utility in this baseline case:
Υ∗
(=) = wu(1−1/α)
n
α
(1 − α)
. (12.10)
Overstateddownstream congestion (z > un)
This case is nearly identical to the base case, except un cannot be substituted for z in the net utility
formula:
Υ(>)(xN) =
wα
(1 − α)
x
(1−α)
N − zxN,
Υ∗
(>) = wz(1−1/α) α
(1 − α)
. (12.11)
Understateddownstream congestion (z < un)
This case is also nearly identical to the base case, except xN cannot be substituted for x1 in the net
utility formula, because the dropper reduces it by uN/z:
Υ(<)(xN) =
wα
(1 − α)
x
(1−α)
N − zx1
=
wα
(1 − α)
x
(1−α)
N − zxN
uN
z
.
Υ∗
(<) = wu(1−1/α)
n
α
(1 − α)
. (12.12)
The three cases for α = 1 can be calculated similarly. Then the gains in optimum net utility28 from
over or understatement of expected downstream congestion z are:
∆Υ∗ = Υ∗ − Υ∗
(=)
=

    
    
w α
(1−α)(z(1−1/α) − u
(1−1/α)
n ), z > un, α 6= 1;
wln
 un
z

, z > un, α = 1;
0, z ≤ un.
(12.13)
Over their given valid ranges, none of these expressions are greater than zero. These examples support
our proof of Theorem 12.2; that the re-ECN mechanisms at ingress and egress remove any incentive to
misrepresent downstream congestion for anyone as long as their utility for bit-rate is concave.
If we use a normalised measure of net utility gain ∆Y ∗ = ∆Υ∗u
(1/α)−1
n /w, we can derive its slope
as
d
d(z/un)
∆Y ∗ = −

z
un
−1/α
. (12.14)
Therefore, for all α, this normalised net utility gain has slope -1 when z → un from above. Fig 12.529
plots normalised net utility gain against overstatement of downstream path congestion, for various values
of concavity of utility α. When z is understated (the heavy horizontal plot along the horizontal axis to the
28Note that these values of net utility are meaningless except for comparisons between two values from the same utility curve.
In economic theory, utility is generally considered ordinal, not cardinal. α-utility curves with α ≥ 1 do not even pass through the
origin, and their numeric values are negative (in the α = 1 case, both positive and negative). The value and sign of Υ2 − Υ1 is
meaningful if they come from the same utility curve, but (Υ2 − Υ1)/Υ1 is meaningless.
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Figure 12.5: Normalised Net Utility Gain;
∆Y ∗ is plotted against overstatement of downstream path congestion z/un for various concavities of
utility α. For z/un < 1, plots are shown both with the dropper (heavy ﬂat line) and without (dashed
plots).
left), it can be seen that there is no net utility gain relative to the case where z = un. Plots of normalised
net utility gain without the re-ECN dropper are shown dashed above it, to show how the dropper removes
any gain from understating z.
We must emphasise at this point that our proof of Theorem 12.2 is not intended to imply anything
about whether the engineering of the re-ECN mechanisms is robust against gaming. For instance it does
not imply that the mechanisms can remove incentives to misrepresent downstream congestion immedi-
ately, or against someone with no utility at all for transferring any bit-rate. It does however prove that
the re-ECN mechanisms do not depend on how concave the utility function is, as long as it is concave,
i.e. the re-ECN mechanisms proposed in this dissertation are indeed transport-oblivious. Put another
way, this proves that in any circumstance where the proposed re-ECN mechanisms protect the integrity
of congestion signals, they do so with a one-way incentive barrier—a barrier that no rate response to
congestion can overcome.
Note that the phrase ‘no incentive to misrepresent downstream congestion’ is not as strong as ‘an
incentive to correctly represent it’, which we have not strictly proved, although we have given a discur-
sive argument why this is so. Our dropper design principle of ‘Proportionate Sanctions’ only removes
any gain from understating downstream congestion, witnessed by the ﬂat plot to the left of Fig 12.5—
theoretically, a customer would be equally willing to sit anywhere along that ﬂat line. But even the tiniest
additional latency due to unnecessary dropper discards or the tiniest additional punishment beyond neu-
tralising the gain from understatement will push a customer’s incentives towards stating downstream
congestion correctly.
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balance—one-off Cautious credits per-ﬂow represent a customer’s willingness to pay to avoid this un-
certainty. And an active sanction at the dropper against ﬂows that had been negative for more than the
minimum idle ﬂow-state timeout would provide a very strong incentive not to stray into understatement.
§7.3 on the principle of ‘Proportionate Sanctions’ gave two main reasons why neutralising any gain is
preferable to punitive sanctions: i) infeasibility of punitive sanctions against cheap pseudonyms (i.e. ﬂow
IDs) and ii) the risk of the mechanisms being perverted to amplify third party attacks.
Note that the proof of Theorem 12.2 would actual hold for all convex not just concave utility func-
tions. However, the economic optimisation on which the re-ECN framework is based is only proven for
concave utility [KMT98]. Below we discuss how to handle applications for which utility can be expected
to be convex over part of their range.
Inelastic Applications. It is convincingly argued that certain types of so-called inelastic applica-
tion [She95] exhibit concave utility over their operating range of bit-rates, but below a certain bit-rate
utility becomes convex.30
Flow admission control can be used to ensure inelastic ﬂows are only admitted to the system when
it is in their concave operating region. Congestion marking can determine the initial admission deci-
sion [GK99a], but then the ﬂow is not expected to reduce its rate if congestion in the system subsequently
moves out of its operating region. At least three strategies are possible for engineering such a system:
• Inelastic ﬂows can be isolated in a separate trafﬁc class, and admission controlled into the capacity
assigned to the class by network-controlled gateways. This is the approach adopted31 and being
standardised by the IETF in its pre-congestion notiﬁcation (PCN) working group [Ear09b, Ear09a]
• Inelastic and elastic ﬂows can be mixed. If congestion rises so that inelastic ﬂows would reduce
below their operating range, admitted ﬂows can remain while elastic ﬂows adapt to the temporary
shortage, but new inelastic ﬂows will not enter the system. Our paper [JBM08] on a bulk con-
gestion policer similar to that proposed in §11 analyses how it makes users sacriﬁce the bit-rate
of their own elastic applications to preserve their ongoing inelastic ﬂows, by creating cross-ﬂow
congestion as if it were real congestion.
• Alternatively, inelastic and elastic ﬂows can share the same capacity but packets have separately
identiﬁable classes. The marking of the two classes of packet is linked [GK02] so that both classes
optimally share the available capacity on longer timescales, but the inelastic trafﬁc is allowed to
keep its admitted bit rate once it has entered the system and it is served with very low latency. The
PCN architecture discussed above can be used to implement this approach [SEB+06].
The re-ECN incentive framework has been proposed as a way to allow pre-congestion-based ad-
mission control systems based on network gateways to scale to an internetwork operated by network
providers that do not trust each other [Bri08b]. It uses exactly the same pattern of incentives as the
30Experiments on people paying to view videos in Lab conditions have shown that people do indeed have such convex-concave
utility functions for video streaming, but unfortunately the experiment results remain conﬁdential [HE02].
31In work by the present author as a co-author with others.12.3. Re-ECN System Properties 214
re-ECN framework proposed in the present dissertation, but the system is contained within gateways
around the edges of the internetwork, which are equivalent (in incentive terms) to endpoints in our more
general re-ECN framework.
Section Summary. To summarise this section, we have proved that the re-ECN system creates an incen-
tive for bandwidth consumers to truthfully declare their expectation of downstream congestion, whatever
their utility function if it is concave. And further, we have brieﬂy introduced engineering mechanisms
that allow the same congestion marking and incentive mechanisms to be used for inelastic applications—
those applications characterised by utility functions that are not concave at low bit-rates.
12.3.2 Algorithm Complexities
This section brings together statistics on the complexities of each of the proposed re-ECN mechanisms.
Figures for numbers of processor operations have been established merely by tracing through the unop-
timised pseudocode.
1. Egress Dropper Complexity.
Cycles per packet: Typ: 5, Max: 16 (non-compliant ﬂow, Negative packet) plus 2 header ﬁeld
reads and a ﬂow ID match;
Extra cycles per new ﬂow: 6;
Storage per compliant ﬂow: ∼16B plus ﬂowID;
Total storage for the set of non-compliant ﬂows: Two extra compliant ﬂows’ worth of storage.
See §7.6.1 for details.
2. Extra Border Complexity.
Cycles per packet: Typ: 1, Max: 14 (Positive packet) plus a header ﬁeld read, and 1 extra cycle
if packet picked for sampling. Note: all border processing can be in parallel to forwarding.
Storage per border interface: 2 counters (32B?), plus the ﬂow ID ranges to be sampled and two
counters per sampled ﬂow.
§8.3 summarises additional border complexity a little less tersely.
3. Optional Extra Forwarding Element Complexity.
Cycles per packet: Probably Typ 1, Max 2 for preferential drop; Marking Cautious should be
possible by altering an existing test with zero extra cycles.
Storage per interface: Zero.
4. Ingress Policer Complexity.
The baseline ingress congestion policer would be similar in complexity to the dropper plus the
same downstream congestion normalisation as the basic border mechanism above (without ﬂow
sampling) plus an additional bulk token bucket. Altogether (without even having written the pseu-
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Cycles per packet: Typ: 10, Max: 26 (Negative packet) plus a header ﬁeld read;
Storage per ﬂow: ∼16B plus ﬂowID;
Storage per policed interface: 16B (token bucket) plus two extra ﬂow’s worth of storage.
12.3.3 Performance
Initial performance results from simulations of the dropper are given in §7.8. So far, too few runs have
been attempted to make any deﬁnitive statements, but we have tentatively concluded that a hard-coded
up-front credit of two or possibly three packets should prevent the dropper introducing all but a residual
additional drop fraction for TCP ﬂows in reasonable network environments. Dropper performance has
been predicted analytically in §7.7. The other parts of the system are yet to be implemented.
12.3.4 Outstanding Vulnerabilities
Attack Model. This dissertation has attempted to subject the re-ECN system to an ambitious attack
model in which potential attackers are either rational or malicious, on condition that the malice of net-
work operators is bounded (deﬁned in §8.1.2).
Caveats and Concerns. The least solid defence we have proposed is ‘Sample-Based Congestion Volume
Inﬂation’(§8.2.4). Itisdesignedtoremovethemotivationfornetworkstoattackeachotherusingdummy
trafﬁc. At this stage, this idea is no more than an architectural direction, backed by some rationale and
theory. Defending against the ‘Dummy Neutral Background Load’ attack depends on this direction being
fruitful (§12.1.1). This attack aims to raise congestion costs for other users.
The attack ‘Dragging Down a Spoofed Flow ID’ (§7.5.3) is as easy (or hard) to mount as it already
is to mount ﬂow ID hijacking attacks. Addition of a re-ECN dropper to a network would add a new way
to use this attack against the ﬂows of others.
The need to start a ﬂow with a Cautious packet to get it through the re-ECN dropper could increase
the cost of reﬂection attacks against any servers routinely giving responses either as single packets or
very short ﬂows (e.g. DNS servers, see §12.1.3).
The ﬂow time-out mechanisms of the dropper (§7.6.1) and a tentative proposal to use ‘Covert Mark-
ing’ as a signalling channel from policers to end-points (§11.3.1) have yet to be fully explored. These
may reveal further vulnerabilities. The possibilities for attacks using legacy codepoints in the extended
ECN ﬁeld and using tunnels have not been exhaustively explored, although these issues have been thor-
oughly considered for most parts of the design.
Aside from these outstanding caveats, we believe we have shown that the proposed re-ECN mech-
anisms are otherwise robust against all the other attacks on the integrity of congestion signals identiﬁed
in this dissertation.
Of coursenew attacks may beidentiﬁed in thefuture. However, over the years, re-ECN has attracted
considerable attention from researchers trying to break down its defences with new invented attacks.
These have been generalised into the range of attacks enumerated in this dissertation. This is certainly
not claimed as any form of ‘proof of security’. However, even proofs of security are only as good as the
deviousness of their attack model.12.3. Re-ECN System Properties 216
Better Defence against Attacks on the Existing Internet.We cannot claim re-ECN fully prevents
distributed bandwidth ﬂooding attacks (DDoS). However it should considerably raise the bar against
them—the brief analysis in §12.1.1 estimates that a botnet army would have to be two or three orders
of magnitude larger to sustain an attack of the force it can muster today without re-ECN in place. The
Re-ECN system also shifts liability for the congestion cost of a ﬂooding attack to the ingress network.
It also throws likely attack trafﬁc into sharp relief throughout the network path. This both provides a
strong incentive for other active preventative measures, and provides the evidence needed for them to be
deployed close to the root cause where they will be most useful.
The re-ECN system also provides additional protection against initial packet attacks (e.g. TCP SYN
ﬂooding—see §12.1.3) and ‘State Keep-Alive’ attacks (§12.1.3).Part IV
In Closing
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Conclusions
13.1 Closing Arguments
Hypothesis 1: Congestion Signal Integrity
Proof. We will take Hypothesis 1 (p37) phrase by phrase.
“The incentives of self-interested malicious economic entities can be aligned to assure the in-
tegrity of indications of downstream congestion in the packets of a connectionless simplex internet-
work...”
We can only prove this part of the hypothesis with strong conditions.
Lazy Removal of Dummy Trafﬁc. In §12.3.4 we have outlined our concerns and caveats regarding
outstanding vulnerabilities. If any of those issues are not resolved, including discovery of new success-
ful attacks, the hypothesis falls. In particular, those concerns include the question-mark hanging over
‘Sample-Based Congestion Volume Inﬂation’ to align the incentives for networks not to attack each other
at borders. Indeed the whole system must be considered riddled with concerns, given some parts still
only exist on paper.
We should therefore add the form of condition suggested by Bauer & Faratin that: “No network
element before the ﬁrst dropper after congestion can rely on the expected congestion declared for a
ﬂow.” Wherever there are dummy trafﬁc attacks in progress that have not been detected and removed,
the integrity of congestion signals in their packets will not be assured.
Although this sounds like it kills the hypothesis, we can continue if the argument is acceptable
that we can still assure signal integrity wherever it is used, with no need to assure it otherwise. All
the information is available to detect and remove dummy trafﬁc attacks at any node in the network.
One could take the direction we have outlined to ensure that reasonable (lazy) effort would get rid of
negative ﬂows relatively quickly. Or, with greater effort, one could do much better. The above condition
still strictly states the limit to congestion signal integrity, but only because the architecture deliberately
allows an operator to avoid expending effort unless the problem warrants it. The architecture at least
provides the information to test whether there is a problem and whether the effort expended has solved
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Dynamics.If we take the liberty of assuming that all the above concerns prove unfounded, we have
shown that the re-ECN dropper can remove the gain from misrepresenting downstream congestion. But
the implemented algorithm only completely removes gain over a long period, not immediately (§7.7.2) .
As soon as someone starts to gain from cheating, the system only starts to remove the gain increasingly
strongly. This is sufﬁciently fast for some attacks (e.g. ‘Flow ID Whitewashing’) but not others (e.g.
‘Stop Payment’). We had to allow a trade-off to avoid false hits being too harsh, by using moving
averages (at least we found we could set the characteristic period of the EWMA to move fairly fast
a = 1/16 or perhaps 1/32). This trade-off was ultimately necessary because re-ECN markings use the
same unary encoding as ECN, which is a very slow signalling channel.
However, these short-run gains are only possible because we recommended, but did not implement,
a more active timeout mechanisms. With a timeout mechanism, any ﬂow persistently negative, even
slightly, for more than the timeout (perhaps 1 sec) could very simply be subjected to arbitrarily high
drop rates and, ultimately, complete blocking.
Thus any small gains are potentially limited to the timeout period. Attackers cannot exploit multiple
timeout periods (or even one) without ‘spending’ a Cautious packet for the right to each timeout (only
one timeout is available per ﬂow). To gain, an attacker would have to be able to gain from the ‘Flow
ID Whitewashing’ attack. But, with the addition of active ﬂow state timeout, we have shown that isn’t
possible.
Slight additional punishment. In §12.3.1 we proved that the combination of the policer and the drop-
per gives self-interested entities ‘no incentive to misrepresent downstream congestion’, at least not in
the long-run (and we have just handled short-run issues). We went on discursively to show that any
additional punishment beyond neutralising the gain would turn this into ‘an incentive to correctly rep-
resent downstream congestion’, as long as the punishment increases with understatement of congestion.
Timeout punishments alone would ﬁt this description.
Scalable enforcement mechanism. §12.3.2 summarises the complexities of the proposed algorithms
for the various components of the re-ECN system. The ingress and egress components exhibit sub-
linear scaling with number of ﬂows, but only just. Flow state is required for every active behaving ﬂow,
also held for a short timeout once they become inactive. Assuming there are some misbehaving ﬂows,
this represents sub-linear scaling with ﬂows (just). From a practical angle, exhaustive ﬂow-state is not
required except at the outer edges of the internetwork. At every other trust boundary, only sampled ﬂow
state is required.
Additional per-packet processing can be truthfully described as minimal in all cases.1 The most
processorintensivecomponentisthepolicerat10cyclesperpackettypicalwithamaximumof26cycles.
Border elements require one extra cycle per typical packet (max 14). Importantly, border operations can
all be in parallel to data forwarding. An optional addition to forwarding elements would require two
cycles per packet maximum. For the parts that are yet to be designed in detail we assume our complexity
estimates are reasonably accurate.
1Strictly any additional per-packet cycles make the system scale super-linearly with packet load.13.1. Closing Arguments 220
“...This can be achieved by only constraining aggregate downstream congestion-volume sent by
each economic entity over time, without any dynamic congestion pricing to end-consumers, without
any further constraints on transport behaviour and without any further constraints on the agents’
freedom to distribute load across the internetwork, or across time.”
Bulk Congestion Policing.The fact that re-ECN allows the design of bulk congestion policer in §11
satisﬁes all these conditions. The policer only constrains aggregate downstream congestion-volume over
time. Theorem 12.2 in §12.3.1 proves the policer combines with the rest of the system to be transport
oblivious. And the policer sets no constraint on where trafﬁc goes, and no constraint on when it is sent
as long as aggregate downstream congestion-volume over time ﬁts into its ﬁll-rate and peak-rate.
Flat Pricing.Within the proof of Theorem 12.2 (Transport Oblivious), we saw that, in the long run,
proportionate sanctions at the dropper made Positive marked bytes at the ingress z equivalent to Negative
at the egress un, even if Positive markings were under-declared. Therefore the bulk policer can be
considered to give equivalent incentives to congestion pricing, but at the same time it can be fed by a
constant stream of tokens that represent a ﬂat charge, not a dynamic one.
Thus, Hypothesis 1 is not proven unconditionally and conclusively. But with all the above strong
conditions concerns and caveats, it can still be valid.
Note that the strong conditions required on this proof could be considered as evidence that the
hypothesis is too ambitiously worded. However, it is preferred to preserve the hypothesis as an enduring
statement of the goal (quod errat) and continue to try to improve the re-ECN system to soften the caveats,
or otherwise ﬁnd a concrete refutation of the hypothesis in the future.
Hypothesis 2: Welfare Maximising Allocation
Proof. Again we will work through Hypothesis 2 (p37) phrase by phrase:
“With a competitive market and under Assumptions 3.1 & 3.2 (p37), incentives of all parties can
be aligned so that the system produces the welfare maximising allocation of resources, under all the
conditions of Hypothesis 1.”
If Hypothesis 1 holds, Positive marked bytes at the ingress z are equivalent to Negative at the egress
un. The assumptions referred to in this hypothesis are equivalent to Kelly’s assumptions in [KMT98].
We need the additional assumptions:
Assumption 13.1. All network operators on the Internet choose to use the re-ECN bulk congestion
policer, or an equivalent.
Assumption 13.2. The consumer perceives paying for tokens that pay for congestion as equivalent to
paying directly for congestion.
Then the incentives in the re-ECN system are equivalent to those in Kelly’s SYSTEM. Then a Wel-
fare Maximising proof for the re-ECN system follows by equivalence with Kelly’s welfare maximising
proof for users with concave utility [KMT98].
Therefore, under these assumptions, the shares of network resources that users will choose to use
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Note that Kelly’s proof of welfare maximisation requires the condition of concave utility, which is a
sub-set of the range of utility functions our proof of Theorem 12.2 holds for. Therefore, unlike the proof
of our ﬁrst hypothesis, welfare maximisation only applies for elastic trafﬁc.
It is unlikely that Assumption 13.1 will hold, as many operators will prefer to charge by value
rather than cost, by discriminating prices for different types of session. This situation will prevail wher-
ever competition is weak enough. The re-ECN framework is designed to merely provide congestion
information to reveal marginal costs as a ﬂoor for pricing—it is not the designer’s role to insist that
pricing should track congestion costs, but pricing must be able to as competition intensiﬁes. Of course,
network operators should heed the corollary of Hypothesis 2; that any other pricing scheme will lead to
resource allocations that do not maximise welfare. Or put another way, a network operator can do no
better to satisfy its customers than to use congestion policing.
In §12.3.1 we also outlined how ﬂow admission controls can prevent inelastic ﬂows being admitted
when the shadow price of the system is outside their region of concave utility. We are not claiming that
these mechanisms would take the system to the welfare optimum for users with both concave and convex
utilities. But if the shadow price did not change drastically for the duration of each ﬂow, it would be
fairly close.
Also note that the condition of a competitive market is necessary to ensure that congestion signals
tend towards shadow prices for capacity; a representation of the marginal cost of the capacity needed to
alleviate the congestion.
13.2 Re-ECN Limitations and Further Work
Architectural Issues. The need for a end-point ﬂow ID sub-layer in the Internet architecture needs to be
justiﬁed by and incorporated with wider concerns than just resource sharing.
The re-ECN architecture does not allow self-congestion beyond the egress of the provided internet-
work to be discounted (except by tunnelling).
The question of how an egress dropper can allow for packets that arrive mid-ﬂow due to reroutes
(§7.3.3) has been addressed but full assessment remains outstanding. This could be somewhat of a
problem for multi-homed receivers or mobile receivers during hand-overs.
Although the high level implications of re-ECN on routing & trafﬁc engineering have been articu-
lated, they need to be more deeply considered (see [BCSJ04, §4]).
An architecture for proxying re-ECN senders and/or receivers needs to be deﬁned (see §12.1.4).
Management diagnosis of misbehaving / malconﬁgured policers / droppers will need to be consid-
ered.
Accountability for causing congestion has only been addressed for the unicast mode of communica-
tions. For multicast and anycast, superﬁcially at least, the accumulated congestion information provided
by simple ECN is sufﬁcient, because control is at the receiver.2 However, receiver control is only per
2But current multicast forwarding duplicates congestion markings, massively ‘double-accounting’ for each congestion event.
This could be solved with the form of multicast forwarding proposed in an expired Internet Draft and associated Technical Re-
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session while sender control is per packet. So one really needs sender accountability for packet rate, with
receiver accountability only at the session level. If one wanted to hold the sender accountable with re-
feedback, the expected congestion a multicast packet will cause should be the sum of all the congestion
events in every branch. One could achieve this using the unary congestion encoding scheme in [BC01a,
§5], which already picks an acker for each separate instance of a congested link. But a mechanism to en-
sure the integrity of such congestion signals and to meter downstream congestion at intermediate points
such as borders are very much open issues.
Re-ECN Protocol: Network Layer.There are outstanding questions to answer if ﬂow-state congestion
signalling is to be considered for full inclusion in the re-ECN protocol (§10.1).
The tentative proposal to include a signalling channel from policers to the transport via covert
marking needs to be further considered (§11.3.1).
Re-ECN Transport Protocol Extensions.The effect of the current re-ECN dropper design on transports
with infrequent feedback needs to be considered in depth; even delayed ACKs in TCP present some
problems. (Guidelines on re-feedback design for a range of transports other than TCP are included
in [BJMS09a], but no detailed design, performance analysis or testing has been done.)
More comprehensive end-to-end integrity checks need to be deﬁned in the presence of untrusted
receivers (§12.1.4).
Protocols for end-to-end transfer of congestion quota need to be designed.
Economic & Security Analysis.Precisely what the dropper should do with outstanding credit or debit
when a ﬂow times out (§7.6.1) requires further consideration. It seems to be a matter of policy, but it
also has a more general economic interpretation.
Fuller analysis of the effect of re-ECN on internetwork competition and termination monopolies is
required (§12.1.2), taking account of any ability to transfer congestion quota end-to-end.
Incremental&partialdeploymentscenarioshavebeenproposedinanInternetDraft[BJMS09b]and
a workshop paper has been prepared to lay the groundwork to analyse deployment incentives [Bri06].
But a fuller incremental deployment plan and analysis is needed.
Opportunitiestoexploitlegacyﬁeldsintheprotocolandlegacybehaviourshaveoftenbeenincluded
in the economic & security analysis of re-ECN, but not always. Congestion signal integrity needs to be
assured in a partially deployed setting. And the extra opportunities for illegal protocol transitions with
legacy codepoints need to be considered.
Evaluation.Some of the initial dropper simulations need to be repeat tested to derive conﬁdence inter-
vals. Further interpretation of the results (§7.8.2) is needed, with possible further iterative design and
even re-consideration of architectural choices.
The sample-based congestion volume inﬂation ideas (§8.2.4) need to be developed further, and put
to the test.
The full precise downstream congestion meter formula (§8.2.7) needs to be implemented and fully
stress tested.
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Example ingress policer designs need to be tested against the rest of the system.
Congestion Control Evolution.Numerous open research issues remain in congestion control research,
particularly now the goal can be more usefully stated as congestion accountability (not TCP-friendliness)
as well as prevention of congestion collapse. An attempt to document open research issues is currently
in progress [WPSB09] as a work item of the Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG) of
the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF).
Contractual Transparency. The requirement for contract transparency remains the most unsatisfactory
aspect of the present research. It is solved in all but a psychological respect. It is certainly now possible
to apply a simple tiered ﬂat pricing scheme to a good that is under the full control of the consumer but
the good, expected trafﬁc congestion, is not a natural one for consumers to understand.
The consumer’s software is in full control of its declarations of congestion likely to be experienced
by each packet. So certainly this good is immune to whatever unpredictable congestion occurs. But most
experts, let alone consumers, in the industry aren’t yet even aware that congestion has a very speciﬁc
deﬁnition. Congestion is perceived as a vague state of a system, possibly even binary—either congested
or not. The idea that congestion can be precisely counted is unfamiliar to people.
This weakness could possibly be solved through education, just as consumers were educated about
the previously unfamiliar concept of data volume and bytes before volume capping was introduced
around 2001. However, this is a rather ambitious hope.
Nonetheless, UK road tax licenses are now priced based on the volume of an economic externality
of the vehicle’s performance that no human can even sense (mgCO2/lt of fuel), so perhaps, as long as
the good being priced is generally recognised as valid, it doesn’t matter if it’s not tangible.
13.3 Material Contributions
Material contributions are divided between those directly relevant to this dissertation and those that have
provided background context.
13.3.1 Direct contributions
Accountability for congestion with freedom: A protocol has been invented3 that enables4 an ingress
access network to constrain the overall congestion an attached data sender can cause anywhere in
a connectionless internetwork, without any further constraints on the user’s freedom to distribute
load across this internetwork nor across time. This contribution is summarised in the recent work-
shop publication “Policing Freedom to Use the Internet Resource Pool” [JBM08] (co-authored5).
Accountability for congestion robust to gaming: Robustness to gaming can never be proven conclu-
sively, but we have at least outlined the re-ECN system’s robustness in the face of currently fore-
seen attacks, and stated the limits of its vulnerability.
3With co-inventors.
4Subject to further successful performance experiments.
5I contributed the overall ideas the structure and most of the text, except the central section analysing the effect on ﬂow
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Simple pricing: The tension between the irresistible economic logic of usage-sensitive pricing and the
immovable consumer desire for simple and predictable pricing [Odl97] has been resolved. Mini-
mal constraint can be applied to consumers to align their incentives within a tiered ﬂat rate pricing
plan, without dynamic congestion pricing. Nonetheless, ‘sender-pays’ dynamic congestion pric-
ing with simple bulk accounting is now possible as well—at any trust boundary—so it is free to
develop in wholesale and interconnect markets if desired.
Necessary but sufﬁcient mechanism: The alteration to feedback transparency at the network layer
claims to be no more than the minimum necessary to offer generic support to a wide range of
higher layer resource sharing approaches—it solely reveals expected rest-of-path congestion. The
mechanisms suggested to ensure truth-telling and provide sender and network accountability are
not embedded in the network layer—they are merely optional applications of the protocol mech-
anism.
Identiﬁed fundamental problem: The problem has been narrowed down to a lack of information about
quality that is necessary for efﬁcient contracting: expected downstream congestion.
Localisation of resource accountability: By adding congestion accountability to self-contained data-
grams, identiﬁcation of the entities local to each trust boundary is sufﬁcient to create strong chains
of precise accountability, without requiring a global identity infrastructure. Either party at a trust
boundary can hold the other accountable for causing congestion—whether A forwarded too much
trafﬁc, or B provided too little capacity.
Identiﬁed the ﬂow rate equality problem as a nonsensical distraction: “Flow Rate Fairness: Dis-
mantling a Religion” [Bri07b] (ACM CCR journal) and [Bri07c] (individual IETF Internet draft)
explained far more clearly and simply than before (indeed bluntly) why ﬂow rate equality is a
non-goal and why fairness should be measured in terms of congestion volume in order to ensure
fairness on a global scale between different local deﬁnitions of fairness. “Problem Statement:
We Don’t Have To Do Fairness Ourselves” [Bri08d] (individual IETF I-D in progress with co-
authors6) explained the mechanisms by which ﬂow rate equality is leading the Internet into a
highly suboptimal state, backing up the assertions in “...Dismantling a Religion” with more con-
crete evidence. This in turn has led to positive coverage in the technical media, including being
invited to write an article on the subject (and on re-feedback) for the Dec 2008 issue of IEEE
Spectrum Magazine [Bri08c], and invitations to present the work in several international fora.
Placed solution in commercial context: “Commercial Models for IP Quality of Service Intercon-
nect” [BR05] (BT Technology Journal with co-author7—presented in two international industry
fora).
Articulated solution, rationale and evaluation: “Policing Congestion Response in an Internetwork
6Co-authors contributed considerable editing, restructuring & reviewing
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using Re-feedback” [BJCG+05] (ACM SIGCOMM conference paper with co-authors8) described
the solution for any abstract connectionless internetwork, and for the Internet speciﬁcally.
Full protocol speciﬁcation: “Re-ECN:AddingAccountabilityforCausingCongestiontoTCP/IP”[BJMS09a]
(individual IETF I-D in progress with co-authors9—presented to IETF six times).
Applicability & rationale for re-ECN: “Re-ECN: The Motivation for Adding Accountability for Caus-
ing Congestion to TCP/IP” [BJMS09b] (individual IETF I-D in progress with co-authors).
Enabled both open and closed models to interwork: The bulk and per-ﬂow policers described in the
“re-ECN” I-D [BJMS09b, Appx B] enable open and closed models respectively, and the border
arrangements allow both models to fully interwork. Thus the tussle between service-oriented
networks and open Internet access can be fought out at run-time without losing the value of full
interconnectivity, because the service-oriented networks can protect their interests against excess
congestion caused by trafﬁc from their open neighbours (and vice versa).
First design of scalable internetwork admission control: “Emulating Border Flow Policing using
Re-ECN on Bulk Data” [Bri08b] (individual IETF I-D in progress—presented twice) uses re-
feedback with infrequent congestion feedback at reservation refresh signalling time-scales to
create incentives for network operators to admission control trafﬁc that would otherwise cause
‘pre-congestion’ in other operators’ downstream networks.
First know treatment of DDoS as a congestion policing problem: “Using Self-interest to Prevent
Malice; Fixing the Denial of Service Flaw of the Internet” [Bri06] (paper for Int’l Workshop on
the Economics of Securing the Information Infrastructure).
Outlined incremental deployment incentives: “Using Self-interest to Prevent Malice...” [Bri06] out-
line the incentives for initial deployment, incremental adoption and the convex increasing incen-
tives towards complete deployment. Also outlines the strong incentives to deploy other DDoS
solutions. The “re-ECN Motivation” I-D [BJMS09b] also outlines incremental deployment issues
and incentives.
Patent ﬁlings and gifts: I have ﬁled six patent applications covering the present research with co-
inventors10 (under BT’s ownership). All are now published and have so far survived searches.
The primary patent of the re-feedback mechanism was recently granted in Europe, the others re-
main pending. Nonetheless, the present author persuaded BT to gift11 free of royalties any aspect
necessary to comply with our IETF standards contribution (the wording of BT’s IPR declaration
takes precedence if there is any conﬂict with this wording) [Orm05].
8Co-authors contributed co-invention, text on TCP policing and conducted & documented performance experiments, which I
designed except for the co-author’s choices of topology & trafﬁc models
9Co-authors ﬁnessed protocol design and contributed appendices on policing & edits throughout
10The nub of the re-feedback idea was the result of a truly collaborative discussion between the co-inventors, but I originally
laid out the problem space and developed the newly formed idea to reconcile it with the structure of classic feedback.
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13.3.2 Background contributions
The Market-Managed Multi-service Internet (M3I) project: 12 A medium-sized (EUR3.7M) EC In-
formation Society Technologies Fifth Framework project that I initiated and led, to take up Kelly’s
work and build practical network controls and pricing schemes around it. “A Market Managed
Multi-service Internet (M3I)” [BDH+03] (Computer Communications journal paper with many
co-authors) summarises the project.
M3I Architecture: Principles & Components: “Market Managed Multi-service Internet: Architec-
ture Pt I; Principles” [Bri02a] and “...Pt II; Construction” [Bri02b] (technical reports).
Split-edge pricing and end-to-end clearing structure: “The Direction of Value Flow in Open Multi-
service Connectionless Networks” [Bri00, Bri99b, Bri99a] (technical report combining two pa-
pers, one for the Int’l Conf on Telecoms & E-commerce, the other an invited paper for the Int’l
Workshop on Networked Group Communications).
Extending ECN and its economic effects to protocols below the network layer: “Explicit Conges-
tion Marking in MPLS” [DBT08] (co-authored IETF Proposed Standard RFC), “Layered Encap-
sulation of Congestion Notiﬁcation” [Bri09] (IETF I-D accepted as working group business—in
progress), “Service Differentiation in Third Generation Mobile Networks” [SBS02b] (co-authored
Quality of Future Internet Services (QoFIS) int’l workshop paper) and “Economic Models for
Resource Control in Wireless Networks” [SBS02a] (co-authored Personal, Indoor and Mobile
Radio Communications (PIMRC) int’l conference paper).
Applying policy control to congestion control: “Market Managed Multi-service Internet: Pricing
Mechanisms; Price Reaction Design” [BDT+00] (main author of technical report).
Fixing important but detailed aspects of congestion notiﬁcation: “Byte and Packet Congestion Noti-
ﬁcation” [Bri08a] (IETF I-D accepted as working group business—in progress) and “An Open
ECN service in the IP layer” [BC01b] (expired co-authored individual IETF I-D used to ﬁnesse
the proposed ECN standard).
Synthesising admission control from congestion notiﬁcation: “Pre-Congestion Notiﬁcation Archi-
tecture” [Ear09b] (contributor to IETF working group I-D in last call for Informational RFC
status), “Marking behaviour of PCN-nodes” [Ear09a] (contributor to I-D on the IETF standards
track to standardise virtual queue congestion marking), “Guaranteed QoS Synthesis for Admis-
sion Control with Shared Capacity” [SEB+06] (co-authored technical report), “Guaranteed QoS
synthesis - an example of a scalable core IP quality of service solution” [HBC05] (co-authored
BT Technology Journal article), “An edge-to-edge Deployment Model for Pre-Congestion Notiﬁ-
cation: Admission Control over a DiffServ Region” [BES+06] (co-authored individual IETF I-D
in progress).
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13.4 Concluding Remarks
This concluding section aims to bring out the concepts contributed during this period of doctoral re-
search.
Architectural and economic: A primary economic contribution has been to highlight from Kelly’s work
the importance of congestion-volume as a metric for trading bandwidth usage that is both location and
time independent; unlike bit-rate or volume, congestion-volume represents the same cost wherever and
whenever it is used in a competitively provided internetwork. It seems many missed these subtle but
pivotal insights in Kelly’s model, which have been instantiated in the bulk congestion policer of §11:
location independence allows the shares of ﬂows traversing all different resources in the internetwork to
be controlled in one bulk mix in each policer; and time independence allows spending to be shifted back
and forth in time using a token bucket buffer.
Another contribution (both economic and architectural) has been to follow a trail of multidisci-
plinary research to expose and articulate a major structural problem with the Internet architecture—an
unusual form of information asymmetry where each of the providers in the value chain cannot deter-
mine the quality of their own product whereas the end-consumer can. Theoretically, this information
asymmetry could in turn cause market failure, where all of quality, price and investment decline. In the
case of the Internet, rather than a market failure, it seems to be causing network providers to violate the
architecture that is causing the problem. This in turn is causing further problems as the resulting mess
ossiﬁes the ability of the Internet to evolve.
To solve this problem a novel feedback pattern called re-feedback has been proposed. It induces
buyers to reveal the quality of the product to providers, both at the edges of the network, and at the bor-
ders between networks. It enables self-contained datagrams to carry an expectation of the characteristics
of the rest of the path. This reveals information that could be used to solve the information asymmetry
problems of packet networks. A way called re-ECN has also been invented to deploy this idea without
having to change the forwarding elements of the Internet, through a protocol.
Re-feedback had the potential to align the incentives of all the stakeholders on the Internet to truth-
fully reveal the previously hidden price/quality information. The primary task of this dissertation has
been to establish whether this is so for the much more challenging case of re-ECN where re-feedback
ideas have to ﬁt into the remaining one bit of space left in the IP header. The arguments in §13.1 that
attempt to prove the hypotheses show that this has been tenuously proven, with strong caveats, concerns
and conditions. In truth, it remains inconclusive. It is likely to remain inconclusive unless tested on a
real internetwork against truly motivated attackers, although a lot more experimental work can be done.
However, on a more positive note, no clear ﬂaws or vulnerabilities exist in the design, in the sense
that none of the proposed attacks have no defence, or at least no direction in which further work can
proceed to establish a possible defence. Given the severe constraints on header space and the highly
ambitious attack model, this is certainly a nontrivial achievement.
A particular contribution is a policer design that represents a desirable contractual proposition for
network operators. The proposed bulk congestion policer has the potential to allow a ﬂat fee contract to13.4. Concluding Remarks 228
be offered to any size Internet consumer, while at the same time aligning their incentives (and in turn
the incentives of their application developers) to take account of the congestion costs they are causing
others. In Odlyzko’s words, this resolves tension between the irresistible force of usage-sensitive pricing
and the immovable object of consumer desire for simple predictable pricing.
Also, the policer sets no particular constraints on transport behaviour, thus potentially enabling
easy evolution of new behaviours without having to ask permission of the network. A proof of this
transport-oblivious property has been provided.
However, although oblivious to transport behaviours, we reluctantly could not make the re-ECN
system oblivious to ﬂow IDs. The only way to test for cheating is to look for ﬂows that consistently
under-declare expected congestion relative to actual. This can be tested locally, so it does not need to
knowwheretheﬂow iscomingfromorgoingto(thereforeno need torelyonpush-back), butit doesneed
to match packets to consistent ﬂow IDs and hold ﬂow state. Knowing that the shared fate Internet design
principle advised against this, we have designed a fully ﬂedged ﬂow ID sub-layer into the architecture,
based on partial soft-ﬂow-state, with its own ﬂow-state congestion signalling.
Along the way, a few other architectural insights have been articulated and incorporated into the
design:
• Datagram resource accountability: Rather than holding end-point identiﬁers to account for re-
source usage (infeasible globally), holding the datagrams themselves to account enables account-
ability to transfer from one party to the next across each contractual boundary between networks
in turn.
• Principled adherence to the use of explicit in-band signalling for all congestion-related functions,
todecouplethecongestionsystemfromanyrelianceonreversereachabilitysemanticsofﬂow-IDs;
• Create a cost for using pseudonyms: Given ﬂow IDs are zero cost pseudonyms, if ﬂow IDs are to
be punished, a transport must be made to invest a small cost in using each new ID.
• Proportionate sanctions: A policing mechanism embedded at the lower layers should take great
care to only neutralise any gains as a minimum architectural contribution, not to over-punish mis-
behaviour. Otherwise the ampliﬁed punishment could be turned against others by spooﬁng their
identity.
• Bufferless border control: Trafﬁc should not have to be held back in a buffer while it is tested
for compliance at high speed (e.g. photonic) interfaces. The system should be able to work with
virtual queues and minimal or zero actual buffering.
Myths Slain:Some long-standing fallacies have been dismantled.
• Flow-rate equality & TCP friendliness; for two main reasons:
– Fairness must be between economic entities not arbitrarily chosen pseudonyms;
– Fairness must incorporate a time dimension.13.4. Concluding Remarks 229
• Per-ﬂow policing, for four reasons:
– Particular transport behaviours should not be embedded in the network (see ‘transport obliv-
iousness’ above);
– Flows can split and follow stepping stones to game the system;
– Sampling cannot be used as a deterrent when a ﬂow can switch pseudonyms as soon as it
detects it has been caught;
– And fourthly, given ﬂow-rate equality is a meaningless goal, rate comparisons between ﬂows
are just as meaningless anyway.
• Flow isolation harmful: In our most recent publication, ‘Policing Freedom’ [JBM08], we argue
that ﬂow isolation (a goal of WFQ etc.) makes trafﬁc that would be willing to shift in time unaware
that others want it to—it mufﬂes congestion signals that would otherwise allow better re-allocation
of the resource pool. Providing signals of incipient congestion without actually introducing any
impairment is more useful.
• RED: Three aspects have been found suspect, the last two of which open up major DoS vulnera-
bilities:
– Uniformlydistributingspacingofmarksintheaggregatejustwasteslotsofvaluableinterface
cycles, because they becomes geometrically distributed again within each ﬂow;
– Packets should be marked independent of their size;
– The goal of 100% drop above a threshold queue size leads to forwarding absolutely nothing
and gives unresponsive ﬂows a huge advantage;
Modelling:The components of the re-ECN system have generally been designed for provability—to
meet principled objectives. The objectives are sufﬁciently non-arbitrary that the results of initial experi-
ment so far have validated the models fairly closely.
A model of the distribution of congestion events within a window has been created. An initial
experimental proof of its validity implies it could be very accurate.
Algorithms:Compact algorithms for metering and manipulating unary encodings have been developed.
One in particular to meter precise downstream congestion is rather pleasing. It outputs the unary encoded
product of a unary encoded sum and difference (which itself contains a quotient), using only adds,
compares and shifts on a small minority of packets (maximum 14 cycles on a Positively marked packet).
Generalisation & Prospects: This dissertation has focused on policing downstream congestion-volume
as a way to encourage congestion responsive transports without restricting their freedom. If we really
have solved this problem, we have also provided a basis for at least two other ‘applications’:
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• an extremely simple quality of service mechanism that naturally ‘just works’ as it is extended
to multiple domains, with surrounding mechanisms for security, monitoring, pricing, mobility,
multihoming etc. thrown in for free.
This dissertation has discussed the prospects for mitigating ﬂooding a little, but it has not particu-
larly explored the applicability of the work to QoS. However, it is certainly not to be dismissed.
Simplicity?Reﬂecting back on this research endeavour, an appropriate question to raise is “Has the
initial simplicity of the idea been lost as defences have been added against each new attack?” The sheer
length of the dissertation in order to accommodate the discussion of each attack makes the outcome feel
complicated. But, on reﬂection most of the space is used to prove or show that the basic mechanisms are
robust enough against each attack—very little has been added to counter each attack:
• Theneedtocheckindividualﬂowsfornegativity, althoughalwaysrecognisedasnecessaryinsome
form, is the least satisfactory aspect of the whole scheme. Compared to Kelly’s simple charging
of ECN marked bytes to the receiver, this clearly adds unwelcome complexity. But, in return,
operators can fully align incentives without all having to conform to a single dynamic pricing
plan—that few, if any, customers would accept. And applications do not have to ask permission
of the network to behave in novel, unexpected ways. The core of the hypothesis is that it is worth
striking this Faustian bargain;
• The addition of ﬂow state on middleboxes brought with it the need to manage potential memory
congestion. But it was recognised that the facility to manage end-point ﬂow state congestion was a
missing piece of the Internet architecture anyway. So memory congestion control has been added
for both middles and ends, with hardly any more complexity than would have been necessary to
add it to end-points alone.
• Sampling ﬂows at borders to introduce an inﬂation factor for negative ﬂows is probably the most
complicated (and still unproven) addition;
• The introduction of Cancelled packets created extra potential attack possibilities that all had to be
checked through. But, overall, this act probably removed much more complexity than it added;
• The algorithm to meter precise downstream congestion rather than using the simple difference
between volumes of Positive and Negative packets certainly adds complexity, but the resulting
algorithm can hardly be called overly complicated;
A summary of the computational complexity of each part of the re-ECN framework is provided in
the concluding section (§12.3.2) of Part III.
Perhaps accusations of complexity can be rebutted, but the word ‘brittle’ seems to justiﬁably apply
to the end result. The incentives seem to balance on a knife-edge, and the mechanisms seem to only just
work. But this is unsurprising. The aim was to balance maximum freedom against minimum account-
ability, all with minimum complexity. The chosen method was to design at the knife’s edge—to probe13.4. Concluding Remarks 231
the limits—not to recommend that production networks operate at these limits. In practice, implementers
should have cycles spare to beef up the incentive mechanisms or add their own special features.
Final Words.In the long term, all that can be hoped is that the main contribution will be seen as having
identiﬁed the problem. Even if there’s a better way to solve the problem than re-feedback, then it will
have been worth it. But, on reﬂection, it is quite incredible what can be achieved by judicious use of one
extra bit in packet headers—and how much can be written about it.
This dissertation set itself ambitious goals. More was bitten off than chewed, but enough was
chewed to make it very long and very late. So I shall stop.Appendix A
Design Alternatives
A.1 Mid-Flow Dropper Algorithm
It is possible for the egress dropper to bound the amount of ﬂow state it uses by monitoring the packet
stream for packets marked Negative and randomly picking one every so often. It can then create ﬂow
state for the ﬂow from which the packet was selected, with a higher chance of picking ﬂows causing a
highervolumeofcongestion. ItwouldthenruntheroutinelistedbelowthatwecallnewRecentBal().
It is similar to newBal() used in §7.6.1, but it doesn’t maintain or check the lifetime balance.
Instead of remembering the credit a ﬂow might have given when it started, newRecentBal()
makes an arbitrarily conservative allowance for round trip delay to allow Positive marks to catch up with
the Negative ones they should balance. It doesn’t act on incoming Negative marks, but instead stores
them for a short ﬁxed period—long enough to allow for all reasonable round trip times, e.g. 1 sec. After
the ﬁxed period, the dropper inputs the delayed mark as if it were applied to the next incoming packet.
The pseudocode for newRecentBal() is given below. The constant rttAllce determines how
long to buffer Negative marks (it may be possible to implement a ﬁxed delay buffer more efﬁciently with
hardware support).
The ﬂow state of each sampled ﬂow no longer stores the lifetime balance of the ﬂow V or the
maximum packet size smax, but instead it holds pending Negative marks in the buffer structure
negvBuffer. The functions enQueue() and deQueue() add data to and remove data from op-
posite ends of the buffer. The function readQueue() reads the oldest data from the buffer without
dequeuing it.
/* Maintain flow congestion balances
in the fState flow state structure.
The parameter s is the packet size.
*/
newRecentBal(s, fState) {
eecn = readEECN(packet)
/* Buffer NEGV & CANC marks
and wipe as if not marked */
if (eecn == NEGV || CANC) {
if (eecn == NEGV) {
eecn = NEUT
} else {
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}
/* Store time-stamp in delay
buffer */
enQueue(timeNow(), negvBuffer)
}
/* If a buffered mark older than
rttAllce, treat as if marked*/
if (readQueue(negvBuffer)
>= timeNow() - rttAllce) {
deQueue(negvBuffer)
switch(eecn) {
case POSV:
eecn = CANC
case CAUT || NEUT || CU:
eecn = NEGV
/* Otherwise no action */
}
}
if (eecn == POSV || CAUT) {
z += a*s
} elseif (eecn == CANC) {
z -= a*z
u -= a*u
} else {
/* NEGV, NEUT or CU */
fState = probDrop(packet,fState)
if (eecn == NEGV) {
z -= a*z
u += a*s
u -= a*u
}
}
return(fState)
}
The following pseudocode would be used to maintain recent state of sampled ﬂows with the help of
newRecentBal().
/* maintainSampleFlowState()
Maintain flow state in fState structure
*/
foreach packet {
s = readLength(packet)
eecn = read EECN(packet)
flowID = readFlowID(packet)
fState = matchFlowID(flowID)
if (fState != NULL) {
/* Existing flow */
fState = newRecentBal(s,fState)
if (z >= u) {
/* Compliant status flow */
lastGoodTime = timeNow()
} /* else Remand status
so lastGoodTime unchanged*/
} elseif (eecn == CAUT || POSV) {
/* New Compliant flow */
allocate(fState)
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u = 0
z = 0
r = -1
fState = newRecentBal(s,fState)
lastGoodTime = timeNow()
} elseif (eecn == Not-ECT || ECT(0)
|| CANC) {
/* LEGACY: forward unimpeded */
} else {
/* New or old misbehaving flow
set status to BULK */
fState = BULK
/* update balances of BULK
and probabilistically drop */
fState = newRecentBal(s,fState)
}
}
A.2 Precise Downstream Congestion Meter Algorithm
The algorithm presented below seems na¨ ıve relative to that in §8.2.7 that was developed later. However,
the algorithm below has been fully implemented and more thoroughly tested.
We developed this original algorithm to implement the accumulation of congestion-volume based
on Eqn (8.6) on p162 avoiding using any multiplication or division operations. Both parts of the max
function are implemented simultaneously, so that they both accumulate downstream congestion-volume
in real time each using one of the alternative parts of the formula. Then the maximum of the two results
can be used. This discourages the upstream network from cheating, because its dominant strategy will
be to try to keep z/c = u/y, which should be the case for random congestion marking.
Given the algorithms approximate the true inﬂation factors by sampling, taking the maximum of
two approximations could introduce a persistent positive bias that would disadvantage even an honest
network. We tested the algorithm measuring downstream congestion with stationary but random conges-
tion at 1% and 97% neutral packets and no malicious packet marking. We found that, over 40 samples
of 100M packets, the error of either algorithm had a mean and standard deviation of about 0.005% and
0.02% respectively. Therefore, for an honest user, taking the maximum of the two will not disadvantage
an honest user. However, the experimental conditions were fairly ideal with no variation in congestion.
A more rigorous experiment would have to be conducted to be certain that taking the maximum of two
alternate formulae would not disadvantage honest networks.
Below we give a pseudo-code algorithm for just Eqn (6.4). C source is also available. The algorithm
for the other formula is nearly identical. It works by accumulating zi − ui as normal, but also adding
an additional sample of zi − ui taken over c bytes out of every z. Remainders after rounding are always
preserved by using them as initial values for the next round.
int V=0; /* uninflated downstr
congestion-volume*/
int Vc=0; /* inflation increment for
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int zc=0, uc=0, rc=0; /* increments of
z, u & c */
#define SI MAX_MTU /* sample increment*/
int sic=SI; /* sample increment index*/
int zs=SI; /* last sampled zc*/
for every packet {
s = readLength(packet);
if readEECN(packet) == POSV {
zc += s;
V += s;
} elseif readEECN(packet) == NEGV {
uc += s;
V -= s;
} elseif readEECN(packet) == CANC {
rc += s;
if (rc > zs) {
zc = 0;
uc = 0;
rc -= zs;
sic += SI;
once = 1;
}
if (sic > 0) {
sic -= s;
} elseif (once == 1) {
zs = zc;
Vc += zc - uc;
once = 0;
}
}
}
Whenever a positive or negative packet arrives, its size is added or subtracted from the running total
of downstream congestion-volume, V. But another running total is maintained of the amount of inﬂation
Vc required on top of this downstream congestion-volume.
Two incremental variables zc & uc are also maintained to hold how much positive and how much
negative volume has arrived since they were last zeroed. We will start the explanation from when they
are both zeroed (they are always zeroed together). While they are gradually incrementing as positive and
negative packets arrive, the algorithm keeps track of how many bytes of Cancelled packets are arriving in
a third incremental variable rc. As soon as more than an arbitrarily set amount MAX MTU of Cancelled
bytes has arrived, the difference between the two incremental variables for positive and negative bytes
can be added to the amount of inﬂation required.
A snapshot of the incremental positive variable zc is also stored in zs, which will determine how
longthealgorithmignorespositiveandnegativearrivalsbeforeitzeroesthemagainandthecyclerepeats.
The two incremental variables go on accumulating positive and negative volume, but once the snap
shot has been taken, their values are no longer used. The incremental variable for Cancelled volume also
continues to increase and when it ﬁnally exceeds the snapshot value taken of positive congestion zs, the
incremental variables are zeroed and the sampling period starts again.
This mechanism ensures that the whole cycle repeats every zs bytes of Cancelled packets, whereA.2. Precise Downstream Congestion Meter Algorithm 236
zs was the incremental volume of positive bytes at the snapshot. Then it doesn’t actually matter how
many bytes there are before the snapshot, it just has to be some known number of bytes that is bigger than
any single packet (the value MAX MTU). At this snapshot, z/c more positive packets will have arrived
than Cancelled. So zs = z/c * MAX MTU. Then, by waiting until zs Cancelled bytes have arrived,
we will have waited for z/c times more Cancelled bytes than there were up to the snapshot. So the
difference between the two incremental variables for positive and negative bytes taken at the snapshot
will have been c/z of the difference over the whole cycle. Accumulating these snapshot differences gives
the required amount of inﬂation of downstream congestion-volume, (z − u)c/z.
Note that Cancelled bytes are accumulated then tested against thresholds (MAX MTU or zs), but
they are never zeroed which would lead to a bias in one direction due to rounding errors. We have
been careful to always subtract the threshold from the count of Cancelled bytes, so that the remainder is
carried forward into the next round.Appendix B
Rejected Design Alternatives
B.1 Rejected: Three Primary Marking States
We introduced the Cancelled codepoint to remove a vulnerability of the previous re-ECN wire protocol
encoding, which had just three states, Positive, Neutral and Negative.1
The currently standardised ECN ﬁeld [RFB01] provides the redundancy of two states to mean ‘not
congestion marked but able to understand marking’ (termed ECN-capable transport or ECT and the two
states are called ECT(0) and ECT(1)). They were intended to allow a nonce [SWE03] to be woven into
a stream of packets by the source, so it could detect if the receiver or any network element had tried
to ‘unmark’ a congestion mark. A congestion mark set the ECN ﬁeld to a third codepoint (congestion
experienced or CE). So if anyone tries to unmark a packet, they have to guess which of the two ECT
states the sender originally set. And the sender can detect when they guess wrongly.
The original re-ECN wire protocol [BJCG+05] used the codepoint of the ECN ﬁeld that was re-
served for the ECN nonce [SWE03].2 ECT(1) was used for a Neutral marking and ECT(0) for Positive.
And CE meant Negative. The unused bit in the IPv4 header was used to indicate something akin to what
is now the ‘Cautious’ marking. As it is still, the charge for downstream congestion was measured by
subtracting Negative from Positive bytes, whether actually translated into money, or subtracted from a
user’s ‘congestion quota’.
This all seemed nice and simple, but problems piled on problems because both Neutral and Positive
packets changed to Negative when congestion marked. Firstly, no-one could tell whether a Negative
packet had previously been Positive, so a source had to introduce a relatively complicated inﬂation of
the amount of Positive it sent to allow for some being marked. Secondly, networks could bias their
Negative congestion marking against Positive packets in order to reduce the charge they had to pay for
downstream congestion. As they gained two points of worth for marking a Positive packet against one
for a Neutral packet, they had a strong incentive to do this. Although this led to a negative balance at the
egress dropper, it was not possible to attribute the blame to any one network. Then, the source couldn’t
be sure how much inﬂation it should add, and the problems descended in a vicious spiral.
It became clear that we had to introduce the Cancelled state, making the re-ECN wire protocol as
1Setting aside the complication of the changes we made to the Cautious state at the same time.
2Re-ECN provides a superset of the capabilities of the ECN nonce, so we claimed the nonce is no longer necessary.B.2. Rejected: Using Positive Not Cautious 238
described in this dissertation. With the introduction of the Cancelled state, a Positive packet can now
be congestion marked to remove one unit of worth, which is gained by the network doing the marking.
But it does not lose two units of worth as in the previous scheme, and it is still possible to infer that a
Cancelled packet probably started as a Positive packet. These changes have three useful effects:
• there is no longer an incentive for a network to bias its marking against Positive packets
• end-points can detect if a network changes packet markings in contravention of the protocol (see
§12.1.4)
• there is no longer a need for the sender to do any complicated marking inﬂation
B.2 Rejected: Using Positive Not Cautious
The role of Cautious packets seems only marginally different from Positive packets. This raises the
question of whether the functions of the two could be overloaded into one codepoint—the codepoint
currently used by Positive—leaving the Cautious codepoint spare for future use. The primary reason for
keeping the Cautious codepoint is a rather irritating and possibly minor backward compatibility issue.
As we have pointed out, the primary reason for introducing re-ECN into the internetwork layer is to
provide principled control of sharing and congestion of the resource pool. When ECN was ﬁrst deﬁned,
of course, there was no control of excessive use of resources. The solution for controlling unwanted
trafﬁc was thought to lie in anomalous ﬂow detection, either those using excessive network resources,
or those being rejected by hosts that didn’t want them, perhaps using push-back messages, capabilities
or other ideas at the time. This left the thorny problem of the initial packets of ﬂows—they had to be
assumed valid.
Those who standardised ECN knew that hosts sending unwanted trafﬁc could claim that they would
respond to ECN markings to gain an advantage over other legacy trafﬁc that didn’t. They also knew that
the sender of the initial packet of a ﬂow couldn’t claim for certain that the receiver would understand
or respond to ECN markings, because it hadn’t yet established communication with it to ﬁnd out its
capabilities. Therefore they mandated that the initial packet of a ﬂow MUST NOT be marked ECN-
capable.3
The thinking was that servers and stateful ﬁrewalls could then immediately discard TCP SYN pack-
ets that claimed to be ECN capable, thus thwarting any advantage there was in using ECN-capability in
a SYN attack.
With re-ECN, we have added control of resource sharing at the packet level. So we don’t need
any special measures to prevent initial packets gaining advantage from congestion marking. And we
have devised another way to handle a re-ECN source being able to claim ECN-capability on the ﬁrst
3The letter of the speciﬁcation solely stipulates this for TCP transports, saying “A host MUST NOT set ECT on SYN
...packets”. But the spirit of the speciﬁcation seemed to intend a similar sentiment to apply to all transports. However, the
DCCP transport, which became a proposed standard in 2006 (5 years after ECN) assumes support for ECN but says next to
nothing about it, let alone whether the initial packet should claim ECN support.B.2. Rejected: Using Positive Not Cautious 239
packet—before it knows whether the receiver will understand a congestion mark from the network.4
However, if a re-ECN sender uses anything but Not-ECT (00) in the ECN ﬁeld of the ﬁrst packet of
its ﬂow, it is bound to hit problems with ﬁrewalls and servers who have followed the ECN speciﬁcation
and built in rules to discard TCP SYNs with ECN-capability.
We contrived the re-ECN protocol so that the Cautious codepoint made the packet look not ECN-
capable (Not-ECT) to equipment that only checked the ECN ﬁeld. However, Cautious is distinguished
from Not-ECT by setting the RE ﬂag. Therefore, as forwarding equipment is upgraded to understand
re-ECN it can mark the ECN ﬁeld in Cautious packets rather than drop them.
If Positive packets had served both the Positive and the Cautious functions, the protocol would have
become trapped in a Catch-22. A source would not be able to send a Positive packet to start a ﬂow
on some paths, if a ﬁrewall or the server itself discarded ECN-capable SYNs. But if the source sent a
non-Positive SYN, a re-ECN dropper would not necessarily set up ﬂow state without any credit.
With the addition of the Cautious codepoint, a source can set-up ﬂow-state with a packet that looks
as if it isn’t ECN-capable to legacy equipment and servers (even though it actually is) and it can have
positive worth.
There is a strong possibility that some ﬁrewalls or servers will discard Cautious packets as a pre-
caution too (because the RE ﬂag has not traditionally been set). However, re-ECN won’t work at all
through such ﬁrewalls anyway, because it relies on using the RE ﬂag. We can only hope and beg that
ﬁrewalls and servers are upgraded to allow re-ECN capable packets. But we cannot ask that the rule to
discard ECN-capable SYNs is removed from ﬁrewalls because, even if re-ECN is deployed, that ﬁrewall
rule will have to stay as the only protection against DoS attacks using legacy ECN packets.
It might seem that packets with the codepoint used for Cautious could serve both Positive and
Cautious functions instead. But then, every time a re-ECN ﬂow needed to re-echo a positive marking,
it would have to send a Cautious packet, which appears not to be ECN-capable to legacy forwarding
equipment—a situation that would persist for many years, and probably decades. This would leave
positive packets with a much greater chance of drop than other packets, making the resulting alternative
re-ECN protocol highly ﬂaky.
There are other reasons for introducing Cautious not just Positive markings:
• The most principled, but least concrete, argument is that a separate marking for Cautious from
Positive allows the economic values of the two markings to diverge in the future given their differ-
ent semantics. For instance, policers might rate-limit Cautious packets more strictly than Positive
packets to throttle the opening of new ﬂows.
• Markings in response to actual congestion (Positive) can be separated from markings that don’t
indicate actual congestion (Cautious) when monitoring packet aggregates within the network, per-
haps for trafﬁc engineering or SLA monitoring.
4If the receiver’s initial response shows it doesn’t speak re-ECN, the sender is advised to proceed cautiously as if the receiver
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Finally, we should point out that we RECOMMEND that servers and middleboxes allow ﬂow state
to be set up by a request in either a Positive packet or a Cautious packet, but it is only MANDATORY
to set up ﬂow state when requested in a Cautious packet. Therefore hosts would be advised to use a
Cautious marking to be sure.
One advantage the Positive marking does have is during a DoS attack. A highly congested for-
warding element could be re-marking all Cautious packets to Negative and all Positive to Cancelled. A
re-ECN dropper further along the path that was stressed by the same DoS attack would probably drop
all the Negative packets, but it would forward the Cancelled packets unscathed. However, even a highly
congested forwarding element shouldn’t be congestion marking 100% of Cautious and Positive packets
(see §9).
Note that congestion marking a Positive packet to Cancelled MUST NOT be taken to mean ‘Flow
state not stored’. This would add too much ambiguity to the protocol.
It is compliant with the ECN speciﬁcation [RFB01] for a host to send the codepoint ECT(1)
(termed Positive in the re-ECN protocol) in order to weave a nonce into the ECN ﬁelds of a stream of
packets [SWE03]. If these arrived at the re-ECN dropper, it would not necessarily have to set up ﬂow
state, even if they hadn’t been preceded by a Cautious packet with the same ﬂow ID. But if a ﬂow were
re-routed into a re-ECN dropper from another path, it would be good if the ﬁrst Positive packet in the
stream did set up ﬂow state, even if the initial Cautious packet had previously passed through a different
dropper.Appendix C
RED under Extreme Load
The drop probability of RED [FJ93] (and AQM’s derived from it such as WRED [Sys02] or RIO [CF98])
is deﬁned to rise to 100% in its congestion control phase. Therefore unresponsive trafﬁc would make the
link forward precisely nothing.
The core of the RED algorithm is meant to have three phases dependent on the size of the averaged
queue:
• Normal [0,minth)
• Congestion avoidance [minth,maxth)
• Congestion Control [maxth,∞)
The problem concerns the drop (not marking) behaviour of RED in its congestion control phase.1 When
the load L on a link is above the link capacity C, the average drop fraction in order to shed sufﬁcient load
only needs to be pn = 1 − C/L. Fig C.1 shows pn for a range of overloaded utilisation u = L/C from
100–1000%. As soon as u ≥ 100%, the average queue maintained by RED will rapidly rise past maxth.
RED is intended to drop 100% in its congestion control phase, when the average queue, ¯ q ≥ maxth (or
¯ q ≥ 2maxth for gentle RED). Thus, with sufﬁcient unresponsive trafﬁc to ﬁll the link, we assume RED
will allow nothing through at all, as the conjectured plot of pR in Fig C.1 shows.
RED will be likely to strongly favour unresponsive trafﬁc over responsive as it approaches conges-
tion control phase. If utilisation were hovering around 100%, causing drop to hover around 100% also,
any responsive trafﬁc would slow itself to a trickle. Therefore if, say, the average drop probability were
95%, the remaining 5% of capacity would virtually all be taken by unresponsive trafﬁc. Whereas, if the
queue were just naturally shedding load with no AQM, the drop probability could be relatively low (at
least low relative to 95%) with such a load. For instance, even at 110% utilisation, natural drop would
be 9%. Without RED if the arriving load were half responsive and half unresponsive half and half would
get through.
1By ‘RED’ we mean how researchers describe it. It is possible that some implementers of RED have noticed this problem and
invented ad hoc work-rounds. For instance, the ALTQ code for BSD Unix switches to tail drop when aveq > maxth. An older
random drop behaviour can still be conﬁgured instead. The research community still routinely models RED with 100% drop in
congestion control, e.g. ns-2 [ns2] has no other behaviour.242
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Figure C.1: Drop at an Overloaded Queue.
Utilisation u = C/L > 100%. pn: drop needed to shed sufﬁcient arriving load; pR: conjectured RED
drop in its congestion control phase.
Note that ‘unresponsive trafﬁc’ doesn’t have to imply a DDoS attack. It could just be a ﬂash crowd
of inelastic trafﬁc on a link. We will need to redesign an AQM that is robust against unexpected trafﬁc
loads, rather than forwarding nothing at all.
It could make sense for RED to increase ECN marking to 100% in the congestion control phase. But
it doesn’t seem to makes sense to increase drop to 100%. In fact, the problem seems to be that the drop
behaviour mimics the marking behaviour when it shouldn’t. The ECN speciﬁcation, RFC3168 [RFB01]
says that when RED moves into congestion control phase, marking should be turned off and it should
only do drop. This is clearly intended to prevent unresponsive trafﬁc gaining by abusing the ECN ca-
pability. However, it would only be a sensible strategy if drop mode itself didn’t so strongly favour
unresponsive trafﬁc.Bibliography
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